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COLONIAL POLICY

By

A. D. A. DE KAT ANGELINO


Abridged translation from the Dutch

By G. J. RENIER, Ph. D.

in collaboration with the author

VOLUME I

GENERAL PRINCIPLES



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INTRODUCTION

The Colonial Task

The growing interest in the welfare and in the development of the population of colonies, protectorates and mandates is one of the favourable signs of the times. A large part of these populations, in so far as they are not yet in possession of a complete social-economic and political structure that can weather the forces of the modern period, is still more or less in need of the leadership of other nations. There is all the more reason for rejoicing at this interest because in many spheres colonial policy, moving in the same direction as the pan-humanistic currents of the present day, has reached a stage of development which demands the general and constant co-operation and devoted study of all nations. Since the day when the mother-countries began to feel that their leadership meant nothing less than the calling forth of powers that were alive or slumbering within their overseas subjects, since the day when they realised that it was their task to assist their subjects towards taking, eventually, a worthy place in the governance of the world, supporting themselves, if possible, by their own strength, complicated problems, pregnant with meaning and vast in their size, have presented themselves with growing urgency.

Teachers and parents who have tried to study the problems of education must often have experienced a sense of oppression when they considered the difficulties and the responsibilities entailed by the bringing up of a growing generation. How much larger must the sense of responsibility be when what is in question is not the development of individuals, but of whole populations belonging to other races, differing from the guiding nation in religion, character, organisation, aspirations, needs, manners, and customs! Left face to face with the unknown, the educator must needs begin by turning pupil himself, in order to penetrate most thoroughly into the nature of his task. His sense of responsibility can but in-

crease at the thought that here there is not the natural relationship of parent and child, and that his task is self-imposed and the result of a one-sided and deliberate decision.

In the forefront of his equipment, he must possess the gift of discerning in the cultural patrimony of others that which is good and fit for use. He must be able to communicate the benefits of his own culture, while knowing what to prune and eliminate, so that it may form a living and harmonious whole with the autochthonous civilisation and the natural tendencies of the native psyche. Well may the French colonial statesman, Jules Harmand, say that such a task requires, more than any other, rare qualities of judgement, of critical sense, of erudition, and of philosophical penetration of the Eastern soul ¹).

We therefore find ourselves without further preliminary confronted with the question whether the mother-countries, in those parts of the colonial world where the need of guidance still exists, are fit to perform so exacting a task. In former centuries only a few far-seeing men were able to visualise the nature of a colonial policy which in their days went far beyond the capacities of colonial Powers and which at present is only in its first stage of execution. It is not by pure chance that the solution of these gigantic educational problems has only begun to be attempted in the twentieth century. Before this point could be reached, a long evolution of the colonial conception was required. Our strength had to grow, our knowledge and our experience to gather volume, and the endeavours of many generations that preceded us had first to level the ground and to clear the vista. The task which is calling to-day was not put before us suddenly, for its magnitude and content grew apace with our power and our will. Its immensity derives not from accident, nor from outside compulsion but from the inner certainty that it is worthy of our strength and enthusiasm — and if it be a burden, it is not one that outreaches our capacity.

We have proceeded a long way already on the road of this evolution. Forces innumerable move in the same direction, and there is no going back from the ground that has been mapped out for the endeavour of nations by the best of their sons. Everywhere the function of colonial Powers has become primarily educative or

¹) Jules Harmand, *Domination et Colonisation* (ed. 1919, p. 167).

co-operative, or is in process of becoming so. Joseph Chailley, one of the most eminent colonial writers of France, recently said as much when he declared that, as long as there is any need of colonial activity, "such activity rests and must rest upon what is called indigenous policy, which is the art of knowing and guiding the indigenous population" ¹).

The influence of international thought

After the great war this conviction became embodied in the mandatory system under the auspices of the League of Nations. Art. 22 of the Covenant entrusts the care for the well-being of the Indigenous populations of the mandated territories, which are not yet able to stand by themselves, to certain mandatory Powers, as a sacred trust of civilisation. But the quintessence of this idea had already been incorporated years ago in the policy of various Powers. Their colonial system had been directed of their own accord in the sense which has since received international sanction from the mandatory system, while the latter, in turn, inspires by its ideal of international co-operation the growth of liberal and humanitarian ideals in the colonial sphere, far beyond even the mandated territories.

To aid and assist the weaker peoples towards development is becoming every day a more marked characteristic of colonial policy, and it is now a powerful adjutant of the universal urge towards international co-operation. While the old colonial policy of economic exploitation aimed at isolation and monopoly, modern policy is ever more inclined towards international action and the interchange of ideas, precisely for the sake of the welfare of its overseas subjects. The whole colonial world, influenced by increasing trade and by international humanitarian thought, has slid into the sphere of world politics.

Never before have the nations been so lucidly aware of the necessity of comparing notes about their colonial experience, because they have never realised as clearly as they do to-day that problems almost identical in nature confront all of them in the colonial world. Even outside the League of Nations many forms of material and intellectual co-operation have grown, and they can

¹) In the preface to Professor J. C. van Eerde, *Ethnologie Coloniale*, p. IX. See also Harmand, *op. cit.* p. 152.

only serve the good purpose of helping to defeat the difficulties met by every colonising nation.

The French ex-minister of Colonies, M. Albert Sarraut, Lord Olivier in England, Mr. van Rees, the vice-president of the Permanent Mandates Commission, have all pointed to the influence which is exercised by such exchanges. More and more nations will consider it a question of honour that their policy should answer the requirements of lofty international principle, while, on the other hand, every result achieved by each colonial Power will be bound to acquire greater international significance.

The case of Holland

These considerations will show how regrettable it is that Dutch works on colonial policy are, by the lack of knowledge of the language in which they are written, apt to be overlooked in other countries. For, owing to their area, to the size of their populations and to the number of centuries during which experience has been gathered there, and owing to the economic possibilities which they offer, the Dutch East Indies are bound to draw upon themselves a considerable amount of international interest.

In the passage from which we have already quoted, M. Joseph Chailley remarked: "In my lectures (on Comparative Colonisation) which I have been giving for so many years at the *Ecole des Sciences Politiques*, I often said to my students: if you wish to acquire an incomparable knowledge and a wide reputation, learn to read Dutch, and peruse the works on Colonial affairs which have been written in this language, either in order to translate them, or to re-write them for the use of our compatriots. You will render an immense service to our country and present it with a magnificent instrument for its own work"¹).

At present only a small part of the gap has been filled, notwithstanding the devoted efforts of a number of Dutchmen who are doing their best to spread abroad information concerning the colonial work of their country by lectures and translations, supporting the activities of the International Colonial Institute and by participating in International Colonial Congresses. The Dutch Ministry of Colonies has therefore deemed it appropriate to

¹) *op. cit.* p. VII.

arrange for the publication of a work dealing with the Colonial Policy of the Netherlands and with the view taken in Holland about these matters. By making this work accessible to foreign readers it is hoped that its usefulness may extend far beyond the circle of readers in Holland and among the East Indian *élite* and that it may be a contribution towards the furthering of international colonial co-operation.

Colonial evolution and the unity of the West

No single Colonial Power could give a complete review of its colonial history without paying tribute to the eminent thinkers of many countries, whose humanitarian and humane ideals have exercised an influence reaching far beyond the frontiers of their own land and embracing the whole colonial world. Quite early, we begin to discern the thread of international connection which links the nations' past with their future, and if we follow this thread, we shall see how colonial policy was gradually evolved into the ethical function which is its latter-day aspiration.

If we question the past, we shall discover how sympathy towards weaker races, broadening out from a few individuals to a small *élite*, and from an *élite* to a wider circle, has been the fundamental cause of the progress made in colonial relations. We shall ascertain further that this progress is closely connected with the onward march of the whole of Western Society. This glance backward will at the same time give us the certainty that co-operation between all countries which have to fulfil a colonial mission, but remaining truly national, however, inside each one of them, will bear still richer fruit and will most certainly be able to meet the still heavier demands of the future.

FIRST CONTACTS

Two centuries ago only the solitary voices of a few humanitarians could be heard, protesting against slavery and the exploitation of the weaker races. At present a mighty chorus of similar voices re-echoes in wide circles, and the time approaches when it will have called forth an enthusiastic popular conviction. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, interest in the development of overseas populations was almost restricted to missionary circles. Our own time, more tolerant and enlightened, may not approve of

every aspect of their activities, but on the whole, the Western world is deeply in their debt. In the days when the first contacts were reached between the West and the non-Western societies of the New World, of Africa and of the East, the West only too often gave free rein to its less lofty inclinations; the less noble of its elements were only too frequently those that played the most important part, while the missionaries raised high the torch of Christianity by preaching, education, and charitable service. By introducing a spiritual and ethical element into the expansion of the West, they provided it with a brighter side and a certain amount of moral vindication.

Western society was better than its vanguard overseas, and the small powers of resistance of the Eastern communities increased the temptation to exploit them, and generally to give way to baser instincts. Coen, twice Governor General of the Dutch East Indies, 1619—1623 and 1627—1629, and the real founder of the Dutch Empire in the East, complained to his principals in Holland that the bad elements which were coming over were bound to create a most unfavourable impression of the whole Dutch nation among the Indigenous population. His successors have often complained of the existence of the same evil, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century we still meet with their requests for greater care in the selection and the training of the Dutch personnel and for severe measures of repression against unworthy officials.

The experience of other countries, both among the servants of Colonial Companies and, with the exception of organised Western plantations like those in America and in Canada, among private settlers, was equally unfavourable. In 1837 Sir George Cornwall Lewis, the eminent author of *Government of Dependencies*, complained in a private letter that the scum of England was "poured into the Colonies"¹). French and other colonial statesmen deplored the existence of the same evil.

One of the first and most significant improvements brought about by the sense of responsibility which has been so markedly on the increase since the beginning of the nineteenth century was the higher standard of colonial officials. In the Dutch East Indies, Governor General Van der Capellen gave this matter his special attention, and it has exercised the minds of the authorities ever

¹) P. Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, 1927, pp. 19, 20.

since 1825. A steady improvement is noticeable from that time, and especially since, in 1843, education for the East Indian Civil Service began to be one of the concerns of the Dutch Government.

It is by similar measures that the various countries have succeeded in creating in their colonies a really select body, eminent by its ability, by its integrity and not least by its devotion to the interest of the population. Equally valuable was the process of selection by which private concerns provided Africa and the East with a large contingent of educated and high-minded men and women, whose co-operation has since become indispensable to any government in the performance of its Western mission.

Certainly, it would be unfair to past generations not to admit the difficulty they have experienced in carefully selecting their colonial pioneers at a time when there could be little attraction in the career of a colonist or a colonial official. Furthermore, we must not fail to recognise the many splendid instances of courage, faith and endurance which marked the beginnings of colonial enterprise. Moreover, Western Society itself did not follow very exacting standards. The true principles of Christianity were by no means generally applied in the course of everyday life. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tolerated situations which our own time, still so removed from perfection, would consider unbearable. Many of the evils of the old colonisation were, therefore, not so much inherent in the system itself as resulting from conceptions that were generally current, even in Western society.

In the eighteenth century truly medieval conditions still prevailed in the larger part of the whole European countryside. Serfdom disappeared only in the nineteenth century. The situation of the French peasant, as described by De Tocqueville in *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, appeared to a retired Dutch colonial official, Jhr. van der Wijck, to justify the declaration that the lot of the European peasant, half a century before his time (1865), was harder than that of the Javanese under the cultivation system ¹⁾. In 1788, the German peasant was still tied to the land, and lived under a paternal supervision which constantly interfered with his private life. And far into the nineteenth century the workers of the rising industries and the miners were scarcely in a happier position.

¹⁾ Jhr. van der Wijck, *Onze Koloniale Staatskunde*, 1865, pp. 8—10.

Our ancestors had at their disposal hardly more than a fraction of the means which we can apply to the improvement of our relations with the Orient. Progressive Holland only seriously began to re-organise its secondary education in the middle of the nineteenth century, and elementary education was dealt with later still. We must, therefore, not be one-sided in our judgement of our predecessors. We must remember that it is to Western authority, however limited its capacities in the past, that the autochthonous population in different parts of the world owes the beginning of a fuller consciousness which could never have been born under a primitive popular authority or under despotic princes.

It is only in the course of the eighteenth century that the interest taken by missionary circles in the welfare of the Indigenous population spread to a small *élite* of humane thinkers and social reformers, such as the great leaders of the Evangelical Revival in England, Wesley, Whitefield and Wilberforce. They were compelled to concentrate their activities upon the fight against slavery and the grosser forms of exploitation which were also being attacked by the Society of Friends. Burke's speeches on Indian affairs proved that liberals and conservatives alike held these humanitarian sentiments. "All political power which is set over men," declared Burke, "ought to be in some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit ¹⁾." When, after 1800, the ideas of the French Revolution were rapidly spreading abroad, liberal England turned to the truths proclaimed by this great thinker in order to be able to answer the insistent call from her overseas territories for a more enlightened system of administration.

With even greater forcefulness and determination the voice of the great humanitarian schools of the eighteenth century had been raised in every country, not only against slavery, but against every manner of racial oppression. They all shared a belief in the brotherhood of man, and the idea that the Western sense of superiority disregarded the virtues of other cultures and the moral qualities of other races had manifested itself early in the century. In *L'Esprit des Lois*, Montesquieu condemned the Company system, and in the *Lettres Persanes*, he chose an Oriental as the inter-

¹⁾ Burke, Speech on Fox's East India Bill. Cf. also his *Speech on the Nabob of Arcot's Debts*, quoted by J. H. Oldham, *Christianity and the Race Problem*, p. 99, and S. H. Swinny, "The Humanitarianism of the Eighteenth Century and its Results", in Marvin's *Western Races and the World*, VI, pp. 121—145.

preter of his acute criticism of Western society. During the same period, the radical reformer Defoe personified in Man Friday the ideal of morality which at that time only a few Western thinkers saw in the savage. Similar conceptions became wide-spread in the second half of the eighteenth century under the influence of the French philosophers Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau. It became the fashion to criticise the civilisation and the religion of the West and to extol the culture of the East. It was then that the notion of an unperverted communistic state of nature also acquired general currency, and that people believed in the "free, happy and noble savage". If these doctrines played a part in shaking the social fabric of Europe, they also were the starting point of the colonial reform movement of the nineteenth century.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Especial significance attaches, in this connection, to the work of the Abbé Raynal, which appeared at Amsterdam in 1771. It was entitled *Histoire philosophique et politique des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes*, and exercised an immense influence upon a public opinion which had long become critical of colonial evils. It lost nothing of its appeal by being burned, as were so many other books, by the executioner, and, as Morley remarks, it "brought the lower races finally within the pale of right and duty in the common opinion of France"¹). To the unanimous opinion thus fostered was due the new and more liberal trend of the colonial policy of the old régime which, before its disappearance, had already abolished the Company system.

The movement in favour of the emancipation of other races which became so powerful after the outbreak of the French Revolution was therefore already deeply rooted in the human conscience. It culminated in the proclamation of 1792, which recognised as French citizens, equal in right, all free men and women in the French colonies, and in the abolition of slavery in 1794. The system of monopoly and exploitation had already been abandoned some time before. But a nationalist protectionism was still maintained.

¹) Cf. Swinny, *op. cit.* p. 132.

Only the notion of absolute equality could satisfy the minds of contemporaries, in view of the unanimous pronouncements made before the Revolution. There could scarcely be a question of separate legislation or administration for the colonies; and the centralisation which was so prevalent in France naturally also applied to the colonies, marked by the seal of a levelling policy of assimilation. All the colonies were granted representation in the National Assembly ¹⁾. It is a fact worthy of attention that almost everywhere in the West efforts were made to enable the colonies to share as much as possible in the social and political freedom which had been conquered at home. Subsequently, the reaction which set in caused a relapse into the old colonial system. Liberalism was still too much lacking in those qualities of universality which would have allowed it to hold unlimited sway over a long period. Half a century had still to pass before it was to reach this stage.

In 1802, under Bonaparte, a complete reversal took place. All the rights granted to the Indigenous populations were withdrawn, slavery once more was allowed, and even the old mercantile system was re-introduced, while mixed marriages and the admission of Africans to France were prohibited. Repeatedly, during the years that followed, in 1848 and 1871, a return to revolutionary tradition took place, and it was followed by a new interest in the policy of assimilation, albeit in a more modest form than in 1792. Even before 1848 such a policy had been applied, with due regard to the distinction between so-called old colonies, like the Antilles and Réunion, where the Indigenous element was either absent or did not present any special difficulties, and the colonies which had been conquered since 1815. The legislation of 1833 similarly took into account to a certain extent this distinction with regard to the old colonies, treating Martinique, Guadeloupe, Bourbon and Guyana in one way, and Senegal, the Indian settlements, Saint-Pierre and Miquelon in another.

After 1815, the year in which a small part of its colonial empire was returned to France, colonial policy was for some time without much practical importance. Public opinion, however, remained uninterruptedly concerned with the abolition of slavery, which was one of the first measures proclaimed in 1848. In that

¹⁾ G. Hardy, *Histoire de la Colonisation Française*, 1928, pp. 111—129.

year there was a complete break with the system of the past, and the second Empire not only adopted most of the new principles, but strengthened them in certain respects, providing thereby a conclusive testimony that in the course of the last half century liberal principles had received such backing and support as no longer to be dependent upon the rise or fall of a small circle of people.

Further evolution of colonial doctrine: France

It may seem surprising that colonial liberalism of the nineteenth century so often manifested itself by a system of assimilation and unification, even towards overseas communities that were so utterly different from the West in their own organisation. This policy, by which no single state has altogether remained untouched, is often severely criticised. "No form of domination is more tyrannical," wrote Jules Harmand ¹⁾. As a matter of fact this policy, which at the outset met with much appreciation and even enthusiasm on the part of the colonial population, formed an almost unavoidable stage of transition from the system of exploitation to modern colonial policy. It implied the defeat of the point of view of absolute domination and racial arrogance, and recognised the unity of mankind. Its acceptance by the Eastern populations is equally easy to explain, and corresponds to the various emancipation movements inside Europe.

South America

The doctrines of the French philosophers spreading across Europe had even reached the distant overseas settlements in the West. The movement they called forth gathered great impetus in South America, where, under Simon Bolivar, a struggle began which resulted for Spain in the loss of her American dominions in the course of two decades (1810—1830). Mexico succeeded in gaining its independence, while Brazil seceded from Portugal and became an independent Empire. The newly founded republics gave proof that they were also prepared to apply the ideas of

¹⁾ *Domination et Colonisation*, p. 23.

freedom towards the weaker races living within their territory and slavery was abolished ¹).

The mixed population soon underwent the same influences which had already reacted upon the Western settlements where the feeling of consciousness was naturally keener. Haiti became independent, and when the Philippines lost the liberal constitution of 1812 a rebellion broke out. In the course of the nineteenth century the awakening of national consciousness gradually caused all colonial populations as well as the Eastern nations whose independence was being threatened, to move in the same direction. We contemplate here a big, restless growth of the movement which was to find its natural culmination in the awakening of the East.

The British Empire

British Liberalism, which had achieved its major victory in the shape of the Great Reform Bill of 1832, took up its position against the centralisation which at that period was also being applied to the Western plantations. It is a mistake to believe that the secession of the North American colonies had in any way affected the preference shown for this system. Far from being caused by the fear of further secession, the inclination towards a more liberal colonial policy was the result of the march forward of Liberalism in Great Britain itself.

Gladstone and the other colonial reformers did not wish to use coercion for the preservation of the imperial connection. Their ideal was rather the Roman system of local autonomy within the *municipia*, and they were soon to turn to the absolutely free relationship between the Greek city-states and their self-governing colonies as the model of the British Empire of the future. In the case of the settlements of British race, Gladstone had fully recognised the importance of the Hellenic principle of freedom as the necessary and only true imperial tie of the future. This conception was again and again put forward and outlined in the course of his great speeches.

From about 1850 onwards, British statesmanship began to veer definitely in this direction, in spite of the condemnation of many

¹) A brief review of the earlier colonial policy of Spain and Portugal in H. Merivale, *Lectures on Colonisation and Colonies*, 1928, Ch. I and II.

of Gladstone's countrymen who to the end of his life pursued him with the taunt that he was a little Englander bent on wrecking the unity of the Empire. Yet recent history has vindicated his conception. The solemn declaration of the Imperial Conference of 1926, which is an event in the history of the world, recognised Gladstone's principle as the foundation of imperial unity, for it stated that Great Britain and the Dominions "are autonomous communities within the British Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another.... though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations ¹⁾."

The presence of great settlements of the same nation in Canada, Australia and New Zealand had given to the liberal spirit a unique field for colonial action. These activities in their turn affected the policy adopted towards other portions of the Empire, and in particular towards India. In 1824, one of the greatest British colonial administrators, Sir Thomas Munro, declared that it was the duty of Britain "to train Indians to govern and protect themselves." It was in the same spirit that the Parliament, returned after the Great Reform Act, stated in 1832 upon the occasion of the renewal of the charter of the East India Company that "no native of the said Indian territories, nor any natural British-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company." ²⁾ It is necessary to emphasise once more that the liberal spirit of the nineteenth century made no distinction of race, at least in principle. It is true that the further development of liberal principles enabled the settlements of the white race to profit more directly by it. But the endeavour of the spirit of the West was universal, making no discrimination. As early as 1807, the slave trade had been forbidden by Great Britain and the Congress of Vienna gave international sanction to the principle. In 1833 there followed the abolition of slavery throughout the Empire. This was another triumph for humanitarianism.

India did not escape the interpretation of liberalism which worked for assimilation, although the growing preference shown

¹⁾ Knaplund, *op. cit.* p. 164.

²⁾ Chirol, *India Old and New*, 1921, pp. 66—83.

in Great Britain for the separate organisation of each part of the Empire naturally limited its thorough application. Macaulay became the champion of the idea of assimilation through education. About 1830, exactly one century before the Round Table Conference, he spoke of the day on which, thanks to the support and educative labour of England, India would become independent, as being the "proudest day in English history". In the same breath however he went on to declare that to this purpose, "a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia"¹).

It should never be forgotten that in Macaulay's time the West was but imperfectly acquainted with the significance and the moral value of Eastern cultures, and was still less aware of their popular institutions. Moreover, before criticising Macaulay's preference for English as the language to be used for education in India, one should remember the part played by this language in the formation of National Indian thought, which had been impeded by the existence of hundreds of languages and dialects. Does not Mr. Gupta say that "the most vital symbol of Indian nationality is the noble English language which is the *lingua franca* of all educated Indians"?²).

Although tainted with the excessive literary trend which characterised all education in Europe in his day, Macaulay's famous memorandum of 1835, viewed in the light of his own times, remains a monument of human endeavour, and as much may be said of the educational programme drafted in 1854 under the administration of the noble Dalhousie, inspired by the same ideal. This programme was an attempt to give practical expression to the possibilities opened out by the Parliament of 1833, and a humane spirit resounds in Dalhousie's utterance when he declares it to be the mission of his country "to found British greatness on Indian happiness"³). The Royal Proclamation of 1858, after the taking over of the Company's possessions, shows how strongly this spirit had expanded about the middle of the nineteenth century. Notwithstanding the great mutiny which had

¹) Ronaldshay, *The Heart of Aryavarta*, 1925, p. 20.

²) *The Foundations of National Progress* (Calcutta, 1927, p. 265).

³) Chirol, *op. cit.* p. 82.

just been repressed, it confirmed all the liberal principles and promises of 1833.

Practice may have shown how great the difficulties still were. Here, progressive policy met with tremendous obstacles which did not exist in territories developed by European settlers. These difficulties, more than a few hesitations regarding the desirability of a more conservative policy, account for a comparatively slow pace of progress in India. The fact, however, remains that the impulse, given by a few thinkers at the beginning of the eighteenth century, had resulted in a movement which, by 1850, had gathered sufficient momentum not to be diverted by momentary obstacles from the intended goal.

THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

The Dutch colonial statesman, Dirk van Hogendorp, recommended to the High Commission established in 1791 a series of reforms inspired by the spirit which at that time pervaded France. He wanted to end the Company system, to abolish compulsory labour and deliveries in kind, to introduce freedom of trade and freedom of the person and of labour and to give certainty of legal redress to the Indigenous population. He further favoured the introduction of fixed taxation and the recognition of individual ground property or hereditary land tenure, and finally, fixed and sufficient emoluments for officials, in order to prevent graft and corruption. Needless to say, he also opposed slavery and the slave trade.

Van Hogendorp made no impression upon the authorities in the Indies, and sent an address to the National Assembly in Holland, in which he courageously exposed all the iniquities of the Dutch East India Company's administration. He returned to Holland and followed Burke's example by starting a campaign, which fell on ears by no means deaf, as is proved by his appointment in 1802 on the commission which had been directed by the Government to prepare a new charter for the Dutch East Indies. He found a warm sympathiser in Muntinghe who at a later stage became the trusted adviser of Raffles and played a great part in the reforms which were initiated or projected during the British interregnum (1811—1816). The Batavian Republic (1795—1806) followed the example of the French Republic, and by its constitu-

tion the legislature was entrusted with the task of introducing republican principles into the colonies.

In Holland as in France the tide turned in 1803. The state-commission adopted only a few of the suggestions of its member Van Hogendorp, and upheld the main portion of the Company system, preserving forced labour, deliveries in kind, feudalism, monopolies and the despatch of produce to the mother country. Van Hogendorp repudiated its findings. But although the projected charter was withdrawn as early as 1805, it exercised in other respects a preponderant influence upon later charters drawn up for the organisation of colonial administration ¹⁾).

Daendels, who was Governor General from 1808 to 1811, maintained a large part of the old system and exacted more forced labour than before, especially for the construction of his great strategic road across Java. On the other hand he fought corruption among officials and the extortion practised by Javanese chiefs, and attempted to reform as far as possible the systems of jurisdiction and administration. His mind was imbued with the enlightened principles of the day, but his methods in dealing with the population smacked of the old régime ²⁾).

Yet, as Professor Heeres remarks, the "thundering marshal" should be considered in many respects as the precursor of Raffles, who became Governor General after the brief tenure of office of Janssens, when the Dutch colonies passed into the hands of the British in 1811. Without Daendel's determined activities Raffles could have had no more than partial success in his great task ³⁾).

With the administration of Raffles comes the decisive break with the old system and the turning point in Dutch colonial history. His short administration saw the introduction of the system of land-rent, which aimed at giving to the Javanese peasant the free disposal of his labour and its fruits. Only a part of his harvest was to go to the Government, which considered itself the ground-landlord, a conception which has been attacked in later years. Raffles fought slavery and the opium trade, improved the administration and the judicial system, and put his face against

¹⁾ Kleintjes, *Staatsinstellingen van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1927, p. 11.

²⁾ Cf. F. de Haan, *Priangan*, I, p. 495*.

³⁾ Heeres, "Geschiedenis en Bestuur," in *Neerlands Indië*, 1911, I, p. 376.

corruption. Some of his reforms were too hasty, some were never applied, and others proved to have been inspired by wrong conceptions of the organisation of Javanese society and of its agrarian system.

At that time a lack of intimate knowledge of Oriental society could not have been surprising. It was precisely Raffles who took great pains to increase his knowledge and later on he published the results of his research in the form of most useful contributions to science. It is not by their aptness or by the information underlying his reforms that his work must be judged, but by the humane spirit which it breathed and by the definite breach with the past which it spelt.

In 1816 and 1817 the ancient possessions of the Dutch East Indian Company reverted to the Netherlands. The Commissioners General who were sent out to take over these colonies expressed in their published reports views which prove that more liberal conceptions still prevailed. They declared it to be the Dutch King's explicit desire that the population should be protected against arbitrariness, that its lot should be improved, its property assured, and that it should share the happy effects of his government with all his other subjects. The East Indian Government Regulations of 1818, 1827, and 1830 also displayed this concern for the Indigenous population to which, in their view, right had to be done rather than that they should form a source of revenue.

It was however under the last of these fundamental regulations that the cultivation system of Van den Bosch was introduced, which was the result of the dreadful financial inheritance of the past. The change of policy which was imposed, after more than ten years, was also due to the disappointments caused by the application of liberal ideas after the recovery of the colonies. Hope of a quick development, once the population had been delivered from the oppressive system of forced labour and forced deliveries, had been frustrated. There had been no chance of redeeming the East Indian debt or of paying its interest from revenue collected in the Indies.

Nowadays we cannot feel surprised at this development. Our knowledge of the economy of the *desa* or Javanese village community has vastly increased. We can see that Government guidance and instruction should have been forthcoming before these

closed economic units with their production entirely organised for consumption within a small circle could be induced to accept a fundamental change in their methods. Even Muntinghe, a warm supporter of the liberal ideas of Van Hogendorp and of the reforms of Raffles, felt bitterly disappointed by the result of the liberal system. In 1825 he declared that only the purblind could deny the immediate necessity of a change of the existing system. Du Bus, who, in 1827, was sent to the East as Commissioner General in order to determine which system would most benefit the development of agriculture, wanted to give opportunities to European capital, enterprise and science for extensive work in unreclaimed territories. He hoped not only that production, trade and shipping in the mother-country would benefit, but also that free labour would provide the population with higher wages and that the example of activity thus to be set would find imitators. But there were others, especially among the officials, who feared that, far from finding a stimulus towards economic improvement, the population would slide still further back once it became wage-earning.

In such circumstances were born the plans of Van den Bosch, which, like those of Raffles, were based on the conception that the Sovereign was the owner of the land. He would therefore be entitled to a land rent of two fifths of the harvest or to an equivalent sum of money. Van den Bosch wanted to induce the population to give up only one fifth of its fields to the cultivation of crops which would be suitable for the European market without requiring more labour than the cultivation of rice. The produce thus obtained would have to be delivered to the Government, which would refund to the village the excess of the proceeds of their sale over the land-rent that was due, while it would alone bear the cost of crop failures. As soon as the special crop had ripened, the obligations of the population would be at an end ¹⁾.

There was no question of coercion in the Government Act or in the instructions given to Van den Bosch ²⁾. Had this been observed in practice, the system might have borne great fruit by

¹⁾ *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, article "Cultuurstelsel".

²⁾ Van den Bosch, however, realised fully that he was introducing coercion, as has been proved by Professor G. Gonggrijp, in his *Schets eener economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1928, p. 118.

giving the population new experience and by producing profits which would have benefited trade and navigation.

But the financial difficulties which increased daily after 1830 soon caused efforts to be made to speed up production, for which all the apparatus of Government was enlisted. The liberal minister Elout had foreseen before the introduction of the system that it would lead to a situation analogous to that which existed under the Dutch East India Company, and had resigned in consequence (1829). In practice the system did develop into the compulsory cultivation of indigo, sugar, pepper, tobacco, cochineal, tea, cinnamon, and coffee. Officials and popular chiefs were interested in increasing production by the grant of percentages and gradually the stipulations about freedom of choice of the crops to be grown and about the restriction of the area to be given over to their cultivation ceased to be observed. Nor were the Javanese in practice allowed to give as much labour to their own rice crop as to the government crops, nor paid a fair price for their produce. The compulsory crops in some cases impoverished the soil and certainly did not benefit the population. Confiscations of its land and requisition of its labour sometimes prevented it from growing the food it required. Moreover the social organisation and the prevalent agrarian system began to deteriorate in many respects.

Rumours began to reach the mother-country about the true situation. But it was not until 1848, when, after a period of drought, famine broke out in the districts of Demak and Grobogan where the rice-cultivation depended upon the rainfall, that the results of the system became evident. Public opinion was roused, and a party led by Van Hœvell began to agitate inside and outside parliament for the rights of the overseas subjects. Liberalism drew renewed strength from this lapse into the outworn Company system of exploitation.

The new constitution of 1848 made it possible for parliament to assume the control of colonial policy, which before that time had been exclusively in the hands of the executive. At the end of the debates about a new East-Indian Government Act in 1854, the liberal leader Thorbecke, who in so many respects recalls the great figure of Gladstone, pronounced these memorable words: "the interest of the overseas population is the interest of the mother country."

It is a remarkable fact that Van Höevell himself did not desire the abolition of the system of cultivation introduced by the Government. No one can doubt that this man, to whose indefatigable agitation was due the abolition of slavery in the East and West Indies in 1859, cannot have been in favour of the system of compulsion. In wishing to preserve cultivation for exportation, provided all abuses were eliminated, he thought of the useful educative effect of accustoming the population to the cultivation of crops that were indispensable to its social and economic advancement. It is worth noticing, at the same time, that the movement for the radical suppression of the whole system came precisely from the conservative party. In the course of the debates which took place in those years, they proved to be animated by a genuine concern for the interests and the needs of the East Indian population ¹⁾. Both liberals and conservatives were merely pressed onward by the rise of humane principles, which existed independently of political parties, even though there may have been differences between the parties as to their application in practice. It is to this universality of the new principles that is due the increasing liberalism which has characterised colonial policy since 1850.

Compulsory cultivation was therefore not abolished, but it was re-organised in 1854. The change for the better was not immediate and abuses still lingered on through the sixties. But in several cases profitable cultivation became simply impossible, once the interests of the population had duly to be taken into account, and it may therefore be said that stringent regulation assured the eventual disappearance of the system. Before 1870 all Government cultivations except those of sugar and coffee had been abolished. In 1870 a transitional system was introduced in the case of sugar, and it was completely abolished in 1890.

After 1854 compulsory cultivation was still subjected to a continued campaign of criticism. In 1860 Multatuli's *Max Havelaar* and in 1865 Jhr. van der Wijck's *Een Beroep op het Nederlandsche Volk* ("An Appeal to the People of the Netherlands") had made much impression. After 1890, only the system of coffee cultivation remained. Though it was usually practised on newly reclaimed ground, it was not popular with the peasants, because

¹⁾ C. W. Margadant, *Het Regeeringsreglement van Nederlandsch-Indië*, II, pp. 178—9.

it gave a lower return for labour than was the case in ordinary commercial concerns. The Government was trying gradually to develop its forced crops into free crops run by the people for their own benefit, and step by step it gave them all up. When, in 1915, the last compulsory crop was ended by the abrogation of art. 56 of the East Indian Government Act of 1854, the whole system had in reality for a considerable time belonged to the past.

We must distinguish between the era of the original system, which was merely considered as a source of revenue, and that which opened about the seventies. Before this date the Government applied any surplus of the East Indian budget to the payment of the interest on Dutch loans and to public works in Holland. This system was also much criticised, and formed the main butt of Jhr. van der Wijck's attack in his *Beroep*, because it still seemed to consider the colonies as an object of exploitation. The increased administrative care given to the Indies, and in particular the expenditure for the war of Atjeh made growing demands upon the East Indian budget, with the result that there have been no remittances to the Dutch treasury since 1875.

From this date the cultivation of sugar and coffee was run entirely for the profit of the East Indian treasury, and one has therefore the right to consider them from a different angle, and to bear in mind the fact that leading liberals had acknowledged the educative value of production by compulsion. Provided all abuses were eliminated they preferred it to the absence of government interference with Indigenous economy, as before 1830, because that policy had proved to be wholly lacking in educative value. It is indeed a fact, which applies not only to the colonial world, but also to every state, every school, every home, that excess of coercion and excess of abstention are both evil. A golden mean must be sought, which will of course vary in practice with each set of circumstances. It is this variety of circumstances which multiplies the difficulties of those who are called upon to give guidance. Mistakes are almost bound to occur, but they will be limited in their extent if the men who commit them understand Eastern society and are animated by sympathy.

The question whether the forced cultivation established by the Government eventually led to free popular cultivation cannot in all cases be answered with a simple affirmative or a simple

negative. In many regions the Indonesians have undoubtedly applied themselves to the rearing of commercial crops, either for the domestic or for the European market, such as tobacco, sugar, tea, pepper, coffee, copra, rubber, maize, ground-nuts, cassava, soya-beans, batatas, and vegetables. It is evident that the knowledge derived from the cultivation of such crops in the course of compulsory cultivation and from the agricultural methods they required has been distinctly beneficial to them.

On the other hand there is the statement of the Commission of Enquiry for the West Coast of Sumatra (1928) to the effect that until 1908 the compulsory cultivation of coffee retarded the free development of economic life in this region. Experience acquired elsewhere points in the same direction, and, as far as the findings of the Commission go, it would appear that, after the abolition of compulsory coffee cultivation, there came a period in which the population gave up this crop altogether in the first flush of elation at its regained liberty, but that this period was followed once more by one of unprecedented revival of the same crop,¹⁾ which nowadays is a source of great profit to the population.

This has not been the case everywhere. The crop often enough disappeared at the same time as compulsory cultivation. It is to the increased world demand and to the growth of traffic and of population, more than to any other factor, that the acceleration of production must be attributed.

From what precedes it is clear that in the Dutch East Indies also practice only followed hesitatingly, and not without reactions, the guiding principles laid down in the Government Act of 1854. But the fact remains that the drafting of this Act forms a second turning point in Dutch colonial history. Much remained vague in its wording, either through lack of knowledge, or through a desire for compromise. Much also was left for future settlement. The main point, however, had been achieved: the interests and the rights of the population had been recognised as the principle object of policy by a wide circle in the Mother Country.

The way in which the Act was framed is more important than its contents, for its significance for the future derives from the

¹⁾ Report of the Commission of Enquiry instituted by Government Decree of February 13, 1927, No. 1a; I, pp. 94—96.

spirit in which it was conceived, and not merely from the letter of the law.

The inheritance of the past remained an obstacle for a long time to come, but the year 1854 marked the beginning of the ethical period of colonisation in which material improvement and the development of the colonies towards autonomy were to become the main purpose of colonial policy.

The intensification of contacts between East and West

The same factors which were precipitating evolution in the Western world were responsible at the same time for the new policy towards many of the colonies.

In the first place almost revolutionary changes were taking place inside Western society, which during the latter half of the nineteenth century was greatly disturbed by a far reaching social and political evolution. Automatically the movement reinforced those who considered it a national duty to assist the colonial population in its development towards more or towards complete autonomy.

Another factor working in the same direction was the extraordinary expansion of traffic, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which brought Western Society and its distant colonies into close proximity one to the other. Growing traffic created numerous new relationships and allowed closer contacts with the Oriental population, and resulted in better knowledge of its real nature, its material and spiritual needs.

Existing sympathies were guided by knowledge, and the social conscience which was being created was enabled to embrace all races and all nations within its horizon.

The importance of an informed opinion hardly needs to be stressed. Even within our own complicated society one class of people may be largely oblivious of the fate and general outlook of another. Only when some striking or disturbing event takes place does a spontaneous movement of public opinion prove that the aloofness was due to ignorance, not to indifference. On the other hand as a result of the organised spread of knowledge of conditions in distant countries, philanthropy not infrequently gives rise to actions which might have been just as necessary within the

home circle, if the situation there had not altogether escaped notice ¹⁾).

The pan-humanistic conception of Christianity and of nineteenth century liberalism, immensely strengthened by social and political evolution and by the establishment of closer contacts between hitherto isolated parts of humanity, began to develop an unprecedented activity in Africa and in the East. This activity was at the same time religious, educational, medical and social. It formed a counterpoise to the feeling of superiority engendered by the conquests of Western science and technique, and to the doubtful political and racial doctrines based on Darwinism. It acted as a stimulant in the East, and as an anti-imperialistic influence favourable to liberalism in the West. Wherever imperialism, jingoism and racial arrogance made themselves too flagrant, it was able to soften or to modify their manifestations.

It is interesting to observe the contradictory manifestations of imperialism and pan-humanism characteristic of this period, which has not yet completely come to a close. They are expressions in opposite directions of the same dynamic and expanding spirit, but Eastern nations have not always grasped this fact, with the result that missions, educational and philanthropic institutions have still to suffer from the suspicion that they are nothing but the vanguard of Western imperialism. In fact they are nothing of the kind, and they have not ceased to exercise a constant and most vigorous influence upon the conscience of the West, always promoting liberal policies, while being at the same time one of the most potent agencies in the awakening of the East which in its turn has presented Western pan-humanism with a spiritual ally across the seas.

The Eastern Revival

This awakening is the culmination of the historical process which has just been sketched. Quite frequently it is considered as an unexpected event and as a threatening and mysterious phenomenon, while in reality it is nothing but a very gradual and pro-

¹⁾ See an interesting parallel between the increased interest in the fate of the working class in France and in colonial questions in Pierre Mille's address to the *Académie des Sciences Coloniales, Comptes Rendus*, 1929.

missing development of consciousness. It is only one expression of a world movement which was bound in the long run to embrace all peoples. Europe, having acquired consciousness in the course of her own Middle Ages, was the first to lift herself to a higher sphere and, drawing principally from the armoury of Hellas, she struggled free from feudal domination and from absolutism. Political emancipation could do no more than sketch the rough design of a movement which had to be followed by social emancipation before it re-created the community in its entirety. Little by little the Western settlements in America, Africa, Australia and New Zealand followed, each in its own way, and eventually the more conscious among the mixed populations, like the Haitians and the Philippinos, joined the onward march.

On the other hand the independent nations of the East and the autochthonous populations of the colonial world had scarcely become acquainted with Western thought. Until well into the nineteenth century, traffic was restricted, the number of European emigrants limited, and contacts were but rarely of a spiritual and intellectual character. A striking change, however, was about to take place in this very respect.

It was really only during the nineteenth century that to all the peoples from Morocco to the Far East, there came to be revealed this other world seething with the novel notions of personality, citizenship, freedom, patriotism, equality, popular authority, security of justice and progress.

The instinct of preservation, created by Western expansion, and the urge for social reform, seized upon these ideas, and in turn were vitalised and quickened by their conjuring up of forces that had so far remained latent.

This development of consciousness should not be attributed solely to the impression made by the Japanese victory over Russia. The reform movement in Japan, which had become inevitable in 1854 and actually began in 1868, should rather be itself considered as part of this revival. In British India the revival dates from the beginning of the nineteenth century. About 1830 an important movement, in which the great figure of Raja Ram Mohan Roy and the Brahmo Samaj group played an important part, was in full swing. In 1885 an Indian National Congress met at Bombay. The movement in the Philippines is just as old. In

the sixties it had a nationalistic hue and under its leader Rizal it reached its climax and found expression in the declaration of independence of 1897 made by General Aguinaldo. The Young-Turkish, Young-Persian, Young-Arabic and Young-Chinese movements had a long development behind them and had all their own characteristics. The Japanese victory was, so to speak, the knot which tied them all together. It is, if one prefers, the meeting point of many endeavours, which had remained parallel until that event.

Thanks to the enlightened ideas of the West, the awakening of the East did not merely remain a movement of defence against the might of the foreigner: it enriched itself with all the conceptions which by now are animating thousands of Orientals with the dynamic force of the West. Viewed from this angle the awakening is the completion of a universal circle of consciousness; the sinister shadows of antagonism disappear, and it becomes a living confirmation of the brotherhood of man, and a powerful reply from all the nations to the call which two centuries ago rose only from a few solitary breasts. It is only by setting it against its historical background that one can see this world-event in its grandiose dimensions, its deep significance and especially its promise for the future.

The new international orientation

Long before the peace of Portsmouth had brought the awakening of the East to the attention of the most unobservant, it had already, in alliance with the liberal thought of the West, hastened the pace of colonial evolution and secured its principles by infusing them with greater consciousness. At the same time it opened a wider perspective to international co-operation, which had previously been restricted to the fight against slavery. The thinking members of all races became increasingly insistent on the ethical obligations which result from the universality of human tendencies, both spiritual and moral.

High minded principles about the treatment of African populations could, as a result, be voiced already in the solemn declarations of the Congress of Berlin in 1885 and of the Brussels Conference of 1889. In many respects their terminology is identical with that of the Covenant of the League of Nations on the subject of

mandated territories. It was the first time in the history of the world that a moral standard of behaviour towards weaker and dependent societies was accepted by a gathering representing many nations.

From this period colonial evolution has made rapid forward strides. It would seem that great forces have collected in silence, and suddenly come out in the open causing greater progress in a few years' time than could have been effected at an earlier stage in the course of a century. All the threads of international co-operation, national endeavour, sympathy and humanity have been collected into one strong endeavour aiming at the development of weaker nations towards complete autonomy.

T h e t a s k b e f o r e u s

The development may seem to have been slow, the results by no means satisfactory yet. But the improvement of the relations between the dominating and the weaker groups is manifest. Nobody should deem his sympathy or his co-operation to be superfluous, least of all in these days when cultural fatigue and materialistic indifference threaten to extinguish the sacred fire which is needed by all leading nations and their Eastern co-operators for the performance of such parts of their task as may still remain undone. Propaganda born from intellectual anarchy tries to persuade men to an untimely relinquishing of their task, and yet no talent, no word, no act is superfluous in the good fight. If the preceding historical survey brings out clearly one single notion, it is this, that beyond a doubt our age may succeed, with the vastly superior means at its disposal, in surpassing previous generations in the performance of the task of which they dreamed. But success will only be achieved if the whole of each colonial nation, loyally assisted by the Eastern leaders, sets its shoulders to the task.

T h e c o l o n i s e r s ' n a t i o n a l t a s k

Passing, in this spirit, from the things that have been to those that are and are to be, we shall have to examine in the first place the reasons which make it manifest that the colonial task must be a national task. The background of spiritual evolution may be international, but the action which applies its principles in each colony must for the sake of cultural and methodical continuity

remain distinct and national. The responsible nations of our own time must feel themselves called by history to perform within their own sphere a specified part of the world's work.

On the other hand the whole history of colonial statesmanship displays the march of international principles. The so-called ethical movement does not spring from a particular country or from a specific set of people. It has grown with the whole of Western society in Europe and in America. The West has communicated this spirit to the East, but, now that the awakening has come, the great problems which scarcely counted, if at all, for our ancestors, have acquired a new urgency.

Modern colonial policy insists more and more upon imponderable elements, psychological and personal factors, and demands the attention, study, and collaboration of all. Its pressing call goes forth to statesmen, representatives of the people, to scholars, to the press, to commerce, shipping, agriculture and industry, to all, in short, who have sympathy or merely good will to offer.

The West must exact this support because it is Western thought itself which has summoned into existence a movement which, if not directed and led into the right channels, may spell havoc and ruin to the world. If this indispensable guidance is to be effective, it must be backed by a popular conviction which is free from party politics. It must be enlightened and well informed. The more numerous the impartial contributions towards the task and its performance, the larger the number of societies and bodies where all available data can be examined in a dispassionate way, the sooner the solution will stand clear before the eyes of men.

It is even in the interest of the colonising nation itself that support should be forthcoming for a colonial policy founded on ethical principle. For, as Gladstone and Thorbecke pointed out, if the connection between mother country and colony is to endure, it can only be secured by a moral bond.

The industrialisation of Western society, the growth of population which came with it, and the considerable rise in the standard of living have caused the mother countries and their mainly agricultural colonies in tropical and sub-tropical regions to grow into one organic unit, with a very complicated economic life, and with many interests, especially cultural ones, in common. There can be no doubt that if the permanence of this connection is assured, last-

ing prosperity and development will be the result, whereas its dissolution or its untimely weakening will be catastrophic for both sides. Ideal and material interests are involved which must be treated with continuous attention and objectivity. People who imagine they are serving their own interests by ignoring the rights of others will find out that their own interests too must suffer, while those who profess Robespierre's famous doctrine, "perish the colonies rather than a principle" in its unalloyed purity, will only disturb the atmosphere which would lead to an objective study and the right solution of the problems that arise.

The national task of the colonisers has yet a further aspect which concerns not only the mother countries and their colonies. By fostering or alternatively by neglecting the spiritual and material productivity of the colonies much good or much harm may be done to the world at large. Every shock reacts far beyond the colonial territory, and the creation and maintenance of a harmonious order which enables the Oriental population to develop its forces to the full, in order to participate in the task of world-governance, is therefore of the highest international significance.

From whatever aspect the colonial task is considered it will always appear as a function of the sense of national responsibility.

The growth of information

An unenlightened participation in the colonial task would clearly be sterile if not dangerous. A sound knowledge of land and people, of present and future problems, of policies adopted or studied, must be spread among ever wider circles. Much is done in this direction, both in the Netherlands and in other countries, and daily papers and reviews nowadays devote a considerable amount of space to colonial problems. There are lectures, courses of study, exhibitions, which illustrate everything pertaining to conditions in the colonies and the life of their inhabitants. Films are exhibited in the schools, and science pays increasing attention to problems of sociology and of Eastern law. In Holland, the Colonial Institute with its many branches, University extension lectures, museums and libraries work in the same direction. There is marked and decided progress, which will not fail to bear fruit ¹⁾.

¹⁾ Cf. *De Gids*, March 1924, p. 337; H. Kraemer, *Koloniale Studiën*, Feb. 1927, p. 12; C. Snouck Hurgronje, *De Islam en het Rassenprobleem*, p. 25.

The purpose of this work

A word may be said, in conclusion, about this work which attempts to make a contribution to the general movement towards enlightenment.

While reviewing principles, material factors, actual situations, and definite aims it should not be thought that it intends to lay down inflexible rules and axioms. All that is intended is to describe the existing situation and to indicate the trend of events. For if there exist fundamental principles from which no departure can be made, there are many questions to which no definite answer can yet be given. The colonial world is in a state of restless motion, not only owing to the forces which are at work within but also owing to the growth of world traffic and of the spiritual and political currents that run through the equally fluctuating Western world. This should be borne in mind right through the reading of this book.

In 1914 already Professor Snouck Hurgronje pointed out that during the last century such changes had taken place in the colonial world that the word "revolution" described them better than "evolution" ¹⁾. Since then reforms of much greater moment have taken place. Everybody will realise, therefore, that the future may bring changes greater still. Practice must show what is likely to suit the continually changing conditions of Eastern society and the important social and economic evolution through which it is now passing. The conduct of affairs in the colonies will therefore not lend itself to rigid formulation, but its main principle will continue to be that the population must be allowed to develop along lines of its own towards self-exertion in every direction. By its own constructive labour this population must acquire a decisive influence on this development.

Division of this work

A survey of Government policy in the sphere of administration, justice and education etc. in the Dutch East Indies, which will form a sequel to the present volume, needs to be preceded by a general exposition which will enable the reader to form his own opinion of the basis and general principles of colonial policy on the one hand, and of the structure and nature of Eastern societies on

¹⁾ *Indologenblad*, 5th year, p. 78.

the other. It has appeared to us that only by obtaining some insight into all that temporarily seems to characterise a large part of the Eastern world and all that so far has made it a thing apart, only by measuring its forces and observing the forms of its life, can any understanding be gathered of its requirements.

It has furthermore appeared essential to show in the following general survey of colonial policy, that many of the difficulties are by no means inherent in colonial policy as such, or in Dutch colonial policy in particular, but that they are part and parcel of a universal complex of problems. It is absolutely necessary that the nature of this complex should be understood, and also the fact that these difficulties extend to the independent Oriental states.

The origin of the problem is the meeting, which only too often results in a clash, of communities that differ so widely in their organisation and progress at so different a pace. Especially of recent years authors have not been lacking who foretell the unavoidable conflict between what they call Eastern and Western cultures. They represent humanity as divided into two entirely different types, separated by an unbridgeable chasm. Such views raise questions which have to be answered, and to provide such answers is infinitely more interesting than to describe existing situations, incidental Government measures, etc. For as long as these questions remain unanswered, the Governments that are involved would appear to be building on the shifting sand.

In attempting an answer to these questions we shall, in opposition to those who consider the clash unavoidable, point to the possibility, nay, the necessity of establishing co-operation and a synthesis of cultures, as the basis of world policy in general and of colonial policy in particular.



CHAPTER I

THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain
shall meet,
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judge-
ment seat;
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed,
nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come
from the ends of the earth!
RUDYARD KIPLING, "Barrack Room Ballads".

Possibility and conditions of the meeting of East and West

It is usual to quote only the first line of Kipling's ballad, and many people in the East as well as in the West use the quotation in support of their assertion that there exists a fundamental difference between two worlds and a chasm between them which will never be bridged. That the poet has expressed, in the two last lines, an entirely opposite doctrine, which perhaps he cherished more profoundly, is a fact generally overlooked by those who quote him so glibly.

From the earliest period East and West have met along ancient trade routes which history has been able to trace in all their detail. It is true that until the sixteenth century, one might even say until the nineteenth century, these meetings were superficial and intermittent. It is no less true that closer contacts, established in the course of last century, have proved more than anything the delicate nature of the spiritual process they called forth, and that neither East nor West has special reasons to pride itself upon the manner in which their meeting was effected. But be that as it may, it cannot be denied that already before the Christian era a persistent mutual cultural influence can be ascertained which confirms the fundamental unity of mankind.

If this were not the case, history would show us two entirely different kinds of humanity, and a fundamental dichotomy to which all the disappointments, antagonisms, frictions and clashes of the past would have to be attributed instead of these being nothing more than the natural results of a laborious upward march. The whole educational mission, embodied in the mandatory system and in modern colonial policy, would stand condemned, while all the idealistic endeavours which aim at fostering mutual respect and comradely co-operation would be doomed to sterility. The colonial problem would merely resolve itself into a choice between the immediate abdication of Western authority or the return to the old policy of exploitation, while, outside the colonial world, a wide neutral zone would have to be created along the line of contact between East and West. If the West did not wish to give up its relation with the East it would have to support its position by a display of force strong enough to crush the ineradicable antipathies resulting from the different mentalities of the two portions of mankind.

It will be more attractive to seek in the experience of the past the confirmation of the moral premises from which present day colonial policy has been developed. The conclusion of the poet will be received with all the more gratitude because of the ugliness of the alternative.

Those who had the privilege of observing at close quarters the common labours of great Western and Eastern statesmen, leaders, and thinkers in the interests of international understanding and of the common good of mankind have been able fully to appreciate the truth of Kipling's words. Those who have taken the trouble to bridge the gulf by acquainting themselves with the language and the customs of other nations have always found that on the other side of the gap there were ordinary fellow human-beings. Sympathy guided by knowledge, knowledge inspired by sympathy, are always able to find their way into the hearts of every people under the sun, and to build a bridge upon which individuals as well as the leaders of policy may venture without hesitation.

There is another lesson to be learned from the words of Kipling. Only then will East and West meet face to face, when both display the large trust and the chivalry by which all differences are

solved. When the relationship comes to be based upon a moral foundation there is a good chance for understanding, esteem, and co-operation.

Even so the condition laid down by the poet will seem so difficult of realisation, that for many people the fear that "never the twain shall meet" will dominate his later qualification. There may be some who have misgivings lest contacts which were begun with so much cupidity and abuse of power will never lead to any good. Others may hold that the colonial relationship, of which they will detect traces even in the contacts with sovereign Eastern states, is immoral in itself and for ever precludes the realisation of the above mentioned condition. There are people who will admit that the West has achieved great things from the point of view of technique and organisation but that the very one-sidedness of this development has caused it to neglect the spiritual and mental aspects of human progress to such an extent that it stands in need of the lessons of the East rather than that it should presume to teach it. At the antipodes of this view stands that held by others, who believe that most non-Occidental peoples have reached the limits of their capacities and that all efforts to make them attain a fuller brotherhood of mankind are wasted in advance. And, finally, there are people who have no wish to absorb themselves in speculations on the relative value of cultures and societies which differ so profoundly. The organisations, cultures, and religions of the East have a good right to be left alone, they declare, and any attempts on the part of the West to interfere with them are symptoms of good-natured short-sightedness or of intolerant folly, which can only do harm to those whom it is hoped to assist.

THE NEED FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND REFLECTION.

Confronted with these numerous and serious objections against the colonial policy of to-day, we are compelled to begin by answering the elementary questions whether the meeting of East and West is necessary and desirable, and whether colonial policy has been and still is a means of bringing about such a meeting and has therefore, at least in a large part of the overseas territories, a right to exist. If these questions must be answered in the negative or without real conviction, there is no point in pursuing the

object of our examination. On the other hand the essence, the aims, and the methods of the policy of colonising states will stand out in perfect clearness even before they are examined in details, if only the point of view they adopt towards this essential question is once clearly realised.

It cannot be denied that some of the objections enumerated above contain an element of self-criticism which is altogether worthy of respect. They draw attention to the necessity for self-knowledge and for reflection as a preliminary to the performance of the colonial task.

It is an excellent thing that throughout the colonial world there is a growing conviction that the development of Oriental populations must proceed from severe scientific premises and that it should not be subjected, as it has been in the past, to changing personal conceptions. This is why the study of customary law, ethnology, sociology and similar sciences is being encouraged. But too little attention is still paid to the fundamental truth that the West cannot fulfil its task of guidance without a thorough probing of its own being, its forces and its ideals. It must acquire an understanding of the how and wherefore of its own social organisation, of the causes that created and preserved its own structure. The powerful roots through which the West has sucked up its culture, and which reach back to the worlds of Israel and early Christianity, to Hellas and to Rome, these roots which pass without break through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, must be clearly distinguished.

When once a knowledge of the immense reservoir of force which has accumulated through the ages and shaped Western society has been acquired, when it has been seen what colossal moral tension has been developed for the guidance and the control of these forces, it will be understood how much the foundations of most Eastern communities will have to be strengthened before they can in their own interest be allowed to give these forces free play.

We and our Eastern friends must not eschew, therefore, the questions asked by those who doubt their own ability and that of Western and Eastern society to fulfil the task that is waiting in the East. All objections deserve consideration, because it is by facing them that all workers will be able to fulfil their task with enthusiasm, and that they will acquire a true conception of the

precautions that are required by colonial policy and its executants if it is to protect Eastern communities and their members from disintegration.

The influence of closer contact

All the arguments against the possibility of a meeting of East and West have this in common, that they express a fear for the results of an intimate contact between two worlds that differ so fundamentally. Let us note in passing that the terms East and West are meant as a comprehensive designation for the spiritual and psychological differences between the modern social, economic and political forms of organisation on the one hand, and the simpler social communities that exist on the other hand. Those who object to the meeting of the two social organisations point to the fact that peoples who have not reached a high degree of modern development become, under the influence of the ideas, the institutions and the technique of the West, estranged from their own dispensation, without acquiring a sufficient hold on the new, which transcends their comprehension and their adaptability. Dissatisfaction and restlessness, a weakening of the social sense, revealing itself by all kinds of symptoms of moral degeneration, such may well be the results of the loss of social equilibrium.

Another argument stresses the danger to the great Eastern cultures, to the religion, the art, the philosophy which form the moral basis of Eastern life and which are shaken by the impact of modern civilisation. The fear is expressed that the cultural impoverishment, which can by no means always be compensated by Western civilisation, will advance more rapidly as the relations between the two worlds increase in volume. After a process of toning down, utter monotony would take the place of the wealth of variation which at one time gave expression to the many-sidedness of the human mind.

The frame of mind which inspires these considerations also manifests itself in the West, where it deplors the passing of all that is old, and bitterly disapproves of modern life with its mass production and the consequent debasing of the artistic sense. It is not surprising that, when great cultures are in danger, even stronger protests are heard.

Much more, indeed, is at stake in the meeting of East and West. It does not merely imply that something old is dying off. Things that live or are perfectly fit to live are frequently ousted by alien novelties which cannot be assimilated and which violate the national soul. The warning voices raised against the impoverishment of Eastern culture are by no means only those of dreamers who stand outside the present and who wish to mummify living societies into a museum of dead forms of Oriental custom. On the contrary, these protests result from a profound wisdom, which recognises that in society as in nature the principle of life requires, for the full expression of its creative power, an infinite variety of form and of colour. They testify to a belief in the organic unity of all the unconscious needs of the popular soul, with its capacity for social constructiveness, a fact to which attention has been drawn but recently by sociology and by the studies of psychological and morphological subjects inspired by sociology.

Nor is the conservative instinct of Eastern societies always as narrow-minded a counsellor as disappointed reformers have imagined. It prevents hurried changes and novelties, which might conceivably stop the development of autochthonous forms and would hinder the growth of the national soul. Whenever this intuitive cautiousness subjects foreign importations to an almost distrusting scrutiny it is working in the interest of a peaceful transition by which new stimulants are dissolved by the old kernel into a natural organic growth.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the contacts of East and West remained too fugitive to enable cultural influences to be more than superficial. Western authority found it easier to carry out its commercial aims indirectly through Indigenous administration and remained very aloof from the life of the people. It was only at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when a realisation of moral obligations towards the population began to make itself felt, that the authorities attempted to enter into closer contacts.

How ignorant they were before appears from the fact that until then the existence of ancient village administrations in India and in Java had escaped notice, although their significance as a nucleus of social organisation and local administration must have been as great to the people of India, China, Japan, Indo-China,

Siam, and the Dutch East Indies as it was in Western Europe before the feudal period.

Then it was that the authorities took steps to further the material welfare of the populations, and to improve education. This departure, together with the extraordinary activity displayed by the missions at this period, as well as the increase of trade and traffic, were the factors which created the very problem which our own time is trying to solve.

Meanwhile the East was trying to absorb the new ideas which were beginning to make their influence felt. This absorption did not everywhere proceed at the same pace.

I n d i a

In India, where the great missionary pioneer Alexander Duff was performing such memorable work, and where numerous eminent liberal statesmen succeeded each other at the beginning of the century, there came into existence the healthy reform movement of the Brahmo Samaj, which raised great hopes, especially when in 1857 it came under the guidance of Keshub Chandra Sen, who led it in the direction of a harmonious synthesis of the best elements of Indian and European cultures. The life of this man, of whom Lord Ronaldshay has written that "he, more than any man, showed by precept and by example that the gulf between Europe and Asia might be bridged without the sacrifice of anything that was fundamental in the race-genius or the race-culture of either," is good reading for those who doubt too readily the possibility of a meeting of East and West. Keshub and his predecessor Mohan Roy are living proofs that the condition laid down by Kipling for the meeting of East and West is not impossible. These manly, strong figures, full of chivalry and of a wide understanding of human duty, display the moral strength which will bring about what the power of conquerors never could effect: the harmonious co-operation and unity of two worlds.

The Brahmo Samaj was gradually left behind by the Arya Samaj movement which, after 1875, exercised a growing influence. It revealed some of that ferment of spirit which had resulted from an over-liberal distribution of Western leaven, starting with an exaggerated contempt for Hindu civilisation to be followed by a reaction, equally exaggerated, against Western influences. The

extreme wing of Arya Samaj wanted to break altogether with Western thought and aimed at a renaissance of ancient Hinduism. The moderates continued Keshub's tradition, and worked for the establishment of a rational synthesis of Eastern and Western culture.

J a p a n

The work which had been attempted by Indian leaders was performed in Japan by the Samurai, an *élite* of men hardened by a tradition of centuries and thoroughly familiarised with the handling of affairs of state. It is to their devotion, their clear-sightedness and their chivalry that a grateful nation attributes its remarkable development and vitality, and not to modern armaments and technique. The latter means, which are so often considered by superficial judges to be the only cause of the Japanese revival, may be indispensable for the life of a community, but without a spiritual evolution, without a moral basis and an inherent vigour, they could not subsist for a single day.

The Japanese leaders acquainted themselves with Western science and made ready use of the assistance and guidance that were offered. But they remained in power themselves, and were able to strengthen the national sub-structure of their country. Notwithstanding all the differences, the task they performed in dealing with their own people bears a remarkable resemblance to the mission the colonial powers have set themselves with regard to their Eastern populations. There are critics who are horrified each time a modern technical improvement is introduced into the East, and who deplore modern transport as having disturbed the homogeneous and picturesque aspect of ancient Eastern capitals. Those especially who belong to the genuine friends of Japan's traditional culture and spiritual life find much to regret in all the changes that have occurred. In so far as a forced Westernisation may threaten what is worth preserving, these criticisms are justified. But changes which result from a mentality very different from that which in olden days inspired artists and sages, and are perhaps to a large extent the consequence of economic relationships which, in the midst of modern world traffic, cannot possibly be arrested, can only be criticised by people who have become estranged from reality ¹⁾.

¹⁾ See Ino Dan, *Japanese Art and its Modernisation*, in the Institute of Pacific Re-

That the Japanese should never forget or forfeit their own soul or their creative mind was a prime consideration which guided their leaders in every sphere of action. A similar preoccupation increasingly animates colonial policy which also aims at preserving the soul of the peoples that are entrusted to it, and the characteristics that are their very own, but it refuses to sacrifice the demands of life to the phantoms of the past. The true synthesis is, in its opinion, a conjunction of thoroughly healthy vital forces, and not the chaining together of what is vital with what is doomed to die.

C h i n a : D u t c h E a s t I n d i e s

Moving in our survey from India and Japan to China and the Dutch East Indies, we shall detect endeavours of the same nature as those which drew our attention in the first two countries. Owing to its enormous area and to the increased difficulties of administrative organisation, in the case of China a longer process was required before the *élite* was able to call the nation to a higher consciousness. Among the high thinkers, mention should be made of Chang Chih-Tung, who at the end of the last century addressed to his countrymen his famous warning call "learn!" and also of K'ang Yu-Wei and Liang Ch' i-Ch'ao.

The spiritual revival in the Dutch East Indies is of a somewhat later date, because the East Indian Archipelago was less directly involved in the growth of world traffic and because education on a Western basis, such as was given in China by the missionaries, was still very restricted in the Indies and on the whole available only to the children of the chiefs and of the notables. Although education mainly aims at the individual, it is able to work upon him with a rapidity which greatly surpasses that of the influence of trade, traffic, and government activity. It is natural, therefore, that aspirations, unheard of in the past, manifested themselves first of all in the circles of the nobility whose higher position had kept their spiritual horizon least restricted.

It is here that a new consciousness was developed, which eventually organised itself in Boedi Oetomo, a society of Javanese

lations, Second General Session, July, 1927, and his view that at the present time Japan is making as great an effort for the expression of its own artistic soul as any other nation, or as it made in any former age.

nobles, characterised by a sane, progressive programme of reforms and by a rational mode of thinking. Perhaps the best formulation of the spirit of these leaders is that given in the works of Kartini, a woman whose outlook is made up equally of Western and of Eastern elements. In the tribute which they both pay to her, East and West really "meet" in a common chivalry.

I n c r e a s e d c o n t a c t s

The leaders of the young reform movements throughout the East were nowhere prepared to give up their own identity in favour of that of the West. They wanted very much to remain themselves, but they realised that the *Zeitgeist* was overflowing the geographical frontier of the West, and that it was destined to embrace the whole surface of the earth. They were perfectly ready to learn from the Occidentals who had been the first to hear the call of this spirit; they desired as soon as possible to catch up with them and to close the ranks of the vast army of humanity in which their own gifts could find a use among the variety which a higher ordination has distributed to all nations. They perceived the dangers to which their secluded self-contained condition was exposing their own nature. They realised that their identity could only maintain itself through intensified activity, throwing out stronger roots and creating new forms. They were prepared to make great sacrifices in order to bring about a national movement tending towards greater dynamic activity and a more intense personal consciousness, in the same way as the West had to make its own renunciation when freeing itself from the clinging embrace of the Middle-Ages.

If East and West had been able everywhere to make sure of the supremacy of the tendencies embodied in this spirit there would have been no occasion for misgivings lest their meeting should have a dissolving effect. But the pressure and the impetus of Western civilisation and the onrush of Eastern youth, often not less unbridled, did not pay sufficient regard, in most countries, to the delicate equilibrium that would have assured a moderate progress in the East. World traffic carries thousands of men away from their own surroundings by the transport of goods and of produce and exercises a constant influence which no statistics could represent.

Ancient forms of production and of consumption are modified as a result, while they cease to be inter-related in the old manner. The older uniformity, the soil in which the common feeling of communities was rooted, gradually disappears as a consequence. Society becomes differentiated, division of labour begins to appear, and simultaneously a change comes over social requirements. There is a falling off of the respect for ancient custom and for Adat law, and even the outlook of the people becomes modified.

Although such changes are usually gradual, they ring in a stage of transition, during which the whole society becomes more mobile, fluctuating, and restless, while the task of the authorities is made heavier in consequence. New supports are required to bolster up old institutions, collaboration in accordance with the principles of Adat must transform itself into conscious co-operation, and the communal sense must dissolve itself into personality on the one hand and public spirit on the other. In the absence of a powerful leadership, this transvaluation of all values must inevitably lead to chaos, which before new directives have been discovered, may lead to the loss of innumerable lives.

Furthermore, the concomitant of world traffic is a maze of roads throughout the interior of the countries and the rise, as by enchantment, of powerful commercial cities, Occidental in their construction and in their function, which draw an immense hinterland into their sphere of influence. Among archaic surroundings numerous modern agricultural and industrial enterprises rise up. World organisations, powerful and led by brains that have at their disposal the technical experience of centuries, rub shoulders with patriarchally organised rustic communities.

In its endeavour to assist Eastern society towards the strengthening of its structure, the authorities find themselves compelled further to increase the quantity of innovations by administrative intervention, measures of public welfare, hygienic care, education, etc. Their goodwill notwithstanding, they will not prove infallible, their wish to give guidance and protection may well lead to excessive interference, and their zeal for strengthening the autochthonous structure may impair the edifice or lead to the suppression of certain elements which later would have proved to be of the greatest service. It is clear, then, that the attempt to allow a popu-

lation to develop along lines of its own is both rational and worthy of the deepest respect, but also that the greatest efforts are needed to bring such an undertaking to a successful issue.

This is why the conservative instinct is such a valuable guide. It creates a marvellous harmony between the gradually disappearing economy of barter and the spread of the monetary system. It preserves the link between wage-earner or contract labourer and the village field, and offers points of contact between the ultra-modern ideas of local autonomy and co-operation on the one hand and archaic institutions like the village community and the idea of mutual service which is its concomitant, on the other. It is sometimes bold enough to interpret in its own fashion measures or hints of the central administration and does not save over-enthusiastic reformers from disappointment.

The quiet though brave struggle of these miniature communities which together compose Eastern societies should not reduce the reformer to despair, nor tempt him to declare that Eastern society is incapable of progress. Rather should he be inclined to give his earnest attention to usages which continue to exist apart from legal prescriptions such as those concerning village justice or the disposal of common land. Provided they can be socially utilised, he should not reject them merely because some reserve may be necessary in sanctioning them. The wise administrator, in his policy, will always try to ensure a useful function to everything in Eastern society that is vital and fit for social usage.

The danger of reaction and of disintegration

The quiet struggle between the old and the new is not always waged with a due regard for the necessity of a transition stage, so advisable especially in view of the difficulties that are bound to arise even in the most favourable circumstances. If the new influences become too strong for the power of absorption and of adaptability of Oriental society and if they break through the wall of conservative instinct, the result will be the disintegration of the old social organism, which may cause, as it has done in the case of some populations or groups, its complete destruction ¹⁾. Or if the conservative instinct has remained sufficiently alive in the masses

¹⁾ Cf. Pitt Rivers, *The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races*, 1927.

and only certain definite circles have become unfaithful to ancestral fashion, the people as an ultimate means of salvation depart from the moderate and adaptable character of this conservative instinct, and a sharp reaction which aims at the exclusion of foreign and indigestible elements takes its place for the time being.

This frame of mind lay probably at the basis of the Sepoy rebellion and of the Boxer movement ¹⁾. The incidental occasion which brought about the conflagration is only of secondary importance. Similar experiences have been registered during the most recent disturbances in the Dutch East Indies and the enquiry which followed these events revealed only a limited number of grievances, none of which, taken separately or *en bloc*, could provide an adequate explanation of what had taken place. But they enabled the investigators to sense the frame of mind which can so easily come into existence at periods of transition, especially if it has been fostered by hostile international propaganda.

In former times a nation could safeguard its own character by taking refuge in seclusion. At more than one period of their history China ²⁾ and Japan have had recourse to this safeguard. The instinctive withdrawal into splendid isolation is as old as mankind, and it will be found either in a latent, a passive, an active or an aggressive form in every nation in the world.

In our own time the remedy of isolation is no longer available. If a too strong cultural pressure is exercised upon a nation, the effort towards recovering lost equilibrium is bound in the long run to result in a reactionary crisis. No authority, whether national or colonial, can bar the expansion of world traffic with everything it implies. Continual vigilance may check excessive economic or spiritual influences, while making the population able to defend itself in the material and in the moral sense. But authority can also, and without any bad faith, increase the unrest of the Indigenous community by too many reforms, especially if they tend to weaken the existing social links, and by failing to restrain the impetus of modern economic influence. Too much

¹⁾ V. Chirol, *India Old and New*; Vinayak Savarkar, *History of the War of Independence of 1857*; George Nye Steiger, *China and the Occident*.

²⁾ Richard Wilhelm *Werden und Wandel des Chinesischen Kulturkreises*, 1928, p. 99.

tolerance may also be displayed towards the seditious, whether they be Occidental or Oriental. And finally there is danger in ill-considered efforts to spread Western education to an extent which goes beyond existing needs or in a manner which alienates Orientals from their own surroundings.

Since the days of Macaulay, who believed that all monies available for education in India "would be best employed in English education alone" ¹⁾, conceptions have vastly improved, owing to the experience subsequently gathered. Popular education, it is now duly realised, is at least as important as the Western learning which only touches a few select circles. Much more emphasis is now being laid upon the need for an education which will help people in their own natural sphere, instead of causing them to break their connection with the Eastern *milieu*. Even if, owing to practical difficulties, such a breach cannot be avoided, society still offers many openings for the utilisation of the capacities which have been acquired. In so far as modern technical enterprise, Government services etc., are in need of their labours, educated Orientals will not present a serious problem. One may even say that the duty of education is to produce the necessary number of persons trained in the modern fashion. But once all the vacancies have been filled there remains a need for men who are able to raise themselves in their own surroundings with the aid of the knowledge they have acquired. Their labour will exactly provide the kind of tonic which is most needed by Oriental society. The first condition for their success will be found in their lasting familiarity with the life of their people. To make this possible is one of the most difficult tasks of education. It is at any rate a considerable step forward that the existence of this need is increasingly realised by those who are responsible.

It is obvious that when every year hundreds or thousands of young men whom a one-sided Western education has thoroughly alienated from their surroundings return to the old society, consequences of the gravest kind must ensue ²⁾. They are completely

¹⁾ Lord Ronaldshay, *The Heart of Aryavarta*; Chisol, *op. cit.* pp. 79—80.

²⁾ Lord Ronaldshay, *op. cit.* pp. 45—47, describes the intellectual anarchy which set in in British India about the middle of the nineteenth century, when young men violently denounced everything Eastern. He quotes the Rev. P. C. Mazumdar and Babu Raj Narain Bose, who describe the process in colours that are more sombre still. We shall return to this subject in a later chapter.

at a loss; they neither understand nor are understood, they become more embittered every day, and act as dissolvents and disintegrants in the organism from which a few years of education have removed them by centuries.

When moreover the community itself to which these young men have returned happens to be in travail and under the pressure of social and economic transformation, is somewhat restless, and a prey to that vague malaise which might be diagnosed as indefinable discontent, there exists every risk that a sudden chemical combination will lead to an explosion. A number of imaginary or real grievances will be seized upon as a pretext, but the real grievance eludes all attempts at identification. The authorities must, for that very reason, give it the greatest attention.

It is necessary, therefore, that we should move with the greatest circumspection along the line of contact between East and West. The stronger the pressure of outside elements, the more violent the reaction. A tidal wave of aggressive conservatism will set in, and upon its crest will be carried precisely those elements which have become most alienated from their own patriarchal basis. In their bitter disappointment they will become the spokesmen of a negative and destructive xenophobia. They will soon push the moderate elements into the background; Brahmo Samaj will give way before the more reactionary battle-cries of Arya Samaj. Soon even "Arya for the Aryans" and "Back to the Vedas" become the slogans of moderation. The end will be non-co-operation, *Swadeshi*, boxerism, and boycott, "Asia for the Asiatics" and similar movements. The East would then expel every form of Western influence, even its commercial importations (*Swadeshi*), as though they were germs of disease, while only a few years ago the same influences were hailed with enthusiasm and deemed far superior to the despised products of Oriental culture. Thus has the later reaction been harvested from the seeds of former excess.

This turning of the tide means first and foremost that moral stress and disappointment have called forth a desire once more to be true to one's own self, to return to the period of self-satisfied seclusion and of Hermit Kingdoms, to the blessed time when no European ships had yet set their course towards the East.

We have found that the objections against the meeting of East

and West do not lack a basis of justification. They teach us to beware of one-sided exaggeration in either direction. But this does not mean that we are justified in demanding from colonial policy, which is undoubtedly the most difficult branch of statesmanship, the far-reaching and all embracing vision which is only the attribute of Providence. It may intend to do rightly, and yet fail, because it is so often compelled to act before a problem has been flooded with the light which will only be forthcoming after the lessons of experience have been learned. In criticising colonial policy we must in the first place consider that goodwill is probably not absent, and realise that many errors of judgement have been and still are unavoidable.

The meeting inevitable

History shows that from the very first journeys of discovery the West was driven by an expansive force which it was unable to control. The vehicle rather than the motor of cosmic energy, it compelled the nations of the earth to come forth from their isolation, and to fulfil their part in the economic world-system of which it bore itself the burden.

Great inventions and discoveries, the re-birth of philosophy, art and science, the rise of a prosperous and liberty-loving middle class in the towns, and the shaping of strong national governments in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries let loose unrivalled energies, which had remained dormant in the midst of the self-satisfaction and territorial isolation of little medieval communities. This unfolding of power could no longer be checked. It also revealed itself in the spiritual growth stimulated by men like Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Kepler, Pascal, Newton, and Leibnitz, and the West was urged to perform the task appointed by an ordination that transcends the human will.

In the presence of the grandeur of this period of human development which was destined to benefit the whole world, every inclination to criticism or reproach disappears. We are reminded of the words of the Latin poet which give perhaps the best expression to the common destiny that links the East with the West: "*Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.*"

Space defeated

This quotation is equally applicable to the continual intensifi-

cation of spiritual and material contact between the two worlds. The isolation of nations, which is sometimes symbolically expressed by a reference to the Chinese Wall or the Roman *Limes*, belongs to the past. The sooner we realise that there is no nation, no culture, no race for which the hands of the clock of history will be put back, the sooner shall we understand that isolationist ideas offer no escape from the difficulties of our own time.

By the acceleration of motion, time gives a triumphant solution to the ancient riddle of Zeno. Space is measured by other norms. It is losing its despotic domination over the history of mankind; distances are shrinking and one-time obstacles are becoming links ¹). An international life that gains every day in many-sidedness pours across the national frontiers, adorning itself with the glory of the thought and artistry of all nations. Humanity, divided of old into atoms, has been freed from oppressive barriers and the growth of traffic makes it aware of its essential unity and interdependence. It can now aim at joining its members into one macrocosm which revolves round a common centre.

The great war taught us that this oneness can no longer be challenged with impunity. No nation can inflict suffering upon another without doing harm to itself and to the whole community of nations. If, a score of years ago, Norman Angell still met with considerable scepticism when proclaiming this doctrine, hard experience has given a general vindication to his views which, beyond the possibility of a doubt, will end by receiving universal recognition. To such recognition we already owe the embodiment of the idea of a League of Nations into a concrete organisation. Politics, which usually follow life hesitatingly and from a distance, are adapting themselves almost in every sphere to the co-operation of nations. The period of isolation truly belongs to the past.

Results of this triumph

This transformation is bound to bring great changes into the civilisation of the East. Everything that is unfit to survive in the open atmosphere of world traffic will be lost, but there will be compensation by the acquisition of new cultural values and of

¹) See the map at the beginning of King-Hall's *Western Civilisation and the Far East* which shows four stages of the shrinkage of the Earth between 1840 and 1930

the fruits of international co-operation. It is the grateful task of colonial policy, wherever it has to supervise contacts between the two parts of the world, to safeguard all that is valuable among the dearest possessions of Eastern societies and to ensure that the transition will be as gradual and as organic as possible. This is why we proclaim the necessity of a synthesis of cultures, not the supersession of one culture by another. Even less can there be a question of a clash of cultures, as predicted by many authors both in the East and in the West.

Partial conflicts are not impossible, but they will have to be followed by an immediate drawing together in the same way as proved necessary in Europe. For all nations at present live in each other's proximity and are dependent on one another. The earth has become too small for everyone to be able to go his own way undisturbed. One would be able to consider the warnings of those who preach Armageddon as the *ultima ratio* with more respect, if they proved themselves able to realise that in the fusion of divergent interests incidental conflicts play a part answering to that of the waves in the Gulf Stream.

The main current imposes the movement towards synthesis. Those who deny or who oppose it create a temporary antithesis, which is perilous enough. For apart from destruction and loss of life, it would create the loss of those innumerable cultural values which even the opponents of a meeting of East and West wish to safeguard.

Only a tactful co-operation supported by the belief in the synthesis of cultures will be able to preserve for mankind the wealth of forms which would not fail to be jeopardized by barren antagonism or by abstention. If they walk together in amity the idealists of the East and of the West will find the only true satisfaction of their longings, whereas otherwise they will vainly spend their efforts in non-co-operation, boycott, resistance, and defeatism and fruitlessly endeavour to arrest the advance of a cosmic event.

A meeting to be desired

Not only should one point to the cultural impoverishment which might result from a clash, but one should also realise what an immense increase of cultural wealth has already resulted and will continue to result from this contact. All the more should one

point to this, as by so doing one will be able to appreciate the services rendered by science to the cause of the reconciliation of East and West, and to the part it plays as the adviser of colonial policy in helping it to define the only true basis of its activity, the thorough knowledge of the essence, the cultural capacities, and the moral forces of Eastern societies.

An impressive phalanx of Western scholars has revealed to us not only the old civilisations of Africa, Mesopotamia, India, China, Japan, and the Dutch East Indies, but also the forces of Eastern cultures and religions which are still living in present day society. Standing on their shoulders, innumerable Indian, Chinese, and Japanese scholars are applying sound scientific methods to the further edification of national cultures. Men like Champollion, Maspero, Flinders Petrie, Rawlinson, Layard, Schliemann, Evans, Legge, Chavannes, Pelliot, Max Muller, Kern, Oldenberg, Rhys Davids, Snouck Hurgronje, Goldziher, Wellhausen and so many others have saved whole civilisations from oblivion, have opened to many nations access to their own past, have extended human history by thousands of years, revealed the beauty and the wisdom contained in the Vedas and Upanishads, in the immortal Mahabharata and the Bhagavad Gita, the jewel of the sacred books of the Hindus, in the Chinese classics and in Arabic poetry.

These labours do not benefit the West alone. No nation is able to study its history and its past culture without recourse to the works of these men. They have given to wide circles in the East access to their own history and mental life, while formerly only the silent few could penetrate those regions at the cost of immense labour. The greatest significance of this work of giants resides in its revelation of the mental life and the powers of nations. It is this knowledge which has made possible mutual esteem and the wish for co-operation.

The higher appreciation of oriental ideas

Without the studies of these Western savants primitive society and its magical mysticism would still be as little understood as formerly, and the same old misconceptions about the value of Eastern cultures would continue to subsist. It has also been a fact of the greatest significance that the so-called pagan cults, which used to be as utterly despised as they were misunderstood, have

been discovered to contain in many cases a deep religious conviction and a definite urge towards moral improvement and spiritual perfection. Nothing tends so much to widen the chasm between nations as this misunderstanding of each others' spiritual possessions.

In Buddhism the living force has been detected which we discover in Asoka and which through the Zen sect has probably contributed most in shaping the spirit of Japan. Hinduism has commanded respect by its conception of the unity of all living things, and Confucianism by the high morality of its teachings and its conception of good citizenship. In Taoism we have learned to see a doctrine where a certain cultural fatigue leads men to dream of a happy state of nature and to give themselves over to speculations about the oneness of opposites. Studies have appeared about Islam which prove that its philosophy, its science, and its mysticism play an immensely important part in the lives of millions of people. We shall have more to say about the value of Eastern religions at a later stage. It is vitally important to stress at the outset that without an appreciation of the mental outlook of other nations and of their aspiration towards the satisfaction of their religious and aesthetic needs no real basis for co-operation can be found, and no sound basis for colonial statesmanship is conceivable.

East and West drawing together

The devoted labours of hundreds of its best sons, which now form the basis for the fraternal studies of scholars in the East and in the West, have afforded proof that the West can really by its contact with other nations produce fruits which will benefit them and the whole of mankind. This preservation, this renovation, this enrichment of cultures deserves the attention of those who put themselves against the meeting of East and West. It should be the object of the strenuous endeavours of all to help in bringing about this scientifically constructive labour, and to further the inter-penetration of the mind of the West and the soul of the East which will result in their mutual enrichment.

We may fittingly end this chapter dealing with the meeting of East and West, and with the absolute necessity of inter-racial contacts by reproducing the warning recently addressed

to his compatriots by that distinguished mind, Mr. Gupta. He says: "Non-co-operation can after all at its best be only a negative virtue and it is not by petulance and turning our faces away from the light of day that we will serve the best interests of the country" ¹⁾).

These are the words of a man who has served his country for thirty years in a responsible position, who has, in the course of his work, sensed as no one else the purport of the deepest problems of popular education and colonial statesmanship. From his strong conviction, which stands out with equal vigour in the works and speeches of many others both in the East and in the West, whose mental alertness and broad-mindedness are far superior to the spiritual narrowness of the exclusivists and non-co-operators, we may draw with some confidence the conclusion that it is the policy of the synthesis of cultures which will lead us along the right road, and that its ultimate triumph is assured against the doctrine of non-co-operation.

¹⁾ Gupta, *The Foundations of National Progress* (Calcutta 1927), p. IX.

CHAPTER II

THE CALL OF LEADERSHIP

From "white man's burden" to universal human task

The West has so far been able to carry the burden, to which not so many years ago Kipling could still refer as an exclusively Western duty, whereas nowadays one can already look with pride upon the host of men and of women who have risen in the East and taken their place in the ranks, in order to help bear the burden. Already now the task self-imposed upon various nations is losing its exclusively Western aspect: it has become part of a collective sense of responsibility for world peace, world co-operation, and world progress.

Meanwhile, the relationships which still exist in our own time in many parts of the colonial world compel us to enquire into the basis and the nature of the leadership in order to establish whether it was necessary for the West to undertake this task at all. We shall have to discover why the meeting of East and West once demanded and often still demands leadership, of what it had to consist, and when it will have achieved its aim. In the process, we shall attempt to dispel that attitude of depreciation and doubt which too often characterises those who tackle these problems, and in its stead induce a spirit of faith and conviction.

There are many people who, while agreeing that East and West should meet, cannot admit that the establishment of Western authority was necessary or even desirable in order to achieve this object. They hold that the political dependence of weaker races or peoples, resulting from the establishment of this authority, is immoral and deplorable. They would like to see this meeting take place in full freedom, without any interference on the part of Western authority.

The consideration for the political freedom of other people which appears from this attitude deserves respect, and is closely related to the moral conceptions which animate modern leadership. This doctrine, however, is not without its weakness, in case it induces its adherents to disregard the claims of the present in favour of those of the future, to under-estimate the forces which are the prerequisite of freedom and independence, and, most particularly, in case it has no eye for entirely different forms of bondage which can make the life of the individual intolerable to a far greater extent than the lack of political freedom.

Objections to the leadership of the West

We are unhappily familiar with the results of free or insufficiently controlled intercourse between East and West, and between the vanguard of the Western economic movement and the weakly organised societies in other parts of the world. From the conquest of Mexico and Peru to similar experiences made in more recent times in Africa and in the Pacific, sufficient data are at our disposal to establish that freedom easily leads to free-booting, unless the disparity between the forces of the two parties concerned is not too considerable.

It is only a strongly organised authority, whether national or foreign, which can preserve the equilibrium between weak social units that are still in the course of development, and the all-pervading phalanx of organised modern expansion. A few states such as Japan, China, Siam, Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey have been able to face this task. They have either used their own forces, or have acted under foreign guidance, and their success, which so far has often been no more than partial, has been made possible by particularly favourable circumstances which by no means apply everywhere. There have been cases in which a sense of cultural solidarity formed a ready groundwork for national consciousness. To some of the factors which prepared these conditions we shall revert when we discuss particular aspects of colonial policy. We shall then see that most regions which compose the modern colonial world have been much less favourably placed than a country like Japan, which, at least since 1600 A. D., has potentially been a nation and a great Power.

It may be useful to point in passing to difficulties such as these:

they make the outlines of our own task stand out in greater relief. By understanding the difficulties met by other people we shall feel more tolerant towards them. The struggle of China's millions to organise themselves into a nation will then appear to us as an arduous march hampered by numerous obstacles, with which we are perfectly familiar through our own leadership of Oriental societies. Sympathetic insight will soon take the place of depreciating prejudice, which misjudges the depth and the extent of the problems that have to be grappled with.

The essence of leadership

When there is reason to believe that a nation has within itself a large cohesive force which, under the guidance of a small *élite* able at the same time to sense the national soul and the spirit of modern times, can acquire the unity of consciousness which forms the basis of national life, the West may well leave the fulfilment of this calling to the national *élite* itself. But when, as was the case in the colonial world, the factors for this acquisition of consciousness were entirely or mainly lacking, while at the same time there was no possibility of arresting the contact between East and West, the only result of an attitude of aloofness would have consisted in infinite chaos which sooner or later would have endangered the peace of the world.

A vigorous authority of foreign origin had to occupy the vacant seat of power. If this authority wishes to encourage the factors making for the consolidation of Eastern society and for its eventual autonomy, it will find itself confronted with precisely the same task as that which in more favourable circumstances would be accomplished by an Oriental national authority. National and colonial governments must in many respects treat their populations in the same manner; they meet with the same difficulties and may almost consider themselves as colleagues executing identical tasks.

We must utter an emphatic warning against the views of those who attribute every kind of complication that is met in the colonial world to the conditions obtaining in this world. As soon as one takes a wider view it becomes obvious that difficulties of exactly the same nature are met with along the whole line of contact between the spirit of the twentieth century and that of former ages.

It is for this reason that the task of leadership, whether in the colonies or elsewhere, calls for a dual function: that of protection and that of calling forth the power of self-exertion. Only when this dual function is adhered to can the life of the people, rooted as it is in ancient institutions, escape to a certain degree from disintegrating influences, until such time as it becomes capable of resistance by a new unfolding of its own vigour.

To call forth the people's power of self-exertion was a mission which scarcely interested the authorities during the first two centuries of colonial expansion. Even the task of protection only began to appeal to the West after a long process of evolution. The direct administration established in their colonies by Spain, Portugal, and later also by France, or the administration by the big French, English, and Dutch Companies was already a great advance over the free-booting system which was first allowed in many colonial conquests and could still be met at a later stage in more than one part of the world.

There was one serious objection to the Company-system, although it undeniably aimed at more orderly conditions. It considered the interests of the populations as entirely subordinate to the requirements of commercial profit and consequently it tolerated many excesses for two centuries. Furthermore, colonial authority was at this period not sufficiently powerful to afford protection to the indigenous population. Even if they had wished to do so, the central authorities would have been utterly incapable of adequately protecting them against the enterprise of private persons or against the vexations of local administration.

It should not be thought that Western commercial, agricultural, and mining enterprises necessarily aimed, in former centuries, at oppression and exploitation. The tendency to succumb to these temptations should rather be ascribed to the absence of resistance on the part of defenceless communities. On the other hand the view that idyllic situations existed everywhere until the arrival of the men from the West should find just as little credence. Weak Oriental societies were, as much before the first meetings with the West as after them, the victims of the worldly-wise and the strong, whether autochthonous or foreign. It follows that in the intensive contacts of the twentieth century, with its imposing world-organisations, they should less than ever be

thrown on their own resources, if such freedom would benefit not themselves but outsiders ¹⁾).

The task of protection

Too much attention may, in fact, be given to the question of political freedom. Personal, social, economic, and spiritual bondage, which are felt to a much higher degree in the daily life of every household, usually remain unnoticed and are left out of the picture. If Western authority withdrew altogether from the colonial world, modern enterprise would not go with it. There might be a few individual withdrawals, but wholesale desertion would be impossible for a long time to come. The industrial world cannot subsist without the produce of the tropical and sub-tropical regions which compose the colonial world. Modern economy is indissolubly linked up with these territories and with their future. It is only when the Eastern populations are able to satisfy the world demand by their own energy and organising power, only when they will succeed in finding the direct way towards the world market, an achievement most of them have so far proved incapable even of attempting, that foreign enterprise will find it possible to withdraw.

Foreign enterprise certainly would not welcome the abdication of Western authority, in case this would imply the disappearance of public order, modern transport, traffic etc. In that case, however, even worse consequences would follow for the Eastern communities. Human nature is such that we may take it for granted that organisms with a weak social and political structure would not be able to resist for long, if left defenceless to exploitation on a large scale. What happens at the present day along the line of contact between modern production and archaic economy, from the point of view of the use of the land, of the supply of labour, and of the penetration of money-economy, proves this up to the hilt. It is not without reason that modern writers on colonial questions have emphasised the need for wise agrarian legislation. It is not without good cause that colonial authorities which are conscious of their responsibility try to strengthen in-

¹⁾ See P. H. Kerr, *An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, 1915, p. 149, and A. E. Zimmern, in *Progress in Government*, "Unity Series", II, p. 163, edited by F. S. Marvin.

indigenous society by credit institutions, co-operative movements, and labour legislation, and by rousing its power of economic self-defence, in order to save it from being overwhelmed by the flood of new influences.

We are, moreover, not merely concerned with the contrast between Western enterprise and intellect on the one hand and Eastern society on the other. The conflict is really one between the modern mind and its methods and the simplicity of ancient days. This modern spirit has called into existence, in all Western countries that have witnessed its birth, a whole crowd of mighty creations which preserve the social equilibrium, such as personal and social consciousness, the democratic idea, public spirit, the solidarity of the weak, etc. In societies where this counterpoise is being only slowly established the unbridled power of dynamic progress would make its appearance as a knight in full armour in the midst of a defenceless multitude who do not even realise the value of modern forms of collaboration. We do not suggest that there are people who would set out deliberately to take advantage of these circumstances. But circumstances themselves, which are an indefinable and yet all-pervading factor that always finds out the weakest spot in an organism, would slowly but surely cause things to drift in the wrong direction. We have only to look back into the near past, at the rise of the mining industry in Europe for instance, to realise the need for the protective function of leadership.

The time may come, and in the case of India appears to have come already, when these protective and constructive functions may be safely left to the *élite* within the Eastern society. One day this society will have learned to provide for its own spiritual and material self-defence, or will have succeeded in bridding the centrifugal forces that are active within itself. Japan and to a certain extent Siam have been able to do this already. But generally speaking the *élite* is still far too small, and in the colonial world many elements which in Japan had been in existence for centuries are still lacking. At present Western leadership has everywhere begun to welcome the co-operation of such an *élite*, in the same way as it has made use in the past and still continues to use the mediation of autochthonous authorities, whether popular or autocratic. But, weaned from Western leadership, indigenous

groups and administrative organs would still as a rule be unable to preserve the balance among the organisms of a modern state. They must, before they can undertake such a task, find an effective counterpoise for selfishness, personal ambition and group-egoism.

We do not wish to imply that the West is free from these evils. In this as in other matters the difference is one of degree, not one of essence. But small percentages will often make all the difference. Without a certain measure of public spirit no society can exist. Now public spirit in the modern sense is a quality usually alien to members of patriarchal groups where the democratic sense of responsibility so far finds no place in the scheme of things. In consequence some people will advise the continuation of autocratic Western authority. Others will prefer the return, accompanied by some special safeguards, of Eastern autocratic power; while still others, identifying the democratic form with the national consciousness which alone can instil life and significance into it, demand the right of complete self-government in favour of a small *élite* with Western education.

These demands are made in the name of the whole population, but if they were granted in full they would have results that would strangely surprise these populations. For they would amount to the establishment of modernised autocracy with just the difference that a young *élite* would be invested with the oligarchic attributes which formerly belonged to an Eastern aristocracy. In the Philippines the *élite* stands for a solution in this sense. Yet, although this would agree in principle with the wishes of the whole American nation, neither President Taft nor President Coolidge has seen his way to accepting it, because it would not be in conformity with the interests of the inhabitants. Without sufficient counterpoise from within the community, a small circle endowed with great power soon becomes an exclusive oligarchy.

Furthermore, there would nowadays always be the danger of a combination of the economic and political power in the same hands, which would lead to the worst of all tyrannies, to systematic despotism. This is a difficulty which applies not only to one particular population, but to mankind as a whole. Nowhere yet have human beings proved able in the long run to carry the bur-

den of power without counterpoise. Whether one regrets these facts or not, whether one considers that the spiritual, social, and economic development of a community is a process far more difficult than the creation of a small *élite* or the modernisation of ancient autocracy, such one-sided growths are not tolerated by the spirit of our time.

Although in many countries the continuance of autocratic power, whether Eastern or Western, is still an imperative necessity, it is not destined to last for ever. The growth of world-traffic will eventually put an end to it. That is why it is far better to realise that the force of circumstances imposes popular consciousness, popular self-defence, and popular responsibility as the only form of government that will live in the future. It is not by accident that in autocratically governed independent Eastern states the democratic idea, however alien it may be to their nature, demands ever growing concessions.

Development, albeit gradual and in conformity with the nature of Oriental societies, remains absolutely unavoidable, and not only in specific circles or social layers, but throughout these communities. The spirit of the times has created a marvellous organisation which will not rest till it has drawn the whole world within its field of action. It has also given birth to other forces: personality, the civic sense, and the democratic idea. They unite the direction, the rhythm, and the pace of progress into an harmonious forward movement which will impart consciousness and dignity to mankind.

Even in the West this harmony is by no means always perfect. The social sense and the responsibility of democracies still leave much to be desired. But even such relative harmony as exists in the West could not be achieved in Oriental societies unless the forces which can bring harmony are simultaneously developed while these societies are in the process of being modernised. Colonial and national authorities, when confronted with the problem of modernisation, display wisdom whenever they prove that they do not conceive of the contrast between East and West as being purely geographical. Wherever the modern spirit makes its influence felt, the problems connected with the meeting of East and West arise and call for the exercise of leadership and protection.

The method of protection

If, to take an example, indigenous life shows a tendency towards the development of big landownership, big industry, and in general towards modern methods of production, the need will arise for a corresponding strengthening of social organisation, of civic sense, and of respect for human dignity. Otherwise the balance will become disturbed and intolerable situations arise. The problems thus encountered may be illustrated by the danger of calling into existence a landless proletariat as noticed by Temple in Nigeria, because crafty and rapacious individuals are nowhere lacking among Africans or Orientals themselves.

Confronted with these real dangers, one becomes more inclined to welcome timely intervention and preventive action on the part of colonial governments by means of a wise agrarian legislation, such as has been developed in Nigeria, where, as in many other colonies, measures have had to be taken which one could not fairly judge if one were not aware of the circumstances which called them forth ¹⁾).

The methods by which this protection is to be extended present many difficulties. A real dilemma at once arises. There are people who reject any form of protection such as that given to the population in Nigeria. It leaves nothing, they argue, to indigenous initiative. Only bitter experience can prepare these populations for autonomy. If latifundia are forming in the hands of certain individuals, they will give rise to a landless proletariat which is bound in the long run to cause a reaction. There is much to be said for this argument. For in society as in nature there is an organic capacity for creating compensating pressures and counterpoises. It is a question whether the development of latifundia or big industrial enterprise is one of the symptoms of a general mental and social metamorphosis, or whether it is an incidental phenomenon due to special circumstances. In the first case the necessary counterpoise is bound to arise within African or Eastern society itself, but in the second case a forceful intervention of the authorities will be indispensable.

The cry of "leave them alone", which is so frequently uttered, nowadays, and by no means always without reason, must be condemned with the same vigour as indiscriminate interference by the

¹⁾ C. L. Temple, *Native Races and their Rulers*, 1918, p. 145.

authorities. Western communities have learned to satisfy almost automatically the requirements of the increasing world traffic, but communities of a different nature are still unable to cope with it unless they receive help from outside. This is why they want protection to-day, and training for self-defence for the future. The energy which can strike or stay its hand at will, but remains equally concentrated and equally active in either attitude differs altogether from the fatalism which allows events to take their own course. Abstention which proceeds from justifiable prudence and from respect for the nature of others we may accept; but that which is the result of indifference and fatalism should never receive our approval ¹⁾.

There is a policy which tries to keep the golden mean between abstention and continual interference. Realising that most Oriental societies are still too weak to be able to resist the maelstrom of world traffic and to organise their own defence for the future, it accepts in so far as it is necessary in various territories the task of leadership, and will even allow itself to interfere with the course of events. It is aware that in weakly organised societies the demand for immediate and complete autonomy overlooks the necessity of social growth. To admit it would open the door to disruption, oppression, degeneration, and real subjection, notwithstanding, or rather as a result of the acquisition of external independence.

Political overlordship of one nation over another nowadays undoubtedly goes against our moral sense. But if it is considered as belonging to the transitional division of labour which has been determined by world-history, and is felt by those who exercise it as a moral urge to serve the weaker peoples, it receives a justification of a higher order, provided always that it be exercised in honest fulfilment of this urge towards guidance and protection. The leadership must not be based upon pride of domination or upon the desire to exploit, but upon a sense of duty. Neither should it lend itself to being used in order to subordinate the interests of the population to those of public or private enterprise, nor should it lead us to disregard the demands of the spirit of the time or hinder the co-operation of East and West. Leadership

¹⁾ Cf. F. S. Marvin, Introduction to *Western Races and the World*, "Unity Series", VI, p. 18 (1922).

must hold an impartial balance, weigh the rights and the needs of each interest against those of all others. It must fulfil the function of umpire whenever necessary, but as a general rule it should encourage the kind of collaboration which makes arbitration superfluous.

When such conceptions of leadership are held in honour, public authority ceases to be purely Occidental in the narrower sense of the word, even before a transfer of power actually takes place. The authorities will then appear as a living, active embodiment of the synthesis of East and West, in which the dependence of Eastern society is obliterated. A fusion takes place and a spirit of collaboration in a common task is awakened to which both parties contribute according to their full capacity, without reservation or thoughts of domination and submission, without discrimination between the various functions temporarily imposed by an indispensable division of labour.

The task of calling forth the power of self-defence

The two tasks of protection and of calling forth the power of self-defence continually overlap, but they are not by any means identical. The latter is directed forward and requires more foresight, it necessitates the existence of a definite scheme, a great knowledge of the essence of the West and of the nature of the East. As a task it will come more easily to national authorities because they are usually supported by national aspirations, while colonial authorities are exposed to misunderstanding and even to opposition on the part of nationalism. Religious, cultural, and racial sentiment does not so easily become exacerbated when attempts to interfere with tradition and social conditions come from a national authority.

On the other hand there are cases when a foreign, impartial authority has more chance of success than one that is national. In territories where the process of cultural and racial fusion has not yet been completed authorities of local origin will run a greater risk of becoming involved in local antagonisms of a religious or racial nature. A sound basis provided by a sense of real community will be required, before they can exercise their function in a democratic way. Consecrated autocracy, which in the East

is the ideal stage previous to national democracy and which is exercised by the sovereign or by feudal circles, may be able to function for a time without the existence of a sense of community as the basis of national unity, because of the spiritual link that exists between the subjects and their deified Ruler. Eventually, however, the spirit of the time is bound to corrode this mystical bond of union. If, however, this traditional element of unity is found to be lacking, a central Eastern authority, created suddenly and out of hand, would nowadays not be able to function.

Colonial governments have the great advantage of disposing of a larger organisation, science and technique and of being thoroughly familiar not only with the nature, the tendency, and the perils of the spirit of the time, but of possessing means for guiding and, if need be, for bridling this spirit.

Both groups have a means of filling the gap in their equipment. National authorities can call upon Western advisers, and use Western training, while colonial authorities can use Eastern organisms and indigenous officials, train an Oriental *élite* and devote themselves to a thorough study of the customs and institutions of the autochthonous community.

The structure of Western society

We can only understand the nature of the task of leadership if we try to realise the difference of structure between Eastern and Western society. This difference is itself no more than the outer shell in which the creation of the soul and the spirit of East and West has been clad. Let us look at other creations of these different mentalities in order to discern some of their characteristics. Let us first look at the physical contrast between the two worlds, as shown by their internal structure. If we look at the national communities which compose the Western world we shall see societies in their full development, almost liberated from territorial relations, detached and mobile, which have become absorbed in an atmosphere of varying tensions and centres of force, and are in continuous and accelerating motion.

In such a sphere man emancipates himself and becomes an autonomous microcosm which appears to determine its own place and its own function in the free development of its personal inclinations and gifts and in a transient contractual relationship. Even

landed property has been wrenched loose from matter and form as a result of restless transfer and transformation. It has become an abstraction, dominated only by world credit. This credit itself expands and contracts with unceasing vibrations in which the present and the future are reduced into one. Western society indeed appears to emulate time and space in their very elusiveness. It can foresee the interests of future generations, and take care of them as though they were already dwelling in its midst. Its wide powers of perspective are revealed in every sphere, in that of production and trade, in its provision of educational facilities, its science, its organisation and its technique, its law, its provisions for social and hygienic precautions.

The very looseness of its composition, which, thanks to the unprecedented tension of all its component particles, Western society is able to save from crumbling into formlessness, enables it to achieve, when circumstances demand, an extraordinary concentration of power. Its very mobility allows hundreds of forms of collaboration on a large scale, whether temporary or permanent, while its capacity of abstraction defeats matter and the laws of space and of form. To all this the West owes its capacity of concentrating material and spiritual powers which remained unused, in the West itself, in former times, and remain so to a large extent in the East. When concentration is not the requisite method, the West knows how to leave these powers decentralised, while yet applying them to the local furthering of common interests. General co-operation in an ever further specialised division of labour allows it to extract from them their greatest possibilities.

The West tries at the same time to complete and to bind together the results of the differentiation of labour by a whole series of institutions and organisms such as the organisation of governments, of business, of science, and of parties; it has systematised international co-operation, the work of commissions, and representative institutions. It has its universities, its credit system, its banks and exchanges, its traffic, its trade unions, its national armies and navies. Its legislation consciously looks towards a distant future, while the administration of its justice is guided by abstract principle rather than by the concrete instance or by personal feeling. While erecting personal relations and the relations

between persons and objects into an immensely varied juridical system, the West nevertheless respects personal initiative and the free development of the personality, abstains as much as possible from imposing repressive sanctions, and restricts itself to co-ordination and co-operation, in order to assure harmony between personal spheres. Its self-control enables it even to tolerate the existence of quasi-autonomous spheres, in which the rightful claimant may seclude himself with his real rights as if he were a separate nucleus surrounded by its own satellites.

The spectator who looks upon this Western society, with the lightning interplay of its innumerable centres of power, must be struck by the fact that in their seeming chaos all these particles maintain their contact and prove, eventually, to be actuated by the ordered dynamics of a gigantic macrocosm. All these members are joined by organic solidarity ¹). They are not tied together by many-sided public regulations into a whole of rigid unfreedom, because they rest on the deliberate decision of free personality and a natural social connection. Progress, publicity, and responsibility characterise the whole of Western society. It is in the big cities, where division of labour and co-operation have reached their highest degree of development, that we see the dynamic centres of Western society.

Qualification of the terms East and West
Geography does not always correspond with the distinctions we have established. There are many territories which geographically belong to the West, but which have partly, and sometimes largely, escaped its influence. On the other hand there are portions of what geographically is the East, where the structure of the West is already super-imposing itself upon the older building. When speaking of East and West we only mean different periods of social development. But here too there might still remain a cause for misunderstanding. For it should not be thought that in every aspect and in every shape of its life one portion of the world has reached a higher stage of development than the other. This notion of rectilinear development of life is too naively simple.

There are cultures that may have reached, in one domain or another, the highest pinnacle at which mankind can aim. In the

¹) Emile Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 65, 85, 101 (5th. ed.).

metaphysical, magical, philosophical, technical, and artistic spheres, cultural acquisitions have been made which do not lend themselves to comparison. They may be something entirely distinct which will never be repeated. But there are other forms which, just as in every human body the same members are to be found, will never be sought in vain in any society. They may be rudimentary and undeveloped, or they may have reached their complete unfolding. It is to these characteristics that we limit ourselves when we establish the distinctions that enable us to make a division between East and West.

The terms East and West will always have something arbitrary about them. Were it not that the modern era had exercised an ever growing influence over the whole globe, and had thus called into life a certain contrast with its own being, this terminology would even deserve to be called presumptuous. But, in view of the world wide character of the reactions it provokes, and in view of the fact that it originated in the West, and has impressed its stamp upon Western national communities more than upon even the most modernised communities in the East or in Africa, the modern era deserves to be called the Western era. The distance between East and West can be no difficulty for the transmission of the dynamic spirit of the West, precisely because the distinction between East and West is not, strictly speaking, geographical. Currency, new methods of production, education, the press, modern associations, whether social, economic, political or sporting, they all introduce an element of Westernism into Eastern society. In contact with the East, the West, embodied in the big city, with its great force of organisation and expansion, mechanically takes the lead. This is why we see so many Western cities appear in the East, while on the other hand the life of the country, with its agricultural simplicity that is in many respects so intimately connected with the Eastern social sphere, stays behind in the West.

Structure of Eastern society: A static community

Eastern society appears to us as an altogether different world. It is earthbound, living with the rhythm of nature, and mainly consists of territorial and genealogical communities. These communities are rooted in thousands of more or less isolated cen-

tres, mostly villages, which are autonomous units, almost self-sufficient in their religious, social, political, and economic life. In many parts of the East great religions like Buddhism, Hinduism or Islam have super-imposed a common veneer of general religious culture upon these isolated little communities, without, however, causing them to lose the peculiar shade of mystical-magical feeling of their own particular life. Within this circle human identity and human consciousness feel merged into the community and the group-instinct. Tradition, status, and the interests of the group determine the place and the function of the individual, and as a rule heredity transfers them. Aptitude or inclination are not consulted, so that talent is rarely given the chance of unfolding itself.

Property, which consists mainly of real estate, moves slowly and within a restricted circle, because in disposing of it one has to take into account various claims exercised by neighbours and by the whole community. The soil and the community are tied together by sacred links, and the right of property, exercised only in virtue of membership of the community, is really a social function which entails all manner of social obligations. Among these obligations one may reckon that of taking part in functions of public utility, such as public safety, the maintenance of roads and of irrigation, providing for the requirements of officials, who are working for the welfare of the whole community, participating in ancient and traditional festivals. There are also the innumerable smaller reciprocal services, which in the West may to a certain extent be expected as a proof of neighbourliness, but which in the East are demanded as a social duty from all right-minded members of the community.

Everything that transcends the capacity of the individual, such as the building of a house or of a boat, everything which facilitates his labour, such as the gathering of the harvest, the fulfilling of wedding or funeral ceremonies, is performed by mutual assistance. Arable implements, tools, and other articles of utility are at the service of neighbours just as in the West they can be used indiscriminately by all members of the family circle.

The interests of these groups, which are like large families, are managed by chiefs who might almost be called the incarnation of the group-consciousness, or by the informal gatherings of the

inhabitants or of the elders of the village. As Tacitus said about his Germans: "De minoribus principes consultant, de maioribus omnes" ¹⁾. There was no question, of course, in ancient times, of electing the chiefs or the elders, as is now not seldom the case. Either heredity, with certain reservations in order to eliminate the obviously incapable, or else the gradual acquisition of a position of eminence used to be and still frequently is the usual way by which a man becomes a chief. The notion of dividing the community into a majority and a minority between which there exists a tension has a dynamic flavour which is totally alien to Eastern society. There lengthy consideration is given to every aspect of a problem, until in the end a unanimous decision can be reached.

The economy of Eastern society

Economic life in the communities of the East presents the same close-knitted aspect as social life. Mutual assistance provides the means of filling the void which would otherwise result from the practical absence of division of labour. Social obligations can usually be fulfilled by contributions in labour or by payments in kind. Under the influence of twentieth century ideology these primitive forms of taxation are sometimes ruthlessly suppressed, with consequences which may be most unsettling. As long as the division of labour and the monetary circulation remain under-developed, such a policy of reform undermines the simple economy of the community. It may deprive it of its most obvious economic instrument, subject it to heavy pressure, and deliver its individual members to conditions which, though more modern, are nevertheless much less attractive. Except in cases where a natural evolution or the untimely introduction of taxation in money brings about a strong modification of natural relations, the community forms an economic unit which practically provides for all its own needs, and has to obtain from outside only a few articles like salt, or iron for the manufacture of implements.

The Eastern community tries to be self-sufficient in every way. The barter of commodities and of labour, supplemented by a restricted use of money for the acquisition of commercial produce

¹⁾ Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, 1921. I. *Direct Legislation by the People: Referendum and Initiative*, p. 371.

and for the payment of taxes, is sufficient for the slow rotation of goods within a limited circle. The needs of the household or of the community are the only standard by which the individual will measure his contribution in labour or in assistance. Such a closed economy creates the frame of mind which makes people averse to labour as a paid service such as we know it in the West. It is not labour itself, but the absence of reciprocity which appears irksome. The normal harvest provides the necessary food. As a modicum of money is everywhere required, a few select products are cultivated for sale upon a wider market, and it is not rare that the language actually distinguishes between a harvest-for-food and a harvest-for-money.

In the West we have a system of production which appears to stand on its own: often it leads to unwholesome over-production. In the East requirement and production are inseparable. If the harvest happens to be exceptionally good, consumption immediately increases, as though this were determined by economic law, while the opportunity for the formation of capital is altogether neglected. Not even when the first stage of monetary circulation has been introduced does this uneconomic attitude disappear. Often, when world-demand suddenly creates a great increase of income, this is entirely lost in the acquisition of sweetmeats and trinkets.

But this attitude of mind creates a great demand for consumptive credit. For whenever unforeseen circumstances limit production or increase consumption, as happens in the case of a wedding or a funeral, there is a shortage which has to be met by credit. Now, up to a point, the tradition of mutual assistance can provide the necessary credit, in which case it need have no onerous character. But there are circumstances when it may entail liability for high rates of interest. For in a period of transition like the present the communal sense is weakening, the willingness for mutual assistance decreases, and needs that were formerly unknown expose the individual to the temptation of acquiring imported articles that are now being offered for sale. The increased use of money strengthens individualism at the expense of the communal sense.

Not only does this intrusion of modernity bring about an enormous demand for credit, but it brings about an extravagant rate

of interest, because the economic simplicity of these people is inclined to discount the obligations as well as the enjoyments of the future against a fraction of those of the present. In this way transactions like the sale of several future harvests for a small sum of ready money, the sale of a field for the price of three crops, or even for a sum which is scarcely higher than one year's rent are by no means exceptional. The cure of such evils, which are inherent in a period of transition, will have to come from improved methods of production and from a new mentality that is better able to look into the future. A task awaits the national or colonial authorities: by measures against usury, by agrarian legislation, education, the provision of credit, the spread of agricultural knowledge and particularly by the encouragement of co-operative societies, they can fulfil at the same time their double mission of protection and of organising the self-exertion of Eastern communities.

The serenity of Eastern societies, the clemency of nature and the group mind which protects and fences off the individual leave little room for differentiation, either in function, in wealth, or in power. Mutual dependence, uniformity of surroundings, of interests and of labour are causes of the survival of the communal spirit, which was born from blood relationship but does not disappear, even when the sense of territorial community supersedes that which was based on genealogical identity. It is, however, a profound mistake to compare this communal sense with ultra-modern communism. The only thing they both have in common is their retrogressive tendency. We shall return to this question at a later stage, but it is well to point out at once that nothing can be more detrimental to the ancient community, and that nothing is more calculated to impede its progress towards full humanisation than communism. It may sound paradoxical, yet it is a profound truth that communism is a greater dissolvent of communal than of modern societies.

By its very simplicity, Eastern society joins its members into an economic unity. They are free from the obsessing care for the future which continually oppresses the West. Many of us would gladly give up something of our present abundance, could we but purchase a modest but secure existence during periods of illness or unemployment and against oncoming age. To this feel-

ing must be attributed the existence of numerous societies for insurance and mutual assistance. In the East the individual and the family naturally give the security which we have to purchase by careful organisation and economy. The function of the communal organisations which fulfil this task in the East should therefore never be under-estimated.

Nevertheless, this communal organisation is an obstacle to social progress. As soon as progress begins the mechanical solidarity rooted in uniformity disappears, to give place to organic solidarity born from the differentiation of Western society¹⁾. Both forms of solidarity are the cement of the community where they prevail. Both develop their own method of co-operation, and sometimes there is little to distinguish them. The co-operative societies developed in the West according to modern ideas and those that exist in the East, based upon custom and tradition, are similar in their outward appearance, and do not greatly differ in their functions and in their aims. But their essence is very different, and they are separated by the same number of centuries as lie between customary law and modern legislation.

The system of Eastern law

The customary law of the East is able to satisfy the need for justice which is felt in the communities where it applies. According to the nature of the disputes and of the relationships to which it is applied, it is able to adapt and to perfect itself. Yet its resemblance to Western legislation is only one of appearance. The rule, so familiar to every Occidental, which moves steadily towards a known aim, and even envisages a distant future, is almost entirely alien to communities that remain chained to the present. Their mind is affected only by Revelation dating from the dim and distant past, consecrated by the wisdom of ancestors and sanctioned by age-long usage. It is a sacred possession which supplements itself through an indiscernable development and through the quiet shedding of everything that has definitely withered. Acquisitions are made under the influence of surroundings whenever concrete cases present themselves in sufficient number and in a sufficiently definite manner to solidify

¹⁾ Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social*, p. 100.

the incidental decisions that apply to these new cases, into a more or less settled rule of customary law.

This process, in a simple and limited *milieu*, should not be represented as something entirely regular and systematic. The small volume of litigation does not allow of a speedy fixation of jurisprudence into a dogmatic shape. One is more or less confronted with concrete specific cases, which therefore cannot find their place immediately under a given heading. A flexible application of the law is required, and the sense of justice must have full opportunity for taking into account all the special circumstances and all the interests that are involved. Only in this way has it proved possible for customary law to claim any completeness. There is a mosaic, not to say a jumble, of cases and decisions. But the discerning eye is able to detect the underlying juridical basis, which is continually rejuvenated because it moulds itself upon actual life. In this way a distinct pattern becomes visible which is clear enough to justify a permanent sense of order and security. But at no time is there any attempt to sketch out the development of the future.

There is probably nothing in Eastern life which appears stranger to the Occidental than this quiet shaping of the law, this entirely unformalistic jurisdiction which is yet so full of form, and this justice which remains free although it never loses sight of circumstances and of the personal sense of right and wrong. He will no doubt in the first place be struck by the absence of certainty, and he will probably attach more importance to it than it deserves, in view of what happens in practice. Nevertheless in an Oriental society which is undergoing a process of modernisation, an increasingly urgent need for order, rule, and system manifests itself. This does not imply that of necessity one of the legal systems prevailing in the West need be adopted, but it proves that there is indeed a call for interference of a delicate nature on the part of the national or Western authorities.

If this need is to be satisfied in the right time and in the right manner, a clear comprehension of the legal conceptions of Eastern society is indispensable. There is a vast amount of material which sociologists and experts in customary law are beginning to put in order. Without Prof. Van Vollenhoven's work ¹⁾ we should prob-

¹⁾ *Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië. Miskenningen van het Adatrecht.*

ably not even be in a position to form an idea of the relations which, from a sociological point of view, may exist between a modern legal system and customary law, although these relations can better be sensed than put into actual words.

In Eastern customary law one must not look for a systematic distinction between public and private law, penal and civil law, the law of objects and the law of contract, absolute and relative rights, etc. Nevertheless it has been able, in normal circumstances, to give in every case a decision which satisfied the sense of justice. This must always remain the main object and the touchstone of any eventual reform that may have to be introduced by Western authorities. There is one elementary distinction drawn in customary law, but, according to Van Vollenhoven ¹⁾, it is not based upon a legal relation, upon the *fundamentum petendi*, but upon the object, the *petitum*. A distinction is made between rights on land and water, including relative rights, and rights due to debt, which concern all rights upon personal estate. These rights, together with domestic law and the distribution of effects, cover what in our systematics might be singled out as the field of customary private law. Customary law, however, also prefers to include under this heading so-called torts, which amalgamates our conceptions of illegitimate acts and penal law. This scholar also reminds us of the fact that we need not search for separate rules applying to the civil effects of an illegal act, because the popular mind cannot distinguish between the civil and the criminal effects of forbidden actions. On the other hand there is often an application of penal sanctions to relations which modern conceptions would consider as residing purely in private law. This happens when there is a relationship which has been consecrated by ancient usage or which has been regulated by the laws of the Ruler, who thus gives it a place in the maintenance of public order.

A natural and simple grouping can be discerned, while at the same time many divisions which we carefully observe are merged. The authority of the Ruler or the officials, which forms a sphere above that of popular justice, does indeed aim at a systematic collection of precepts, and occasionally enriches them with a casuistry which abounds in finesses. Such attempts at codifica-

¹⁾ Van Vollenhoven, *Mishkenningen*, p. 52 and 70.

tion have little influence in the sphere of customary law, because there is no popular inclination to make use of official jurisdiction.

No sooner does society begin to loosen its economic cohesion, e. g. by expanding its trade, than there becomes noticeable a need for a systematisation of the law. Systematisations, however, initiated by the state, have been mainly concerned either with administrative and ceremonial prescriptions or with those sections of penal law which the state had brought within its own jurisdiction. The fact is that at the outset the state finds it difficult to conceive of public regulations unaccompanied by repressive sanctions.

Even the West has felt no compelling need for a definite and final systematisation, as appears from the difference between the private law of the Anglo-Saxon communities and those of a considerable part of the European Continent. In a society which is still entirely disconnected, the absence of system remains even more natural, because in view of the limited dimensions of its constituent parts, the case, its special diagnosis, and the incidental decision must of necessity be given a wider latitude. This method should however not be confused with case law, with its jurisprudence based on antecedents, precisely because its character is exclusively incidental ¹⁾. It is only when a political and cultural unity begins to put its mark upon society, as was the case in the Roman Empire or in the national states which sprang up in Europe after the fifteenth century, and when the conception of state and the civic spirit supplant group-loyalty and particularism, that the multitude of legal relations and of cases causes the single case to lose its concrete nature. A general idea then begins to issue from it, pointing towards the growing need for a synoptic view and for certainty. Not before this happens are the conditions fulfilled for a systemisation of the law and for the regulation of every department of social activity.

We may further note that the unsuitability of a simple environment to form a system based on abstractions explains the fact that in the East all rights upon real or personal estate, all rights to services in case of debt, are connected as closely as possible with the concrete bodily form of the object of the right, or of the debtor and his family. It is equally understandable that the East

¹⁾ *Ibid.* p. 47.

cannot agree to our severe distinction between penal and restitutive law. The strong communal feeling creates the need for the connection between sanctions and the commonly felt wishes concerning the personal life of members of the community and their relations towards each other. In the West public interest no longer makes such claims. It is satisfied if restitution and the payment of damages can assure harmonious relations between individuals. Furthermore, the communal life of the East receives in many of its apparently private or personal manifestations a religious consecration which has entirely disappeared in the West, and which cannot be disregarded with impunity.

These are the reasons why Oriental jurisdiction is compelled to draw other limits to its sanctions than those at present — though not formerly — known by the West. On the otherhand it does not feel called upon to interfere in many matters where the West would feel unable to abstain.

The fact that the small Eastern community does not distinguish between personal and real rights gives rise to further considerations about the difference between East and West. The East addresses itself to the concrete object of the dispute, round which it places as it were in a circle all the persons who are directly or indirectly interested. It then tries to do justice to all in accordance with the feelings of equity which are suggested by the circumstances. Absolute rights on things would be a stumbling block to the reasonableness of the Eastern community with its tendency to specific mediation. Moreover, the very existence of absolute rights on things pre-supposes a greater tendency towards passivity than would agree with the communal nature of Eastern society. Western law would, therefore, quite wrongly, invest individuals with special rights, which, in Eastern communities, would mainly apply to the house or to the field, which are precisely things that are felt to belong to the deepest nature of tradition and to form part of a common past and of the natural order. An absolute right, which is invested in the individual, is not in its place in such a community, although it does not follow that consequently the peasant feels any less the owner of his field than if he lived in our Western world.

Furthermore, in such a *milieu* one need not expect to find a completely elaborated law of contract, which can only belong to

a strongly differentiated society, where the diversity of functions of the individual is bound to create continually different relationships. The legal aspects of these relationships eventually become so specialised, as has happened in the West, that in the end their observance or non-observance no longer moves the sense of justice which is common to all men. It will therefore be growingly incumbent upon the authorities to give their attention to a body of restitutive law, while at the same time another evolution, which is only apparently in contradiction with the first, will draw within the purview of the penal law what was at one time the preserve of the individual or of the group ¹).

In the West, the authorities, in maintaining law and order, generally limit themselves to arbitration between persons. They restore or preserve harmony between them without restricting their initiative or their freedom. But they refrain from intervening in the capacity of an interested party, in the way they do when sanctions are required against someone who is disturbing public order, which is the concern of every member of the community. It is only when personality and social consciousness, the two aspects of one and the same social element, have reached an adult stage, that such a complete conception of law can exist, and it is itself the result of a division of labour which became possible in the ancient and medieval towns, while it remained inconceivable in the country.

The townless East

As a rule, the picture presented by Eastern society is precisely that of a vast countryside without any cities. Hundreds of towns, it is true, have arisen even in the heart of primitive Africa, in the course of centuries, and some of them contained over a million inhabitants. Usually, however, they had an entirely different character from the city-republics of the Greco-Roman world, or from the medieval cities, which were the bulwark of European burgherdom based on the division of labour, growing by their own strength and peopled by industrious folk whom a process of natural selection had carried within their gates. This made the medieval city a world by itself, with a mind and a soul of its own, standing out

¹) Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.* p. 42, 44, 59, 60, 83 and Is. Cassutto, *Het Strafrecht in Nederlandsch-Indië*, p. 4—7.

against the mentality of the surrounding agricultural area as sharply as the outline of its walls and towers against the landscape. It lacked the ephemeral character of so many Oriental towns, which owe their existence solely to the choice of a Ruler, of a feudatory magnate, or of officials in search of a residence. A mere concentration of populations attached to their immediate surroundings, sprung up by accident and devoid of future prospects, never becomes a real city. The difference has been expressed by Spengler when he says that most Eastern cities have no soul ¹⁾.

The city of the East remains a large village or an agglomeration of villages, quarters and streets, and it is only in exceptional cases that its cultural and political function approximates to that of the medieval city. It is enough that the official residence should be transferred to another place for the city to die in a short time.

There have been cases, however, in early Eastern history, and more recently in Java, showing the beginnings of a real and influential city-life. The meteoric career of some dead cities throws a light upon the possibilities and the might-have-beens which were frustrated by circumstance. The development of cities holds the secret of social progress, especially in classical, medieval, and modern civilisation. They nurtured the germ of civic freedom and national popular power. Notwithstanding a tendency towards oligarchy, at least in the field of politics, the cities of the Middle Ages preserved a democratic social life which was sufficient at any rate to allow the civic sense so much room for developing within their walls that it could become the precursor of patriotism, of the idea of state and even of international solidarity. It is to its cities that the West has owed the enjoyment, for centuries, of possibilities which only the advent of modernity has revealed to the East.

Needless to say, the picture which has just been sketched will be found nowhere to apply integrally to any part of the East today. The spirit of the time is making itself felt everywhere, even in regions which a short time ago might still be said to belong to the stone age. But what remains true, notwithstanding all exceptions, is that here we have a contrast which aptly illustrates the difficulties of national and colonial governments in the East. By hanging but one single element in the social complex of the city-

¹⁾ Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, II, p. 106.

less life of the East, a re-arrangement and a new composition of the whole society must follow. If there were no such re-arrangement, the exclusively Occidental development of people who have eventually to find an occupation in an unchanged Eastern *milieu* would soon disturb its harmony. As soon as the spirit of the time starts moving too freely in such surroundings, be it in the shape of a modern agitator, of a political organisation, of an extremist journal that is daily read aloud in the village, or in the form of over-hasty government interference or reform, there is a danger that the community will be put out of joint.

For this reason the authorities must consider it their task to repress outside influences when they are too strong, or to deprive them of their vigour by providing a counterpoise. At the same time the influence which they themselves are exercising must be as many-sided as possible in order to allow all the inevitable changes, whether social, economic, spiritual, intellectual, moral or material, to proceed at the same pace, and not to be brought about piecemeal. During a period of transition single problems cannot be dealt with singly. This is why we cannot sufficiently emphasise the significance and the vitality of a social organisation which rests upon the basis provided by group-life. Japan has understood this, and the *élite* of China appears also to understand the principle. Whether under the guidance of a provisionally autocratic Eastern or Western authority or of intellectuals who are conscious of their aim, the independent or colonial countries of the East are everywhere being compelled to adapt themselves to the process of development from a closed economy of barter to a system of world-traffic, from group loyalty to civic sense, from patriarchal and theocratic authority to the conception of state life and patriotism.

This idea is really the key to colonial statesmanship. Those who have understood the frame of mind of the simple community and the essence of the contrast which it forms with the West will find no difficulty in distinguishing all the forms of transition and the differences between the two social forms. They will find it easier too to discern the part that is still played by intuitive solidarity. Altekar, in his *History of Village Communities in Western India*, gives a vivid picture of the existence of artisans in the villages he has studied. He shows how self-contained these small

communities are and yet how able to assure a livelihood to all their members. But the social and economic weakness of a civilisation which largely rests on such a basis is equally apparent from Altekár's description. It has corresponding virtues and defects in every sphere, and the problems it presents are the same, whether one meets them in the internal policy of countries like China, Japan, or Siam, or in the colonial world. The difficulty always is to make isolated living communities fit in with a large society that is taking shape under modern influence.

The endeavour must always be to weaken the contrasts we have enumerated above, and to resolve them in a harmonious fusion of the old and the new, of group loyalty and the conception of state. The authorities can render invaluable services to this end by economic action, and also by administrative reform, jurisdiction, and political and social emancipation.

Where Eastern and Western communities were living side by side before there could be any question of such harmonious understanding, it proved necessary to establish special institutions like exterritoriality. They were by no means exclusively the result of racial arrogance or of imperialism. Where the need for such a differentiation in the colonial world still subsists, it must be preserved. But its duration should not be determined by criteria which imply any kind of unimaginative discrimination. It should be based exclusively upon local necessity.

The nature of the task of Western leadership

It has been our aim in the previous pages to show clearly that in many parts of the colonial world some form of leadership was necessary in order to direct the mode of contact between dynamic and static communities. Those who appreciate what is at stake are bound to realise the absolute indispensability of the function of protection, and also that of educating static communities for the task of self-protection, by which eventually the first function will be rendered superfluous. If the danger of disastrous clashes is to be avoided, surely no other method of managing the meeting between these complete opposites could be thought out? Even the national governments of Eastern countries which have been placed in circumstances much more favourable than the colonial authorities have been confronted with the same difficult problem.

The strife and the friction which have occurred within their territories may serve as a warning to the colonial world, when a broad basis of national unity is still lacking.

In a territory like Java, with its special problem of over-population, there is a need for all the very best that can be given by twentieth century technique and organisation. The social backbone, which will one day have to carry the gigantic burden of these millions of people, must be strengthened. Sudden withdrawal would cause these millions to perish in unspeakable misery. The quickest way towards self-government is that which is being pursued by the colonial governments, whose efforts are tending towards protection and towards preparing the populations entrusted to them for the task of self-defence. Those who in the Indies agitate for immediate and complete autonomy, without paying any heed to the necessity of fulfilling this double task of leadership, are actually pointing to a long and devious way to the achievement of their object.

Heavy though it may be, the task of leadership is not beyond human strength. Those whose life work it is, whether they be progressive mandarins, judges or social reformers in China, statesmen or leaders in Japan, colonial or indigenous civil servants, will never be heard to confess themselves discouraged or admit defeat. They do not escape misunderstanding, for they have chosen to tread a middle way, but not the easy middle way of compromise. They go ahead, full of confidence, and often enough without even considering the implications of the problems that confront them in the theoretical manner which we have attempted. Those who have accompanied a political officer of the Dutch East Indian administration on one of his tours of inspection, or an enlightened planter or mine-director, must have observed that three quarters of the difficulties which are apt to arise where East and West are in touch will simply evaporate as soon as the problem is approached with sympathy and understanding.

Notwithstanding the serious character of the opposition between East and West, the will towards comradeship can and does bridge the chasm and make for co-operation. Long before the contrast has entirely disappeared enough material may have been brought together from both sides to fill the chasm.

Racial and cultural unity

There is one factor which may contribute more than any other to the synthesis which is so desirable. It is the racial and cultural unity which at the present time already joins together immense tracts of Eastern territory. As in our own Middle Ages, the fragmentary society of the East is unified by immense cultures like the Chinese, the Indian or the Arabic, or by religious and ethical systems like Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, or Islam.

There is also a cultural area called Indonesia, where certain points of resemblance appear, which are connected with the cultural and the racial relationship between a number of populations in and outside the Dutch East Indies, and which justify the belief that one day a feeling of social and national community will develop in this region. The presence of this important factor of unification must be very welcome to all those who are conscious of the enormous difficulties which are still in the way of the creation of an efficiently functioning social and political organism.

Such feelings however must not be confused with the kind of idealism that cannot distinguish between the present and the future. There are people who run ahead of our time to such an extent that they use the purely scientific name of Indonesia when speaking of the Dutch East Indies, which is only a part of it. Their frame of mind betrays a lack of appreciation of the gigantic task that has still to be fulfilled before the sixty million inhabitants of the islands under Dutch leadership are in a position to acquire unity and solidity. Many reservations have still to be made about the alleged racial and cultural unity of Indonesia, and apart from these there are still such considerable gaps from the social, economic, and political points of view in the fabric of Indonesian civilisation that we must be careful to avoid confusion between cultural and political notions.

This is a consideration which may equally apply to other colonial territories. Cultural unity holds the dormant promise of great things for the future, but at present the forces it represents are often still far too weak, far too little conscious, to be able to obliterate the social divisions that still exist. In British India some fundamental elements of social cleavage are even rooted in religious and cultural notions. Even in certain independent Eastern

states, where circumstances in general are much more favourable than in the colonial world, the problem is still of sufficient seriousness for the whole domestic policy to be dominated by it. If we further take into account the existence of hundreds of languages and dialects, economic seclusion, imperfect means of communication, and numerous autonomous cultures, we shall realise at once that the limited amount of cultural unity which at present exists in the Indies cannot form the exclusive basis of the edifice of the future. Nevertheless, it has an immense significance, and must be utilised by being allowed to permeate into every compartment of life.

The disconnected aspect of Eastern life is only what can be expected under prevailing circumstances. The isolation of thousands of territorial groups compels them to adopt a mode of living that can make them self-sufficient while scarcely leaving any room for the development of creative cultural power. This very fact will explain how if once, owing to exceptionally favourable circumstances, a cultural centre arises, its influence can spread in concentric circles and finally embrace a whole continent. Its influence is accepted in a passive manner: the smaller spheres that undergo it feel unable to create a similar force of their own. They realise the existence of a vacuum which they fill with what happens to be ready to hand: immigration, trade, and commerce are the vehicles of the new culture. But all the while the communities that are thus influenced continue to cling to what was their own patrimony.

Prof. Ernest Baker describes a similar process which took place in the West during the Middle Ages¹). The peoples of the West were linked together by unity of culture and faith, but their strength was rooted in weakness. They were in a low stage of economic development, and the synthesis was effected so easily because there were so few factors to be united. Between the conscious internationalism of the present and especially of the future, and the facile internationalism of the Middle Ages lie five centuries of incessant strife and hard labour, during which the weak international web had first to be rent, before the work of knitting the closer international cohesion could be begun. This is equally true of the

¹) In *The Unity of Western Civilisation*, ed. F. S. Marvin, "Unity Series", I, p. 94, 95 (1922).

Eastern world. Those who point to the existing cultural unity will see by the example of the West the road that has to be followed. But thanks to the presence of leadership a shorter cut could be taken. Moreover modern instruments such as education will endow the existing elements of cultural unity with a greater force of penetration, and enable them to reach the widest possible circle where formerly only the select few could be influenced.

The founders of Eastern cultures, and the small circles which have continued their labours, have given many proofs of their great power of abstract thought and of the other capacities which undoubtedly were also slumbering in thousands of people, but which could not be aroused owing to the disconnected state of social life. We may feel sure that if only these existing powers are once applied to social problems, they will soon be able to embrace a horizon as wide as those they were able to cover in the sphere of religion, metaphysics, literature and art. And the group of thinkers will grow in numbers as well as in capacity as soon as their attention is focussed on social weal. Then, indeed, the time will not be long before the cultural unity of their fathers will also have become a social, economic and political unity.

Political unity

Everything we have said about cultural unity also applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to political unity. In Eastern as in medieval society, we can see centres of power that are favourably situated and are able to fill the political vacuum left by thousands of isolated communities, without much friction or struggle. Their influence is accepted passively, and under a vigorous rule the people are able to enjoy the fruits of peace, order, and security. Arbitrary despotism may also occur, under which the people are at no time certain of the protection of life and of property or of the honour of their wives and daughters. Then, although there is no steady and general popular consciousness, people may be driven into common resistance.

The sphere of popular consciousness, indeed, remains limited to the small community, which is almost completely autonomous and provides for its own administration, its security, and its jurisdiction. Loose federations as in the days of Hellas may occur, and they are an important phenomenon for present-day colonial

policy, but their radius remains restricted. The large amount of self-government enjoyed by such communities sometimes induces people to speak of village republics ¹⁾. This term should be used with great circumspection, because it does not take sufficiently into account the fact that there usually also exists some higher authority, central, feudal, or bureaucratic, and that it might give rise to confusion with what we understand by democracy in the modern sense.

But, although democracy in the sense of equality, elections, majority decisions, etc., is utterly lacking in the village communities, one might say that they possess a silent democratic practice, which gives to the members of the community the right to draw attention to their needs and requirements and to express their views about common interests. In the days when the East was completely organised on this pattern, everything outside the immediate common interest came within the province of the Ruler or his officials. The points of contact between these two spheres were few, and we may be sure that on both sides this separation was duly appreciated. A certain amount of assistance would be forthcoming on the part of the central authorities when a bridge, a temple, a dike, or an aqueduct had to be constructed; while the village justice received, if need be, the moral support that was occasionally needed. On the other hand, great criminals would be handed over to the higher jurisdiction, and the village authorities would see to a fair distribution between the heads of the families of the taxation imposed on the village as a whole.

Defence, communications, and the suppression of robber bands, matters which can in no way be said to be local, were left entirely to the central authority; the local authorities had to raise taxation, either in the form of payments in kind or even in money, or of *corvée*. Moreover, in the event of visits from the Ruler or his representatives, they had to provide for their entertainment and

¹⁾ Especially since the studies of Baden Powell and Maine in British India. See, for the Dutch East Indies, the monumental works *Adatrechtbundels*, (28 volumes), *Pandecten van het Adatrecht*, (8 vols), and C. van Vollenhoven, *Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië*, which remains unparalleled in colonial literature. Also Dr. L. Adam, *De Autonomie van het Indonesische Dorp*, and Dr. B. J. Haga, *Indonesische en Indische Democratie*. For Japan, see the great work of the Commission for the Investigation of Old Laws and Customs in Formosa, published in Japanese, and obtainable only from the Formosan Government, and the *Provisional Report* of Professor Sataro Okamatsu, Kyoto, 1900, written in English (very valuable).

comfort. It would not be correct to describe these payments and services as a contribution towards the costs of central government. Such an interpretation would be too modern, for it pre-supposes the existence of a dynamic tendency which did not yet exist. One must consider the political organisation we are now describing as a number of closed local spheres covered in, as it were, under the one roof of the Ruler's authority.

In this patriarchal world the authority of the Ruler was felt as something paternal, as the authority which preserved order in the vast family of hundreds or thousands of local autonomies. The dignity was at the same time deified, not in the person, but in the function of its bearer, because it exercised a mediating function between the whole nation and the world order. If this order became disturbed in any way, the Ruler, upon the appearance of symptoms of disturbance such as droughts or famines, felt himself in duty bound to atone for his share of responsibility by fasts and prayers. At the same time the conception of a state authority, which actively intervened in everything and regulated the life of everybody, was entirely absent. Such a notion is essentially modern. The Ruler's part was rather that of one who sets the good example, and the responsibility of the local notables, within their own sphere, remained absolute. Higher intervention seemed called for only if the local authorities appeared to neglect their task. The support, encouragement, and reward occasionally accorded by the Ruler had a paternal character; they were not systematic acts of government, and many of the activities of the state had a religious tinge which transcended local affairs and aimed exclusively at the good of the nation considered as a whole.

As the vicar of the supernatural powers, the Ruler was invested with absolute power. He could use it as he thought fit, but his function was considered to be of a spiritual nature, resulting from the dignity which he incarnated. Everything under Heaven was said to belong to him, but this Eastern notion expressed a religious rather than a practical principle. It was not strict reality. The peasant considered himself the sole proprietor of his field, and except in cases when he went beyond his rights and acted tyrannically, the Ruler respected this conception. On the other hand the Ruler had the same absolute rights upon the harvest which also belonged to the divinity. He naturally did not exercise

his right to the full, and remained satisfied with a tribute which varied between 16 per cent and two-fifths of the harvest. The percentage was fixed according to the needs of the Ruler, and could be reduced if circumstances, such as a bad harvest, required a diminution of the burden on the tillers of the soil. In this case again despotism would sometimes go beyond what was considered to be its strict right.

The Ruler who assisted the local governments in a patriarchal manner, and the Ruler who oppressed them tyrannically, may both be considered exceptions. The usual relationship between Ruler and local authorities was one of the loosest possible contact, while each sphere remained exclusively occupied with its own concerns, taking notice of the other only in times of stress and crisis ¹⁾.

We must not allow ourselves to be led astray by the use of modern terminology. The village government was above all a local organ, born of ancient custom, and not established by the will of the Ruler. Its function should be considered as the fusion of two activities peculiar to the society in which they existed: that of mediation and that of collective responsibility. The latter rested, in practice, upon the heads of the family, the group, or the village. It resulted sometimes in the punishment, even by death, of hundreds of individuals for the crime of one among them. However unjust such a procedure may appear to us, it constitutes the corner stone of a weakly organised state. Moreover, it finds in the communal ordination a basis which it would not possess in the West. As for the principle of mediation, it is the result of the social seclusion of small circles which have felt the need, that grew into a tradition, of looking for the intervention of an intermediate person or an intermediate group whenever questions arose that were beyond the normal purview of village life. The village administration, and in particular the chief whose function was frequently hereditary, appeared indicated by nature to mediate between the community, of which he knew the needs like no one else, and the Ruler or his feudal or official representatives.

A state organisation of this kind differs fundamentally from

¹⁾ Radhakumud Mookerji, *Local Government in Ancient India*.
Radhakamal Mukerjee, *Democracies of the East*, esp. p. 198.

that of the modern state. It might be better even not to use the word state at all. The modern state, with its system of lower autonomous communities, which implies at the same time a great concentration of power and a considerable differentiation, bears no resemblance to what might perhaps be best compared with the federal connection (the "*foedus iniquum*") that existed in the Roman empire.

Meanwhile, little principalities and small or large administrative areas have, in various countries, very gradually created a tradition which has accustomed the popular mind to the idea of a larger territorial unity. The government of the Ruler has done nothing in this sense which can be attributed to purpose or set policy. Good Rulers have not been lacking, and in many Eastern countries the Ruler has respected the small living organisms in the country, and the groups and guilds in the towns. Rulers have financed great works where these were beyond the capacity of the small community. But others have done nothing for the country, and used the state exchequer only for their own pleasures and those of their favourites.

Such an organisation of the state appears at its weakest in the concentration of the whole idea of state in one person, with whom often the whole régime and the peace of the country stood or fell. When nothing had been done to instil into the population a consciousness of things outside the range of local interests, the death of the Ruler has frequently meant the collapse of the fabric of the state. It was not in its organisation or in the military means at its disposal that such a state found the source of its strength, but in the sacred character of the Ruler's dignity, a character which after all has nothing to surprise us if we think of the days when, in Europe, the Prince was above all the Defender of Justice, the Protector of the Faith, and the Vicar of God.

Eastern and medieval society

There are other striking similarities between Eastern and medieval society. From the political point of view there might even have been an absolute similarity had it not been that in the West the disappearing village community was able to entrench itself behind town walls, there to reach a higher development which eventually broke the vicious circle of absolutism. But the medie-

val town created a spirit of its own, which presently became as strongly contrasted with its rural surroundings as in our day the West is from the East. Eastern towns, as we have seen, do not show the same contrast with their surroundings. We may say, therefore, that with the birth of the Western town the ways of East and West have parted, not to meet again until the time, which is now drawing near, of the coming of world citizenship. A useful work of preparation has at any rate been performed by the unifying influence which has from time to time been exercised by the political unity that has prevailed in the past in large portions of Eastern territory.

Notwithstanding the contrast between the static society of the East and the dynamic society of the West, many people, far from becoming aware of antagonism and unbridgeable antipathies, will be drawn towards the simple and peaceful outlook of the East, and towards the colourful richness of its feudal life and the depths of its metaphysical thought and mystic feeling. The charm that emanates from the East may well call forth within many of those whom the restlessness, the tension, and the complication of our own society fill with apprehension and dismay a longing for something which surges up within themselves as a dim memory of their own past. No Occidental who has travelled in the East can have remained entirely deaf to this famous "call of the East". He must have felt it sometimes, in the exalted rest of a temple court, amidst the patriarchal atmosphere of the rural surroundings of a sanctuary, or while sitting under the banyan tree, listening to the rhythmic beat of the rice winnowers in the neighbouring villages.

The state of repose, achieved by the soul that has thrown off all care, and walks in the present without concerning itself with the uncertainties of the future, appeals so much to the Occidental because it corresponds to something that lies deep within himself, to some "pre-natal memory" of his own past. In Huizinga's *Decline of the Middle Ages* we find described precisely the same life, in which society slumbered without concern for the future, while the contemplative trend of the soul lived its restricted life in a circle of thinkers and scholars, and the mystic flame burned in the bosom of the Saints and of the elect, radiating over the whole population and, occasionally, sending through it a wave

of intense emotion. Then, too, in the castles and in the towns, at the courts and in the churches, the eye was diverted by the splendour of pageantry, by symbolism and ritual, by costume and style, by forms and by customs, by festivals and by mystery plays. The wide expanse of our modern society has allowed this colourfulness to fade. It lacks the sense of immediate proximity in which all the manifestations of life took place during the Middle Ages.

In the life of our ancestors we are struck with the same static social element which characterises the East; we find the same intimate mixture of the profane and the religious, the same sanction given to art, learning, and social order by piety and devout endeavour. Ritual and ceremonies as a necessity of life, and the deep religious sense which even characterises dress and style, we find them wherever people are still near enough to nature, even if in their simplicity they are not always able to express themselves with the wealth of form and variety which are open to more developed communities. But in other respects these ritualistic ideas go even deeper. Human life is divided, in accordance with what is felt to be an ordination of nature, into fixed periods, with rites and crises that mark the transition and which have still survived in our own time in the form of usages the origin of which has long since been forgotten.

The parallel between medieval and Eastern societies might even be extended, although we must never lose sight of the fact that similarity does not always mean identity. Let us never forget that the Middle Ages gave rise to true cities. There was cultural unity in the Middle Ages too. The Church of the Middle Ages was the bearer of a spiritual unity, science was international through its medium of Latin, and culture through the Romance languages. This period had the vision of a united Europe, a vision which it never gave up and which was embodied in the idea of the Holy Roman Empire. Weak though the unity may have been, it was able to manifest its reality, as by the Crusades, in a manner which is not inferior to the bonds of union that are joining certain parts of the East in our day.

Five centuries of incessant labour, of indomitable courage, of suffering and endeavour, were necessary to bring about the transition from medieval society to our own. Even the history of the twentieth century in the West proves how difficult it remains to

preserve the equilibrium between all the forces that are operating. The balance between mentalities that differ but slightly is upset for one moment, and devastating revolutions, catastrophic wars and incessant clashes between contending classes result. How infinitely vaster still would be the extent of the tragedy that would result from the haphazard contact of two worlds that differ between themselves as much as the medieval world differs from ours. This is why leadership was and often still is necessary, in order to bridle, with wisdom, earnestness, and confidence, the blind forces and instincts from which danger threatens.

Our aim in the previous pages has been to create confidence in the possibility of fulfilling the task of leadership. Confidence is indispensable, for it indicates the direction which leadership will necessarily have to take, if it is to be embodied in the right kind of statesmanship. This confidence, based upon the forces that are slumbering within Eastern society, and also upon the real kinship, unconsciously realised by all of us, between the East and the West, will prove to be an inexhaustible source of energy which will in due course overcome all the obstacles that are in the way of future co-operation.

The endeavour to make the patrimony of all great Eastern cultures accessible to every member of the Eastern community, to activate all existing social and cultural forces in the service of a living society, to support unstintingly the labour which must construct, with the assistance of Western organisation, technique, and science, an edifice pregnant with all that is best in the West, will no longer be considered to be "a white man's burden", but a task for all mankind. Japanese, Chinese, Siamese, Turkish, and Persian statesmen, leaders, and thinkers, Indian and Indonesian Rulers, officials, and chiefs will collaborate in this spirit, in order to consummate this meeting of East and West which has already gone very far, and which will eventually mean nothing less than the reconciliation of two worlds. For this, and nothing less, is the ambitious aim which has to be pursued; such is the great and noble task that awaits colonial policy and constitutes its very basis and justification.

CHAPTER III

THE SPIRIT OF THE WEST

The shades of night were falling fast,
As through an Alpine village passed,
A youth who bore, 'mid snow and ice,
A banner with the strange device,
Excelsior!

LONGFELLOW.

The urge towards distance

Too often, in the previous pages, has it been necessary to point out the inevitability of tendencies and events. *Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt*, we said with the poet. But this is a doctrine which the West will only accept when applied to the past: it feels reluctant to accept it for the future. Before colonial statesmanship can kindle the sacred fire necessary to the performance of its task, not only in the hearts of the officials who have to apply its policy, but also in every member of the leading nations and among the Eastern leaders in the colonies, it must be able to place itself upon the standpoint of human solidarity, which should be recognised as a genuine ideal and one capable of realisation.

It may seem bold to aspire to heights that are above the moral requirements born from a mechanical necessity. It might appear that by such an attempt one transfers reality into a nebulous distance, whither no sensible person can wish to direct his step. Yet it is precisely the peculiar characteristic of the spirit of the West that it is animated by an irresistible urge which has linked it from its birth to everything that is hidden behind the most distant horizons. In its wonderful temerity the spirit of the West has dared to battle with distance, and to defeat it with the energy of the greatest of its exponents and to conjure it with the magic instruments created by its technique. All its colossal inventions, all its heroic explorations were born from this urge towards dis-

tance, and its science and its philosophy are to this day carried and inspired by this same compulsion.

The spirit of the West dislikes to be driven by an irresistible moral necessity. But it will always feel the appeal of a task to which it may apply itself of its own free will. Because it is in the nature of the West ever to aim at the highest pinnacles, it is incumbent upon us to consider the question whether the West possesses not only the high ambitions but also the spiritual and moral forces that are necessary for the responsible task of leadership. Never could this question have been put at a more critical moment, never was there more reason than at the present time to study the problem more earnestly. This chapter will therefore examine the spirit of the West and its capacity to execute its task in the East.

Critics of the West

The progress of our examination is at once impeded by a series of despondent reflections from critics who find fault with the core itself of Western civilisation. More than ever and in wider circles than before, there is noticeable a doubting and despairing tone regarding the soundness of the basis of our Western communities and of the living force of Christianity. There is talk of the decline of the West. Western society is being reproached for its growing materialism, for a civilisation in which technique, science, and industrialism have created mechanisation, lifeless routine, soulless bureaucracy and decaying parliamentarism, and again for fostering a demagogy without mind, battle-cries without conviction, dogmas without faith, while all this emptiness is said to express itself in spiritual poverty, moral deterioration, and hectic individualism. From such a society the critics declare themselves unable to expect the performance of a spiritual and moral task such as that which lies before colonial statesmanship.

None of these crushing indictments is without truth, but none of them contains unalloyed truth. That these accusations could arise at all in the bosom of such a society is at any rate a favourable indication of the existence of at least a modicum of moral sense. The point of view of the critics is as much part and parcel of the West as the evils which rouse their indignation. That they can speak their mind so freely testifies to the existence of a con-

siderable degree of latitude and tolerance. It may be remarked, moreover, that the existing faults need not absolutely be attributed to Christianity, but may quite well be due to those who profess it. It might be more to the point to enquire into the paralysing influences to which may be ascribed the fact that Europe is still not Christian.

Christianity does not merely imply, in this connection, dogma and church-going, but the observance in the course of everyday existence of the two main commandments, which certainly do not need to be mentioned in this place. In so far as the West does not observe these two commandments, it may be said to have failed and to be failing still. No doubt the objection will be made that it is dangerous to distinguish between a doctrine and the life of those who profess it, and that the tree will be judged by its fruit. But we should remember that in other societies than ours the same difference existed. The fate of the prophets, of Socrates and of Plato gives one another idea of the real conditions in ancient civilisations. And the situation in present day societies, not only in the West but everywhere, reveals the same state of affairs. Human beings will always lag behind the highest standards which they sincerely honour.

There is, for this reason, no room for the revival of those eighteenth century ideas, which, in a modernised garb, are once again coming to the fore. The eighteenth century worship of all things Eastern was due in the first place to the deplorable conditions which generally existed in the West at that period, and furthermore to ignorance about the real conditions of Eastern society. To-day at any rate there exists no such ignorance to excuse the same misapprehensions. The researches of nineteenth and twentieth century scholars have in many respects confirmed the highest notions of the eighteenth century as to the glories of the ancient Oriental civilisations, but they have also shed much light upon their social limitations and their other shortcomings.

No doubt the West will be able to welcome the wealth of Eastern cultures, and a sound appreciation of these cultures must even form the indispensable pre-requisite for the future synthesis of East and West. But if the synthesis would become utterly impossible by the destruction of Eastern cultures, it would become just as impossible if the West lost faith in itself. Where criticism is

directed towards certain unhealthy tendencies, it must be hailed as a constructive force. But if it goes beyond this function and becomes comprehensive, it will cause incalculable harm in the East, because it will undermine the confidence which is necessary for co-operation with Western leadership. And if it turns against the very soul and being of Western culture, criticism, even if it does not make itself heard as far as the East, will prove to be the greatest danger of our time, because nothing is more disastrous than that which undermines self-confidence, the faith in the possibility of progress and improvement. There is no greater evil than that which would cause the West to doubt its calling and its task. The Roman Empire, notwithstanding its great gift of the *Pax Romana* which was appreciated by many of the peoples who benefited by it, became unnerved by a similar cultural fatigue in the circles from which leadership should have come. Those who should have preached self-searching and self-improvement gave the example of doubt and dereliction of duty. "They were drifting", says Professor Stuart Jones, "towards abstentionist philosophies, towards other-worldly religions, towards the shoals and rocks of astrology, magic and such like" ¹). For nations called upon to play the part of Rome to the best of their ability, this is a danger that should not be overlooked.

Disappointment not seldom overpowers the best men in the West, those whose services are most required because of the unselfish idealism that inspires them. They turn their backs upon reality, and often enough their worst enemies, those who oppose all progress and whose unbridled instincts crave for absolute licence, range themselves by the side of the idealistic abstentionists. Closely akin to them is the movement of intellectual anarchism, which utilises the Western freedom of expression in order to attack authority, tradition, and all the most precious aspects of the social inheritance in a manner which would be tolerated in no Eastern state. While these people enjoy order, safety, the certainty of justice and all the other invaluable blessings of an ordered society, they forget their indebtedness to religion, the state, the family, and society ²).

¹) H. Stuart Jones, "The Roman Empire", in F. S. Marvin's *Western Races and the World*, 1922, pp. 106—107.

²) Lothrop Stoddard, *The Revolt against Civilisation*, 1922.

At bottom, these divergent tendencies are symptoms of the moral pressure which is the unavoidable concomitant of the rise of mankind towards a higher social life. A similar moral lassitude can be detected in the great cultures of antiquity: Taoism, the school of Yang Chu, various pre-Buddhistic sects in India, and more than one philosophical sect of the Greco-Roman period display all its characteristics. And in our own period there is no denying that colossal demands are made upon every mind which wishes to keep pace with the modern era. The growing generation has to sacrifice some twelve years to serious work, discipline and self-control in order to acquire a superficial acquaintance with the achievements of its fathers. Five more years of intense specialisation are necessary for those who wish to make their own contribution to the development of this inheritance. In Goethe's days a *savant* could still acquire an encyclopaedic knowledge, but nowadays even specialists complain that they are unable to keep abreast with the flood of special literature in their own branch. The burden which each generation transmits to the next goes on increasing, and one begins to wonder whether the carrying capacity of the newcomers will not one day be overtaxed.

Such is the trend of feeling which forms the unconscious basis of hundreds of forms of dissatisfaction and of anti-social thought. When a man's inner self is attuned to his social surroundings, the duties they impose upon him appear light enough. For it is only in a vigorous social consciousness, in the public spirit of the West that freedom in voluntary constraint, which is the only true liberty, can be found. The creation of culture is like the reclamation of a tropical forest. Every foot of arable soil has to be conquered by energetic application, every step forward is taken at the price of a new struggle, while the result in its turn increases the area of the struggle. But at the same time a freedom of movement, a security of subsistence and a new variety of life are created, which would never have been the gift of the virgin forest. It may happen that a generation born in ignorance of the horrors of the forest will put aside the unwieldy instruments of reclamation. This is what a portion of Western thought is doing at present; it has thrown aside all discipline and self-control in its intellectual interpretation of life and society, its criticism of the moral foundations of family and state, its attitude to sex-relations, its dances,

its music and its art, and closed itself to the spiritual and moral forces that are living in our religion and in our culture. In both cases the result is fatal: the virgin forest will return in a rush and chase effeminate man into the wilderness.

There are other voices too, however, which insist upon the improvement of the methods of cultivation and warn against deadly routine. Such voices deserve all our attention. Just because of its calling in the East, because of its responsibility towards the young countries which are being treated according to methods which have originated in the West, the West has a duty of continual self-criticism and self-improvement. Let us beware of making a confusion between the voices of apathy and anarchy and those of critical advisers. There is an easy criterion to distinguish them: just as simplicity is the hallmark of truth, so moderation is the sign of a good leader. By the same token every doctrine which demands the utter sacrifice of the human being to the system, of the personality to the community, or of the community to individual liberty, stands condemned. Public spirit is the pendulum of the ages, the *perpetuum mobile* of human development, moving between personality and society. The civic sense, which can only be fostered by education and self-discipline, unites the personality with society.

When the dissolving tendencies in our Western societies find their efforts to undermine the foundations of the West frustrated, they turn towards the East with a special gospel of disaffection, atheism and anti-Westernism, but in this case the East also finds a simple means of distinguishing friend from foe. The true Western friend of the East never uses words of hatred or of mockery towards the religion, the culture, and the society of the West. The East not infrequently feels by instinct that Western criticism which mocks the West cannot be honestly inspired. For the good Eastern patriot also refrains from hatred and from mockery, even when he cannot approve of everything around him and agitates for reforms. He too adheres to the golden mean which equally eschews self-depreciation and boasting. But in a period of transition such as that in which we are living, when nationalism and urge towards autonomy cause the Eastern temper to rise, blind sentiment often has the better of true Eastern instinct. The propaganda of hatred tries to rouse this sentiment by representing the

contact between East and West as an uninterrupted exploitation, the good which resulted from the contact is systematically passed over in silence, while no allusion is made to the evil that once prevailed in Eastern societies.

It would be an utter mistake to imagine that the lack of foundation of this propaganda of hatred must be self-evident. Such an idea only fosters the erroneous trustfulness which neglects to rectify mistaken assertions by pointing to facts which are easy to check by everybody concerned. One forgets that far more power of suggestion emanates from one lie that is repeated a hundred times than from truth which is uttered only once, if at all. The West is in a particularly difficult position in this respect. For it has long ago written freedom of utterance on its banner, and is most reluctant to withdraw the liberty of the press and of the spoken word which it has once granted. Often it is even disinclined to make use of repressive methods when freedom has become licence.

The danger which results from this situation and the fact that freedom remains the most desirable of conditions imposes a duty upon all well-meaning persons both in the East and in the West. The press is the conscience of society: the more it is fettered, the less will it be able to fulfil its mission. The real remedy is the creation of a natural counterpoise within society, and voluntary self-control on the part of the press. Everybody has the social duty to fight pernicious propaganda by giving currency to real facts. No government can execute this task by itself. Every man, every woman, whether Western or Eastern, has therefore the duty to collaborate in this social work of fighting mendacity, hatred, and mockery by word of mouth and by writing, and especially by setting a good example.

It is a happy fact that in all social circles and in all countries, enough feelings of friendship have sprung up already to work as a vigorous antidote to the poisonous campaign of propaganda. This is a labour in which everybody can share. Nobody, either in the East or in the West, can possibly profit by the recriminations which one has met continually, in the course of the last two decades, in all the newspapers, whether Western or Eastern, which appear in the East. Even though they do not actually, as a rule, falsify the facts or the characteristics they

mention, one will notice, generally speaking, that the kind of shortcomings they emphasise are not specifically Oriental nor Occidental, but universally human. Every Occidental, therefore, who lives in an Eastern milieu, and every Oriental who lives in a Western milieu, will, by avoiding giving umbrage, by endeavouring to be courteous and righteous, in a word, by treating those he meets like fellow human beings, become a living germ of synthesis, which will eventually grow and help to stifle the weeds of antithesis. It is upon the exertions of such people that the possibility of the synthesis of East and West rests.

Having thus clearly distinguished between constructive criticism and destructive propaganda, we now can pass to the question whether Western society really does breathe that soulless materialism which usurps in the East a position of power that only rests upon violence, upon technical superiority and guns. The success of the propaganda of hatred, which has been well described as the exploitation of each case of exploitation, gives a final answer to this question. Public opinion in every Occidental country condemns every case of exploitation that comes to its knowledge. If we still possessed the mentality of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we should take it as a matter of course that this material preponderance should be used and abused to the uttermost. But it would not do, nowadays, to preach this doctrine: everywhere it would meet with indignant condemnation. We have therefore the right to make a distinction between the West and its unhealthy excrescences, between the ideals of to-day and the practice which follows only with hesitating step.

The policy of political and economic emancipation that is now being applied to Eastern communities, and that is mentioned in the Covenant of the League of Nations as a sacred duty, is not inspired by fear of the awakening of Eastern consciousness, as is sometimes suggested. This awakening has been caused by the West itself, and is deliberately being fostered every day by the West, because it is an inherent part of the moral progress of the whole of Western society. It is the most distinctive characteristic of the West that it makes for conditions which tend to raise the personal dignity of every human being. Never, whether in the East or in the West, has this principle been applied as thoroughly as it is to-day. It is not only accepted and recognised, but an incres-

sant struggle goes on to ensure its application to the life of every day. Notwithstanding the significance of great figures like Asoka, the incarnation of the pan-humanistic conception of early Buddhism, like Marcus Aurelius, the great Stoic emperor, like Akbar and Kublai Khan, the endeavour to apply the idea of the respect of personal dignity on a large scale is altogether modern.

The great war, to which so much of contemporary pessimism is due, may have revealed the existence of a large amount of latent atavism, yet it remains a fact that the millions of warriors and the nations behind them genuinely believed that they were struggling for a good cause or even for lofty ideals. In every war one can detect a tendency which nowadays gradually begins to be controlled and which is to be ascribed to the particularism that is the real source of all strife, and has ever been mankind's worst enemy. The same forces which have slowly undermined the despotic reign of space and have weakened its most powerful entrenchments, the territorial connections, will also eventually reduce the influences which still attempt to preserve the divisions that are becoming ever more artificial. Group egoism in the West is giving way before a better and higher vision.

Considered in this light, the worst depths of the great war, however much below the level of contemporary moral standards they may have been, remain above the deepest troughs of previous wars. For, co-existent with all kinds of deplorable motives, there were alive, in a greater measure than ever before, lofty ideals concerned with the interests of the whole of mankind. If we did not relapse into the ferocity of former ages, if instead, a clamour arose for a League of Nations and for practical measures to ensure that there should be no more war, it is to this fact that we are indebted.

Western humanity proved itself to be possessed of an idealism and a heroism which were capable of confronting every kind of suffering and of privation. Will it not prove capable, in the interest of humanity as a whole, of doing equally great things, once it has learned to co-operate in the greatest of all connections, in the international connection? Will it not then animated by the consciousness of human solidarity, be capable of transcending the last remaining demarcations of class, nation and race? It is the application of such great principles to an ever widening circle and to

the life of every day that constitutes the true evolution of society. The forces which have gradually caused the application of such principles to the Western world and will spread them ever further are partly spiritual and partly moral. It is all the more necessary to distinguish their true nature in view of the fact that they are present also, either in embryo or in stages of further development; within every non-Western society, where they must be brought to their fullest development before these societies can enter into the modern era without any danger to their own members.

At bottom, as we shall afterwards establish, the moral forces of the East and those of the West have the same content and the same tendency. Indeed, it would be strange if it were otherwise. And it is upon this fundamental community that the whole idea of synthesis is based. It does not ask the East to become Westernised, the Indian to become a Briton, the Javanese to become a Dutchman. It wants to widen and vivify all existing social spheres. In the same way as Christianity can be summarised in two commandments which also embrace the whole content of Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Islam, and mystical-magic thought, the idea of synthesis can be summarised thus: it is the adaptation of the dynamic spirit of the West to the two spheres of ideas which completely dominate all social life and feeling, from the smallest African or Australian tribe to the powerful communities of the West. The idea of synthesis does not proceed from a claim of the West to material or moral supremacy. It wants to activate the social forces that are present everywhere but are usually still too much hampered by special resistances. Those who take up the defence of the West are indeed fighting for something more, they are fighting for the preservation and for the strengthening of the same moral principles that exist all over the world: they are fighting both for the East and for the West.

The social horizon

The West no more owes its spiritual possessions to its own exertions than will the East of the future. It is the glory of our fathers that they were able to discern the value of other cultures, and it will be the honour of the East that it will in its turn learn the Western secret of activating its own social forces. For the West possesses one secret, which, however, is not hidden beyond

the reach of those who search for it. The time has come for us to enter the holy of holies, to tread the soil where Western morality has germinated. In this sacred place our eye first of all meets the inheritance of Israel, the belief in one personal God, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and the deep religious consciousness and stern sense of justice of the prophets, Isaiah's vision of human solidarity and of world peace based upon righteousness ¹⁾. Bordering upon the legacy of Israel is Christianity which by its two great commandments, its stern call to repent and to strive after spiritual rebirth, has become the true dynamic force of the West and the ever flowing well of its moral strength. From Hellas come the ideas of art, science and philosophy, and also the ideals of freedom and truth, while Rome gave us the respect for law, order and organisation.

These ideas and these revelations awakened capacities which were already present in the populations of North-western and Central Europe, just as they are present, actually or potentially, in every other nation in the world, and enabled them to reach a greater development. Nothing more had to be added to this patrimony by the growing West except the utilisation of what is perhaps most truly its own special characteristic: the doctrine of the deed. Had our fathers not been able to amalgamate all this wealth into the unity provided by action, we should never have witnessed the free development of the human personality, which was not even possible within the Greek city states, however much enamoured of freedom they may have been.

Our time knows an aberration, individualism, which is often supposed to be the mark of the West. Nothing is less true. Individualism is atomism, and those who profess it are anti-social. An "individualistic society" is a contradiction in terms. The individual can never be the social unit. Only the personality can form this unit, and it can develop, within society and its component parts, such as the family, the village, the town, or the corporation. The personality reveals itself at its best in the great beings who are able to place themselves unassisted in opposition to society, when they know it to be for the social good. Those who have become aware of the colossal moral force which is necessary to preserve in a society as wide and as differentiated as that of our West

¹⁾ Isaiah, II: 4, XI: 6—9, LXV: 25.

a connection that works properly and is well balanced, will realise the importance of the personality as a means of countering the dangers of individualism.

The personality is an immense and valuable reservoir of energy. When group loyalty in the East will finally have broken down, as it is bound to do, the millions and millions of persons who have not yet reached complete development will have to be directed towards the acquisition of personality as the only way of achieving a higher and wider social unity. The extraordinary tension of the social sense, living in the whole of mankind, and seated in the consciousness of the free personality, such is the hidden, but also the most patent source of the strength of the West.

After the previous passage it will be understood more easily why the introduction of Western institutions in the East must take place with the greatest circumspection. There is no greater and more fundamental problem for the East than the creation of a higher synthesis of its group-loyalty by the fostering of a stronger social dynamism. Only the statesmen of Japan seem thoroughly to have grasped its significance. It forms the basis of their domestic policy, as it is also the main element of the internal strife that since 1911 has been going on in China. Every colonial power, all the national *élites* of the East will have to give it their most concentrated attention. The task before them is that of weakening the hold of the group or caste morality without losing any of its really vital elements.

It is because they were unable by their own unaided forces to achieve this higher synthesis that the Greek City-Republics were overwhelmed by Macedonia and Rome. It was only when these states imposed unity from above upon the Greeks that Greek culture acquired its vast power of expansion. Similarly, Eastern communities will only find an outlet for the undreamt of possibilities they contain when the West has revealed the way towards a higher unity to the group loyalties that now divide them. This is a problem that arises in every section of colonial policy. It is not individualism that must be cultivated in Eastern society, if the walls of its narrow group-egoisms are to be broken, but personality, the kind of personality which realises that, although its interests may be defended, they yet can never come before those of the community.

The East has its individualisms as well as our own society. We are told, for instance, that the Toradja tribes of Celebes are too weak to reject the bad elements they contain, although behind their backs everybody talks about them with the utmost contempt ¹⁾. Stronger communities, however, have their own ways of ridding themselves of anti-social elements. But there is a real danger that with the growth of Western influence the communal sense will be weakened and thus open the way to an anti-social individualism. For it should not be thought that a wide social consciousness can be created all of a piece, without there being intermediary links to join the individual and the state. Several communistic experiments have been based upon such a misapprehension, which represents an ideal that has always been present in the mind of human beings. There is no short cut towards absolute solidarity; the road is long and arduous, and human nature has to move from stage to stage, starting with the family, until victory over itself leads to the acquisition of social personality.

Those who try to abolish individual or group selfishness by decree reckon without human nature, and start where human evolution will only arrive in the very long run. It is a method which deviates from the golden mean, and which is bound to lead to the tyranny of the community on the one hand and to unsocial individualism on the other. Nature and practice will then seek a *modus vivendi* between these two extremes, but after a great amount of effort they will only prove able to achieve an unstable equilibrium which will be so exhausting to maintain that there will be no energy left for true progress.

The complete personality requires the spacious atmosphere which can only be provided by a great society which is the nation, or better still, by mankind as a whole, in order to be able to live its life to the fullest extent. But it will only acquire the necessary upward impulse in the smallest circle, in the family, which has rightly been called by the greatest thinkers the pillar of society and of the state. Some unavoidable drawbacks of group egoism which in the West may still to a certain extent characterise the family, the village, the town and the nation will have to be accepted, because their social function infinitely surpasses in importance

¹⁾ N. Adriani, *Korte Schets van het Toradja Volk*. 1920, p. 11.



the effect of these drawbacks. Moreover, education, religion, legislation, provide the necessary means by which these disadvantages can be overcome.

The West itself is still far from having reached the culmination of this evolutionary process. There are still considerable chasms, between classes and nations, that remain to be bridged. On the other hand, vigilant care must still be exercised lest the individual escape from social control. Whoever undermines the family, whether in the East or in the West, undermines at the same time the state and the social fabric and creates individuals in their thousands. In the East care must be taken to provide the necessary substitutes for the fences which separate groups, clans, families, and castes. The nascent personality must be protected, while it must be allowed at the same time to enter into contact with the outside world.

Contact with the outside world will be advanced by education, trade, traffic, administrative care, organisation, co-operative organisations, and the creation of representative institutions which stand above the small communities. All these means are indispensable, but they have little value if at any time they attack or destroy the social sense instead of strengthening and widening it. This is not to say that the whole population must necessarily be metamorphosed into a mass of strong social personalities. Nature is sparing, under any climate, of such precious fruits. Tens of millions of human beings in the East will still for a long time have to preserve their hold upon existence through the only available means, through the community instinct and the clan connection. Colonial policy will have to preserve these forces, in the same way as the wise statesmanship of Japan has done. But it will assist all those who feel that these bonds prevent the enlargement of their social horizon. It is the most appropriate task of the colonising authority to develop this noble instinct in all those who possess it in germ.

The danger of over-hasty interference on the one hand, and of disregarding the moral forces which are at work in Western society on the other, explains the necessity of these remarks. For the meeting and synthesis of cultures is above all a moral problem. Those who consider it superfluous or beneath their dignity to look at this wide social horizon would do better to abstain from med-

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dling with colonial problems. If they imagine that it is merely a practical matter, they have failed to understand the true nature of the colonial question, and they can only create misunderstandings, not to speak of greater evils.

The spiritual zenith

Having looked at the social horizon of Western society, we may now lift our eyes towards the spiritual sphere, where the second function of colonial policy must display its activity. The path which leads to this exalted summit is the path of faith in perfectibility, in improvement, and in progress. In its theocentric form this faith was the most definite characteristic of the medieval Church, which manifested itself in its purest form in the spiritualised lines of Gothic architecture. With the Humanism of the Renaissance this faith entered human society as a living force and became its inner dynamic urge.

In Goethe's *Faust* we see it as the thirst for the infinite and the unachievable. Although the Faustian soul risks losing itself in the infinity of its own desires, its drama can never end in the triumph of the earthbound spirit of universal negation. In the earthly sphere, no doubt, it may deviate into unbridled ambition, a restless chase after the increase of earthly goods and after pleasures, record-breaking, the noise and din of modern life. But even under these externals often the noble ancestry reveals itself, and will prove capable of the greatest mental and moral efforts, when circumstances call for them. It is this spirit which created our science, which gave us our explorers and inventors, our sport and our technique. But to preserve its social quality, it requires an enduring spiritual atmosphere.

Under the guidance of colonial statesmanship the Faustian spirit is already beginning to stir up the complacency of Eastern society. The new life is revealing itself by the creation of schools, nursing homes, and hospitals by Orientals themselves. It appears in the efforts made by Orientals to abolish child-marriages and to improve the position of women. It is time that we ceased to regret the complacency which is being shattered by the Faustian spirit: not seldom does it hide a fatalism born of impotence, a mute despair which is the result of repression in men and in women endowed with special gifts that have no chance of unfold-

ing. It is the duty of the West to activate this personal urge towards spiritual, moral, intellectual, and material improvement.

Machine, technique and civilisation

We ought perhaps, in a few words, to refer to another reproach that is too often levelled at our Western civilisation. Many people look down upon it because it is a technical civilisation. But technique is the skeleton upon which its organisation rests; it provides one of the most powerful levers of the moral force of our West. The Dutch sinologist Duyvendak has pointed this out in his extremely interesting studies about the meeting of cultures. "There is", he writes, "a real grandeur in the quiet command of natural forces, in the untiring, tenacious energy which is able to defeat space and time, and which continues with ever fresh devotion the task it has undertaken. There is spiritual greatness in the economic running of a machine, in a well-managed administration, in an account that balances. . . . Each instrument, to be technically perfect, requires devotion, love of truth and self-discipline"¹). We may rejoice in finding a similar appreciation in the views expressed by several thinkers in China, Japan, India, and the Dutch East Indies, who have shown that they are aware of the moral foundations²) of our technical civilisation. For it would be a serious obstacle in the way of future development if in many Eastern communities industry and technique met with an attitude of moral and intellectual superiority.

Indeed, technical progress is frequently the result of heroism and self-sacrifice on the part of inventors and scientists. A single improvement has sometimes absorbed the mental energy of a lifetime, which was spent in endless struggles against failure, mockery, poverty, and solitude. And even the right functioning of traffic or industrial organisations on a large scale is only possible with the assistance of the personal element, the sense of duty of millions of men whose work remains unnoticed. It is this personal aspect of our mechanical age which has saved the workman from becoming a soulless cog in the machine, and though it is true that specialisation of labour has increased the routine side of it, it has

¹) J. J. L. Duyvendak, *China tegen de Westerkim*, pp. 66—67.

²) See Prof. J. A. Smith's Study "The Contribution of Greece and Rome" in the *Unity of Western Civilisation*, p. 89.

also roused a greater sense of responsibility. Is it not a fact that a negligent workman can endanger the life of all his fellow workers, or can spoil the product of their labour? Being aware of all this, the modern workman has acquired more consciousness and more confidence, even outside his daily task, than the medieval workman or even the present-day agricultural labourer. Everything that adds to the dignity of the worker enlarges the moral foundations of society.

The Golem legend simply does not apply to our time. It is untrue to say that the whole West has become the slave of the machine, which it called up in an evil hour. The mind which was able to create the machine will never become its servant. And the social activities, the labour and hygienic legislation of our time prove that we do not intend any part of our community to remain in its thrall. The mind of the West is indeed acquiring an ever growing control over the technique to which it has given birth.

The morphological interpretation of history.

After these encouraging considerations we are bound nevertheless once more to ask ourselves whether there really are no blemishes at all that tarnish the bright spirit of the West. None of the criticisms we have reviewed so far affect fundamental issues. But might not some of the less encouraging phenomena which we were bound to observe cause, in the long run, chronic disease which would profoundly disappoint the hopes of those who believe in the mission of the West? This query is of the highest importance, because the synthesis of cultures must of necessity be a very long process, during which the spirit of the West ought to preserve its powers unimpaired.

All the unfavourable symptoms which we have mentioned are due, in the long run, to materialism and to individualism. The larger the size of a community, the greater the danger that its members will degenerate into non-social, i.e. immoral and soulless, individuals. When the power of growth has produced all the forms that were within its capacity, its struggle with matter must come to an end, and the paralysing and decomposing influences that were never absent begin to take the upper hand. The path of human history is strewn with the relics of cultures that have been

courageously established in bygone ages, and within whose orbit human beings may have fancied themselves as certain of continued progress as we are now. They have, like ourselves, known a period of cultural youth and growth, and by the same law we ought, just as they, to be moving towards our end and decomposition.

Never has this theory been presented in such an accomplished and ruthless form as in Spengler's morphological interpretation of the history of the world. If his interpretation is correct, the growing individualism and materialism of our age, its alienation from faith and from morality, its political and social evils, its class war and its world war would be symptoms which require no further explanation than that our culture has reached its old age.

The decline of the West

This interpretation of history and its application to our own fate are of primary importance for our colonial policy. No serious exchange of views about colonial problems seems possible nowadays which sooner or later does not develop into an argument about matters connected with this philosophy. We may as well state at once that those who wish to give an air of rationality to their discouragement, their indifference or their anti-social feeling by pointing to the twilight that is falling over the West would be better advised to seek their arguments elsewhere. They will certainly not find them in Spengler's work, which breathes an altogether different spirit, and is full of manliness and courage. Spengler would be the last to advise the West to view with resignation its coming doom and to give itself over to a policy of abstention. It is, on the contrary, the spirit of the West that speaks through him, with the voice it always finds when fighting with its back to the wall.

If, however, we really were fighting with our backs to the wall, certain of being overwhelmed in the end, we should have to follow an entirely different colonial policy from that which has been outlined in these pages. The period of blood and iron would have arrived, and the great war would be the beginning of a new era, not the end of an old one. Dictatorship and warfare for personal ends would slowly demolish the old order. The big town, that Moloch which draws the best blood of the nations but which, owing to the

declining birth-rate, does not return it, would sap the energy and the genius of the West. This sombre interpretation of the past and of the present, accepted by so many people, necessitates the enumeration of the grounds upon which colonial policy intends to base its faith in a fruitful and active future.

The call to accept heroically the imminence of our fatal end may sound like the voice of the West, but it is not worded according to the spirit of the West. If it were a question of a sudden, imminent and unavoidable end, its effect would indeed be different from what it must be, now that we are given to understand that many generations after our own will be subjected to the same necessary decline. This changes the call for heroism into a counsel of fatalism. Could we indeed envisage, day after day, such a future, we should soon have acquired the souls of slaves. For it is not possible to walk upon the high summits of heroism every hour of one's existence. Fatalism already has pervaded only too large a portion of Eastern society owing to its dependence upon nature and surroundings. If we too were to adopt this doctrine, there would indeed be nothing left for us to hand over to the East.

Analysis of the morphological interpretation of history.

These pessimistic doctrines appear to find some corroboration in the lesson, taught by all history, that the factor which is strongest in shaping the attitude to life and the outlook of the human individual and of society is the influence of the cultural environment. It would appear, then, that any given generation is left with no alternative to building upon the existing basis. This gives the impression that the existing culture is the guide and maker of the future, which compels all nations to follow a predestined plan and to work it out to its last consequence. Once the aim has been reached, culture becomes suddenly rigid, according to Spengler, and starts dying, although, like a gigantic forest tree, it may still remain standing for ages.

We are asked to believe that Eastern civilisations one after the other have reached this stage and have become absolutely immutable, and that the populations which live within their sphere are living in a zoological period without any history and are no more than an immense collection of petrified growths. If we point

to the fact that they are still able to undergo active outside cultural influences, we are expected to be satisfied with the reply that this is merely the phenomenon which crystallography describes as pseudo-morphosis. A cavity, formed by the disappearance of a crystal inside a rock, is sometimes filled at a later stage by entirely different matter, which then presents to the investigator a shape altogether out of harmony with its nature. Outside influence, according to this view, has precisely the same effect upon Eastern cultures. But the facts of history do not fit in with these views.

The German sinologist Richard Wilhelm says "the contention that Chinese culture is entirely cut off from the outer world and has existed in a petrified condition for thousands of years is as ridiculous as the expression 'a Chinese wall' itself". And certainly, only an arbitrary marshalling of the facts of historical evolution will attempt to classify important periods of cultural efflorescence like those of the Han, T'ang and Sung dynasties as periods of mummified stagnation. The creative joy which characterises them is as fresh and as youthful as that of the starting period of a thousand or two thousand years earlier. And why should one not admit the intimate relationship that exists between Buddhism and the whole popular life of Japan or of the T'ang period in China? To talk of pseudo-morphosis in this connection or to postulate a fundamental difference between these cultures is also entirely arbitrary. In the fourth and third centuries B.C.¹⁾, China possessed an intense and original life such as she was not to know again, and this was due, partly at least, to contacts that were not even very extensive with Mediterranean civilisations. One might point to analogous facts in the case of Hindu and Arabic influences in the Malay Archipelago, or of the influence of the classical world upon the West and of the West upon the whole world. There are, everywhere and at all times, instances of periods of fruitful culture and periods when the most vivid interest was shown for foreign ideas, which in their turn gave rise to the creation of new and original forms. Let us not, by staring ourselves blind upon differences in form, persuade ourselves that there is a complete and fundamental difference between early Christianity and the Christianity of the Middle Ages, and between the latter and that of our own time. Indian

¹⁾ Prof. Henri Maspero, *La Chine Antique*, 1927, pp. 607—608.

Buddhism does not differ only from Japanese and Chinese Buddhism, the Renaissance has much in common with classical antiquity.

The positive horror with which the advocates of the morphological interpretation of history reject any suggestion of vivifying influences exercised by one civilisation upon another is due to the fact that they consider each culture as a plant rooted in a definite landscape. According to them the creator of a culture is the spirit which suddenly discovers and fertilises the soil where it will be able to grow. It will then shape amorphous populations into nations, which will be compelled to construct their religion, their language, their political organisation, their architecture, and their art according to pre-existing cultural plans. This fatalistic conception of life owes much of its plausibility to the fact that it takes as its starting point the birth of new cultures. But it neglects the influences which, apart from the autochthonous culture, have acted upon the real creator of each culture, the human society. What seems to be the birth of a culture is only the meeting point of innumerable active factors, such as landscape, climate, popular characteristics, outside cultural influences, etc. Culture never was the creator: it is the creature.

Human societies, growing in volume, in strength, and in consciousness, create cultures and in their creative labour they are not seldom assisted or hampered by powerful outside influences. Culture is not really a localised growth. It is a burning source of energy, warmth, and light, which can call forth in all countries and under all climates innumerable and varied forms of growth. The philosophy which inspired Western policy is based upon this universal conception of history. It believes in the universal oneness of mankind, although a unity of tendency and direction is not yet possible, while an actual or potential uniformity is undesirable. Differences that can be observed from country to country do not affect this potential unity. It is sufficiently confirmed by the fact, established hundreds of times in the course of history, that a creative response to outside influence has always been and still is manifest in the cultural growth of all groups of mankind.

There are differences in the fertility of the soil. Climate imposes definite limits. But this does not affect the unity which inspires colonial statesmanship, because it does not aim at a universal

Westernisation, but only wants to exercise a powerful and benevolent influence. Richer in its shapes than Proteus himself, life is always able to mould nature and society into new shapes that fit in with environment, the soil, the race, and the moment. Bergson's *élan vital* persuades matter to receive its spark by a mysterious process. The spark which vitalises human society is not its culture, but the divine element which lifts man and his community above the animal world. The more this principle of life dominates matter, the more will man be able to rise upwards in the divine illumination and to aim at becoming, as was once ordained, the image of his Maker.

It was given to the West, thanks to the labours of numberless peoples which preceded it in the course of time, to dominate matter in a way which has never before been witnessed by the world. Let the West forever remember that it owes this victory neither to its intelligence nor to its technique, but to its spiritual and its moral powers. Once one considers the principle of life in every society in this manner, once one believes in the spirit of the West and in its mission to help others in liberating from the embrace of matter the spark that is already burning in them, one will necessarily come to the conclusion that an almost inexhaustible task has been reserved for colonial statesmanship. The coloniser, everywhere, will feel bound to aim at the fullest possible unfolding of human dignity.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE FUTURE

The real spirit of the West is not tied to any place or any time. It belongs to all times and knows no frontier. To try and apply organic laws to it would be as absurd as to attempt to read the laws of the majestic spaces of heaven in the development of a tree or a shrub. The real spirit of the West feels that it participates in the essence of the Eternal and the Infinite. The stream of its energy can never come to rest: behind each horizon it seeks a further one, till it can reach the most distant horizon that can be thought of. The end of its expansion is still distant, but we are upon the right road: we have preserved the family, the village, the town, the province, and the fatherland, and we wish to keep them as indispensable nurseries of an ever-growing solidarity¹).

¹) Prof. Max Scheler, *Nature et Formes de la Sympathie*, p. 280, shows how extreme internationalism and communism point to an entirely different direction.

But they must never become ramparts for the particularism which fears space.

In the same manner the East must keep the manifold forms of its own social organisation, the group community which is so dear to its heart, the family, the confraternity, the corporation, the village community, but they too must be nurseries where the opportunity of cultivating unity is available. In order to be able to co-operate in this aim the West had to begin by freeing itself from the territorial connection, and to exchange its Western garb for the energy of universality, in which East and West can participate on equal terms, and in which the spirit of the West can rise towards international co-operation.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOUL OF THE EAST

"Akin by nature, men are made strangers through the influence of their surroundings".

LUN YU, XVII: II. Conversations of Confucius.

Human kinship and the criterion of humanity

The previous chapter was not meant to be an apologia for the West; similarly the following pages should not be taken as a one-sided plea for the East. They are to be considered as a continuation of the same trend of ideas, applied to the East, and as an endeavour to point out the pillars of the bridgehead on which the bridge of synthesis can securely rest. The great war, materialism, and individualism must not lead us to underestimate the vigour of the spirit of the West. And the differences between the social order in the West and in the colonial world must not prevent us from discerning in the East a real kinship which transcends all contrasts. In every Oriental and in every Occidental who feels this relationship, the way towards understanding, towards sympathy and towards co-operation is sure to reveal itself. For the spirit of the West and the soul of the East are closely related to one another; they resemble each other by nature, and differ only as a result of the influence of varying surroundings.

When we speak of the spirit on the one hand and of the soul on the other, we do not wish to place two principles in opposition or to mark a clear limit between their respective spheres. We only wish to make it clear that the same agent manifests itself, in the West, through a more active inner dynamism, and in the East, rather through the contemplative divine spark. For in both cases we have to deal with man, who stands above all other creatures as lord of the creation. A clear sense of distance which is not restrict-

ed by narrowing influences of environment, and the feeling of reverence which was born from it and enables man to pierce the zenith with his eyes, while embracing at the same time the social horizon, this is the criterion that distinguishes human beings from other creatures. It would be an injustice to mankind to imagine that it began with the *homo faber* and his implements and inventions. The great wonder of creation had happened before primitive man sat down in the sweat of his brow to begin the struggle between matter and spirit.

By this term, and by identifying the spirit of the West and the soul of the East which from the hour of their birth have been opposing and conquering matter, we wish to indicate the great dualism which has preoccupied men from early times, and finds expression in the doctrines of Taoism and Confucianism, in the Upanishads and the Vedanta-system, in Buddhism, in the Law and the Prophets, in the Gospels and in the doctrine of Islam: the opposition between spirit and matter, energy and mass, change and inertia, tension and vacuum, time and space, creation and chaos, rule and anarchy, life and death, light and darkness, good and evil, reason and instinct. Without these distinctions, which modern science does not always accept ¹⁾, human beings would have been unable to think. All mankind, in the East and in the West, has looked upon the arduous upward march which is life, as a struggle between these dualities, between spirit and matter. In the course of this struggle the spirit called forth the *homo faber* as an accompanying manifestation of humanity, as a significant but by no means the most important expression of man.

When man came forth from his prehistoric cavern and shaped the first palaeolithic stone into an implement that would serve for uses that existed only in the future and in his mind's eye, he proved already that he was possessed of a sense of distance in regard to time and to space, such as no other creature has ever displayed. We may detect a spark of intelligence in some animals, but even those that enjoy the warmth of a fire never think of feeding it. They cannot in their thought separate the fire from its surroundings and consider it as an instrument. It was the prerogative of man to be able to place himself outside the present and away from his surroundings, and to break away from their compelling embrace.

¹⁾ Dr. Gustave Le Bon, *L'Evolution de la Matière*, 1923, pp. 14, 17 sqq.

He increased the distance between himself and matter. Separated from his surroundings, he distinguished, at varying distances from himself, his parents, his relatives, and his friends, the chief of his tribe, etc. He saw them in different relations towards himself, and above them all he saw a zenith, and around them a horizon, everything subject to order and rule. Thus his sense of distance created human relationships, duties and feelings which resulted from them, obedience and loyalty and above all reverence. His loyalty was no herd instinct, his reverence no miserable servility. Distinction between human relationships spontaneously brought about community of mind, language, and differentiation between good and evil.

All this had taken place before growing mankind was able to send out the *homo faber* as its servant, its faithful helper. For, before it was able to work out its technical improvement, humanity had to possess the sense of distance and this capacity for reverence. Let us beware of considering technique as the end of mankind and the *homo faber* as the real man. No, if we remain human beings, we must recognise that reverence was, is, and will be the criterion of mankind. While man bows humbly before the infinity of the heavens, his soulless image and counterfeit, the *homo faber*, tries to storm the heavens with his technical capacity and to annihilate distance, which contains the very secret of the strength of mankind; while man infinitely prolongs distance by his reverence and therefore participates in an all-embracing connection with infinity and eternity, his image, chasing after the wrong infinity, annihilates distance and destroys every possibility of connection.

All these considerations are of the highest importance to colonial statesmanship. If, as a *homo faber* of gigantic dimensions, it had succeeded in casting across the colonial world its railways, its telephones, and its telegraphs, its harbours, factories, and works, its organising technique, its political forms and its intellect, but had, at the same time, ignored its own humanity, such spiritual community as has already come into existence between East and West would have been broken irretrievably. However self-seeking, the Company system of previous centuries would have been far preferable because it left the populations practically untouched and did not harm the souls of these millions. Colonial

statesmanship is a task of humanity. He who neglects the human element is a bad leader. Let us begin therefore with the beginning, with Man, who must be the foundation of the central pillar of the bridge of synthesis. Let us recognise the kinship of Eastern and Western man, proved by their capacity for obedience and reverence towards society and the worldorder, whether this capacity be called group loyalty, family spirit, caste solidarity, *esprit de corps*, civic sense, patriotism, or world-fellowship, as far as the horizon is concerned; and by their personal urge towards spiritual progress and improvement striving for mystical oneness with the world-order or religious veneration of transcendental Divinity, as regards the zenith. The pilgrimage which we undertake in this chapter and which will finally lead us to the real popular sphere, the sphere of magical mysticism, in the colonial world, must be preceded by an introductory review of this kinship of all men as manifested in their religions and cultures.

Christianity

In its two great commandments, of which all religions ¹⁾ and cultures have felt the reality, and the essence of which they have all tried to express, Christianity formulated with unparalleled precision the true human attitude towards life: its respect for zenith and horizon. This formula indeed embraces the best thoughts of mankind, especially because these two commandments were united by Christianity into one indivisible unity ²⁾. This is one of the main ideas of Christianity. It does not preach a mere cult of the Supreme Being or a one-sided love of one's neighbours, but the service of the Supreme Being in mankind and of mankind in the Supreme Being. Humanitarian and social activities which run the risk of degenerating into exclusively material assistance, find in the first commandment of Christianity a warning against such a limitation of their horizontal expansion. They will be doomed in the struggle against matter, unless they receive an irresistible impulse towards higher things from a spiritual force which never ceases to sustain them.

This formula transcends all church dogma. Its value and its truth are universal, and no human society could endure, were

¹⁾ Cf. *The Laws of Manu*, IV, 204 and II, 15, and Maeterlinck, *Le Grand Secret*, 1922, pp. 98—101.

²⁾ Matthew, XXII, 39. Cor. I, 13: 2.

there not a spiritual zenith and a moral horizon to lend a human character to the sphere of its activity. Every society has tried within its innermost being to attune its finiteness to the Infinite. In the measure wherein a society disturbs its spiritual sphere by placing its zenith too low or by limiting the circle of its neighbours too narrowly, it deprives itself of all uplifting power. But, when a community decides to heighten the zenith of its reverence and to widen the horizon of its loyalty, its morality, and its charity, it acquires the power to create in every direction. If it settles down either because it is frightened by the call of the spirit to incessant watching, work and struggle, or because matter has imprisoned it inside the invincible resistance of environment, its sense of distance remains restricted and can produce no more than a loyalty and a morality applicable to a small circle only. In such a circle there can be no thought of a large organisation, or of a world-embracing technique. A one-sided preference for one of the two directives leads to mistakes. When there is an almost exclusive endeavour to reach the zenith, practice runs the risk of neglect. Man withdraws into solitude, asceticism and meditation, while his eyes stare upward till they end by seeing nothing at all. There is a danger of spiritual egoism and pride which will deprive mankind and society of all power of improvement. It is a mistaken infinity which is prepared to adopt any arbitrary point for its centre and which can be content with empty space. Such is not the way to develop personality; it merely leads to sterile individualism. The inseparability of the two fundamental religious precepts has never been entirely ignored, not even in the popular conceptions of magical mysticism, which is so anxious to keep a veil drawn across the sources of its inspiration. The universally human urge towards infinity and eternity, consciously guided by Christianity, is the secret of all the capacities of the West. If it is in any way interfered with, the support on which technical capacity rests will disappear and, like the power of organisation which can only root in a spiritual soil, it will shiver into dust.

The world of Islam

If one searches the sacred books of India, of the Buddhists, China's classics, the Koran, the Law and the Prophets of Israel,

the Gospels, and the conceptions and precepts of popular magical mysticism, one will always find among all their diversity and notwithstanding the fact that they often leave all great ideas entirely in the background, that they contain the urge towards the infinite and the social doctrine of duties. In the world of Islam reverence for Allah is placed above everything, and the first precept is submission (*Islam*) to Him alone ¹). Only Allah can judge the sincerity of a man's faith, because human beings can only judge according to externals. Those, however, who wish scrupulously to perform all their religious duties will not find this easy. In Islam one discerns clearly, as well as the zenith which is the worship of the Supreme Being, the horizon which is the communion of the faithful who form, since the death of the Prophet, the only infallible source for further elaboration of the Law.

The severe monotheism of Islam, by making the small isolated populations where it penetrates the bearers of the conception of unity, gives them a strong upward bent, while it also opens to them the wide horizon of the communion of the faithful. Its religious precepts are such that the faithful can never for a moment lose sight altogether of the zenith. No doubt in the world of Islam, as elsewhere, there is a wide gap between doctrine and life. Here too there is formalism and a practice which proves that magical mysticism often has allowed only a few rays of light to penetrate into the ignorance of the mass, and that the conservatism of the Law, which insists on regulating for ever the smallest details of life, may easily encourage particularism and estrangement from social realities. For form, though an expression of life, gives it rigidity. But on the other hand it remains true that all life, even the religious, utters itself by an urge to create and to re-create form; by conforming to this rule all true religion displays its unending reverence and is able to communicate its spiritual and moral strength to all the stages of social evolution.

Hinduism and Buddhism

Hinduism is often opposed to Islam and called the Proteus among religions ²). The whole Hindu society is permeated with

¹) Edouard Montet, *Le Coran*, with numerous comments, 1929, and C. Snouck Hurgronje, *Nederland en de Islam*, 1915, pp. 3, 14, 42 sqq.

²) Cf. J. S. Speyer, *Hindoeïsme*, 1911; Barth, *Les Religions de l'Inde*.

religious feeling; in all his behaviour the Hindu displays this sense of the inseparability of the sacred and the profane. Every family adores its divinities, embodied in their statues, a duty in which the female members of the family faithfully participate. Notwithstanding its great variety, Hinduism continues to be considered as a unity. One speaks about its pantheistic monotheism because one feels that the multiplicity of its appearances always refers to one Supreme Being, just as Vishnu, Siva, and Brahma form the *Trimurti*, the inseparable Hindu Trinity. All the philosophic and theosophical systems of Hinduism aim at the liberation of the spirit from matter and it is particularly in this aspect that the universal human tendency of this religion is revealed, notwithstanding all differences in form and in method. We are struck by the conception of unity, of the all-pervading, all-creating Supreme Being, which again resolves everything within itself and is the universal soul, present in all things and in all creatures, the deepest and most real being in the world.

Buddhism points to desire as to the origin of all suffering in the material frame ¹⁾. It puts love for all creatures above asceticism and religious activity. Its horizon may therefore truthfully be called infinite and it is only equalled or surpassed by the pan-humanism of Christianity and by the modern Western conception of kindness to animals. Hinduism retained its outlook with regard to the fate of the soul in after-life, but the dogma of transmigration of the soul as a result of one's *Karma* spread side by side with it. Buddhism has kept the belief in transmigration of the soul, but it has not adopted the soul as an individuality, for which reason Professor Speyer calls it nihilistic. But others believe that they can discern in Buddhism, as regards the doctrine of Karma, individual identity and the conception of an immaterial soul. That Buddhism entirely denies free will is not correct, for in the struggle to achieve *Nirvana* the human being is not deprived of will. If Buddhism had not admitted that man can act for himself and exercise his will, it could never have attained so strong a moral influence. We need not therefore believe that the doctrine of Karma must of necessity lead to fatalism, although we ought to recognise that it has the advantage of giving

¹⁾ R. Pischel, *Leben und Lehre des Buddha*, (1910), p. 65. T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*.

resignation in adversity. Also it is not correct to consider Buddhism as an atheistic doctrine: next to earthly manifestations it also recognises spirits and gods as parts of the great stream of existences open to every human being, which lead to Nirvana.

We can now see Hinduism as a gigantic sphere with a wide horizon and a high zenith, sub-divided into innumerable and eternally moving smaller spheres. The caste-system, which in the social sphere provides such a number of small sub-divisions, should not be considered as an absolute hindrance to intercourse between the members of the various castes. Trade, labour, traffic, village administration and so on prevent a complete segregation, especially nowadays. It is true that the caste appoints to every man his place inside a very small social horizon. Everyone of its members remains so conscious of the individuality of his group that the warmth and intimacy which are indispensable for spiritual and moral unification, without which mighty structures of the mind cannot easily exist, will only be effected at the cost of almost superhuman endeavour. There is an idea that Buddhism represents a movement of opposition against the caste system, but Buddhism like Hinduism accepts the view that already by his birth man belongs to a definite caste and to surroundings which spiritually, morally, and materially are inherent in his identity ¹⁾. We must therefore reject the idea that Buddhism was merely a movement of social reform. It is a doctrine of liberation which points mainly towards moral action. The great difference between Buddhism and the West is that we place the soul as it were by the side of its own actions and opposite them, in such a way that it is able to render account of them; Buddhism, on the other hand, considers that the actions themselves form the identity of the soul.

In spreading across the earth, ethical Buddhism, which knows no other means of liberation than the act of self-denial, has practically no place for a Supreme Being or for an individual soul, and does not recognise the power of prayer, has everywhere undergone great modifications. In Tibet, in Mongolia, and in a few parts of northern China, it has changed into Lamaism, which is a

¹⁾ A. Mayhew, *The Education of India*, 1926, p. 41 sqq.; E. Sénart, *Les Castes dans l'Inde*, 1927, pp. 229, 230.

highly divergent system ¹⁾. In Japan, China, Siam, and elsewhere it has also acquired a religious aspect. Mankind was unable to do without the helping hand which was as necessary as its own struggles in order to save it from suffering and from the thralldom of matter. Let us pass over in silence the idolatry, the magic, and the devil-worship which grew across such vast conceptions. The idea of liberation, the love of all creatures, the immense demands for virtuous action have done and still do much good in Japan, in China and elsewhere, much in the same way as Christianity has blessed and is still blessing our West.

We have said enough to establish the essential kinship of all mankind, even in this immense territory of faiths and of creeds. We have contemplated the peaks of the human mind lost in the highest abstraction; we have noticed a consuming desire for liberation from matter, and witnessed the struggle of mankind against dualism. Everywhere there is a thirst for moral actions, for love of one's neighbour, and for self-denial which aims at the realisation of the great Unity. But in their wish to defeat matter human beings should not despise it; they must search its being with all the sharp penetration of their mind, they must compel it to serve the mind; for matter, like the spirit, is part of creation ²⁾.

Confucianism and Taoism

If we look beyond the external differences which mean so little, we shall discover in China an endeavour similar to that of ourselves, with a zenith and a horizon of which the significance for the family, for society, and for the state has never been overlooked. It is a delight to study the wisdom and the matter-of-factness of men like Confucius and Mencius ³⁾. It would be difficult to agree with those who say that their ethics have place only for a social and political horizon, and have no spiritual zenith at all. Confucius strikes one as a wise man, full of serene calm, though always fighting in the interests of his fellow human beings. He realised that asceticism is not the way to help oneself or

¹⁾ Cf. for the influence of Lamaism upon daily life, A. David Neel, *Arjopa*, 1928.

²⁾ Max Scheler, *Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft*, 1926, p. 66.

³⁾ See W. Grube, *Geschichte der Chinesischen Literatur*, 1909, p. 145. Scheler, *op. cit.* p. 105. E. Chavannes, *Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-Ma-Ts'ien*.

others. This can only be done by acquiring a personality in and for the sake of society; and the personality thus acquired is able, when the moment demands it, to utter itself, not by abstention but by the conscious deed which is the climax of all life. As though he had been expressive of the spirit of the West before the very birth of this spirit, Confucius preached the principle of true reverence towards society, and the virtues of loyalty and civic duty. His was a time that needed matter-of-factness, for it displayed a spiritual anarchy and an indifference which are only too well known in our own West. He was compelled, therefore, to emphasise the importance of the social horizon, although his whole personality shows an unmistakable tendency towards the zenith.

Taoism is seemingly the exact opposite of Confucianism. It gives the preference to mystical endeavour and preaches the complete loss of self in the eternally one Tao, which is believed to be a close approximation to the Logos of Saint John the Evangelist. Taoists felt drawn towards an ascetic flight from the world; their doctrines remind one of the innocence of paradise, and one can understand their feelings for Confucius, whom they must have considered one of those eternally untiring and futile champions of improvement. The opposition between Taoism and Confucianism is strangely suggestive of that between East and West in our own day, and there is an amusing story illustrating this. Confucius one day, in the course of a walk, had seated himself on a hillock overgrown with apricot trees, and, charmed by the beauty of nature, he began to sing a song, accompanying himself on the lute. Some distance away, his disciples were resting by the riverside. Suddenly, from among the reeds, an old fisherman appeared in a small boat. He waded towards the shore and listened for some time to the distant song. Then he asked the disciples who they were and who was the singer; whereupon they told him admiringly of Confucius's faith and truthfulness, of his love for mankind and of his righteousness, of his interest in ritual and in music, and of his researches into the moral relations between human beings, which were intended to profit the Empire. Far from praising Confucius for his activity, the old man turned back towards his boat, muttering ironically: "Love of mankind, love of mankind! I fear that he will not escape his fate. While he tortures

his mind and exhausts his body, he is endangering his inner love of truth. Ah, how far he is from Tao!"

The disciples ran to tell Confucius, whereupon the Master hurried after the fisherman, saying "He must be a saint!" He was just able to attract his attention and humbly besought him for advice; he hoped at last he had found where to obtain the highest wisdom. The old anchorite again laughed somewhat ironically because of Confucius's avidity for information; then he told him to leave every man to his own environment and in his own function, and not to meddle so actively with the business of other people. He compared Confucius to a man who runs away from his shadow till he succumbs, while all that was needed was to sit down quietly in a shady glade where he would not have been troubled by his shadow. Confucius would only heap upon himself trouble, ingratitude, hatred and persecution, whereas he could find salvation in the quiet self-improvement which would help others by the strength of example. The only way to wisdom was to achieve the inner love of truth. Although to do so would have turned the whole of his life and all his works into vanity, Confucius was so deeply impressed by the words of the old fisherman that he asked him to accept him as a disciple. The old man replied that it might be possible to reach the mysterious Tao with one congenial comrade, but never with those who do not understand its nature. Thereupon he pushed off his boat, leaving the philosopher to his own doubts.

HUMANITY AND CHRISTIANITY

We too may have been impressed with the words of the old fisherman; yet he was wrong. For nothing, absolutely nothing will ever be achieved by those who only look upward towards the zenith; nothing either will be achieved by those who have only eyes for the social horizon. Moreover, Confucius was by no means devoid of religious feeling; it was precisely his reverence which made him reluctant to discuss the supernatural. This is another resemblance with the West, which also hides its temple within its own heart. It hides the spiritual and moral values from which it obtains all its strength, and while its very reverence gives birth to the wonders of an organisation and a technique that covers the world, the spectators who only see its restless labour draw the

conclusion that it suffers from spiritual poverty. Slowly, however, this very discretion is becoming a guilty silence. Now that not only the East, but many people in the West itself have begun to think that the strength of the West is made exclusively of externals, the belief is gaining ground that progress is open to the East by merely adopting these externals. By adopting such a course the East would merely be precipitated into chaos. We are not trying to justify ourselves against misrepresentations; a greater thing is at stake: we have to prevent a world catastrophe. The time has come therefore to bear witness to the spirit of the West.

On the other hand, we shall also have to bear witness against those who wish to praise meditation and mysticism as the exclusive source of knowledge and of general progress. Progress will never be achieved by turning one's back to society. It is embodied in the social deeds of the man, the citizen, the friend, and the member of the household. Let men seize life in all its splendour, and store up in their souls the thousands of impressions perceived by their senses. Let everything be investigated, and let that which proves good be preserved. Man's place must be sought right in the centre of society. Emptiness in every one of its aspects is to be shunned like death. Let man fill his personality to the brim and let him be ready when the call comes to give up this personality with the same reverence as that with which he acquired it. The more he subdues, for the sake of his surroundings, the individual which always aims at annihilating the sense of space and of reverence, the more he will be a Christian, in practice if not also in name. By obeying the second commandment inside the framework of the world-order, man will show that the first commandment is either present in his mind or at least that he is unconsciously aware of its existence, and in this way he will be really human, and a real social personality.

It is thus that we perceive the mysterious meeting point between true humanity and real Christianity, of which perhaps Tertullian was thinking when he used the expression *anima naturaliter Christiana*. The idea which takes such a central place in Christianity has remained alien to no religion and to no ethical system. It was the touchstone universally used by mankind, and society everywhere has classified its members in accordance with their

behaviour towards each other and towards the supernatural world.

Manners and morals

The universality of this criterion of human behaviour throws light upon the deeper sense of Tertullian's words. Moral standards differ and can therefore never be judged according to one identical criterion of external form. By an unfathomable decree the numerous factors determined by environment have resulted in the adoption of entirely different standards by people who were fundamentally moved by the same feeling. The Chinese philosopher Mo Ti, who lived about 400 B. C., was already perfectly aware of the existence of one basic morality, above and throughout every variety of manners. He tells us that in the land of Chen-Mu, when the eldest son was born, he was cut into pieces and eaten, because this was considered useful to the younger brothers. When a grandfather died, the grandmother was driven from home, to die far away from the house, because it was said that one should not go on living with the wife of a ghost. In the land of Yen, when relatives died, their corpses were allowed to putrefy, whereupon the flesh was thrown away and the bones were buried. "Thus", says Mo-Ti, "does one acquire a name for great piety". "In I-Chu, dead relatives were put on a pyre and burnt", says Mo-Ti, "and in this way one acquired a name for great piety. Highly placed people saw in this a government measure and the lowly ones a custom which they preserved and from which they did not deviate. . . . This was what is called adapting oneself to custom and making manners into morality".

Colonial policy can make an excellent use of the wisdom of Mo-Ti. The criterion of humanity is not to be found in existing customs. It lies in the measure and the manner in which each person is connected, inside the world-order, with the community to which he belongs. This manner appears from the devotion with which he tries to obey and to improve the principles and actions which are deemed, rightly or wrongly, to be necessary for the existence, the prosperity, and the development of his community. In so far as a person organises his life upon this basis, just in so far will he be human and "a Christian by nature". If it could be possible to help the soul of the people which is naturally Christian, in

its struggle against unwilling matter, entirely different moral standards would become gradually possible or might even be realised at once. The human soul would be able to unfold itself in the wide national and international community, and reach the adult stage of world dynamics, and the power of tension which belongs to the spirit of the West.

The soul of the East had found expression in the great thoughts which are displayed to us, frequently with impressive loftiness, by its religions, its ethical systems, its literature, and its art. We should always remember that this cultural and age-long labour of the Eastern soul is the background against which Eastern society can be most clearly observed. In this respect, the doctrine of synthesis must impose upon itself that self-restraint which entirely agrees with its own essence. It limits itself to studying many utterances of the sense of life and beauty of the East and to welcoming them as a confirmation of the fundamental unity of human endeavour. So many of these growths are specific and must on no account be changed by our own forms of life, because it must be the prerogative of the people of the future themselves to change or to preserve them as they may wish.

Social organisation and the place it takes in nature and in the world-order will also display a wealth of varying forms and conceptions, but every natural human society, in which man dominates and not the system, is actuated by an upward urge which is open to the guidance of supernatural powers. In every such society there is also an equivalent harmony in the relation between the social body and the personal units. Bearing this in mind, one will always be able to see man above the race and morality above special cultural and social forms. This will not prevent our discerning and appreciating the reasonableness and the utility of many natural and social differences. In the following pages we shall therefore give our attention to society, to the popular sphere, and to their place in the world-order, which, in the case of the Eastern soul, is the most universal human sphere, the sphere into which the human mind of the West, with its universalist manifestations, must obtain admission.

Is there an unbridgeable gulf?

It is necessary that the spirit of the West should enter into this

sphere and its presence should not be considered an intrusion, for wherever it displays its universal humanity without having to use specifically Western forms of expression, it will always be a welcome guest, provided however it is allowed the liberty to adapt itself to its environment. It is not indeed its task to impress upon the East Western habits, customs, etiquette, clothes, language or art; changes in those respects should be neither prevented nor imposed. There are too many people nowadays who would like to persuade the East or even to compel it to adopt not the slightest change. They want to hinder the development of large groups of humanity, to isolate them as monuments of nature. Such extremism the spirit of the West cannot admit, for it will never renounce its call to widen and to purify the sphere of activity of the spiritual and moral forces which animate the East.

If this endeavour remains unsuccessful, we need not expect that the great political and administrative reforms in various colonies, the social and economic emancipation, the development of a democratic form of government, and many of the other plans that are being mooted, will have the slightest chance of success. Nobody can understand what it means to transform a Javanese feudal regency into a political, democratic unity, or to develop the Council of the People from a representative into a responsible parliamentary organ. Nobody will understand what it means to turn an association based on customary law into a modern co-operative society, unless he has fully learnt to understand the essence of Eastern society and of the soul of the East. This is why the present investigation has to make sure whether the opinion expressed by many people, that the spirit of the West has undertaken an impossible task, is justified or not. The most serious objection is that which declares the East to be extremely conservative and, apart from a few countries like Japan, altogether immutable. If this should prove to be the case, all the changes made under Western leadership would disappear as soon as this "unnatural" interference came to an end. It is further declared that all the small, local communities of the East could never be joined into a society that functions in the right manner, because the group life is based upon social instinct and not upon personal consciousness. And finally the mentality which manifests itself through this social organisation is said to be of a nature so utterly

different from ours that it will never be able to understand the West and its purpose.

It was in anticipation of these objections that we declared that it would be desirable continually to keep the great cultures as a background before our mind's eye, in the course of the social enquiry upon which we are now embarking. Let us begin by making it clear that the leaders who have preserved and expanded these cultures have originated, throughout the centuries, from all layers of the population and from all the territories of their country. There has been a perpetual rise and decline from the popular sphere to the governing classes and the bearers of culture — even in the caste system, and especially in its less rigid period, which lasted till about the eighth century A. D. In China the ancient democratic system of examinations provided a convincing proof that there existed a very general power of expansion of the horizon within the cultural sphere. The frequency of such personal transfers provides abundant proof of a mobility and a power of adaptation which must have been present everywhere, at least potentially. Another and not less important phenomenon is the cultural influence exercised by leading personalities, whether they remained in their original surroundings, or eventually returned to them. This is why, right in the country, one will meet important cultural achievements such as impressive temple buildings, which are in no way inferior to those of the cities. There is abundant proof that the simple communities of the East possess a certain power of self-renovation, similar to that of the gifted personalities inside their sphere.

The immutable East

When we previously described modern and Eastern society as a dynamic world opposed to a static world, this was done only in a relative sense and for the purpose of contrast. Taken in an absolute sense this characterisation would be no more than a caricature. Life and especially social life refuses to accept the extreme consequences of intellectualistic methods of thought. An interpretation which would ossify the relatively stationary Eastern society into one that was absolutely immutable, and which would explain its communalism as a complete absence of individualism could never be made to agree with reality. There is

a particular danger in the use of the expression "a primitive society" when one means one of those communities which have not yet, or scarcely, been touched and lifted up by one of the great Eastern cultures or religions. For this manner of speaking suggests the survival of archaic forms dating from the origin of mankind.

The small and simple little communities outside the reach of cultural influences, which were never able to create a culture for themselves, are in no way entirely immutable; the studies of men like Spencer, Gillen, Rivers, and Codrington have shown that even in the smallest communities there is a continual mutation and a capacity for adaptation ¹⁾. India's caste system likewise shows continual mobility, splitting and regrouping. Similarly, China's clan system evolved towards the more richly variegated large family as the real social unit. Evolution did not stop even at this point; it continued and still proceeds further in the direction of the family and of the household, opening even the road to development for the personality, until, without needing to give up the old social connection with all its advantages, it will reach a more or less autonomous status for the household and the person. The richer this plurality of unities becomes, the more many-sided will be the personality of the human being and the more able will the personality become to create the higher unity which absorbs the group connections into national, and presently into international thought. All existence, all life, changes with a rapidity and a completeness which are proportionate to the intensity of life. Everywhere the wisdom of the old Ionian saying πάντα ῥεῖ continues to apply ²⁾.

To appreciate the degree of mutability of these group communities, we shall have to use a yardstick provided by the world to which they belong. For a community which, considered from the modern technical point of view, advances so slowly that one might feel inclined to describe it as a fossil, may perhaps undergo very important variations in another respect, more important, for all we know, from its own point of view. In his standard work

¹⁾ Baldwin Spencer and F. J. Gillen, *The Arunta*, a study of a Stone Age People, 1927. W. H. R. Rivers, *The History of Melanesian Society*, 1914. A. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*.

²⁾ Cf. Le Bon, *op. cit.* Boutaric, *La Vie des Atomes*. L. Poincaré, *La Physique Moderne*.

which we have already mentioned, Professor van Vollenhoven has tried to consider Eastern society as it were from inside, and the first phenomenon which drew his attention was that of perpetual change. He remarks: "Customary law is not, as is so often believed by Europeans, an unchangeable quantity, although the change is usually not visible within the period in which one observer can look at it". He recalls the Malay proverb which proves that educated Indonesians are quite aware of the gradual transformation of their customary law: "When the flood comes up, the bathing place is moved, when the Raja changes, the adat (customary law) changes" ¹).

If these small communities are subject to change owing to the fact that they are living organisms, they must seek to adapt themselves harmoniously to their environment from the point of view of social organisation, economic activities, technical improvement, etc. When great cultures or religions engulf all these separate small communities and are in their turn activated from outside and enriched by other influences, the pace at which the communities change and expand also increases. Even where there is no such cultural influence or where it is scarcely active, life has not stood still and has effected its quiet mutations in the gifted personalities whence it will suddenly spring forth at times of important modification in the social organisation. We must unfortunately also admit that these changes are not always in the direction of progress: so far, it seems to have been the fate of mankind to move perpetually in an alternating rhythm ²).

Primitive society

It is known nowadays that the division of the supposedly very primitive Australian aborigines into tribes is anything but primitive and that behind it there is a long and complicated development, full of ups and downs. On the other hand it now appears that monogamous marriage and the bilateral household, which are supposed to be a very recent development, are genuinely primitive, as the American ethnologist, Lowie, has pointed out ³). More remarkable still, scientific circles now consider that neither

¹) C. van Vollenhoven, *Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1925, I, 65.

²) L. Weber, *Le Rhythme du Progrès*, Etude Sociologique, 1913. J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong, *Cultuurtypen en Cultuurfasen*, 1922, p. 24—25.

³) Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, 1921.

animism nor pre-animism are the original forms in which religious instinct first expressed itself. The really primitive form of religion, we are now told, is the belief in a Supreme Being, which approximates to one of the main principles of Christianity rather than to the plurality of later religious and animistic ideas. Opinions on this point are still at variance ¹⁾. There are others who prefer to think that religion originated with the belief in an all-pervading force, to which on all sides man is exposed and which works alternately to his advantage and to his detriment. Thus the conception of an all-pervading force and the pre-animistic view would, implicitly if not explicitly, be complementary one to the other. In any case, it is clear that the term primitive will have to be used with care in relation to religion, all the more so because this implies an exclusively Western standard which qualifies as primitive i.e., as immutable in its initial forms, everything that is incomprehensible or useless according to modern criteria. The fact however is that as soon as these criteria are abandoned, one is struck by the evidence of continual change, although no doubt many people may remark almost involuntarily that change does not necessarily mean improvement.

Now that we have established the fact of universal change, there is no question which can interest us more than whether change can always be considered to be an improvement. To answer this question it is necessary to avoid applying a specifically Western standard. Change must be judged from within the framework provided by surroundings and circumstances. An attempt in this sense has been made by the French writer, Leroy,²⁾ who says: "To declare that a population where magical practices have grown and multiplied is more primitive than a population where such practices are few or non-existent amounts to believing in a regular forward march of the human mind, starting from magical beliefs and ending at the complete disappearance of such beliefs. This amounts to admitting the most arbitrary rectilinear

¹⁾ A. W. Nieuwenhuys, *De Mensch in de Wereldijkheid, zijn Kenleer in den Heiden-schen Godsdienst*, 1920; K. Th. Preusz, *Die höchste Gottheit bei den Kulturarmen Völkern* (Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Nov. 1922) and *Glauben und Mystik im Schatten des Höchsten Wesens*, 1926; Pater W. Schmidt, *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*, 1926, and *Die Offenbarung als Anfang der Offenbarungen Gottes*; J. J. Fahrenfort, *Het Hoogste Wezen der Primitieven, studie over het Oermonotheïsme bij enkele der laagste Volken*, 1927.

²⁾ Olivier Leroy, *La Raison Primitive*, 1927. *Essai d'Introduction critique à l'Etude de L'Economie Primitive; les Théories de Karl Bucher et l'Ethnologie moderne*, 1925.

evolution". Leroy prefers to consider that the first kind of population represents a highly evolved type, but a type which has developed in the direction of magical evolution. A civilisation that is deeply imbued with magic represents, according to him, a stage of development which is as advanced as that of a civilisation which has entirely rejected magic. In Oldham's *Christianity and the Race Problem* ¹⁾ we read that, apart from the capacity to participate effectively in the political and economic arrangements of Western modern civilisation, there may exist other equally valid standards of human excellence. Questions like these are extremely embarrassing for those whose task it is to act, unless they possess or think they possess an answer to them. "Are these people," one feels inclined to ask, "not really more carefree than we are? Are we not bringing them, with our efforts towards uplift and especially with our restlessness, a decrease of human happiness?" It is clear that where such questions can be asked, colonial statesmanship must answer them by establishing a scale of values.

The criterion of happiness

The point of view that the state of nature and the simplicity of rustic life possess attractive sides has already been dealt with in the second chapter. We had, however, at that time, to draw attention to the considerable disadvantages attached to this mode of existence. Nature may be kind, but it often enough causes the greatest insecurity. The social system of the East also often fails to offer an opening for talent. If it is true that a narrow horizon is the true sphere of humanity, because satiation and simple satisfaction can more easily be reached within it, and if it be true that such a simple life really brings happiness, it would be well for all of us, civilised or uncivilised, to return to the forests and to sink back into the twilight of instinct. There are people, so it would seem, who expect to find happiness in this direction; but they would soon be disillusioned, for nowhere is there more selfishness and more cruelty, nowhere is there more unintellectual anxiety, the prime disturber of all modest unsophisticated happiness. The advice to return to the state of nature would not even help the wild man or the cannibal; even he has already receded from it. Such real happiness as he possesses is the direct

¹⁾ 1926, p. 77.

result of the morality which he, like others, tries to achieve by showing loyalty towards his own community and reverence to the Force which pervades all nature. The fact that he limits his morality to the narrowest circle is in itself a reason for fearing other groups and the outer world in general. As on the whole he is only able to organise his reverence with a view to the interest of his own group and of himself, this feeling again becomes the source of a burning anxiety lest the competition of others in trying to obtain the support of this supernatural power will cause it to be turned against himself.

In this way the capacity for reverence is turned inwardly by the limitation of the sphere which is open to it, and threatens to become a fear-instinct. The fear of power has led to an imposing science of power and to a technique of power which is really a technique of fear ¹⁾. With its thousands of commands and prohibitions, its rules of conduct, and its little remedies, it proves the existence of an aptitude for organised knowledge and science which would be capable of great things, had it been provided with a less faulty hypothesis at the start. Even in the state of nature we see man developing a great mental activity, and a miserable humanity struggling for life and for freedom from matter. Let this suffice as a reply to those who are no longer able to see struggling humanity beneath the surface of a fatalism which may have the appearance of good humour, although actually it is despair of finding the wherewithal to escape. The criterion of happiness, which many find such difficulty in establishing, is really simplicity itself, for the only source of happiness for all times and all parts of humanity resides in morality. The wider the sphere of applied morals in East and in West, the more active its dynamism, the greater the power of tension and of reverence, the greater also will be the amount of real happiness and the smaller that of fear. In the really moral man, whose ethics embrace the whole world, fear of death itself has been defeated. There is no need therefore to doubt even for one moment that the policy of uplift, of colonial statesmanship which has so often been mocked, is unassailable in its foundations even though it may fail occasionally in the choice of its instruments. In so far as it tries to extend the circle of social loyalty and tries to liberate the sense of rever-

¹⁾ Max Scheler, *op. cit.* p. 154.

ence from the parasites of fear and of matter, which eat into its power of tension, it opens the small social sphere to greater morality, to fuller humanity, and, thereby, to an infinitely richer and truer happiness.

Personal dignity

Apart from the bad effects upon economic, spiritual, scientific, and technical matters, the limitation of the social sphere has also most deleterious effects by limiting the personality and oppressing the consciousness of personal dignity. The small community dominates the personality to such an extent that its interests become the touchstone of moral actions. This has the result of depriving the community, to a large extent, of the most powerful motor of all progress, which is personality, while on the other hand anarchistic arbitrariness is admitted into all personal relations which, in its shortsightedness, the group does not consider to belong to communal interests. In this manner too much is left to personal choice and to intrigue, even in the most unsophisticated group, and things which ought to be considered as of public interest, or which ought to call forth the regulating and justiciary function of the community, are allowed to remain unheeded. Of private law there is no trace and the numerous personal controversies which occur in the state of nature are never submitted to it, not even when serious crimes against the lives of persons are the results. Unjustified actions therefore occur to a very considerable extent. During his expedition in New Guinea, Captain Rawling witnessed one of these idylls of nature, when a man and his first wife tried together to drown the second in the presence of all the villagers, who did not interfere. She owed her life to the assistance of the captain, who declares that "there is no portion of the earth's surface where the teaching of the great message, 'Love one another', is more urgently required". "It is curious", he also writes, "that the members of small communities such as these cannot live together in harmony. . . . Justice, as we understand the term, is unknown. . . . Might is right. . . . The natives treat their wives with the greatest brutality" ¹).

No doubt we should not judge the state of nature exclusively

¹) Rawling, *The Land of the New Guinea Pygmies*, 1913, p. 58 sqq.; cf. also Rivers, op. cit., I, pp. 346—7.

in the light of incidents such as those reported by Rawling, for when a community deems itself to be in danger it tolerates no arbitrariness. But one should be impartial enough to admit the existence of serious drawbacks while recognising the attractive aspect of communal life. One must understand that a limitation of the social environment oppresses the notion of personal dignity to such an extent that the community does not feel called upon to make it respected. This remark applies just as much to our own group morality, as applied by those who are actuated by class feelings, chauvinism, and racialism. But it is obvious that the smaller the circle to which a particular morality extends, the worse the results of the limitation will be.

In our own Middle Ages, with the exception of a few classes, the community extended its interests to personal relations far less than is the case in our own day. Personality had little chance of growth and disregard of the personal dignity of others, when they could be used for the gratification of acquisitive or sexual desires, was a frequent occurrence in the Middle Ages and even in later centuries. In our West this is no longer tolerated, although individuals by no means always conform to the social standards which are now adopted. Small populations living in a state of nature display all the sexual orgies and excesses which no longer occur in more ordered societies, both in the East and in the West, although it is true that even in the state of nature a certain decorum is observed. But there the danger always exists that the members of the small community are allowed an anarchical freedom towards other members of the same group or towards other groups, whenever they believe, often erroneously, that their actions cannot do harm to their own group ¹).

Always, when comparing situations that exist in the state of nature or that have prevailed in former centuries, with those of our own time, there is the same need to temper one's judgement with charity. In every man there is a tendency towards good and a tendency towards evil. The only thing each generation can hand

¹) R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, A Study of the Origins of Sentiments and Institutions, 1927, Part III; J. Winthuis, *Das Zweigeschlechterwesen*, in *Forschungen zur Völkerpsychologie und Soziologie*, ed. by R. Thurnwald, Vol. V., 1928; Malinowsky, *The Sexual Life of Savages in North-Western Melanesia*, 1928, pp. 369 sqq. Cf. also Fuchs, *Sittengeschichte*, 6 vols. 1910—1912.

over to the next is a series of possibilities, and it is the task of education to develop those that are good and to repress those that are bad. It is especially ignorance and the seclusion of the group which stand in the way of human development. This is why the best pedagogical methods of statesmanship will be those that respect the social unit, but gradually break down the wall which surrounds it and secludes it from the world. Even in the territories that have been influenced by Eastern cultures, the territorial communities suffer from the serious drawbacks which result from the limitation of the sense of distance. If it is true that one finds in their midst the highest domestic virtues, it is equally true that they display various drawbacks due to the narrow social horizon of the bulk of the population. These drawbacks result in great capacities remaining dormant and useless. It would perhaps be easy to conclude from these facts in favour of a far-reaching interference on the part of the authorities. Such however will not be our conclusion. We shall rather, from the disadvantages which appear upon examining the life of small communities, conclude that the limits of morality must be widened without prematurely affecting group loyalty itself. In the same way, in the West the beautiful and necessary feeling of patriotism has still to free itself from jingoism, and the equally indispensable *esprit de corps* of the professions must be liberated from narrow class spirit. Harmony through synthesis, not through uniformity, must ever remain the watchword of East and of West.

It seems strange that there are still many people, even among intelligent Occidentals, who continually praise as an idyll, the state of nature and of group seclusion, although one must believe that they are not unaware of the existing drawbacks. Their one-sided judgement, however, has nothing to astonish us. It is the result of the call, which all of us feel upon occasions, of the woods, of freedom, and of a life that gives free rein to the instincts. It is a silent revolt against the incredible self-discipline which civilisation demands from all of us. Western society tries to satisfy this need for freedom by weekends, holidays, the eight-hour day, etc.; but during these free hours society mainly wishes to draw us away for a brief space from daily life, to the same purpose as when a painter steps back in order to see his work from a distance. Society cannot do more than that for its members;

but many do not deem it enough, and turn away their mind's eye from reality, towards the people who live in a state of nature. Armed with the latest improvements of modern technique, they sometimes actually go to these peoples and may find indeed the satisfaction of their one specific craving for liberation. Otherwise there is nothing further to find, and as soon as they notice the numerous and terrible voids of the state of nature they return with all speed to their own West.

These temporary defections might be harmless enough, were it not that they often give rise to unfair criticism of the work done by the authorities or by the missionaries. When this criticism attacks the principle itself of colonial policy, the moment has come to make a sharp distinction between innocent and guilty defection. Having perhaps fought an attack of malaria with a dose of quinine, these critics sit down in order to describe their idyll, unmindful of all that is implied in this one dose of quinine. For it means the whole of Western society, its system of production, its transport system, its education, its science, and the discipline of centuries. All these things indeed, which are implied by the one little dose and of which undoubtedly colonial policy is one, deserve our fullest support. For they aim at the liberation of mankind and of all those who are chained down by matter, even if they are not yet conscious of their bondage.

The absolute standard of values

Although we have rejected the view that Eastern society is unchangeable, there remains still the question of the direction in which changes that do occur should be guided by colonial policy. We have still in fact to find a standard of values to which this policy must conform. If there is no such standard, it will be wiser to base it exclusively upon economic considerations, for if all other common values were proved to be illusory, there would still remain for East and for West the necessity of maintaining the economic link which is by no means exclusively an interest of the West, and even less exclusively of western capitalists. The part played by the West in the economy of the whole world is so considerable that it would be extremely naïve to believe in the possibility of undoing the memories of the contacts between East and West, and of returning to earlier standards of life under former

systems of production. This possibility has definitely gone. The East itself cannot go back and does not want to. There may be a temporary political enthusiasm for Swadeshi, but even its own adherents find out every day that they harm only themselves by ignoring the spirit of the times.

On the other hand, however important in themselves these economic contacts may be, they are but a frail poor link between East and West. We could base our policy exclusively upon them, if the colonial authorities restricted as much as possible all contact between Orientals and foreigners, while exercising a severe control in all cases where economic necessities still imposed contacts. This would apply, for instance, to the use of the land and to the supply of labour. The colonial task would then become extremely simple and matter of fact, and no rational motive for idealism would remain. Nobody could really welcome such a development. We may rejoice therefore that the criterion which happily is available not only saves us from having to draw abstentionist conclusions, but enables us to find a positive standard of values which can incite us to action. Needless to say such a judgement of value will only be effective if it can be accepted by everybody. In what then does this criterion consist?

We are aware that the moral endeavour to effect progress is principally directed towards the interests of the community and towards the assurance of harmony between its functions and the supernatural power or world-order. Such an endeavour is just and moral and entirely in accordance with the attitude of the West. If it is unsuccessful this will be mainly due to lack of knowledge and experience and to the restriction of the moral sphere. By helping to do away with existing misunderstandings, we do not become parties in the dispute about the alleged primitive and retrogressive character of other societies, and we refrain at the same time from either excessive praise or blame. Such impartial objectivity, however, enforces upon us the need to develop Eastern powers by widening knowledge and by broadening the social horizon. No valid objection can be raised against such an attitude. Who would affirm that existing capacities, whether apparent or latent, could receive all their due as a result of an understanding which was acquired from a small circle, with the help of entirely insufficient methods and based upon a very limited experience,

which, in the absence of education and frequently even of the art of writing, was bound to wear off as quickly at the lower strata as it increased at the higher? The limitation in time and in place also necessitates the basing of moral standards upon local facts which in themselves form but a small part of truth and which moreover risk being interpreted in a one-sided and mistaken manner. This is why one sees not infrequently goodwill and capability beating in vain against the prison walls of ignorance and isolation through which they often cannot break by their own unaided strength.

Educational work will make a breach in this isolation, light and air will be admitted through it and the spectators will be surprised by the rapidity and readiness with which those inside will widen the breach. The result of this educational task will similarly appear from the diameter of the future sphere of knowledge and of social consciousness within which the intellectual and moral powers which exist everywhere will learn to serve a more general truth and a more general morality. Until that time arrives, reason and soul will be cooped up inside a narrow zone: just as by the river side in many districts a willow is still called "the tree" and the pool in the steppe "the water", in the group community only the fellow member will be called "the man". This consideration enables us to draw two important and fully justified conclusions: the beliefs of the group and of the nation must have the whole creation for touchstone and the moral standards of the group and of the nation will have to be judged according to their fitness for the moral, spiritual, intellectual, and material progress of the whole of mankind. This is the criterion which the West can safely follow for itself and for the communities which are entrusted to its guidance. It is a never failing beacon whose light will shine for all mankind, while revealing impartially individual errors and mistaken courses.

Collectivism, personality, and individualism

If the objection which we have mentioned before, that Eastern society does not know personal initiative, were justified, it would be impossible to imagine that it would ever experience any change. It is true that a very uniform and secluded group-life offers little opportunity for the personality to reach maturity. This is a fact

which, in extreme cases, leaves the spectator with the impression that there exists an inexorable social mechanism which has dissolved the individual into an unconscious cell in the organism of the group. Notwithstanding its relative truth, this impression does not apply in an absolute sense even to African and Australian tribes. It results from disregarding the truth that one has to consider the social microcosm of the group with concentrated attention to become aware of the fact that its electrons move continually and separately around the positive nucleus which is the conception of the group ¹⁾.

Such is the conclusion drawn by Professor Allier, who had at his disposal an extensive range of first hand material collected by a number of experienced investigators ²⁾. He is convinced that personalities can undoubtedly break through the charmed circle and develop intellectual and moral initiative. If this is true about groups whose horizon has never been broadened by the influence of a wider culture, one may accept it without the slightest hesitation for the thousands of communities which live inside the sphere of wider cultures, because it must be by their members that those cultures have been preserved and enriched for centuries. We may safely take the view that not only are group communities not immutable but that no absolute and dull uniformity reigns within them. If only the community could be artificially enlarged, it would be discovered that the functions which now make the impression of being instinctive would acquire the character of consciously directed actions. Suppressed capacities would soon develop into special talents ³⁾.

The consecrated sphere of customary law proves that the communities are by no means entirely detached. The function of village justice in dealing with crime, in communities entirely ruled by customary law, sufficiently proves that the interest of the group extends very far. If this is a symptom of the reality of the group connection and of the strength of communal feeling, it

¹⁾ Boutaric, *op. cit.* p. 37.

²⁾ Raoul Allier, *La Psychologie de la Conversion chez les Peuples non-civilisés I*, pp. 13—14 (1925).

³⁾ L. Weber, *Le Rhythme du Progrès*, Etude Sociologique, 1913. R. H. Lowie, *op. cit.* W. Beck, *Das Individuum bei den Australiern*, 1924. D. Draghicesco, *Du Rôle de l'Individu dans le Déterminisme Social*, 1904. B. Malinowsky, *Argonauts of the Western Pacific*, 1922; *The Family among the Australian Aborigenes*, 1913; *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*.

is also a strong proof of the reality of clashes between the person and the community and between the individuals themselves. The principal aim of communal interference and of interference by the higher authority is always that of effecting reconciliation between the parties concerned and with the order of nature. That there are individualistic tendencies within the community is a fact so well established that in certain cases they have to be punished by banishment ¹⁾. There is also in existence, in India, in China, in the Dutch East Indies, a punishment by which a person is compelled to give a festival of reconciliation. This is a punishment which in our view would often appear to have a purely restitutorial character, but in this environment there is no sharp distinction between indemnification for damages and a repressive sanction. We see in any case that the community knows how to make itself respected, but the fact that this is rather frequently necessary seems to be an eloquent proof that the theory of absolute collectivism simply will not hold. It is very significant that in cultural spheres the community is no longer so completely ready to remain passive in regard to personal relations, even when they do not directly concern the common weal. The community indeed displays a sense of responsibility for persons and households that are within its circle and it is taking the road which, after a period of transition with penal and semi-penal sanctions, will eventually be bound to lead to a separation between penal law and private law. From a sociological point of view this phenomenon is of primary importance; it points to the growth of personality and to the increasing appreciation of the personality by the community which becomes more aware of its need for protection.

There is ample proof that Eastern thinkers themselves are aware of the hidden stirrings of individualism and of personal consciousness in the bosom of the family communities. Mr. N. Ghosh speaks of the Hindu home as "a source of endless distraction and embarrassment" which has "extinguished many a spark of native fire, buried many a noble

¹⁾ L. C. Westenenk (a former governor of the East Coast of Sumatra and one time member of the Council of the Dutch East Indies), *De Minangkabausche Nagari*, 1918, p. 63.

project" ¹). He thinks that the living together of many men and women, often not in sympathy with each other, deadens the energies and that there is at best only a state of armed neutrality among them. Mr. Mukerjee, who thinks this view exaggerated, admits that individualism is the weak point of this community. There is little doubt that if we had in the West the habit of keeping so many relatives living together under one roof the results would be even worse. We should, if anything, rather feel surprised that this extremely difficult life in common is at all possible with a relative amount of harmony and understanding. We may be sure that it has been possible only because the group sense has imposed certain limits to personal consciousness from the time of birth; because the daily influence to which he has submitted has eventually caused the person to merge his feeling in those of his little environment and in the long run because precept and example have developed domestic and social virtues, which have encouraged delicate courtesy and skilful diplomacy as the only means of making life tolerable ²). When we consider this family background of the individual life we shall be in a better position to understand the extreme sensitiveness of the Oriental, his proverbial courtesy and his facility for impromptu oratory.

Groups and economic development

We have by this time formed for ourselves an image of Eastern communities which is very different from the exaggerated descriptions presented to us in many cases. If some idyllic conceptions have been shattered, it is nevertheless a welcome fact that from the broken shell of unreality there comes forth a thoroughly healthy humanity with tendencies and minds similar to our own, with corresponding virtues and defects and with analogous interaction between the person and the community. It is doing no good service to Eastern peoples to portray them as an unreal phenomenon among men, for such exaggerations, published by certain authors who rave about the East, have almost the same results as downright declarations by equally biassed judges that they are

¹) Quoted in Radhakamal Mukerjee, *The Family as the Economic Unit*, in *The Foundations of Indian Economics*, 1916, I, III, pp. 25—26.

²) Cf. also A. H. Smith, *Village Life in China*, 1899, p. 338.

inferior, and many Oriental thinkers dislike them just as much. It is precisely because Eastern humanity is entirely normal that the East has celebrated and spiritualised the domestic virtues to such an extent. This applies also to genealogical connections and to the tribe, and will be true in a still higher degree when territorial and functional connections come into existence by their side or above them. The more variation there is, the better the household and the person will be recognised and have justice done to them, even though segregation from the surrounding world, uniformity of labour, of interests, of customs, and of religion may continue to preserve an external uniformity. The continuation of this uniformity, however, is mainly to be ascribed to economic factors. Co-operation in a small group and in a very limited circle has its advantages, but from the economic point of view they only apply to a very simple system of production. The disadvantages are not less considerable, especially in our own time, because the divergence of talents and aspirations remains unutilised, while the system of production scarcely requires capital, so that every available surplus is used for increased consumption or for personal adornment.

Before we condemn without any reservation the life of the smaller economic and social circle, we must pay some attention to warnings against the other extreme, against the complete sterilisation of the countryside under the influence of big industrial cities. Rabindranath Tagore, who takes the defence of the village as a centre of culture, is undoubtedly right to the extent that the town and especially the world city might threaten mankind with a one-sided development which would draw too exclusively upon the intellect and leave no time nor inclination for mere contemplation ¹⁾. If the big city draws away the best from the countryside, the little streams of spiritual culture in the villages will silt up while it withers the soul of many people. When, however, Tagore summarises his views by saying that the village must revive the old communal spirit of co-operation and gives us to understand that co-operation has been the secret of the creation of all human culture and must continue to be so in the future, one may agree on the whole, but one feels that the poet's warning requires a qualification. For how will the villager, bound

¹⁾ Tagore, *L'Occident et L'Orient, la Ville et le Village*, Revue Mondiale, July 1928.

as he is to a very restricted circle and bent over his field, be able to form conceptions of organisation, of national and of world traffic, of a credit system, and of national and international co-operation? The town alone can liberate him, in the same way as he in his turn will be able to protect the soul of the town against one-sided intellectualism. World co-operation pre-supposes the broad and forward looking mind of the big city.

Let us look at the incredible progress of the countryside in many European countries, such as Germany, Denmark, and Holland. What is the origin of this spirit, which has linked up by its transport system the most isolated little village home with the profitable stream of world traffic? This gigantic spirit could never have originated in the country side. Had it not been working, first of all in the town, creating, giving to the nation and to mankind its science, its traffic system, its banks, the countryside would not now enjoy one of its blessings. The town has liberated the countryside, it has constantly enlarged the sense of distance of the countryman, who has become increasingly able to develop a real civic sense which helps in carrying the national responsibility and yet remains true to the village.

It certainly is not right that the big city should draw like a Moloch the best from the village and from its circle ¹⁾. But it is good that the spirit of the town should throw its wider horizon across the villages. If one talks with a Danish agriculturist, and by no means with a gentleman farmer alone, one need feel no surprise if he reveals knowledge and breadth of vision or if he supports his views with an occasional French or Latin quotation. He is a real citizen and often even a citizen of the world. He has acquired elbow room and has more time and inclination for contemplation, and for the expansion of his capacity for reverence. Many people may not have noticed that our civilisation is passing through a crisis such as would probably have spelt the doom of any of the cultures that preceded ours. In the onward march of civilisation there has always come the same threatening point of inertia, when matter entrenched itself in the materialism of the world city surrounded by a soulless countryside. Never yet has it been pos-

¹⁾ See Spengler's *Decline of the West*, passim. For the significance of the countryside in the history of the West, in its present and in its future, cf. R. Walther Darré *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der Nordischen Rasse*, 1929, esp. Ch. VII and IX.

sible to overcome this point of inertia and it must have been at this stage that each time regression and decay have started.

This time it appears as though the spirit of the West had turned the tide of centuries, which ran from the countryside to the town. The magic streams of electricity have overrun secluded villages, linking up village industries and provincial towns directly with world demand. The means of fast communication have brought larger markets within the reach of village production. The wireless aerial over every farm allows its inhabitants to participate after their day's work in the pleasures of distant world cities. Telegraphs, telephones, and banks link up the countryman with the halls of world commerce, while excellent education enlightens his mind. For those who are prepared to accompany it in its upward soaring, the spirit of the West has still many other things in store. Meanwhile it gives to the countryside and to the small towns the means by which to keep their blood warm and their soul alive, and yet to participate in all the great constructions of the mind. The pull of the town may now adopt natural dimensions; the village and the small town may be saved for Western culture, and thereby a healthy future be assured to it.

Communism and Communism

The lesson which colonial policy can learn from this trend of European development is clear. We have said above that communal consumption and the system of closed economy of produce, with its necessary complement of mutual service, form an obstacle to progress. An attempt can and should be made to preserve and even to strengthen these local loyalties and this spirit of mutual assistance, but the seclusion and the impenetrability of the small communities must wear off gradually, because they stand in the way of the progress of hundreds of millions of human beings. The plea for a wider solidarity is sometimes answered by those who point to the absolute solidarity of modern communism as the remedy of the existing evil, all the more because communism strongly reminds one of the communalistic tendencies of the East, so that it might be supposed to be unusually suited to the task of leading Eastern communalism out of its present narrow sphere of group-solidarity.

Now primitive communalism was a natural psychological

result of the almost absolute sense of solidarity which is felt by the person towards the group of which he is a part. It is a mystical feeling which links only a small circle, held together by community of blood, of customs, of occupation, of tradition, and of faith. This in itself already makes it inherently antagonistic to the absolute solidarity taught by modern communism, which moreover announces itself as an intellectual conception. Modern communism, on the other hand, which preaches an ideal of absolute solidarity in which every human being works according to his capacity and receives the fruit of the common labour according to his need, so that mankind grows as it were into one large family, must fear the greatest danger from the perpetuation of all the personal, genealogical, religious, class, party, and national spheres. It will therefore always be inclined to destroy or to ignore all these selfishnesses, although this will amount to the simultaneous destruction of social personality, of group loyalty, and of morality. Colonial policy aims at the doubtless more modest, but also more practical, goal of the relative solidarity which we call the civic sense, which it will try to cultivate, but not to impose by any system or tyranny. This indeed, apart altogether from the difference in their methods, is the cardinal distinction between colonial statesmanship and the communistic ideal.

There is still another basic difference between mystical communalism and modern communism. The solidarity of both starts from entirely different premises. The first is exclusive and ego-centric; the second all-embracing and altruistic, at least in theory. The roads which have led to their outward similarity are therefore altogether different. Thousands of years of tribal, family, and village communalism lie between them, even though by reviving various economic drawbacks of primitive communalistic consumption, communism in one of its aspects has adopted something which is closely akin to the life of the group communities.

No one can fail to be struck by the fact that through the doctrine of communism there appears perpetually a fundamental note which recalls the revolutionary individualism of the eighteenth century ¹⁾. Nobody has yet succeeded in proving from the experimental practice of communism, that under this system there

¹⁾ Durkheim. *Le Socialisme* (posthumous work, 1928).

can really exist an absolute solidarity, or even a natural social equilibrium between the community and the individual. As this solidarity is now generally admitted to be for the time being beyond the powers of human nature, every communistic practice must hesitate between an idealism in which the community dominates at the expense of the personality, and an eighteenth century revolutionary individualism which looks upon the communistic conception as an ideal of equality, and is prepared to sacrifice to it the prosperity of the community. Were it really possible to bring about this ideal of absolute solidarity, in such a way that all selfishness and partisanship would have become unthinkable: in other words, had human beings already become angels giving joyfully to humanity everything they can offer, discreetly taking in return what they genuinely consider to be their needs, then indeed both difficulties would have been solved in a completely harmonious fashion. As this is not the case, people are beginning to realise more clearly every day that the root of injustice does not lie in some political or economic system, but in the human mind itself.

This means that the way to improve and perfect society will have to be sought in the only place where it can really be found, i. e., in humanity itself and in the enlargement of its sense of reverence. As long as this is not understood, every communistic experiment must continue to hesitate between an unprecedented centralisation on the one hand, and a static autonomy of all the sub-divisions of the community on the other hand; which would indeed be most undesirable for the elevation of human dignity, for the future of true democracy, and even for the existence of the modern state. While maintaining the strongest discipline in defence of a few strategic key positions, communism will have to tolerate an almost anarchical freedom in individual life and in the life of the family. In these circumstances it will only be possible to preserve an artificial and thoroughly unstable equilibrium, in every country where the experiment is tried. Such a system will in the end weaken the humanitarian feelings of all those who attempt to put the doctrine into practice, even if it is through pure idealism that they have placed themselves under the banners of communism. For wherever social equilibrium escapes from the influence of normal human capacities and

inclinations, system and an iron discipline obtain the upper hand. This is not an ideal for which men will willingly suffer and struggle. The result is that a conception which leads to these consequences must apply to the whole social system the same form of despotic methods against which, but a few years earlier, its leaders were calling up the resources of idealism and love of freedom of the whole world.

Certainly there is no question of greater importance for colonial policy than that of the attitude which will have to be adopted towards the genealogical and other communities which we have found to be so different in their inspiration from modern communism. If, led astray by a superficial likeness, one came to the conclusion that modern communism and the communal feeling of these groups were closely related, one might consider that the propaganda which aims at close co-operation between the two ideas would afford the right solution. That is why we must draw attention to this source of dangerous misapprehension. Far from being the embodiment of ideals of equality, the spirit of the small communities is one of egocentric solidarity against the outer world. In a smaller degree it also animates our Western family, our professions, our classes, our nationalities, our races, and even our sexes. Here indeed is a true sign of kinship with Western society and not with communism; it is even a reason why we should attempt to liberate our loyalties from all negative particularism, but is not a reason why we should try to destroy these nurseries of humanity for the sake of an ideal that is still very distant.

Malinowsky has shown that "the savage is neither an extreme collectivist nor an intransigent individualist", but that "he is, like man in general, a mixture of both"¹). Even in the world, penetrated with magic beliefs, where inter-tribal barter still prevails, the importance of the person and the sense of property are clearly perceptible. Property there is linked up with certain rules. It really represents the personal right to share in a certain quantity of available goods. Constant use is made of taboo signs in order to inform the whole community of a claim to private property. Among the populations that live in a state of nature, the poet protects his poem, the magician his art. Even these forms of

¹) Malinowsky, *Argonauts*, pp. 64, 169, 94, 174—175; cf. also Pitt Rivers, *op. cit.* pp. 212, 207.

abstract property are appreciated and respected. One might indeed detect among these rudimentary societies symptoms of personal consciousness, of property, of insurance, of the registration of property rights, of copyrights, and of patents¹). In small rural communities situated within the cultural spheres of the East, where conditions represent a much higher degree of evolution, these indefinite tendencies have indeed become conscious acts. The erroneous interpretation of group communalism and of common instincts, and the notion that they are at all akin to modern communism, are shown even more clearly to be based upon the most thorough misunderstanding. Inside the sphere of group solidarity, smaller loyalties exist consciously. Divisions and social classes come into being, the social function of professions, possessions, property, and talent is continually pushed farther into the background, while the differentiation of wealth, influence, power, and knowledge increases. The relative difference between the East and the West is decreasing and each instance of a richer gradation of social life contributes to strengthen the resemblance between East and West, while underlining the basic oneness of the two spheres, which has such a primary importance for colonial policy.

Modern communism, however, would not only stifle group loyalty but also the promising germ of personality, by its unsocial individualism. For its absolute solidarity has no place for the relative solidarity of the group and its equalitarian ideal cannot tolerate the inequality which prevails inside the communal group. Communism would therefore tear to pieces the connection sanctioned by customary law throughout the East, and the promising future of the East would thereby be destroyed at one fell swoop. No system, no discipline can ever take the place of this silent motive force of human devotion, for organisation pre-supposes morality. If one wishes therefore to build the city of the future one must respect all these nurseries of social morality because they are the most precious element of the social edifice. Nothing must be lost; everything, even the loyalty of the smallest group, can be put to use. Accepting the virtues of group loyalty,

¹) Malinowsky, *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, p. 56; R. Firth, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori*, 1929, esp. pp. 351—359; J. Ph. Duyvendak, *Het Kakean-Genootschap van Seran*, 1926, p. 145.

we have also for the time being to accept the group selfishness and the restricted development of the personality, although, as we shall see later on, it is by no means necessary to resign ourselves definitely to their continuation.

For this reason we must be grateful to the national governments of the East and to Western colonial authorities, to the students of customary law and to the administrative officials who have endeavoured to point out the significance of the naturally grown organic forms of popular life, and who are protecting them and trying to utilise them for future development. We must also pay due respect to the resistance offered by these honourable social and territorial communities because they have already repelled with such excellent results the common enemy of East and West. Without them we should have to rely mainly upon the efforts of the police and upon vigorous intervention of the authorities. More ill-guided people still would have placed themselves outside the pale of society, while society happens to be in the greatest need of their knowledge and of their energy. The Chinese family for instance has already repelled Sovietism with a great measure of success. Family ties and other ties based upon customary law not only imply a readiness for mutual assistance, they are also a source of religious feeling and of exquisite virtues. They have indeed dug a deep chasm between communism and the consecrated social connection of the East. The debt of gratitude of the Dutch East Indies to its Indonesian communities cannot be measured. It is an interesting fact that communism has obtained the greatest hold upon those sections of the population which have made the greatest economic progress, because their strong development has weakened the communal feeling and the links established by customary law. Thus an ideal field for the sowing of unrest and dissatisfaction has come into existence. Owing to the stimulus given by the authorities to the newly born public interest as expressed in the press, in meetings, and in political action, a cultural instrument has been forged which can now be turned by the enemy of culture against civilisation itself ¹⁾.

It would be a mistake however to draw the conclusion that economic progress necessarily makes the population more liable to

¹⁾ Bantam Report, p. 6. Report on the West Coast of Sumatra, II, pp. 11, 12, 17, 32, 36.

respond to communistic or other propaganda, and that progress should therefore not be encouraged. The contrary is true: poverty and ignorance are the natural assistants of this propaganda, prosperity and knowledge its worst opponents. The only justifiable conclusion is that prosperity and economic development are unable by themselves to create satisfaction and a civic sense. It should therefore be the task of the authorities to be ever on the alert and to see to it that wherever, under the influence of economic progress, the old connections are slowly becoming atrophied, each withering root of moral strength is replaced by a fresh one. We shall see in another chapter in what manner this is to be achieved.

Is there a primitive mentality?

By drawing these conclusions we have penetrated deep into the territory which those who doubt the possibility of a synthesis between East and West want to reserve to themselves. Our way now leads to the most serious objections against the policy of the world wide co-operation followed by present day colonial statesmanship. These objections are based upon the assumption that there exists in the East a mentality entirely different from our own. The arguments brought forward in defence of these views can be found in a great number of sociological studies and can perhaps be best labelled in the words used by Professor Lévy-Bruhl when he speaks of the existence of the "*mentalité prélogique*" ¹⁾. The "pre-logical" mind is supposed to reveal itself by an aversion to logical thought, by its inability to reason and to associate ideas, and further by a tendency to substitute recollections for reasoning. It displays an incapacity to discern between reality as perceived by the senses, and the beyond, and forms for itself a world of representations in which "all objects and all beings are involved in a network of mystical participations and exclusions", in which primitive thought "does not impose upon itself before all other things, as with us, the fixed rule of abstaining from contradiction". All these phenomena have been noted not only in the simplest communities, among populations living in an isolated manner in a state of nature, which have scarcely been influenced by the great cultures, but they are also

¹⁾ L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La Mentalité Primitive*, 1925, pp. 1, 5, 7, 11, 14, 17, 18.

perceptible in certain wide areas over which the great religions and the great cultures have spread centuries ago, without however altogether penetrating into the deepest layers of the popular mind.

The mentality of which we are speaking must necessarily be entirely lacking in organic character and can therefore have only a relative value if used as a starting point for guidance in any direction. Now it is true that in accepting a great culture the population which has a "pre-logical" mentality may in effect only adopt it in so far as its own small culture has left the ground free. But even so such a population has everywhere proved capable of choosing by a silent selective process the most gifted among its members, and making them the bearers of the higher culture it has adopted, who preserve the inheritance, adapt it to new needs, and even enrich it. Among these chosen personalities, who were the bearers of culture in the East, an admirable capacity for logical independent thought combination has never been lacking. They were possessed of those brilliant gifts of philosophical insight, artistic initiative, and wise statesmanship we are used to respect so highly in our own midst, and often showed a dominating personality with a wide social consciousness. It is a well known fact that to raise himself up from the popular sphere the individual, for instance in India and in China, had to make intense spiritual and intellectual efforts. As the process of selection was thereby intensified, it is all the more legitimate to draw the conclusion that a similar ascent would have been possible to thousands of others who were unable to succeed by their own endeavours if they themselves in their environment had had at their disposal the means which modern education and Western social organisation alone can provide.

From this we may further deduce that there was always a community of mind between all the members of the popular and of the cultural spheres, a community which existed at least potentially. Furthermore the popular sphere in those countries which have not yet benefited by a large and general culture so closely resembles that of many areas within the great Eastern cultures, that one can fairly assume that they are capable of a similar process of adaptation. There is, therefore, a real kinship between the spiritual, moral, and intellectual capacities of the West and of the East. Now it is a fact of great significance that

Professor Lévy-Bruhl himself refrained from drawing any absolute conclusion from his own theories. Blondel, who has summarised the studies of Lévy-Bruhl, also denies that there is of necessity an organic difference by which alone the phenomena of the so-called pre-logical mind can be explained ¹). He is inclined to see no more than a relative distinction which answers to the existence of two types of society.

Even with this important qualification, many other writers have found themselves unable to accept the absolute distinction between a logical and a pre-logical mentality, and they have endeavoured to reduce it to a relative difference. Professor Allier remarks, "As our logic is characterised by the constant use of the principle of identity, the term pre-logical simply means that the mind to which it applies does not bother about this principle, without which civilised humanity cannot conceive of the existence of thought at all". To this mode of thinking Allier prefers to apply the term of "para-logical" which seems indeed a better description ²). It does not, according to him, proceed from a mental defect, but from the social influences of environment, and from the lack of knowledge and exact methods. Even the Occidental mind, which has been trained to strong analysis, to logical determinism, and to rigorous methods of thought based on causation, displays a para-logical tendency in moments of stress and of uncertainty. On such occasions it will be prepared to suspect the mysterious influence of thousands of small factors, it will look for a concordance of figures, colours, arbitrary events and encounters. In short, it allows itself to enter a world of apparent causal concatenations which it will reject as soon as the stress has disappeared. One must reflect that in the life of people who live in the state of nature, and even in the popular sphere of communities which have already reached a high degree of cultural development, lack of knowledge and the uncertainty of the struggle for existence are inclined to assure an almost permanent supremacy to the para-logical and fatalistic tendencies which have existed for thousands of years. These ideas in their turn exercise a strong influence upon each growing generation, and from early childhood they stimulate fantasy to such an extent as to obscure

¹) Ch. Blondel, *La Mentalité Primitive*, 1926, pp. 25—27.

²) *Op. cit.* I, p. 86. Cf. also Draghicesco, *La Réalité de l'Esprit*, 1928, pp. 99—100.

the sense of reality. Moreover auto-suggestion assures such success to various magical practices that believing them becomes the most natural thing in the world. Hence confusion and a blend of truth and untruth, of fancy and clear observation, of rule and of accident.

In the midst of this confusion, however, it is possible to discern very precise powers of observation, and even on occasions to admire a considerable *finesse* and a power of association of ideas which justify the conclusion that much may yet be expected from the para-logical mind ¹⁾. Moreover, in daily life, whenever the feeling of uncertainty happens to be absent, we can see the same logic and the same realisation of causality which exist in our West. There is no doubt that, starting with the tribes which are called the most primitive, right across the popular sphere in the less as well as in the more culturally advanced areas of the East, and in the Western popular sphere, until we come to the circles of Eastern and Western bearers of culture, throughout mankind from the Stone Age to the modern era, we can observe one single and gradual shifting of the limits between the so-called pre-logical mind and the domain of reason ²⁾. A large part of the area which is now dominated by the para-logical mind will disappear like snow before the sun when a popular education organised to this end has revealed the possibility of a much wider application of logic, and when a richer and wider social life full of moral force has begun to guide the mind outside its secluded sphere. The experience of all teachers and missionaries goes to show that this education must guard more especially against memorising as a means of widening the mind. Methods which have been used to good effect in the West, because the family and society completed them, may not be the best under circumstances where the effects of the family and of social life are antagonistic to the work done by the educator.

Reason and soul

We have now seen clearly that numerous irrational conceptions, especially those of animism, pre-animism, and magic, have been reinforced by a considerable number of notions which resulted

¹⁾ *Neerlands Indië*, I, p. 205.

²⁾ Allier, *Le Non-civilisé et Nous*, 1928, p. 289.

from fear or from ignorance. Nevertheless, it should be realised that these conceptions are an attempt to arrive at an explanation of one's own being, a really human characteristic in which the West finds its own spirit reflected. Until now we had considered the para-logical mind only from outside and from an intellectual point of view. It is time that we should realise that it also contains an entirely different element which is the germ of a whole world outside the sphere of logic. Reason and soul should be clearly distinguished, otherwise an entirely erroneous judgement is reached which leaves the spiritual element out of consideration. Animism is usually represented as a purely intellectual error without any religious character. One might as well say that the whole Western civilisation, most members of which believe in the historical truth of miracles and in a divine interference with the order of nature, is merely suffering from intellectual aberrations.

It should be understood that the germ of religiosity is no more absent in animism than it is in ourselves. Let us recall the word of Tertullian that the soul is naturally Christian. Let us remember also that the capacity for reverence, the criterion of humanity is nowhere absent. The religious element exists everywhere and Professor Preusz is right in calling this element a particular organ which is inseparably linked with the concept "man" ¹⁾. The moment a human being ceases to rely upon the knowledge and the forces which have been given him he feels an urge to seek a bridge across the threatening abyss of the unknown which surrounds him on every side. Instinctively mankind rejects the fortuitous, for it needs a world-order with which its being and its work can be identified. Participation in the world-order is a mystical need of the soul. There is, in this spiritual world, no place for logical thought, but only for inner experience, for revelation, for the intuitive sensing of the invisible, of the powers that are above causality and in whose hands rests the ordination of the world.

Even if the actions of these powers are often beyond understanding, the belief in their existence gives a sense of repose. Magical mysticism with its dances, songs, prayers, sacrifices and ceremonies, and by observing all manner of commands and prohibitions, gives to mankind the means of identifying itself

¹⁾ Preusz, *Glauben und Mystik*, p. 12.

mystically with these powers and of averting their ill-will. Once we look upon these expressions of belief in this light we feel that we are really treading holy ground. In many systems which exist among primitive people, such as the Taboo or the *Pemali* system, one should not merely seek for absurdities, but realise that they stand for a feeling of moral responsibility which imposes upon the individual the duty of assisting in preserving or restoring the order of nature in the interests of the community to which he belongs. As long as science does not enlighten him, man is obliged to endow his environment with an anthropomorphic character. He will see the world as a macrocosm of which the family, the local community, and, in the highest instance, the whole country or the empire is a small image. The world and society must identify themselves according to such a conception. In both there exists the same order and the same hierarchical division¹). This consciousness of an intimate union between himself and society, and between society and the order of nature or of the world, which is never absent from his mind, fills man with reverence and with a strong sense of responsibility for his own actions. It forms the moral basis of society in all Eastern cultures.

This explains how, in small circles of the popular sphere, the communal tie has established a distinct concordance between the deeds of the individual and the society to which he belongs, for these deeds are considered to influence the order of nature and to cause for instance bad harvests, illnesses, tempests, and other misfortunes. People who hold these views will of course be unable to grant a sharply defined identity to any being or to any object; they see connections everywhere and will sometimes classify the cardinal points, the constellations, the seasons, plants, animals, the members of the human body, the elements, the whole of society, of nature and of the world-order according to definite correspondences which they believe they have observed. One member of the body, for instance, will form a complex with one element, one cardinal point, one colour, one taste, one plant, etc. If this member ails or aches, the cure will then not depend upon local treatment, but upon magical operations which will influence the other parts of the complex to which the member belongs. It is ac-

¹) E. Durkheim and M. Mauss, *Classifications primitives* (L'année sociologique, 1901—02); E. Durkheim, *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie religieuse*.

cording to the same order of ideas that the ruler is made responsible for disasters which visit his country.

The dignity of the ruler, as well as every form of leadership, receives its real significance from the unmistakably religious or sacred character of its bearer. Administration and jurisdiction are therefore sacred functions, by which the leaders assure or restore harmony between the world-order and society. This is a conception which, apart from certain easily understandable mistakes due to fear and ignorance, also contains the elements of true spiritual grandeur, because it fills life with a sense of reverence for the mystery of creation. Moreover, it forms the basis of personal and collective responsibility, of social consciousness and of morality. The whole of life is permeated with the sense of religious sanction. It is therefore entirely erroneous to attempt a systematic division of institutions as belonging merely to public law, to penal law, to customary law or as being merely economic while some special practices only are classed as religious. For everything without exception belongs to religion and if this religious element is ignored, no function can be entirely understood. It is only in the West that a complete separation between the sacred and the profane has come into existence.

Once more we are struck by the resemblance between the past of our own West and the present popular sphere in the East. In his study of the Middle Ages Professor Huizinga has described the symbolistic mentality of that period. He described symbolism as a kind of mental short circuit, in virtue of which the mind does not seek the connection between two things along the hidden paths of causality, but finds them in a sudden jump, which gives to their conjunction a significance and a purpose. This is precisely the mentality which we find in the so-called primitive communities of the Eastern world, and this fact shows that there can be no question of an unbridgeable gulf.

It should nevertheless be remembered that this mentality must give way to logical thought and moral enlightenment, for symbolism and magic have their dangers. In backward regions, in Africa, for instance, magic may even lead to horrors like human sacrifice and anthropophagy ¹⁾. They are the expression of an attempt

¹⁾ Cf. Leroy, *op. cit.* pp. 161—195.

to reach a compromise between the oppressed mind and overpowering surroundings.

The nursery of morality

We have pointed out already that by respecting existing customs and usages, man could obtain the religious sanction which must ensure order throughout the world. In honouring the authority established by customary law, the family and caste ritual, the customs and traditions inherited from the past, and in observing all kinds of restrictive prohibitions, men perform acts of a more or less religious and magical nature which satisfy their social instincts and their religious needs. It is rare that our attention is drawn to the existence of this religious nucleus which is present even in pre-animistic conceptions. It is true that this magical mysticism is polluted by all manner of superstitions and absurd overgrowths, by misconceptions and especially by vile and sensual practices, even by self-seeking and crime. But this is a phenomenon similar to the degeneration of the social personality into an unsocial individual which can often be observed in the West.

All the failures and defects which still exist in the state of nature must not prevent us from realising that in this condition there already exist nurseries of morality where man can for the first time learn to cast an upward glance. If the organisation of the state and of the group cannot be conceived apart from the order of the world or of nature, the morality of the person can no more be conceived without a connection with his particular community. In his personal relations with the community, as well as in his capacity of a member of the community related to the world order, each person feels his moral responsibility in every word he speaks and in every action he commits. It is this feeling which cements human society. This indeed is the hint which we may well receive from the soul of the East. Its moral standards are the result of the natural inclination of a soul closely akin to our own, although it exists in surroundings which are very different from ours and which therefore require special standards, so long as the differences subsist. These differences are of two kinds. They are caused on the one hand by the limited extent of the social unit which restricts the capacity for reverence and by the paucity of

material and intellectual instruments, which opens the door to the fear inspired by matter.

Wherever great cultures exercise their influence, the sense of dependency decreases while the radius of reason grows at the expense of the emotive world of magical mysticism. Every enlargement of outlook, every increase in knowledge, will open a larger sphere of activity to capacities which are already awake, but it is easy to realise that a purely intellectual education will not suffice to activate this process. An excessive application of intellectual logic, while uprooting some misconceptions, might at the same time ruin the nursery of morality. One might object that for many cultural areas, such as the Dutch East Indies, this remark has no practical value because the overwhelming majority of the population professes the Islamic religion. But it should be remembered that magical mysticism has been highly successful in providing the Islamic doctrine with a field in which to sow. Professor Snouck Hurgronje points to the fact that "in almost every Mohammedan country the spiritual sphere of ideas . . . contains more original pagan than Mohammedan elements"¹⁾. From birth to death, he tells us, all life is under the influence of magic; tender love and care are noticeable throughout and life is full of poetry. These fine characteristics are rarefied by the Islamic reverence for the Supreme Being. In the same way the family feeling and the domestic virtues, in China and Japan, form the basic qualities which have amalgamated with the more universal feeling of loyalty towards the Ruler and the world-order which he represents. In the colonial world Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam have united into an intimate harmony with the magical mysticism of the group communities. We may perhaps go so far as to say that it is from this source that Islam has drawn part of its influence upon the lives of the populations that have embraced it.

Orthodox Muslims may condemn some of these heresies, but if we look deeper we shall be able to discern the divine spark in the dark depths of magical mysticism. Dr. Kohlbrugge²⁾ quotes an interesting passage from Dr. Abdul Rivai about the moral value and the social function of magical mysticism, which is worth reproducing in full:

¹⁾ *Nederland en de Islam*, 1915, p. 18. *Verspreide Geschriften*, IV, pp. 111—249.

²⁾ *Blikken in het Zieleleven van den Javaan en zijner Overheerschers* 1907, p. 24.

It is only by studying these beliefs that one learns to know Oriental peoples. For they are closely related not only to its religion, but also to its customs, which in their turn are closely connected with its laws. In poetry and prose, in songs and in proverbs, one discerns these ancient and fixed beliefs. For it is these beliefs which animate Indonesians, make them live peaceably together, and create their public spirit. They give strength and courage in strife and in difficulties, they spur men on to death-despising deeds and to generous self-sacrifice, while in times of peace they give them quietude and neighbourly love. Indonesians will do nothing if they feel no confidence in their magical mysticism.

Never in any circumstances will they abjure their belief, which is a portion of their own self, and this is why I venture to proclaim that an Indonesian who denies the power of his magic is no longer an Indonesian.

Indeed if the roots of morality are pulled up, whatever may be the soil from which its sap is drawn, nothing will be achieved, however beautiful the system that has been adopted and however ingenious the technique. Let us take Dr. Rivai's final sentence, not as a plea for magic, but as a protest against one-sided intellectualism, materialism, and atheism. For it is the first command of colonial leadership not to harm the "naturally Christian soul" of the East, but to help it in its search for a complete humanity.

The claims of psycho-analysis

It is as impossible to accept a one-sided psychological interpretation of medieval symbolism as it is to admit it as a complete explanation of magic in the East of to-day. Freud, in *"Totem und Tabu"* and in *"Imago"*, not to mention Reik, Rank, Jung, McDougall and many others, has tried to explain the problems of mythology and religious psychology and institutions such as totem and taboo, couvade, and the rites of puberty, by the general data of the new psychology. The conclusions of these studies, if they were accepted literally, would be of the highest importance to practical statesmanship; but they display an intellectual absolutism which makes them ill-suited as a guide for statesmanship; while they take insufficiently into account the social background against which one should always place each section of mankind and each one of its members. The communal feeling and the germ of personality are real factors which should not be neglected. This

is why Professor Lacombe has felt compelled to plead for the combination of individual psychological research with the method followed by Durkheim and his school ¹⁾. The latter method is content with the study and interpretation of material social factors such as legislation, legal rules, administrative forms, religious and ethical doctrine. This also is a one-sided method and consequently Lacombe says that sociology in its turn ought to make use of psychological methods of investigation so as to come to a knowledge of social facts by the methodical examination of the behaviour of individual consciences. This is a reasonable standpoint with which everybody will find it possible to agree. It stands parallel with the opinion of Professor Draghicesco who in his turn warns psychologists that "psychology should turn from its researches regarding the individual as such in order to study the relations between the individual and his kindred, organised as a society" ²⁾.

It is possible, by reason and rationality, to appraise the main-springs of the world of emotion provided they do not attempt to lure the soul into the alien world of the intellect. Professor Allier has pointed to the dangers of a purely intellectual and one-sided individual interpretation of certain manifestations of the personal life of the soul. "What emerges", he says, "is not a very ancient self with gross and almost bestial hereditary instincts. It is a new self which is shaping itself at the invitation of an ideal of which it has caught a glimpse. . . . Who knows whether analyses of conversions, if they only went more deeply than they do at present, would not lead us to further corrections of Freudianism and enable us to discover, beneath the gross layers where it stops, greater depths of mystery that are more closely related to the divine?" ³⁾ There is no doubt that the divine spark burns everywhere, pointing to the resplendent goal of social relationship and of a spiritual zenith. By taking insufficient account of this fact, one contributes to the creation of a distorted representation or even to the denial

¹⁾ R. Lacombe, *L'Interprétation des Faits Matériels dans la Méthode de Durkheim*, Revue Philosophique, 1925, pp. 384—388. Durkheim, *Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique*, 1927.

²⁾ D. Draghicesco, *La Réalité de l'Esprit*, 1928, p. 25.

³⁾ *Op. cit.* pp. 14, 15.

of the life of the soul in simple communities and to a doubt about their rational powers ¹).

If there is one conclusion which imposes itself after this survey of the different scientific endeavours to penetrate into the spiritual sphere of Oriental societies, it is this: a policy which wishes to develop along lines indicated by the nature and the character of those it desires to guide must be grateful for all new material with which students can provide it. Colonial policy demands to a growing extent intense scientific activity and co-operation, which, with the universe for background, will give expression to the feeling of national solidarity and enable it, more than ever before, to place itself at the service of the policy of guidance and protection in the East.

C o n c l u s i o n

Our investigation into Eastern society has given greater results than we might have hoped for at the outset. Nowhere in the whole world have we found immutable societies. Everywhere we have observed life the endless creator, hampered in its shaping power only by material resistances. Nowhere have we observed a confirmation of the caricature of humanity which represents social unity as a bunch of grapes growing from one single branch in a predestined manner, and which accepts the physical body as the only individuality in the community. The greatest moment in our investigation has been that at which, instead of an unbridgeable gap separating two kinds of mentality and two kinds of humanity, we have detected a double relationship of reason and of soul, in which only the outer form and the stage of development differ ²).

This differing form, this soul of the East, it is not the intention of the spirit of the West either to suppress or to destroy. The West only wishes to assist it by widening its horizon. We shall have to subdue the tenacious resistances of matter by our power and our knowledge, and especially by the strength of our faith in progress. In this way we shall enable the soul of the East freely to manifest its inner tendencies. This is the great and single idea

¹) C. Clemen, *Die Anwendung der Psychoanalyse auf Mythologie und Religionswissenschaft*, 1928, pp. 126—7.

²) Max Scheler, *op. cit.* p. 77; H. Poincaré, *Dernières Pensées*, the chapter on "La Morale et la Science", *passim*.

which animates colonial policy. We have investigated the bridge-heads and the central pillar of the bridge of synthesis and we have found them solid and adequate for their purpose. The time has now come to investigate the bridge itself from arch to arch and to see whether on the East side there is sufficient ground for the unfolding of the legions of synthesis in a strong forward movement.

CHAPTER V

THE SYNTHESIS OF CULTURES

Wie Natur im Vielgebilde
Einen Gott nur offenbart,
So im weiten Kunstgefilde
Webt ein Sinn der ew'gen Art;
Dieses ist der Sinn der Wahrheit,
Der sich nur mit Schönem schmückt,
Und getrost der höchsten Klarheit,
Hellsten Tags entgegenblickt.
GOETHE, *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*.

The debt of gratitude

The whole process by which human culture has been created implies one long debt of gratitude. The deeper we penetrate with our historical, archaeological, and prehistorical researches into the history of mankind, the more we discover the essential kinship of mankind and the continual reciprocal influence of all portions of humanity upon each other. The synthesis of cultures, i.e. the policy of dynamising Eastern society, of widening its social horizon, and of intensifying its striving after spiritual, moral, intellectual, and material progress in the colonial world, under the leadership of colonial policy, is only a small repayment for the benefits received by us and by our fathers from others, perhaps from the ancestors of those who are now in need of our assistance ¹⁾.

This notion of gratitude stands at the antipodes of irreverent ideas about levelling parts unequal among themselves. Whenever colonial policy is unable to leave cultural action to be performed by time and by circumstances, it is its duty to do justice to distinctions as much as to similarities. Those who really wish the

¹⁾ See Jacques de Morgan, *La Préhistoire Orientale*, 1927. Maspero, *La Chine Antiqué*, 1927. B. Laufer, *Sino-Iranica, Chinese Contributions, etc.*, 1919. R. Wilhelm, *op. cit.* p. 85. For the classic period, see E. H. Warmington, *The Commerce between the Roman Empire and India*, 1928.

kinship of men to degenerate into complete uniformity should look about them and recognise that notwithstanding the unity of the plan of creation, it has expressed itself in almost innumerable forms of life, without, even so, fully exhausting its potentialities. This impartiality regarding differences in form, in colour, and in tone is not the same thing as lack of principle or indifference. The harmony which solves all contrasts tolerates no clash of colours and no cacophony. This is how one must understand the basic plans of the progress of synthesis which must eventually lead to the great harmony of mankind.

T h e p o w e r o f r e v e r e n c e

The basic note in this harmony is the sense of distance in space and in time, the power of reverence in human relationships and towards the supernatural. From the most ancient times the power of reverence has been the criterion of humanity, of true government, of loyalty, of science, and of technique. Art never existed for its own sake any more than science or technique. Expressions like *l'art pour l'art* overlook that art, like all other cultural expressions of humanity, has always existed as a manifestation of reverence towards the riddles of life. Gripped by its majesty the soul of artists, of scientists, and of technicians, grown powerful in reverence and humility, wrenched itself free from its environment and even from its own nature. In this spiritual rise into the sphere of unity, they realised the great similarity which matter for ever tries to obliterate. In this climax of the sense of distance they were able, more than others, to follow the great Archetype; and they became creators in the earthly sphere, and the spirit spoke through them. These seers, artists, scientists, inventors, governors, and reformers, whose labour indeed resembles that of the prophets of the Old Testament, felt the gift of creativeness only after a long seclusion during which they steeped themselves in a reverent sense of distance. They all prepared themselves for the coming revelation which was to be stronger than themselves, and to which they needs must give heed when the call came. The spirit of the West appears through a great conception, a gigantic idea, a luminous invention which is received by the privileged one with a greater joy than all earthly treasure could give him. If his joy is pure he will feel immediately after the revelation an irresistible

call, that of the second commandment, to climb down once more to the foot of Mount Sinai, but without breaking his tables if he finds humanity other than he expected. As a man among men he will share out his gift in order to enable all to participate in progress.

For mankind, never over-hasty in following in the footsteps of the best, has moreover to make considerable sacrifices for the sake of culture. Without deliberately shedding a large part of human selfishness, intolerance, and roughness, civilisation and culture cannot exist. There is no real opposition between culture and civilisation. Without the self-control and self-denial imposed by civilisation there can be no creation of culture by the great minds and no reception of culture by the people. Without culture there can be no permanent inducement to make the sacrifices which civilisation demands from the individual, and which have to be made to an ever growing extent for the sake of a richer culture. It is no wonder that the multitude goes forward with halting steps: they are more conscious of the sacrifices than of the blessings of culture, which often pass their understanding. Even among the most developed, among those who ought to know better, we have already, in the previous chapter, noted a tendency to rebel against the demands of civilisation which are inherent in all cultural life. Nothing but the sense of distance, which lifts men outside their surroundings and above themselves, can give them the necessary strength. Not before this sense acquires its full pressure, in the greatest personalities, does it become capable of every sacrifice and, thereby, ready to fulfil the creative function of artists, thinkers, inventors, and leaders. It is the task of the schools, especially of the universities, in the West and no less in the East, to fill their students with a sense of reverence. Only thus will they send out not merely men who have been schooled intellectually and in practical affairs, but potential scientists, artists, and inventors, who will never feel themselves within reach of the final goal, and who will therefore always strive further, and compel their surroundings to move on and upward with them.

It is becoming easier now for us to look at the bridge of synthesis through world policy and colonial statesmanship, and to distinguish the great plan through the confusing mass of material. Through the social, economic, and political structure appears the

spirit which speaks to the spectator as it was able to speak through the spiritualised matter of medieval gothic architecture and through the wonderful machines of the inventors of our day. In the same way as these great inventors ensure the supremacy of man over the technician, the chemist, over the *homo faber*, in the same way also as our universities have to give to their students, apart from mere knowledge, a sense of reverence which will endow them with the creative spirit, colonial policy will have to ensure the domination of the spiritual contents of its mission over structural problems. For, notwithstanding its natural resistance, matter becomes like wax under the command of the mind and solves by itself all problems that arise, as long as real humanity dominates the process. The swarm of labourers who are erecting the construction must embody the universal reverence which should animate their individual gifts, lifting up the philosopher to real Wisdom, the artist to real Art, the scientist to true Science, the engineer to true Technique, and the industrial director to faithful Leadership.

Colonial policy has no desire to work before detached spectators who comment, favourably or otherwise, upon its activities. It refuses to allow its guests to scatter, it does not fear their criticism, but wants to hear how the formulation of its aims is received. It knows one fear only, the fear of contamination by matter, which would weaken its spiritual strength and its moral foundations. There is no nation which in its struggles towards higher things has not been aware of this danger and has not symbolised it in its legends. They all have their fabulous hero who fights the powers of darkness and defeats them. But always the hero has one vulnerable spot, where, sometimes at the very moment of his victory, sometimes soon afterwards, he is struck by the evil one who revives and reigns once more until again a Heracles, a Samson, a ruler like Yao, a Rama, an Ardjuna, a Siegfried, a Pandji hero¹⁾, a prophet or a reformer, arises and continues the eternal strife with Evil. The struggle will only end when Man is able to protect his Achilles-heel with the armour which reverence provides against the perils of matter so that he will no longer be vulnerable

¹⁾ W. H. Rassers, *De Pandji Roman*, 1922. Cf. Rassers, *Over den Zin van het Javaansche Drama*, in "Bijdragen Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Ned.-Indië, 1925, pp. 311—381.

to selfishness, particularism, jingoism, and racialism, which do not know the sense of distance, and to individualism and group selfishness, which do not know the sense of reverence.

The international movement of our time lifts up every human being, attacks every pettiness and undermines every particularism. All environment is purified, liberated from the negative influence of matter, and vivified to such an extent that it can generate reverence and loyalty. When world co-operation will have become a reality, when all distinctions and resemblances will have found their place in the great harmony, Man, invulnerable at last, will for the last time put his foot on the head of the dragon and crush it. Such is the teaching of the ancient wisdom of all nations and the very fact of its universal origin makes this idea a fit starting point for the policy of synthesis. It is universally felt and understood, and every people respects it so far as lies within its limited powers. As long as colonial policy places above all else its humanity, i.e., the moral contents of its cultural mission, it will be undefeatable and eventually it will succeed. But while it proceeds with the work of liberation it requires faithful shield-bearers who protect its heel lest the evil one should attack from the rear. Let the West therefore remain faithful to its religion and to its culture, for through these it became endowed with the formula of reverence which protects the hero.

Bearing this formula in mind Western leadership is ready for the struggle against spiritual and social narrowness. It sees with pity how the lack of that reverence from which the noblest human relationships originated, and the oppression of matter have thrown many people back into a limited sphere of action, so limited indeed that the motives that inspire them are often qualified as "instinct" or "group instinct". Some people have even thought that the words which really applied were "herd instinct". It was in order to vindicate the eternal distinction between man and all other creatures that we went, in the course of the previous chapter, in search of the embryos of personality, of loyalty, and of reverence, which form the undeniable characteristics of humanity. It has been an eternal law that in no human society did the light of mankind, its living spirit, which forms the climax of all life, ever completely disappear. It is only in the unsocial individual with an inward, self-centred outlook, who has lost all rever-

ence towards God and His commands, towards the world-order and society, that the sense of reverence and even of humanity has been extinguished. Who does not believe that the soul of the East and the spirit of the West may succeed, by the conjunction of their capacities, in creating harmony between group loyalty and personality, and in leading them towards a synthesis which will reject Eastern group egoism as well as Western individualism? Who refuses to believe that the fusion of the over-conscious Western self-assurance and of the unconscious sense of dependence of the East, may enable all men to experience the true reverence whence victory, in the last struggle against the common enemy, will proceed?

It is a propitious sign that Eastern thinkers are accepting this view. Mukerjee says "Neither India nor Europe and America, but something above them will give us the ideal family". Dakuin K. Lieu, animated by the same thought, says, "By a proper combination of the Eastern and Western civilisations, with society re-modelled to suit both the historical background and present-day requirements, a new régime will come into existence which will be superior not only to the old régime of China, but also to that of the West"¹). Here are two Eastern thinkers, by whose side many others might be mentioned, displaying the width of outlook to which all ideas of synthesis will owe their finest orientation. The aim, indeed, of the synthesis ideal will always have to be that of producing something better than could be achieved by the unaided forces of either East or West.

It is clear therefore that East and West will have to consider each other as faithful companions in arms in the heavy upward march each step of which will bring humanity to a wider perspective and also to infinitely greater ability in every respect, science and technique not excluded. They are running the same risks of defeat in the struggle against matter and materialism. As an example of the dangers which equally beset East and West and which threaten to defeat their effort for preserving the sparks and the flames of humanity, we may refer once more to Communism. When the group loyalty of the East recognised the Beast, it fought and defeated it. But we must not permit such another fight, and our tolerance must not become lack of principle. In

¹) Mukerjee, *Foundations*, p. 26. Dakuin K. Lieu, *The Social Transformation of China*, in "The Chinese Social and Political Science Review", Peking, Sept. 1917.

many nationally governed Eastern countries short shift would have been given to those who publicly declare, in the most disrespectful terms, that they want to throw God off His throne. Little tolerance would have been shown to those who scorn the expression of Eastern reverence. We who rule in many Eastern and African territories and are responsible for public order, bear a heavy responsibility when our excessive tolerance prevents small organisms from preserving the purity of their own blood, the more so as admittedly in certain respects our own attitude unhappily favours the direction which is consciously followed by Communist propaganda. Intellectual, economic, and political developments of the kind that weaken the sense of reverence instead of enlarging it, and which lead to anti-social actions and to over-excited self-confidence, are in reality just as dangerous as Communist propaganda. This consideration may cause many people to reflect that if even progress may thus provide a soil for the seed of immorality, it will become impossible to distinguish friend from foe and that it might be better not to take any action whatever. This would indeed be the wisest attitude, were it not that we possess a sure criterion by which political communism stands condemned, while it justifies moral, intellectual, economic, and political development. We shall then have to restrict our leadership to directing the powers of evolution towards the growth of the human sense of reverence. To reach this achievement, it is necessary to know the sources of Eastern morality, the shapes in which it expresses itself and the reason why it uttered itself as it did and in no other way. All this we must know or learn to know in order to prevent ignorance from attacking the roots of Eastern morality.

The criterion of synthesis

We have now left behind us the most essential part of this investigation. We have recognised as the source of all morality the universal human sense of reverence towards the community, the supernatural power and the deified Ruler and his delegates. The sense of reverence therefore dominates the social, the religious, and the national spheres. The powers which must be present in a large society and which must prepare it to take its place in the larger world-community are therefore active almost every-

where in the world, in the colonial territories also, if often still in a rather limited way. It is impossible to doubt their presence. Ethnographic descriptions, anthropology, the study of customary law, of culture and of history, enable us to discern in every expression of the life of populations and of states, a compromise between spiritual and moral needs on the one hand and the material obstacles created by physical geography, climate, etc., on the other. We may therefore refrain from aprioristic and dogmatic discriminations between good and evil elements in Oriental cultures and societies and try to reach along another avenue the solution of the dilemma which often confronts Western leadership. It would be a serious mistake to condemn a number of customs which would not sin against the criterion we have indicated, even though from the Western point of view they may appear blameworthy, or even immoral and nauseous. No less immoral would appear our own West in the eyes of the populations placed under its care, if it suddenly tried to abolish and to forbid all customs which do not agree with its own conceptions. Such relative judgments are made every day in the personal relations of life. If a man considers his neighbour to be miserly, it may be taken for granted that neighbour is just as convinced that the former is extravagant. What matters is not so much what a person does as what he thinks of himself while committing an action. Nobody can do violence to his conscience in any particular aspect without becoming entirely devoid of conscience. If therefore we compel a population simply to adopt our own moral standards we shall not make it moral, but immoral.

One can understand that many people will object to this conclusion and will wonder whether it would have been compatible with the dignity of leadership to tolerate cannibalism because it increased the magical resistance of a tribe, and adumbrated therefore an elementary form of nationalism; or head hunting, because it was supposed to placate the souls of the ancestors. Such people wonder whether suttee should have been allowed as an expression of the fidelity of a wife ¹⁾, or whether child marriages would be justified by the wish to assure the continuation of the community by numerous descendants. These questions do indeed confront

¹⁾ Cf. E. Thompson, *Suttee, A Historical and Philosophical Enquiry into the Hindu Rite of Widow-burning*, 1928.

national or colonial authorities with a serious dilemma. Some have solved it with the cry of "Let them go their own way", while others have demanded just as insistently that stern prohibitions should put an end to these practices. Happily colonial statesmanship nowadays has scarcely ever to deal with such extreme cases. But on a smaller scale there are still innumerable contrasts between Western and Eastern standards of morality, which often make themselves felt as real dilemmas. It is not possible to draw an invariable line of conduct for such cases; but, although statesmanship is not above occasional mistakes, its criterion will preserve it from serious fundamental errors. It refuses to deviate from its conviction that everywhere in the world similar moral forces are at work. Precisely because it realises that through the influence of their environment men of an unimpeachable morality have often gone astray it feels the mission to point towards the right direction by instruction and education when moral systems have become restricted or misguided.

Why should men not remember the beam in their own eye? Why should the West attempt to gloss over its religious hatreds, its jingoisms and its class divisions, which have taken the place of smaller particularisms now no longer extant? No more than of our larger particularisms can it be said of the particularisms of the East that they are entirely devoid of advantages: the caste system, for instance, is a nursery of loyalty and social sense. The forced assimilation of disparities will never rid the world of particularism; the end of particularism can only result from the synthesis of different talents, inclinations, merits, and points of view into one higher unity. This is the method which never fails to tell, even in the most primitive and supposedly barbarous environment. Let us take as an instance the case of a country where the tribes still practise head hunting. By the influence of world traffic and of administrative and missionary activities the sphere of group loyalty expands and more regular situations begin to prevail, so that presently head hunting becomes impossible in the territory where this progress is taking place. What is more, the outlook of the population will presently widen out to such an extent that even in their relations with outsiders they will cease to approve of head hunting. This amounts to saying that the morality of group-loyalty has been given a larger radius and that

group-selfishness has been freed by natural means of some of its most shocking manifestations. A mere prohibition, unprepared by preliminary or simultaneous education, would on the contrary have affected group-loyalty and, therefore, the nursery of morality. The good would have been attacked as well as the evil, and the chance of a smooth human development would have decreased, a result against which, with a few exceptions to be mentioned presently, we must always strictly safeguard ourselves.

To take a more striking example, let us look at countries such as Bali, where caste distinctions still exist, and where the customary penalty of banishment threatens all those who marry persons whom the caste laws forbid them to choose. Western authorities naturally do not feel much sympathy for caste distinctions, but they know what the caste means from the moral point of view. If therefore a young couple is banished by indigenous justice, the Dutch authorities will agree to the sentence, albeit with a certain reluctance. They will endeavour to change the outlook of the population itself by giving it a wider insight, and to modify customs by the impulse of Indonesian society itself. It goes without saying that the authorities are justified in trying to follow the dictates of their own conscience as much as possible. They may acquiesce in the banishment of the young couple who in the eyes of the fellow members of their group are as guilty as persons who commit incest in the West. They will try, however, to fight such usages by education, and in the meanwhile they will advocate the substitution of milder penalties for crimes which continue to be condemned by popular consent. It would not do to lay down any hard and fast rules. Every case has to be judged on its merits. There are, however, some exceptions; human sacrifices, torture, head hunting, and suttee were long ago condemned by the Western authorities, who have always tried to intervene and who were encouraged by far-seeing Eastern leaders and reformers, long before the moral sentiments of the mass had agreed to the necessity of these changes.

Some people condemn this attitude. But we maintain that the Western authorities, notwithstanding the disadvantages we have just mentioned, had the fullest right to prohibit head hunting forthwith. There are two aspects at least to all such affairs: it is not desirable that either of the parties concerned

should suffer irresistible damage to its soul. A Dajak tribe may for many years deem itself unjustly treated when the strong arm of authority prevents it from indulging in head hunting. But in a case like this our own morality is at stake; every true Occidental for whom the personal dignity of every human being matters above all else, feels it impossible to sacrifice this principle. He cannot look on indifferently while human beings are hunted down in order to serve for a meal, while widows are burned alive in order to follow their deceased husbands. There are other cases of the same kind. Occidentals who would like to bind colonial policy to rigorous and consistent actions must be reminded of the fact that life requires a certain subtlety and that a mania for principle involves an ignorance of realities. It is precisely one of the great principles of colonial statesmanship that it admits of no pedantic sticking for principle. It is perfectly able, for all the flexibility of its methods, to hand over its inheritance unsullied.

Some critics, adopting an entirely different point of view, consider that this flexibility goes rather far when, for instance, the Dutch authorities in the East Indies introduce a semi-parliamentary government. In their view, this is a form of government which is deemed to be impossible throughout the East and especially in the colonial world. To say that such an action is unoriental is to ignore a mass of facts and tendencies in the East. Many acts of colonial government might be called unoriental and many acts of the governments of Japan, China, Siam, Turkey, and Afghanistan might equally be called unoriental. What is usually overlooked is the fact that a world press, world transport, big industry, agriculture on a large scale, are also unoriental. Do the critics really believe that all these innovations can be introduced into the East and that the East can yet remain oriental? Let one newspaper be published and the village community will change! When, for instance, an old China-hand arrives in Canton after some ten years sojourn in Europe and finds a modern city with Chinese ladies going out and shopping with the same freedom as their European sisters, he exclaims "How incredibly fast China has changed!" Then he will go into the country, visit villages and small towns, talk to people "up-country", until at last he remarks "After all China has remained unchanged as of old!" As a matter of fact both judgements are equally erroneous. It is

not necessary to drop continually from the one extreme to the other. The East changes every day, but external appearances are by no means what matters most. The criterion which dominates all symptoms is the social horizon. As the horizon widens in a greater number of Orientals, Eastern knowledge and will-power will also increase.

We must not be carried away by the simplifications of reactionary thought any more than by extremist feeling. Life is not as simple as those who plead either for the "leave-them-alone" policy or for systematic interference would like to believe. World traffic and all it implies never allows colonial statesmanship to rest; it marks the task of Western leadership with the stamp of iron necessity. Hundreds of dilemmas with which European and Indigenous administrations are only too familiar are the result of the permanent opposition between inertia and progress, between interference and *laissez-faire*. A time of transition makes indeed the highest demands upon the capacities of an administration. The greatest difficulty for colonial and also for national authorities in the East results from the following incompatibility: even when the guiding principle for dealing with the population is to leave it free to follow its own natural development, there nevertheless remain numerous occasions when the necessities of the moment demand immediate intervention.

Let us, pending a more thorough investigation of this duality of system, acknowledge the soundness of the criticisms which throw much light upon the dualistic aspects of the problem. Colonial statesmanship, however, must refuse to put back the hands of the clock to 1900 or earlier. When colonial statesmanship prepares the political emancipation of its overseas subjects, this may be called an act of courage, of faith, and of loyalty towards evolution. It is indeed a manly promise made to the evolution of the future and we on our part must respond to such a promise by showing our firm purpose to perform our share in the work. It will be a work by which the widest possible sphere will be opened to the autonomous activity of all those who are prepared to take up their task, by which all personality and all group loyalty must be harmonised in order to assure the progress of the largest conceivable society.

The geo-physical factor

We must now review with the greatest care a series of objections which are made by people who consider that the proof of a real kinship between East and West, and even the discovery of the criterion by which to judge all measures taken in order to strengthen this kinship, do not bring us much nearer to the desired conclusion. These sceptics like to recall Confucius's saying that the influences of environment estrange human beings from each other. They believe therefore that we cannot hope for a future co-operation between East and West, as the estrangement is due to factors which are not liable to change, such as geography, climate and race, or which can only be modified with extreme difficulty, like the social environment. If they are right, the policy of synthesis will be restricted to minor sallies into continually disputed territory which will break themselves upon unshakable resistance. We shall begin by avoiding the one-sidedness of these sceptics, some of whom swear by the geographical factor, others by race, and still others by climate.

We have seen that the morphological interpretation of history rejects the possibility of cultural influences coming from outside the original geographical environment of a culture. At most, something can exist which is called pseudo-morphosis. When outside cultural forms are imposed upon a region which possesses cultural potentialities of its own, the new arrivals grow into dead forms which will never correspond to the essence and to the possibilities of their new home. It cannot be said that this view is entirely mistaken, for there is no doubt that if one dumps one's forms of civilisation bodily into a new cultural region, one will achieve no more than pseudo-morphosis. Only those who never troubled to study life could act in such a manner, ordering rather than inviting it to adapt itself to a new form. Life is responsive only towards the living mind, which is its own supreme expression, but it is intolerant in the presence of its own old rigid forms; it bursts out of them through revolutions. What applies to political forms holds equally in the case of moral standards. If the popular soul is not convinced beforehand, the moral principles which are imposed upon it will only solidify into a state of pseudo-morphosis. This of course is not the aim of colonial statesmanship. Has it then at its disposal nothing but forms and standards

which were already becoming rigid with the rigour of death before they were exported from their original geographical cradle?

It is a fact that colonial policy, national governments, and national *élites* in the East have often taken the form for the essence. But a lesson has been learnt from these mistakes and it is nowadays realised that no new forms should be imposed, however universal they may really be, before the popular soul is ready to accept them. Even so the critics will still have to convince us that there are no cases when a temporary makeshift, by which alone the sinking ship can be kept floating, would not have been preferable to the resigned aloofness which patiently waits till the popular soul is ready for innovation. There was a time when the universal practice of the policy of assimilation prevented people from exercising patience even when it was justified. But assimilation, however imperfect a method, was a necessary phase in colonial evolution. Nowadays there is more experience on the side of the West and also on the side of the East, though life does not always offer the opportunity of acting according to one's better knowledge. All we can ask is that people should endeavour to act according to their lights.

Colonial policy is not in the unfavourable situation of having only dead forms at its disposal. There have indeed been cultures which spread across the earth with considerably more success than the morphologists would have us believe. History proves that cuttings of certain cultural plants can be transplanted with as much success as those of the healthiest rose bush. The vine, fruits or flowers may acquire a special taste or aroma from the soil to which they have been transported, but they retain an unmistakable resemblance to the produce of their original homes. Statesmanship, however, goes further than this; it transplants not only forms, cuttings, and seeds, but also the living spirit which can become creative wherever it has acquainted itself sufficiently with the new physical environment. The spread of culture in former centuries, down from pre-historic times, proves that the spirit bloweth where it listeth, and that its action has always been characterised more by the creation of new living forms in new geographical regions than by the transfer of foreign dead forms. Moreover, if it is true that religions, mythology, symbols, and social institutions often acquired strongly varying contents and mean-

ing in the course of their spread across the earth, according to the country which they penetrated, this is not in itself a proof that the mutations were merely the result of the influence of geographical factors. Could it not be that the reason of the change resides more particularly in the degree of civilisation of the inhabitants of the new geo-physical region? This would certainly be a better explanation of the fact that culture sometimes leaves untouched neighbouring regions with similar geo-physical conditions where the population is still too undeveloped, while at the other end of the earth a cultural soil which was sufficiently prepared absorbs it with the greatest ease. The prophet is often compelled to leave his own country before he receives a hearing. The liberating thought of Buddha acquired strong moral power in Japan while India, the country of its origin, rejected it. Is it not a fact that all religions and symbolisms have been able to communicate their inspiration and their mysteries to men in every inhabited country of the earth? Let us not forget that in the course of thousands of years the varying influences of environment have often modified their original contents to a degree which has made them almost unrecognisable. Such changes happened in the home-land of a culture just as easily as in the new landscape where it settled ¹).

The universal appeal of culture is proved by the pleasure which each of us can receive from the poets of ancient Greece, Rome, China, Japan, India, and Arabia. We are told sometimes that in reading their works we only imagine we understand them, while in reality a contemporary of Sophocles or of Phidias, when admiring their masterpieces, experienced sensations entirely different from our own. There must be a certain truth in this contention; every impression and every appreciation has a personal element. But all these personal feelings are covered as it were by one gigantic dome, the communion of mankind. The trees must not make us lose sight of the wood. Through the manifold forms of life, we must still discern the creative force and the main plan. It is true, though it is but a one-sided truth, that every listener puts his own soul into what he hears, every spectator his own

¹) Goblet D'Alviella, *The Migration of Symbols*, transl. by G. Birdwood, 1894; D. A. Mackenzie *The Migration of Symbols*, 1926; H. Schliemann, *Le Palais préhistorique des Rois de Tyrinthe*, 1885; Fr. Graebner, *Thor und Maui*, *Anthropos*, 1919, Vol. XIV—XV, pp. 1099—1119.

being into what he admires. But it is not less true that the communion of minds can join these different reflexes and make them react as one desire, one aspiration, one deed. Were it otherwise, it would be impossible for two human beings to converse together. We are most definitely able to understand the ancients and to read or contemplate their works with genuine enjoyment. Sometimes one reads a Greek writer and foresees several pages ahead the objections which will indeed be formulated a little further on by a Socrates, a Thrasyarchus, or a Glaucos. It cannot be otherwise, because humanity has always shown, and always will show, a fundamental oneness; because it possesses the one universal criterion, the sense of distance which makes little of all existing distinctions.

It is a good thing that great thinkers should have pointed out the dangers of pseudo-morphosis. Colonial policy cannot possibly take their warning too much to heart. But when an idea, arrived from a great distance, is calling forth new life in new environments, it deserves to be clearly distinguished from pseudo-morphic forms. The latter must sooner or later be rejected or re-modelled, if it were only because foreign additions are bound to do violence to home-grown culture. As for the influence of the geographical factor, it may perhaps be very considerable upon cultural forms, but it need not necessarily affect the spirit.

Differences reduced to their true perspective

We should not always hasten to describe as basic contrasts all the varying forms which have been created by one and the same spirit, and which differ only because they happen to be placed in different geographical regions. In each different environment, in every period and even in every human being there are capacities and possibilities which vary from minute to minute, even in the application of one single idea, whether autochthonous or alien. According to the strength of varying influences, this idea will impress its shape upon the resistances of surroundings and of matter. One single idea may adopt as many shapes as there are regions where it lives, and it may even remain subject to variations and mutations from one moment to the next.

It may be a fact that even the nations of the West do not un-

derstand each other, but then it is equally true that there is no mother who entirely understands her daughter, that no father entirely understands his son, no man his wife, no wife her husband, no Dutchman another Dutchman, no Frenchman an Englishman, no Occidental an Oriental. We may accept this view without demur, for the policy of synthesis is more modest than may be thought. It will be satisfied if it can bring about as much understanding as there can be between a man and his wife, between two Hollanders, between two Occidentals, between two human beings. It has never aimed at an integral understanding, never wanted to plunge the whole world into uniformity. Its aim is rather to enable every nation and every culture to unfold its own peculiar gifts to their fullest capacity. It wants women to develop to their highest possible womanhood, and men to their proudest manhood; it expects each citizen to become an ornament to his own nation. If one were to accept the views of Houston Stewart Chamberlain and of Elisée Réclus whom he quotes, there would never have existed a single Occidental who could understand a single Chinese ¹⁾. It may be true that no missionary will ever be able to say "I have known a Chinese"; but he will not find it impossible to get over his disappointment when he reflects that in a sense no Chinese can ever completely know a single one among his own countrymen.

There is yet another reason why we must absolutely reject the division of mankind into racial, national, and cultural categories, composed of members who live behind impenetrable walls, unable to understand outsiders as much even as a man can understand his dog. The human mind is subject to so many influences apart from geography, climate, and race, that one meets the most varying characters and talents even within one household. In a strongly differentiated society there must be more diversity still. Professor van Bemmelen's interesting genealogical studies point to the transmission of definite characteristics in families. It is a well known fact that musical and other gifts can be maintained in a family for quite a long period, even if they do not appear always with the same regularity. The very general habit of transmitting function by heredity shows that the East is well aware of this fact. The transmission of definite characteristics and capaci-

¹⁾ H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts*, 1919, II, p. 846.

ties in an almost immutable environment, where traditions are apt to favour marriages which will only strengthen an existing family trait and where education will favour its development from early childhood, must have been obvious to everybody. Family resemblances have been guaranteed in this way and this applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to village communities, tribes and races, provided they maintain their secluded existence and preserve the same cultural and physical circumstances. Such small groups are bound to feel alien to surrounding groups.

These circumstances change entirely when the division of labour allows the development, within the nation or the race, of hundreds of entirely varying characteristics, while at the same time international and inter-racial communications begin to cut across all these uniformities. It is then that all the potentialities hidden under this uniformity are suddenly observed. It becomes increasingly difficult to strengthen existing family characteristics by marriage with people of similar inclinations. Different tendencies meet and mate ever more, with the result that entirely new types spring up within the race, while in the same household members will show a much greater divergence than was formerly conceivable. Hundreds of new professions are opened to individuals and give them the opportunity to develop characteristics which had hitherto remained suppressed. As a result the appearance (phenotype) of human beings begins to differ very considerably. The mysterious life-power gives to the sailor, the savant, the artist of all countries, especially when their manner of working becomes standardised, definite features which become often as distinctive as national or racial characteristics. In certain respects these professional features even obliterate the older distinctions; there are callings which mark their stamp throughout the world on those who follow them, and the resemblance will be one not only of features but also of mentality.

There are innumerable factors therefore which differentiate what used to be uniform, and which draw together elements that used to differ. Education acts as a powerful factor in this direction. The influence of the mind is so considerable that, even without transferring him to another country, it can modify the outlook of the member of a race to such an extent that he becomes thoroughly alienated from his own environment. The supposedly

impenetrable wall has really proved to be porous throughout and displays wide breaches. The fusion of three or more different races in almost every European state, that of elements from most Western countries into one American nation, amply justifies the belief in the possibility of co-operation notwithstanding the differences which must prevent an integral understanding. It is true that, owing to variety in customs, in conceptions, and in attitude towards life, the existence of deep personal friendships, such as exceptionally arise between members of the same nation, will be rare, if not impossible. But such deep feelings are by no means a universal necessity. Respect for the characteristics of the other people, and appreciation of its virtues will in numerous cases provide an ample basis for lasting sympathy and co-operation.

The absence of absolute and unreserved personal understanding between Orientals and Occidentals sometimes causes heart-burning to enthusiastic workers for the synthesis of cultures. In his devotion the pioneer or the missionary sometimes wants to undertake too much at once. In a period of transition, of spiritual adaptation to new surroundings, such expressions of disappointment are frequent. It should be remembered that in the sphere of the mind fruitful work can only be undertaken when the other side has been moved to such an extent that it begins by asking for assistance. From that moment, the victory is assured. But what a long preliminary labour is required before this point is reached! Dejection on this score, always based on good grounds, is often encountered among enthusiastic officials, teachers, agricultural instructors, leaders of establishments of credit and of co-operative institutions. Educational work such as theirs has only been going on for some thirty years, in the course of which it was first of all necessary to find out and to remedy the mistakes of previous methods. Yet people are unable to restrain their impatience. They want the Eastern co-operative movement to be a success after ten or twenty years. They expect Indonesian communes to send in at the appointed date a perfectly balanced budget of receipts and expenditure, and to stick to it. They seem in fact to imagine that they are going to meet whole nations of supermen in the East. All such exaggerated optimism never fails to bring about an equally disproportionate disappointment. It is in moods like these that people sit down and write to

their friends in the West that members of Oriental societies will never be taught, not even in a hundred years, and that there exists an unbridgeable difference of mental outlook. All such recriminations are sent to the wrong address, for the only thing to be blamed is unreasonable optimism. Fairness demands that one should admit that immense progress has already been made owing to the work of all the pioneers whose daily disappointments enable us and the generation that will follow us to pluck the fruit which has matured only as the result of perhaps a whole century of work and of quiet growth.

Misunderstandings

Let us moderate our expectations and let us in particular avoid the presumption which imagines that it must understand other races and nations even better than it understands itself. In the meeting between West and East, both parties seem to be animated by an almost morbid and ill-directed curiosity. Like restless tourists they want to know, to understand, and to interpret everything. If the same ardour were displayed in studying one's fellow citizens and all that concerns them, it would soon be discovered how little is known about them. Indeed, so many different standards seem to prevail among people of the same nation, of the same locality even, that they are ready to refer to any action which surprises them as queer, mad, and objectionable. If such misunderstandings are possible within a small circle, it becomes clear why so much disappointment must result from all these sudden excursions into ethnography and ethnology by many people who approach these subjects unprepared either by preliminary studies or by patience and sympathy. It is equally painful, though not less useful, to notice the criticism exercised by Orientals about our habits and our social organisation. How often do they not prove by their assertions about Western individualism that they have entirely overlooked personality, the significance of the Western household, and the fact that in many regions of the West people remain obstinately attached to the family? Blood relationship imposes considerable obligations on a large circle, and it is surprising how many of our moderns observe them with the greatest scruple, without dreaming of leaving their obligations to the state or to philanthropy. The family

shares in all important events that take place in its circle and in the joys and sufferings of its members, even in the honour of its name, however unknown it may be. It will often do its best to stand by and support its weaker members throughout their lives. All these things cannot be observed in the street, in the café, nor in the train, nor in the workshop, nor upon the Stock Exchange. People who only look in these places will imagine that they see nothing but numbers; they have no inkling of the fact that each of these numbers is in reality the centre of an invisible, but strongly knit, circle. In the East such things are not known, even to those who have spent many years at Western universities. These observers similarly often misunderstand the relations between the sexes, and imagine that complete anarchy rules in the West, because they have not noticed the vigilance with which most people look after the conduct of their children. They are unaware that in engagements and marriages the parents and even the family often play an active part, while education and tradition impose very strict rules of life and of conduct upon all these seemingly free agents.

As usual the most important things are precisely those that do not strike the eye. It is not surprising therefore that our Western society is misunderstood by the East precisely in those respects where both worlds are closest akin. Moreover, we do not make it easy for the East to understand or appreciate us, for we seem to make it a point of presenting ourselves through our films, our morbid self-analysis, and our murderous criticisms to millions of amazed spectators and readers in the East as a degenerate civilisation of criminals, adulterers, atheists, and individualists. Every day innumerable film performances are given in the East which dishonour Western womanhood and create the impression that, while maintaining law and order in the colonial world, we are unable to do so in our own country. We who, in Europe, have engaged for many centuries in driving crime back into the outer darkness, give it the place of honour in the cinematograph. Such things do not facilitate the task of colonial statesmanship. There are only two ways in which a nation or a person can impose respect; they are the mailed fist or actual merit. The mailed fist is rather out of date; Western prestige, indispensable in the execution of the task of leadership, has no basis left except such im-

ponderable elements as the respect inspired by the mental, moral, intellectual, and material capacities of the West. If we continue to give such a bad impression of our spiritual and moral capacities, we shall be able to command respect only by our intellectual and material achievements. As it happens our cultural pride feeds this misapprehension by making it a habit to point only to the wonders of our technique and not to our spiritual and moral power. It has now come to such a pitch that only some exceptional people in the East appreciate the secret of Western strength, while the majority seek this secret in technique, in political forms, and in guns, and are tempted therefore to limit their efforts in the cause of Eastern progress to a mistaken striving towards exclusively technical efficiency and political emancipation.

Not from the influences of physical geography therefore, but from causes which even a child can observe do misunderstandings arise which may cause a great mission to fail, and which separate the nations by almost impenetrable walls. Apart from the difficulties due to environment and similar factors, there are those due to exaggeration and to fancy. We may be sure that if the contact of East and West leads to a better knowledge of social conditions and customs on both sides, nations and races will eventually learn to understand each other as well as certain individuals of the East and the West are already able to do to-day. A study of colonial policy which would fail to mention these apparently commonplace factors had better remain unwritten. These problems cannot be tackled without an urgent and personal appeal to every citizen of all leading nations and to every Eastern leader, to do everything within his power to remove all these factors of misunderstanding and to replace them by the seeds of truth, knowledge, and appreciation. We may be sure that every honest action thus inspired will be stronger than geography, climate, or race. Many people may feel it their duty to co-operate while fearing to approach the task with empty hands. There need be no empty hands, for everybody can contribute by will, by word, and by sympathy; there is no government which can perform more than a fraction of what lies within the power of the nation. Do not let us overlook such considerations or gloss over the contributions of our soul, as though they were insignificant factors in comparison with the marvels of technique. It is our duty to warn

the East that our *homo faber* is no more than a faithful helper, and then only when he is guided by the spirit. It is our duty to point out that the East, in aiming only at the imitation of our external technical, economic, scientific and political characteristics, would throw away its humanity and adopt instead a dead form which would put chaos in the place of its inner harmony. As Eastern thinkers have already understood, the synthesis of cultures will give to the East and to the West something better than they have been able to create so far by their separate efforts.

We may summarise what we have said so far about the geographical factor by affirming that its influence, which cannot be denied up to a point, is only an additional proof that pure Western forms should not be transplanted as stimuli but that the spirit of the West itself must go to the East. The forms created by the soul of the East must not be attacked; its popular sphere must only be widened. Habits likewise must not be changed; the moral sense must only be liberated by a greater understanding. It must be admitted that a foreign cultural influence can activate a whole population either in a creative or in a destructive sense. It will be asked, however, whether the cold wind of the north and the burning breath of the south are not bound always to create fatal reactions in living organisms which have not been immunised against them by nature, and which are only exposed to these influences as a result of the artificial penetration of the twentieth century.

By referring for one moment to what has been said about Western communism, it will be seen that in this form the problem also suggests queries about the influence of the spirit of the West. Is it possible that this spirit, blowing towards the East, may become a destructive storm killing the whole vegetation of the East? This is an urgent question which needs an immediate reply. For if the spirit of the West, in the same way as political communism, is deprived of its humanity, if the only representative of the West that goes out East is the technical and political *homo faber* who feels no interest for Eastern spiritual and moral values, this counterfeit of the Western spirit will cause as much misery as an unbridled political communism. But the genuine spirit of the West can do no harm because, being human and therefore really universal, it has existed everywhere, in various phases of develop-

ment. It is indeed the one thing that is absolutely necessary for the birth of a human society, and its activity might be compared to that of an agent which is as indispensable to the growth of a plant as light, air, warmth, or water. It should be the task of the West therefore to open out a wide social horizon which will assure a supply of these elements where they are needed. Acting in this sense colonial policy and its Eastern collaborators will not cause any disaster: they will enable each particular landscape to display its particular gifts, once they are fertilised by favourable circumstances. Colonial statesmanship does not favour a particular religion, but it can never look on with indifference when atheism and irreverence try to eat into the religious consciousness of the East. Even from those who happen not to be religious themselves it demands reverence. Our warning against the worship of form which results in pseudo-morphosis and decomposition, and against unspiritual cultural influences, need discourage nobody. It only confirms the opinion that colonial statesmanship will succeed wherever it preserves its humanity and its respect for spiritual and moral values.

C l i m a t e

Next to the geo-physical factors the climate is an element against which, in the opinion of many people, colonial policy is utterly powerless. There are critics who attribute the restricted development of large parts of the colonial world from the point of view of knowledge and of social consciousness mainly to the demoralising influence of the climate. They warn us especially against tropical heat, and the saying that 10° north and south of the Equator no great autochthonous cultures, no initiative, no progress, no energy, and especially no staying power, are to be expected, is well known. The moist heat of the tropics and the nature of the light to which almost the whole colonial world is exposed are generally considered as being the most unfavourable climatological factors conceivable, and no human power is able to modify them to any appreciable extent ¹⁾. This view seems to be confirmed by the decrease of vitality and of creative power

¹⁾ Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilisation and Climate*, 1915; *The Human Habitat* 1928, pp. 176 sqq. and also *the Pulse of Asia*, and Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race*, 1921, p. 41.

observable in the tropics among the representatives of the most energetic peoples of north-western Europe. These views, however, need not be proclaimed too emphatically, because there are extensive modern works which cast some doubts on them, even in the case of Europeans in the tropics ¹). But it is undeniable that a continual exposure to excessive cold or to a hothouse temperature is bound to impede certain manifestations of energy and to create a passivity which may assist the powers of resistance, though at the expense of normal sensitiveness and initiative. The climate of north-western Europe, which is not extreme, and stimulates men by continual variations is undoubtedly preferable to any other. If a population has been exposed for some generations to a tropical climate it will either die out or have to adapt itself, a process which is bound to influence the body as well as the mind. It might therefore be advisable to transport such a population bodily into another climate. As this is an impossible proposition, resignation is the only possible alternative.

We must try to establish what possibilities the climatic factor allows, and what it rules out. The obvious criterion is the amount of energy displayed by the population in the present or in the past. Incidentally, it must be granted that the past opened far less possibilities than the present. It is often said that great cultures have never been able to renew themselves in tropical and sub-tropical countries. Immigrants from other territories may demonstrate the power of energy, but they, and especially their women, over-excite their nervous system and sap their vitality.

Their children or their grand-children usually remain childless, unless they rejuvenate themselves by inter-racial marriages. It is a fact therefore that climate imposes certain limitations upon human activities. But history proves that the precise extent of these limitations is not necessarily indicated by the conditions that awaited the Western immigrant upon his arrival in the colonial world in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, or in our own day.

Reports of the mighty deeds of the Çrivijaya ²) Empire in Sumatra, and the journals of the early Dutch colonists at the begin-

¹) J. W. Gregory, *The Menace of Colour*, 1925 (extensive bibliography).

²) Gabriel Ferrand, *L'Empire sumatranais de Çrivijaya*, pp. 145—184, in *Journal Asiatique*, 1922.

ning of the seventeenth century, clearly reveal that the climate allows greater possibilities of synthesis than present day circumstances would allow one to expect. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Hindu-Javanese were a people of seafarers, ship-builders, cannon-founders, and colonisers. They dominated the trade of the whole Malay Archipelago and even of the Malacca Peninsula and of the Philippines. In the seventeenth century they had become a purely agricultural population, as a result of the policy of Mataram and of the Dutch East India Company. At the same time the migration of traders from Java and Malacca to Macassar caused the metamorphosis of its agricultural population into one that is still famous for the energy and the spirit of enterprise of its sailors and merchants. Had their hinterland not been so small and had they not met the powerful Company in their way they might have founded a great empire. Descriptions dating from 1622 mention the great junks of the Javanese with which they traded in Malacca, Atchin, Jambi, Palembang, and Siam; but in 1657 the Javanese complained to a Dutch Governor-General that even for the coastwise transport of goods they had to be assisted because they were unable to sail a boat. It is sad to notice such a total change coming over a population. But what would have happened if in the days of the Roman conquest, Romans and foreigners had arrived in the Low Countries at the ratio of twenty enterprising, instructed foreigners with capital and organisation, to every thousand inhabitants? Would there have been much opportunity in such a case for the villages of the Netherlands to develop the energy which led to the creation of medieval towns? In the Dutch East Indies the proportion is less favourable still. A total population of 60 million includes over one million Arabs, Chinese, Europeans, British Indians, and Japanese, most of them strongly concentrated and collected in settlements which dominate the hinterland economically. Moreover, it is by a natural process of selection that foreign countries send the most energetic of their members and feed these settlements with further emigration. True, this foreign energy taps sources which would have remained closed to the Indonesians, who are also benefited, but the strength and the future of a nation never yet resided in its material resources. It is only now that the work of education is beginning to introduce the Indonesian into

the sphere of the mind from which he has been excluded for centuries. This segregation has probably influenced his mental life to a larger extent than the unfavourable climate. In its present situation, if the population of Java, which could of course not possibly be cut off from world traffic, had to rely entirely upon its own resources, it would not be able to keep even those economic and agricultural advantages which it now possesses.

Colonial policy cannot change a climate. What it can do is to favour economic developments which may reduce the importance of climatological drawbacks, and pass beyond the point of inertia brought about by the climate. These developments are assisted by protecting the economic and industrial development of the populations, and by preparing them for self-exertion, through education, a credit system, co-operation, etc. Unassisted, a rejuvenated energy, after having displayed the first symptoms of its existence, would be confronted with an impossible task in its competition with organised enterprise. Human understanding is still too limited to be able to establish set rules or to determine definite periods applying to past evolution. Of no situation past or present can one say with certainty that it does full justice to the potentialities hidden in persons and in nations. It appears again and again that the thing which, for lack of knowledge of some determining factors, we call chance, brings to life the most unsuspected faculties.

T h e r a c e

The third of the obstacles before which colonial policy is supposed to be powerless is a difference of aptitude and character, frequently called racial distinction. Interesting studies¹⁾ are continually being published upon this subject; they will no doubt acquire a greater practical importance when there are less considerable differences of opinion between those who write them. Some people consider that race is a biological complex which can only be modified by way of variation and selection; others explain it as an expression of the influences of geography and climate which favour the persistence of certain characteristics and the disappearance of others. Although race must be considered a pri-

¹⁾ Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color*, 1921; *Racial Realities in Europe*, 1925.

mary factor in the development of the population, it is extremely difficult to give a satisfactory definition of the different races and to distinguish them completely. Even if it were not necessary to take into account the large mixture of races which has taken place, it would not be easy to establish adequate criteria based upon the examination of an immense mass of individually varying persons, in such a way that they would include all the persons belonging to one particular race. The difficulty may be evaded by establishing a number on groups or sub-groups, but always nature plays her tricks upon the investigator. These difficulties have caused a certain amount of opposition against efforts to distinguish races and in certain circles the concept of race has become utterly discredited.

This however is going too far. There are differences between the inhabitants of different parts of the globe which nobody can ignore; the difficulty is rather to analyse the impression of difference into its smallest components than actually to gather the impression itself. The difference between races exists, not only physically, but also mentally, and to deny it would do violence to a truth which everybody feels. It is precisely such essentials as the soul of a landscape, the personality of a man, the perfume of a flower, and the soul of a race which escape intellectual definition, as do all the mysteries of life, although they can be perceived by intuitive observation. Apart from these difficulties we also have to cope with a number of unobjective studies which either deny the existence of all racial differences or else exaggerate them to an extent which confuses the entire issue. Much sentiment has become involved with the sciences which deal with race and a mass of popular literature has introduced practical politics into this question ¹⁾).

Phenotype and genotype

An enlightened policy will deem it safer to take into account only what it can observe and what it learns from history. It will therefore proceed from the point of view that, in the colonial world, other races and other racial characteristics must be taken into account. History teaches that what we now tend to consider

¹⁾ Stoddard, *op. cit.*; Madison Grant, *op. cit.*

as the expression of race need not necessarily be so because races, which perhaps may now strike us as being decadent, may have known longer or shorter periods of prosperity and energy. The experience of colonial policy itself proves that differentiation of labour and education calls forth, within the race to which it is applied, new characteristics which end by becoming as important as the previously observed racial characteristics. It would therefore be unwise to attribute any given condition to racial influence. Races may contain innumerable possibilities which sometimes were displayed in the past and which more frequently are only now beginning to betray their presence as a result of the influence of Western thought and modern world traffic.

The race expresses itself in a broad uniformity of racial characteristics, which will be most definitely pronounced where there is no variation due to national, professional or personal differentiation. Where such differentiations begin to develop, potentialities which have long remained latent suddenly express themselves in manifold outward appearances. These appearances or phenotypes unconsciously try to perpetuate the genotype from which they derive the possibility of their existence by marriage selection which ensures the combination of definite hereditary factors. This may eventually result in a modification of the ratio between the individual genotypes present in the race, or even in the production of entirely new reactions or powers of adaptation. The latter possibility need not be discussed here because it is of a rather hypothetical character. But the fact that every race has at its disposal a greater number of possibilities than can be expressed in any definite set of circumstances is of great importance to us.

This conclusion, which is generally accepted, is of great value to colonial policy. Every generation, then, communicates to the next a complex of possibilities. The outward appearance or phenotype which the new generations will receive is a compromise between the potentialities transmitted by the previous generation and the factors of environment such as geography, climate, education, hygiene, etc. This opens, both in the East and in the West, immense possibilities for education and for all forms of social care. Looking at some particular race, it is possible therefore to see not only its racial spirit, but perhaps also the results of the oppression

of this spirit by matter, in the form of definite environmental factors. Some of the essential characteristics of this race may still exist, in a latent manner, waiting for the powerful and more favoured spirit of the West to break the chain of environment, and to guide its potentialities once more into the light of consciousness.

Biology is definite in its view that race, which is almost unchangeable, must be sharply distinguished from the very variable external racial characteristics which are the compromise of racial and external influences. The fact that so many capacities remain latent because of the resistance of environment will fully justify an active policy of development on the part of the authorities. But they can only expect such qualities to be adapted as are already potentially present¹). This conclusion confirms the wisdom of colonial policy in imposing a limitation upon its own activities and in exercising patience. If one race assists with its own powers those developed by another race, they will both be able to liberate themselves from nature and from the segregation imposed by space. The period of single-handed struggle will have closed for all nations, races, and cultures. As soon as the co-operation of all races has become a reality, the spirit will defeat matter all along the line, and this will be the greatest moment towards which every culture and every religion has looked longingly forward. He therefore who wishes to serve the spirit must fight against race-war, for it is by encouraging this division that matter is preparing its most serious resistance to the spirit.

The power of adaptation

Racial co-operation will be based on the mutual powers of adaptation that are dormant within the fundamental racial type. Which are these powers? Nobody will deny that, physically, the population of the colonial world is perfectly adapted to its surroundings. Until the end of the nineteenth century it often used to be denied that it possessed intellectual and moral powers of adaptation. Nowadays such sweeping generalisations are no longer made. Too many indigenes, even among the most backward Australians, have received a Western education with good

¹) P. J. Waardenburg, *De Biologische Achtergrond van Aanleg, Milieu en Opvoeding*, 1927. Cf. also Bauer, Fischer and Lenz, *Menschliche Erblichkeitslehre*, 1927.

results. Even the universities of the West have been visited by numerous Orientals, among them many from the colonial world, who have often achieved real distinction. The contention of unadaptability has therefore been carried to the subject of morals, where of course proofs are much more difficult to give in support of either view. We are now told that many races either completely lack moral sense in our meaning, or else have not enough power of adaptation to strengthen their moral consciousness to such a degree that it can form the basis of a social life on a large scale. Education cannot fill this gap, and the critics point in particular to the rapid moral deterioration of the population in the big Eastern towns where Western civilisation is believed to predominate.

So many proofs in support of the view that modern influences weaken or destroy morality are adduced even by sound, objective observers, that it would be inadvisable to attempt a refutation of their assertions. The idea of synthesis is reasonable, it admits of no exaggeration, but, once all questions as to reasons and results have been settled, it bows before the facts. The fact of Western influence in itself is of such fundamental significance that it will have to be carefully analysed in a later chapter. For the time being it may be sufficient to draw attention to a few fundamental points. The moral question is of course a most essential one for colonial policy. To establish successfully the moral incapacity of certain races would be at the same time to overthrow the pillars on which this policy is building. We may refer all those who doubt the morality of various populations to the previous chapter where we have tried to prove that the East possesses moral feelings similar to those of the West. Those who assert that, in its contacts with the West, Eastern morality is torn up by the roots do not go so far in their condemnation of the East, because they at least admit the existence of Eastern morality. Once its existence is admitted the problem is brought back within the limits where it really belongs. We have pointed out before that the issue is not one of mere technique, but of the widening of the sphere of morality. Unhappily, a moral sphere can be not only widened, but narrowed, and disturbed, as every educationist can confirm from his own experience. May it not then be assumed that an ill-conceived pedagogical system or a wrong application of

fundamentally right educational doctrines has sometimes led to a narrowing of the moral sphere? This question might conceivably turn the reproach against ourselves and compel us to revise some of our methods or to correct them. We shall examine this problem in greater detail at a later stage, but we may note at present that the example of Japan contains a promise for the moral adaptability of tens of thousands of people to an almost unlimited degree. When examining in greater detail the methods for widening the moral sphere of all human beings we shall see that from one race to another there is only a graduated difference in morality. Admitting that this gradation may put a limit to adaptability, there is nevertheless no argument either from experience or from science to prove that this limit is so low that it could not allow for what is necessary for social life, as we now understand it.

I n i t i a t i v e

It would seem that the real difference between races consists in a variation of energy and initiative. The northern climate is stimulating to an exceptional degree, and gives to the European a larger dose of these qualities. But after a number of years in the tropics, his mental and even his moral interests begin to weaken. Initiative means the power of getting over the point of inertia, of stepping across the walls that surround the present and of appreciating all unrealised possibilities. It is the sense of distance in its most active form. Upon this precious possession largely depends the progress of every person or nation having to rely entirely upon its own strength. It is, however, precisely the gift of initiative that remains outside the reach of the inhabitants of the tropics. But is this true only of them? Is it not perfectly known that ninety-nine per cent of mankind are equally devoid of initiative? We are all conservative, we feel every change as a parting and as a partial death. It is their power to overcome this prejudice which constitutes the real greatness of reformers and inventors.

Once society has been put into motion even the power of inertia has its uses. The motion once acquired cannot easily be arrested, and men prove their strength by accelerating it or by changing its direction. For this, initiative is needed more than anything else: the initiative of great thinkers, reformers, men of science, artists and inventors, and the little initiatives like those of the

housewife. Initiative is the climax of the mind which is itself the highest expression of life. Initiative implies an immense sense of distance, a reverence which encircles everything, and can therefore not be tied to any definite environment, direction or speed. Hence this most precious of all gifts no longer belongs to one special nation but to the whole of mankind, as is proved by the expansive power of all great religious and cultural systems from antiquity to our own day.

In this provisional outline, which at a later stage will be amplified by particulars derived from actual practice, we have already reached valuable conclusions. The power of adaptation of all the races in the world need at no time prove incapable of supporting the system of synthesis, either physically, intellectually, or morally. It even promises a development of energy sufficiently considerable to correspond to the infinitely expanding limits of the social and human sphere.

Race and history

Having surveyed a wide horizon, we shall now enter the narrow path of practice which will lead us back to the past. Our first guide will be Professor Kern ¹⁾ who, though admitting that neither the present nor the past allows us to believe that the Malay Polynesian race will ever be in the van of civilisation, considers that this race has been proved to have the necessary gifts for participating in a higher development. Kern undoubtedly based his views on the fact that the Javanese have been able to appropriate Hindu culture to such a degree that they transformed it into a Hindu-Javanese culture of their own. It may be objected that, whether in the earlier days of the glorious Çrivijaya or in our own time, the cultural powers of the Malays must be placed exclusively to the credit of the Hindus or of the Dutch, who play the active part, whereas the Javanese and the other inhabitants of the archipelago always remained passive agents in the matter. Professor Schrieke quotes an early Dutch shipping journal giving a description of Tuban, from which it appears that the nobility monopolised commerce, so that at that period already it was the class where the Hindu element was racially the strongest that

¹⁾ Kern, lecture on the Malay-Polynesian Race and the influence of Foreign Civilisations, 1883, pp. 29 sqq.

displayed energy and enterprise ¹⁾. Against this, however, we must observe first of all that until quite recently the nobility monopolised education and the possibilities of acquiring a broader outlook to such an extent that there was but small chance for a general development of talent among the lower layers of the population. It must further be observed that the Hindus had to rely for their marriages almost exclusively upon the Javanese population and that the nobility therefore must have been permeated to a very large degree by Javanese blood. Finally we must remember that in the course of Javanese history a number of men and women of the people have proved capable of occupying positions of rank and of responsibility. To believe that the Hindu element had a monopoly of talent would be taking a one-sided view. In this connection the proud princely houses of Majapahit, of Mataram, and of Tumapel, from whom a large number of great Rulers, men of popular descent and unmixed Javanese stock, have sprung, should always be borne in mind.

There is every reason, therefore, to expect that the Indonesian population of the Dutch East Indies will not disappoint those who work for the synthesis of cultures. Nobody will deny that in view of climatic conditions they have needed, in the past, healthy stimuli and outside leadership and that they will still require them in future; but there can be no doubt that, as in the past, these stimuli will in the long run adapt themselves to the social organism to which Dutch leadership will gradually transfer an increasing amount of responsibility. If this nation has one day the opportunity of taking part in world-traffic as an autonomous unit, it will have at its disposal the assistance, the advice and the technical means brought forth by the energies of other climates and other races, should its own outfit continue to show lacunae in certain respects. This is the way in which all races and all climates can profit by each other's qualities and adaptabilities.

Another example from recent history, too important to pass over in silence, is that of Japan. Who could have thought, in 1860, that in the nearest future this nation was going to appear as a new and bright star upon the international firmament? Only those who realised that the history of Japan gave, in the thir-

¹⁾ Schrieke, in *Tijdschr. Ind. T.-, L.- en V.*, LXV, 1925, pp. 114, 115, 130, 185.

teenth century already, the picture of a complete national unit, and that the whole Japanese nation displayed the greatest heroism in defeating Kublai Khan's armada of 4500 ships and his 150,000 terrifying warriors, who in the days of his grandfather had crushed the best armies of Europe. Most history books say that this attack was broken up by a typhoon, but it was really the population itself which saved the national independence. The invasion was already a lost cause before the tempest turned defeat into disaster. This whole nation in arms, men and women, old and young, all struggling for their freedom, praying in their temples for victory against the awe-inspiring, powerful enemy, all this forms an impressive episode in the history of Japan ¹⁾. If one penetrates more deeply into the past of this country, one detects other qualities and sees how its social and economic evolution was achieved by its own strength, starting as early as 1600, and advanced to such a degree in 1870 that the boldest expectations of a few prophetic seers were amply justified. Similar considerations would apply to many another nation: by taking the trouble to check one's views by serious research one will frequently see it in a very different light and realise the latent gifts it possesses.

Racial interpretation of history

The short-sightedness which looks only at a definite period of history and which is the main defect of the exaggerated theories that have been examined in the previous pages is not the defect of the racial interpretation of world history such as it is put forward in the works of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, H. S. Chamberlain, Waddell, and many others. Their interpretation aims at giving a survey of the achievements of every race right from prehistoric times and in every region and climate. It dynamises the static and geographical picture of world history. Two-dimensional figures suddenly acquire depth and a narrow frame widens into a horizon. No longer do the great deeds of artists, thinkers, statesmen, and warriors appear as mere sparks of their personal soul or as rays of light thrown out by tribes, clans, or nations. Whole racial dramas are embodied in personalities. One

¹⁾ Vice Admiral G. A. Ballard, *The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan*, 1921, pp. 27—41.

might perhaps feel tempted to pass in silence all these race problems, which may seem harmful to the idea of synthesis, because of the feeling they are apt to arouse. But if synthesis were no more than a colourful soap bubble made of idealism, bursting at the first contact with hard reality, it would not be worthy of our attention. We shall endeavour to prove on the contrary that the ideal of synthesis can be entertained with conviction by men with an adult outlook and hardened by practice, both in the East and in the West.

Nowadays the old theoretical race divisions are no longer accepted. Instead, the fashion is now to talk of the Europeides, who include the North Africans and the Western Asiatics, and who can be divided into four or even more races: the Nordic, the Alpine, the Mediterranean, and the Dinaric races. Many people consider the Nordic race as the great creator of culture, endowed with far more organising talent and with a sense of personal autonomy, will-power, sense of honour, and initiative. According to them the civilisation of the Hindus in India, of the Persians in Iran, and those of the Greeks and the Romans have been created mainly by tribes and populations of this race, who are also supposed to have played the leading part in shaping all the cultures in the Near East ¹⁾.

It is clear that a history of civilisation which begins with this point of view makes the past stand out in a light very different from that derived from the conceptions of previous historians. In this case the talk is all of races, race-souls, race-characteristics, racial capabilities, the transfer of races, the fusion of races, racial degeneration, etc. Carried too far, it will even endanger the national unity of existing states. It is said sometimes that the Nordic races are fundamentally matter-of-fact, frigidly intellectual and materialistic, devoid of spiritual gifts, that they possess great technical capabilities but that all great religions had to come from the East: *Ex Oriente lux*. The new historical interpretation sees these things from a very different angle. Although religions, geographically, come from the East, it would make Hindu wisdom, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Mithraism, a creation of the Nordic

¹⁾ L. A. Waddell, *The Makers of Civilisation in Race and History*, 1929. H. F. K. Gunther, *Rassenkunde Europa's*, 1926. Lothrop Stoddard, *Racial Realities in Europe*, 1925. G. Kossinna, *Ursprung und Verbreitung der Germanen* (Mannus Bibliothek, no. 6) 1928; J. A. Gobineau, *Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines*, 1853—55.

race which, permeating southwards from countries conquered by Nordics, would have given rise to great cultures and religions. There remains the undeniable fact of the induration and the disappearance of many of the cultures thus created. This is attributed by the aforesaid writers to the influence of an enervating climate and to the mixture with autochthonous populations, far more numerous, which the Nordics met in the course of their settlement. The objection that the Nordics did not first create great cultures and religions in their own home-land and had first to come down into India, Persia, Asia Minor, Greece and southern Italy is met by the reply that originally all energy had to be preserved for the defensive struggle against the inclement nature of the north, leaving no surplus for the creation of culture. In southern countries the milder climate made the struggle for existence much easier, and made the Nordic more independent of his surroundings. The energies he had acquired in the struggle for existence in the North therefore became available for the creation of culture. After some six centuries the Nordic energy began to weaken under the influence of racial mixture and of the mildness of nature. Sooner or later new Nordics came to take the place of their predecessors and were able to carry the work of civilisation to a higher level: but only in order to follow in their turn in the footsteps of the first invaders. Theories such as these simply refuse the non-Nordic populations of Europe any share in the creation of Western civilisation. Chamberlain says "Germanic blood and Germanic blood alone was here the driving force and the building power" ¹⁾.

The racial interpretation of world history has had an intoxicating influence upon many minds. There are people who cannot endure the thought that the many non-Nordics who are their fellow citizens should have a share in the creation of the culture of their own country. They zealously study the biographies and the genealogies of their great men and come to the conclusion that every one of them is a Nordic. They have gone so far that Professor Schneider remarked with good ground that racial faith has become a religion, similar to other religions, not only by the dogmatic forms of its tenets, but also by some of their contents, such as the belief in a golden age, in a good and a bad principle,

¹⁾ H. S. Chamberlain, *Die Grundlagen des XIX Jahrhunderts*, 1919, II, p. 825, and Chapters IV, VI.

in a redemption, etc. ¹⁾. Like some religions it annexes whatever suits its purpose, and ceases to examine the scientific soundness of its own basis. It is impossible nevertheless to ignore such problems and to pass them by as though they did not exist. For racialism spreads further every day and imposes upon colonial policy the duty of formulating its own point of view towards these matters in an unmistakable fashion.

There is no need to belittle the extraordinary merits of the Nordics or to doubt their great gifts and their deep religious and spiritual aspirations. They feel a particular urge towards freedom as distinct from the unsocial individualism which their strong loyalty and faithfulness reject. They are energetic and endowed with initiative. But one is inclined to ask whether other races have not displayed similar characteristics, and others as well, which have suited their environment and which have been equally beneficial to mankind, including the Nordics.

True, long before the Eastern and Western Indo-Germanic populations made their entry into history, Aryan elements seem to have exerted a far greater influence on the great cultures of Sumer, Akkad, Elam, Egypt, the Hittite Empire, and Crete, than was believed to be the case by Assyriologists and Egyptologists a few years ago. But whilst this hypothesis may fittingly explain some striking similarities between these archaic civilisations, it seems on the other hand to credit the local initiative of non-Nordic populations with an imposing array of important differences. The same may apply to the Etrurian and Arabic civilisations and the theory gathers still greater weight when we look at certain cultural centres in the Far East and in pre-Columbian America, like those of the Mayas and of the Chinese along the Hoang-Ho, at the two extremities of the world. These facts may reasonably allow for a historical interpretation of racial values, quite different from racist one-sidedness. In this connection it should be noted that it is precisely to the fusion of Nordics with Mediterranean Pelasgi in Attica and in the Ionian States that Professor Grant and many others attribute the incredibly high proportion of supreme minds among the very small population of Athens. Entirely different were the pure Spartans who treated the Pelasgi as Helots, and the Achaeans as Perioikoi, separated themselves as much as

¹⁾ Hermann Schneider, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 1924, p. 192.

possible from them, and therefore perhaps remained culturally almost sterile. The Pelasgi were Mediterraneans who originally spoke a non-Aryan language and were defeated by the Achaeans about the fourteenth century B. C. The two mixed together and after the Doric invasion of about 1100 B. C., they fused with the newcomers also. This mixture gave birth to the Hellenes, perhaps the most gifted people that ever existed. They produced the Hellenic culture, child of the Homeric Mycenaean culture and of the energy of the North. No better support can be forthcoming for the view that even if the Nordic theory were established beyond a possible doubt, we could still believe in the capacities and the cultural possibilities of other races.

This is why Professor Schneider remarks that the countries where different races have fused into a national and cultural whole have displayed in the course of this process of fusion a genius which results as it were from the loosening of the racial complex which had grown too rigid. He considers that in order to call forth a culture it is necessary that two races should melt which, separated, would be capable of no more than a modest cultural achievement. This would explain why the people of north western Europe, including the inhabitants of the British Isles, displayed until the Roman period only a small modicum of creative cultural power, notwithstanding the fact that they were by no means lacking in capacity. It was not because an unrelenting nature made them keep to the defensive that the Nordics were unable to create a culture, but because they suffered from racial uniformity. The fructifying dualism of allied though different centres of power was therefore not within their reach. Their gifts remained slumbering, their energy lacked a stimulant, their initiative was unable to break through. That they were not incapable of any achievement by themselves is clear enough. Historical investigations have definitely established that in pre-Roman Gaul and Britain, and even in a part of Germany, there existed a relatively high degree of civilisation ¹⁾. When the Romans penetrated Gaul they were able to learn much from the agricultural methods of the conquered, who had towns surrounded by walls,

¹⁾ T. D. Kendrick, *The Druids*, 1927. Rice Holmes, *Ancient Britain and the Invasions of Julius Caesar*, 1907. Kossinna, *Die Deutsche Vorgeschichte*. Ernst Wahle, *Vorgeschichte des Deutschen Volkes*, 1924.



an extensive net of roads with many bridges, large political alliances, etc.; and who, apart from their native writing, also knew the Greek alphabet. It is because the existing culture was already so considerable that Roman and Christian ideas found so little difficulty in spreading. Hermann who destroyed the legions of Varus in the forest of Teutoberg, or the Batavian Claudius Civilis, who led a revolt against Rome, were not mere native chieftains, but educated men who spoke Latin with ease and knew all the secrets of Roman administrative practice. Before the Romans arrived these people had already learned the first pre-requisite of culture, the art of keeping nature at a distance. If they had no further success in the building up of a culture, it was because their initiative did not receive healthy stimuli from the uniformity of their environment. Professor Schneider concludes: "If it be a mistake to assert that the Indo-Germanic peoples, when entirely unmixed in their own homes, had created a high culture or had displayed capacities for high cultural achievements, it can nevertheless not be denied that wherever great cultures were born after 1500 B. C. within the area of Indo-Germanic invasions, they were always preceded by an actual Indo-Germanic immigration". After a series of instances the writer concludes: "Where in historical times a higher culture was born or had new life instilled into it, this event was always preceded by the immigration of another population". To the question whether the new culture must be attributed to the immigrating element, Schneider answers: "The new culture which follows an immigration is neither the exclusive work of the immigrants nor of the autochthonous population.... It is the work of descendants issued from the mixture of both elements.. Racial mixture is the pre-requisite for every creation of culture" ¹⁾.

The author qualifies his conclusion by the admission that there are often admixtures which do not result in higher cultures, because the elements that become mixed are too closely related or differ too much. "It is in agreement with these views that men of genius in all cultures are not those who are racially the purest, but those who belong to the most mixed elements of their nation". He gives Goethe, Beethoven, Rembrandt, and Kant, men who were not in the least Indo-Germanic in their appearance, as instances of his assertion. The existence, side by side, of two such

¹⁾ Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 188, 192, 193.

diametrically opposed views is characteristic of the uncertainty which still prevails upon this subject. We shall not have to be definite and dogmatic in our own conclusion, which will neither be a plea for racial fusion nor an attempt to impose a taboo upon other races from the point of view of matrimony.

World history interpreted according to the idea of synthesis

Once more the synthesis of cultures which implies at the same time the co-operation of nations and of races shows itself to be more modest than many a world-improver might wish it to be. It does not ask from the citizens of colonial nations that they should go and find themselves a mate from other races. It demands neither racial fusion nor racial segregation. History indeed gives us hundreds of instances showing that nations and races can render each other the greatest cultural services merely through the efficacy of an interchange of ideas. A new idea, a wider social horizon, the increase of knowledge and of capacities, these are the forces of synthesis which will prove adequate to change stagnation and isolation into a sense of distance, into mobility, and an interest in progress and the will to achieve it, into public spirit and co-operation on a large scale. Synthesis will fuse all individual societies into one gigantic sphere of power, with dimensions limited only by the capacity and the will of the human beings who are its component parts and where all gifts can develop to their utmost limit. Such is its aim, and not the creation of new races of supermen, and of new marvellous cultures.

It is not feasible at the present stage to winnow the wheat from the chaff in the racial interpretation of world history. Neither is it necessary in order to understand the attitude taken up by colonial policy. At first sight it would seem that the threefold contradiction of race, of morphology based on physical geography, and of climatology, must create a confusion which will absolutely prevent us from adopting a reasonable attitude towards the past and towards the future. Happily, this dilemma is a knot which forms a reliable support for the idea of synthesis: the very fact that there can be a dilemma and that reasonable arguments can be adduced for each of these theories proves that no one can understand the history and the birth of cultures and religions

unless he harmonises them all. The factors of environment, of physical geography, and of climate have displayed their power before us, but without ever convincing us that it was infinite. Race also has appeared important, and has marked out definite limits which cannot be expanded. An impartial objectivity can only exist by dove-tailing these three interpretations.

The idea of synthesis requires all the resources of the earth and all the spiritual gifts of mankind to be utilised for the sake of world progress and of world economy. If the claims of the physical-geographical factor and of the climate had not been honestly recognised, the idea of synthesis would never have been able to point to the possibility of filling the gaps caused by real racial differences. Supposing the whole colonial world to be uninhabited, probably no European race would be able to tap its latent resources. One half of the basis of world economy would soon disappear, while the other half would be deeply affected. Hundreds of works of the mind would also be shaken to their foundation. But there is no need to visualise such despondent possibilities, because its fundamental oneness enables all mankind in its difficulties to co-operate like parts of an organic whole. At the same time its racial differentiation corresponds to such difference in temperament and inclination as may warrant the proper functioning of various races as organic parts of the complicated body we call the world. The capacities of mankind may have been rigidly linked up with unchangeable racial characteristics, but these very characteristics have everywhere in single combat disarmed nature and will eventually defeat it, once the races all assist and support each other. For so great are the potentialities which they all have stored up within themselves, that all the immutable race-characteristics contain an infinity of various possibilities, which will not disappoint us.

There was a time when those same Nordics whose initiative nowadays activates the whole earth, struck Tacitus, a spectator who had reasons for describing them more favourably even than he saw them, as a lazy people. They now in their turn accuse Orientals of being indolent. But they have no more justification than the Roman writer. Mayer ¹⁾, who knows the Javanese most intimately, has said that they are not lazy but that the kindness

¹⁾ L. Th. Mayer, *Een Blik in het Javaansche Volksleven*, 1897, I, p. 72 sqq.

of nature is an almost perpetual temptation to take things easily. In the same way as the indolent Nordics succeeded in expressing their numerous slumbering potentialities by deeds of culture, wherever they came in contact with other races and cultures, the capacities of Orientals will one day appear in the broad daylight. For the mutual influence of races, of religions and of cultures, and their co-operation, is the most powerful of all cultural factors. East and West have much to give to each other; they stimulate each other to reflection and each has lacunae into which the excellent qualities of the other fit to perfection.

Particularism has always kept the flame of culture low. When two or more units were able to join together this was the beginning of culture; but when all men will have joined hands, such progress will be effected that everything performed in the past by separate tribes, populations, races, religions, and cultures will be easily outdistanced. At last men will be able to devote their mental power to real progress; matter will give up its secret and will be compelled to serve the spirit in its ascent to complete humanity. All men need each other. Twentieth century co-operation, and the transfer of functions and of activity which is bound to take place, will soon reveal what are the special gifts that each race can most usefully place at the disposal of the world. The racialists, who always emphasise racial distinctions, will have to tolerate that, on the strength of their own doctrines, the national ideal which is so dear to their heart will recede into the background. Their studies are there to prove that almost all European nations are an amalgamation of two or more races; the Alpine race has been traced to Tibet, the Mediterranean race extends over the whole of North Africa, Asia Minor, Arabia, Persia, and even Hindustan. Yet in different countries, in Europe and America, the distinct races of Europe co-operate so intimately that the patriotic idea has entirely pushed race into the background. The concessions which race has been able to make to nationality will also be possible when they are demanded in the name of internationalism, which will, moreover, make less extensive claims upon each race.

Nor will the future recognise the partisan claims which attribute the whole cultures of India, Iran, Greece, and Rome to one particular race. That a nation should receive stimuli from outside

in the shape of ideas, the importation of goods, etc., is natural, and it is equally natural that it should remain insensitive to influences of which it cannot make use. It will but rarely sacrifice its soul to the form imported from outside. Life is stronger than the form which tries to resist it. The active co-operation of the people which receives the culture is therefore always an indispensable factor. In this sense it is possible for every nation, and not only for the West, to claim the part of a parent in the creation of culture. And we must, on the other hand, not adopt the view of some authors who, in the fertile seed of culture, will see no more than a stimulus, and declare it to be unimportant for that reason. For one stimulus may be worth more than a million hands, one idea more than the strength of a whole nation. Our West, which received not one, but hundreds, of stimuli from at least three cultures, has no right to explain its civilisation as though it were entirely its own creation. In the creation of civilisation we have all been givers and receivers. All races and all cultures have one after the other lit and re-lit their torch one from the other.

The process of expansion: real and exaggerated difficulties

A real danger stands in the way of the final expansion of culture. The whole East, the world of Islam, and great portions of Africa are in ferment; they are engaged in a tremendous effort to link up the myriads of small communities into which they are divided, and are trying to enable them to function together dynamically as one great society, with a horizon that shall be as wide as their spiritual zenith, based upon their century-old religions, is lofty. And if we look at international society and at the upward march of all mankind, we shall see that often the twentieth century imposes upon many nations, religions, or ethical systems a wider social horizon than had been dreamt of in former ages. All the exalted ideas which used to dissolve too often into nebulosity are now becoming incarnate in the midst of human society, where, in the shape of live and pulsating deeds, they will have to fight the many particularisms which resist them tooth and nail.

It was therefore most important that in our fourth chapter we should have dwelt upon the permanent sense of distance and the power of reverence, which meet us in so many cultures and reli-

gions. Let the West be inspired by this reverence and this sense of distance to dispel the clouds of ignorance with the breath of its knowledge and of its science, and to join into a higher unity, by means of its technical resources, all the fragmentary social units, never failing, during the process, to keep in touch with the social horizon and the spiritual zenith which during thousands of years have already been spread out by the soul of the East. In the East on the other hand there should not be this contempt for our logic, our method, our science, our organisation, and our technique; there should be no unscientific repudiation of social and economic reality, since it impedes progress. The outside world is indeed as real as the world of the spirit and both have been predestined in the plan of creation. When the senses fail us, when particularism and selfishness create fantasies, the fault need not be sought in the outside world nor in our senses, but in the fact that matter is holding mind in an unworthy thralldom. Seen in this light, Western science and technique are not fighting only against the resistance of matter; as long as they preserve their sense of reverence, they are also fighting materialism, more effectively even than asceticism and meditation ever could. This struggle will benefit society also. For the soul of the East, which was able to discern, above the multitude of spirits and of gods, one Supreme Being, which embraced all group loyalties and contained the communion of the faithful, will be able to inspire a national society too, and make its contribution even to a world community, provided the means be found to defeat particularism, ignorance, social narrowness, and material impotence.

What, then, is the danger which accompanies this process of expansion? In a period of transition like the present many people who are helping to build up the great society have not been able to eradicate all selfish particularism from their hearts. The political or official power which has become theirs as a result of modern organisation, often stimulates in them the latent group-selfishness which leads to family rule, camarillas, and clique spirit. In such cases Western critics should temper their judgement with charity because it must be remembered that a gigantic inner travail is needed in the East to adapt each person to the coming great society. The member of each group is requested as it were partly to give up his little fatherland: to raise his mind to the

social or patriotic idea means for him as big a victory over the group mind as in the West the acceptance of the international idea means a victory over narrow national selfishness. One should beware therefore of books which contain a wholesale condemnation of whole nations. One will meet works by authors who have consecrated years of study to an Eastern population, who know a great deal and yet have understood nothing. They make public the defects of this population and condemn its morality from what one might call a modern budgetary point of view. Having become acquainted with numerous defects and nothing else, the uninitiated reader will conclude that the whole population is thoroughly immoral and that nothing can be expected from it for the future. But what these authors have neglected to express in the very first place is that among such populations a morality, perhaps even a very severe morality, exists and is really observed, and can give expression to the highest spirit of sacrifice and the noblest virtues, but almost always in the circle of the ancient social unit. This brings us back to our old criterion which does not spurn such a morality but welcomes it as a germ of great promise, and liberates us from prejudice towards all races, climates and cultures. Once this view has been adopted, it becomes easy to pass beyond the narrow frontiers of cultural superiority or racial selfishness, and one will gladly facilitate the endeavour to reach synthesis by assisting in the development of that social germ which is nowhere absent. In order to show what would be the only alternative to the idea of synthesis we shall now place the West at the cross-roads, like a hero of antiquity, and make it choose between the wide downward road of materialism and the narrow, difficult path that leads upward to where the silent, earnest spirit of the West is beckoning.

Synthesis and group morality: the alternative

It is the broad and easy way to which Dr. Josey points in his book "Race and National Solidarity"¹). As man is the first among the creatures and allowed therefore to feed upon the animals of the field, thus, according to this book, is Western man the first among races, his culture the first among cultures.

¹) C. C. Josey, *Race and National Solidarity*, 1923, esp. p. 207.

"If we find that labour can no longer be exploited within our group on account of its growing power and our growing sympathies, there are other means available. The richness of our culture has rested for a long time on the backs of members of our own group. By imposing burdens on some and relieving others of them, we have built up a magnificent culture. Is it necessary that we exploit our own labouring classes? Can we not shift many of the burdens they have carried to the backs of others and still maintain the richness and colourfulness of our culture? Will our conscience allow us to do so? Have we the power? The preponderant might of the European group of nations considered economically, militarily and politically, need not be referred to again. It is sufficient to impose our will on the world. When we raise the question regarding our ability to transfer the burden of our civilisation from the backs of labour groups within our culture to the backs of labour groups without, we are concerned with the possibility of increasing the productivity of the non-European group sufficiently to meet our needs and yet maintain our preponderant power" . . .

"Why", this author asks, "should we hesitate to safeguard ourselves in this way? There is no reason why a strong cultural group should allow itself to be menaced by the rise of new industrial centres founded largely on its capital and knowledge. . . . Instead of teaching willingly all the world what we know about the arts of production, we must take care to safeguard our knowledge. It may even be necessary to extend our patent and copyright laws, so that the discoveries made in our own group shall be the exclusive possession of our groups. Any infringement of these laws should be punished by heavy penalties. In this way we should be able to make secure our control over the industrial life of the world. This control could be made all the more secure and our profits could be greatly increased by exercising a monopolistic control over certain key industries. We might well maintain a monopoly of the manufacture of essential machines and tools. By so doing the industrial life of the outside group would be made dependent on us and at the same time our revenue could be greatly increased. . . . We have the position of advantage. It is only necessary that we make use of it."

Compared with such a doctrine, the real spirit of the West stands out in proud relief. It has invited the East without stinting to the banquets of its science and its technique. It has hidden nothing and allowed everyone to share, even those inventions which cost the lives of some of its greatest sons. Tens of thousands of Eastern students are admitted to Western Universities, hundreds of Western educational establishments have been built in the East. No Western government has ever thought of convening

a conference to discuss the means for preventing the spread of Western knowledge or the export of machinery to the East. Yet would not such a spirit of monopoly be the first desideratum of a selfish and materialistic imperialism? It is indeed time that we should protest against the propaganda which brands opinions like that we have just quoted as typically Western, and declares that the individuals who profess them are typical Western men. Every Oriental who enters the temples of Western science and studies the mysteries of chemistry and of mechanics by the side of his Western fellow-students is a living proof of the mendacity of these assertions.

Dr. Josey himself does see the difficulty that prevents the acceptance of his ruthless policy. The spirit of the West rises up before his eyes with an earnest warning; he tries to ward it off saying: "We must free our minds of many of our ethical and moral prejudices. In order to do so we must view our situation frankly in terms of the maximum good of our group and of the world. If this is done we shall have less hesitation. . . . Shall we, as a result of moral cowardice, throw away the opportunity to exercise a rational control over the future of the world? To do so will be highly immoral. It is our duty to be intelligent"

To interpret Western culture as being synonymous with the exploitation of labour is misrepresentation. Those who exploit labour are renegades of Western culture and it has been the main cultural task of humanity, prompted by the need for spiritual and moral progress, to put an end to such exploitation. These theories again consider races and cultures as almost hermetically closed units, although we know that there is not a single culture that has been created exclusively by its present representatives or by their racial ancestors.

It is not yet too late for the West to follow Dr. Josey's advice. The West still has the initial advantage and could use it to bar the way to those who form the rearguard of progress. It can remove education from its colonial budgets, it can prevent its machinery from going to the East, preserve its inventions for its own use, refuse credit to Eastern commercial and banking institutions. It can break by force any resistance which such a policy might provoke. Let no one protest that this policy is materially impossible. If public conscience were to allow it, it could be adopt-

ed more easily than the international co-operation which has been achieved by the League of Nations. But it is impossible for another reason. In a previous chapter, anticipating the moment when we would find the West at the cross-roads making its final choice between spirit and matter, we examined the criterion of its humanity and saw that this consists in the sense of reverence, which is the source of all Western and Eastern capacity, whether spiritual, moral, intellectual, or material. Even technique appeared to us as a fruit, an expression of real humanity, while we saw that organisation without morality was unfit to live. Without spiritual elevation there can be no technique, no great organisation, no inventions that embrace the world, no inventors, research workers, and others who labour heroically for the good of mankind. It should indeed not be imagined that the artist, the painter, the scientist, the inventor, the organiser, the statesman, the captain of industry work only for pecuniary gain. Of great artists, scientists, and inventors, it is admitted that often enough they died in poverty or in strained circumstances, but the same devotion also exists among the great organisers, the builders of powerful enterprise, of shipping, trade, agriculture, and mining. They too would not have achieved more than a small fraction of their actual performance if they had not put the whole of their soul into the achievement, and that mainly for the sake of the achievement. If the day ever came when the great leaders of the West consented to work only for their own profit, there would be an end to the greatness of the West.

We say without hesitation that if ever the West as a whole adopted the grossly materialistic outlook which would restrict its horizon to the white race alone and abolish its zenith, its genius would depart from it and carry away true science, true art, true organisation, true technique, true heroism, and the true sense of distance. There would be an end to Western greatness, to its vast organisations and gigantic inventions. For those who could thus sin against their own humanity would cease to be men, even within their narrower horizon. Having started once on the downward path they would find their perspective narrowing and their environment shrinking: the light that guides them would grow pale and subdued, while indifference, listlessness, selfishness, irresponsibility, corruption, and fraud on a grand scale would soon

make their appearance and complete the collapse. If the West follows the voice of the evil counsellor, it will cut off the roots of its humanity and thereby destroy its creative power for the future.

The mysterious power of the West

Many Occidentals have visited the East, many Orientals the West; on either side much has been written about the remarkable impressions gathered during their journey. Many Occidentals came into contact with the mysterious world of the Eastern popular soul, with the magical mysticism which filled them with wonder and about which they have told us tales, conjuring up a twilight of spirits and of shades through which thousands of hostile tendrils stretch out towards the terrified human being. But too seldom have they depicted the other and more real aspects of this mysterious power, when it creates habits and customs, institutions, co-operative organisations based upon customary law, morality, virtue, piety, duty, social sense, and loyalty.

Orientals who came to the West have also perceived a mysterious power which seemed to create and to animate everything. Many of them were filled with awe by the machine-demon, the demon of technique, of industrialism, of organisation, by the spectre of speed and unrest, as they called it. To their fellow countrymen they portrayed the miserable Occidental, chained behind the chariot of the machine demon, which dragged him on, extracted his soul from him, and ended by transforming him into a rigid automaton. Rarely have these travellers depicted the spirit of the West in its real aspect. It is time that an Oriental wrote a book about the mysterious power of the West. It is time that he began to discern those nurseries of morality, the household and the family of the West, from which its civic sense, its *esprit de corps*, its friendship, its loyalty, its patriotism, and even its cosmopolitanism have in turn drawn their existence. If in the West tens of thousands of trains with their millions of passengers daily move about with such security that a rare accident creates the deepest commotion, this is due to the mysterious power of the West. The safe and imperceptible journey of a letter through the postal system, the flow of all those drops of capital energy from the little investor to the millionaire, forming together the powerful concentration of the limited liability company, and the financing of its

operations by credit, is managed by the silent power of the West. It is this silent power which guarantees that unknown shareholders, unknown letter writers, or unknown travellers are dealt with faithfully. Its origin is not in the exchanges and in the factories, but in the monogamous household, in the care taken by the housewife and mother, in the examples set by the heads of families, in the word of the teacher and in the writings of the best among us. "Organisation, technique, control", some will say. How superficial! Who will control the controlling agent? Who will prevent him from coming to an understanding with those he controls so as to make life easier for both sides? Again it is this mysterious power. For it is vain to rest all our trust upon control and upon the police. Carlyle's phrase "Europe is anarchy plus a constable" is simply untrue. This mysterious power makes the citizens act as they do, and not fear of the policeman, who is the servant and the agent of the collective will. If this mysterious power were to disappear the policeman would be no more able to hold back anarchy than a human being could prevent an avalanche in the Swiss mountains.

The right choice

Let us, against any one-sided attempt at favouring a particular culture and those who share it, quote these words of Marvin: "The gifts of humanity, all humanity must enjoy and thrive on them, or it will be impoverished and decay, including the vanguard which has, at the moment, the largest share" ¹⁾. These words indeed speak for the real Western culture while those of Josey are the expression of group-morality, which colonial policy rejects because it is unoccidental, in the same way as it has rejected the idea of fatality, and for the same reason. There is enough fatalism and group morality in the East already and enough class spirit, jingoism, and racialism in the West. It is not without reason that, in the East, those who have learned to see the nation itself as the basis of unity complain about the narrow minded group interests which hamper co-operation on a large scale and manifest themselves by the pettyness which anxiously keeps medical, pharmaceutical, and trade secrets inside the family. Every one has therefore to rely exclusively upon his own devices and upon chance

¹⁾ Marvin, *Western Races and the World*, p. 15.

discoveries. In this way progress is made infinitely more difficult than it need be.

The danger of racial one-sidedness has been made sufficiently clear. We can therefore accept with all the more conviction the idea of synthesis, because it recognises the differentiation of racial souls, the variety of cultures, the special possibilities of adaptation, as real, and even as desirable, facts, and because at the same time it stands with dogged determination for the fundamental unity of mankind. The fact that Dr. Josey repeatedly expresses his fear that his policy will be rejected on moral grounds may be considered as a sufficient answer to another kind of agitation, which comes from an entirely different corner of the world, and which likes to caricature Western society as one that rests upon technique and cannon.

C o n c l u s i o n

In the same way as sport enables the best, the ἀριστοί, to come forward by democratic selection, and thus encourages everybody to make ever more strenuous endeavours, colonial policy, by the social differentiation which will enable talents, characters, and capacities to find honourable and remunerative employment, will call forth slumbering capacities and send them upon a restless quest for devotion, progress, and perfection. The struggle which goes on in the colonial world between the spirit of the West on the one hand and matter and materialism on the other is like an immense Olympic game where the West asks from each colonial nation the same interest, the same fair-play, the same real democracy and equality, the same patriotism which deems the fatherland too good to suffer moral defeat, and the same internationalism which is able to honour every talent, which rejoices in the greatest variety of gifts; which is able to honour the qualities of the champions of other races and nations. It asks that the best thoughts, methods, and deeds of all mankind should be a stimulus towards ever greater devotion and endeavour.

The kinship of mankind has now, we may trust, become our square-foot of ground which we shall never allow to be wrenched from us. With the idea of synthesis before us, we can drive back nature when it makes an onslaught through the influence of physical geography and climate. Let the capacities of all

men become infinitely differentiated. But above this differentiation must be placed the communion of minds which will give to one-sided specialisation its precise location in the general plan. Thus will everything become united in one great harmony in which the parts dominate the whole, and the whole the parts. Only the idea of synthesis can join all forces together; nowhere is it petty minded; it will not press upon the East the perpetuation of differences when the East wishes to adopt forms that are universally current; on the other hand it will not impose its own mould when no more is needed than co-operation between the various parts of a complicated body.

We can now see before our eyes the essence of the idea of synthesis. In front of the bridgehead to the East a wide field of fruitful activity has been indicated to the spirit of the West. Only the future will be able to discover which limits climate, physical geography and race may eventually put to its activities. But we know that the legions of synthesis can safely cross the bridge and unfold themselves over the territory which is awaiting their arrival.

CHAPTER VI

EMPIRE BUILDING IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

Fecisti patriam diversis gentibus unam,
profuit invitis te dominante capi:
dumque offers victis proprii consortia iuris
Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat.

RUTILIUS.

Synthesis within walls

In these lines the Gaul Rutilius once sang the blessings of Roman domination, when after much friction between the conquerors and the defeated the synthesis of classical antiquity at last spread its wings over innumerable populations and revealed to them the kinship of all who dwelt within the Roman *Limes*. All those inside the Roman wall were brethren; the barbarians outside remained dangerous and traditional enemies. Far away from this world empire, on the other side of the earth, another powerful empire had risen from the ruins of a feudal system, a centralised state which also had a wall to keep out the barbarians threatening it from the north ¹⁾. The idea behind the systems which erected the Roman and the Chinese walls is the same. There is the same policy of synthesis which made numberless populations and tribes grow into one unity inside the wall, revealed to them the blessings and the necessity of peace and of co-operation, and joined them all in a feeling of inter-dependence. Although not all the empires of antiquity cut themselves off from the outside world by means of walls, they were in reality all animated by the same feelings of exclusiveness. It could not have been otherwise, for space still imposed its limits upon the spirit of men and remained entrenched in antithesis and particularism.

In the present chapter we shall look beyond these material and

¹⁾ Wu Hung-Chu, *China's Attitude towards foreign Nations*, in the "Chinese Social and Political Science Review", Jan. 1926.

spiritual walls and investigate how the synthesis of antiquity found it possible to reveal to the most diverse populations, religions and manners inside the wall that, notwithstanding all their internal differences, they had in common a resemblance which mattered more than all other things. More than this we cannot learn from the synthesis of antiquity, but for our purpose it is enough. Once we have acquired a knowledge of its methods we shall find that whatever was possible inside the wall could also have happened outside it, if the possibilities which are at the disposal of synthesis in our own day had also been available then. Fourteen centuries have been necessary in order to lift the synthesis from the highest level within the reach of its predecessor in ancient history to the new summits whence it can look upon mankind as a whole. Looked down upon from these heights, the old walls seem no more than useless obstacles which could have been demolished immediately. For as soon as the millions see a wider horizon they will break through the walls of particularism. As liberalism at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century enthusiastically overthrew the weather-beaten walls of medieval towns, so will our time show itself intolerant of moral walls which have long ago fulfilled their synthetic function and now only serve to maintain divisions. For international thought demands from mankind that it shall step across all these walls. Mankind must itself become the liberating idea in the mind of all races, all nations, and all religions, as the nation had become, at the end of the previous phase of evolution, for the dying provincialisms and for the loyalties of the town populations which were spreading beyond their own walls.

Is it advisable to demolish the walls and to do away with all particularism? This question cannot be passed over in silence as though it had no bearing on our problem. History and every-day experience prove that particularism and selfishness are inherent in human nature. We shall not deny this, nor need the supporters of the doctrine of synthesis hesitate to admit that human beings individually and collectively have a sense of distinction, a consciousness of difference from other human beings. The sense of distinction need not, however, necessarily give rise to an incoherent medley of unsocial individuals nor to the exclusive antagonisms of clans, castes, nations, and races. The equally universal

sense of harmony which everywhere induces the human mind to adapt itself to the standards and needs of its environment, provides the impulse which, within the national sphere, leads to the formation of fine and strong personalities, and, inside the international frame, to the development of social, national, or racial units, which may differ among themselves, but which are nevertheless the soundest elements conceivable for the healthy existence of the universal body. The sense of distance, according as it succeeds in inducing the human mind to look beyond the immediate limits of the family or even of the country, and widens the horizon to an almost infinite extent, can establish harmony between all these personalities and units without causing them to lose their natural and inborn distinction.

Synthesis and particularism

The smaller the horizon, the more restricted the sense of space, the more numerous and the sharper will be the contrasts. The egoist sees nothing but contrast and the nationalist or the racialist sees only contrast in international or racial relations. In the East the group-mind presents even greater difficulties. It tends to consider every outsider with derision, with contempt, and even with hostility, and usually feels no sympathy towards him nor desires to work with him. But as long as such exclusiveness lasts, there can be no question of material progress nor of the achievement of complete humanity. No sooner is the horizon widened than the contrast immediately begins to dwindle, if it does not disappear altogether. If the horizon is expanded still further it will embrace the whole nation and finally even the whole world-community. Synthesis will defeat particularism with its fear of space as surely as technique is defeating all the obstacles that have divided space into fragments. Difference produces antagonism in fact although there is no reason why it should. The task will now be to destroy these entirely unnecessary antagonisms.

It is a remarkable thing that the cultural arrogance and pride which are so often considered as exclusively Western shortcomings really affect all mankind. There is no African nor Australian tribe that does not possess this same pride or that is entirely free from the self-satisfaction which needs only a very slight incentive

to degenerate into contempt, mockery, and hatred. Ethnologists tell us that Australian aborigines have real racial pride and feel the greatest contempt for everything foreign. Every Chinese or Siamese considers himself vastly the superior of any foreigner. The quips addressed to Occidentals on the popular stage of Java reveal the same pride ¹⁾. It is a strange thought that the antagonisms which split mankind into groups hostile to each other are the result not of racial distinction but of that most universal human characteristic: individual and collective arrogance.

It seems natural that this particularistic antagonism, which appears so universally human, must also have existed in antiquity and that the problems which arise in the colonial policy of our day must have had their prototypes in the course of world history. Many of the difficulties of our own time were not unknown to the leaders of ancient empires: they were a test of the statesmanship of Pharaohs and Caesars, and Alexander the Great discussed them with his master Aristotle after he had become the ruler of a great Asiatic empire. Let us therefore direct our attention to the veterans of antiquity, in order to form for ourselves a conception of the way in which they were able to cope with difficulties that exist in our own day as well as in theirs. Let us remember that Gladstone, when seeking for the right basis upon which to support the powerful British Empire, the greatest empire that has yet been built by human loyalty to one single conception, looked at the Roman relation between municipia and the metropolis and later to the free relation between Greek cities and their colonies ²⁾.

The Greek commonwealth

In this review of the colonial problem of the ancient world, we shall successively examine the commonwealth of the Hellenes, the Chinese, Arabic, Egyptian and Roman Empires, and ancient India. We shall start with the Greeks, whose progress went beyond that of other nations of antiquity, and in this study we shall take for guide the article on Greeks and barbarians by Edwyn Bevan in Marvin's "Western Races and The World." Like all other

¹⁾ Beck, *op. cit.*, passim, esp. p. 67—69; Van Eerde, *op. cit.* p. 149; Graham, *Siam*, I, p. 148.

²⁾ P. Knaplund, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy*, 1927, passim, esp. p. 13.

peoples with a culture of their own, the Greeks tended to regard their own ways of thought and conduct as alone compatible with logic and reason, while they lumped all the rest of mankind together under derogatory terms. Like the ancient Hindus who called men of other races "Mlecchas", the Hellenic tribes along the Eastern Mediterranean coast classed together all the rest of mankind under the term *barbaroi* or stammerers, which implied not only the idea of difference but also that of inferiority. Plato protested that such a comprehensive term disregarded the great differences which existed between these foreign populations. But the Greeks would only see the *barbaroi* as undifferentiated among themselves, and endowed with unflattering qualities forming the opposite of the virtues which characterised all the Greeks. To Aeschylus, Aristotle, and Euripides, the difference was moral: it consisted in the fact that the *barbaroi* had the nature of slaves, while Greeks had the nature of free men. Aristotle gave a scientific explanation for this difference. He advanced what was probably the first climatological interpretation of history. It was owing to the enervating climate of Asia that its inhabitants were not fitted by nature for leadership. This of course could not be said about the barbarians in the chilly north, but these had only small intellectual capacities, which differentiated them in their turn from the Greeks with their intellectual curiosity.

The Greeks, however, did not all think alike, and some of them did not hold this belief of absolute superiority over all outsiders. Thucydides, who had Thracian blood in his veins, held that the Greeks of a few generations before his own had little to distinguish them from the barbarians. Xenophon, after returning home from among the Persians, was never entirely able to forget the attractive figure of Cyrus and the pleasant family life of the leading Persians. He did not feel in the least inclined to agree with his compatriots about their superiority over the Persians. As regards the Egyptians, their religion, their mysteries, and their priestcraft may have filled the Greeks with awe, but in the practice of everyday life the Greeks considered themselves as on a higher plane. There is after all, as Bevan explains, no difficulty in despising people in the common relations of life, while feeling at the same time that they have some uncanny power or knowledge.

What was the practical outcome of this sense of superiority of

the Greeks? According to Euripides his fellow countrymen possessed "a natural prerogative to rule over barbarians." About 350 B.C. there were more Greeks under Persian dominion than there were barbarians subjected to Greeks. This situation appeared monstrous to the Greeks and Isocrates appealed to Philip of Macedon to lead his compatriots in a campaign for the conquest of Asia and the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks. But he considered that such an expedition would also profit the Asiatic barbarians; for they would be able to exchange the despotic system by which they were governed for the Greek *epimeleia*, the system whereby the ruler "uses rational thought to promote the welfare of the ruled". We recognise here ideas which at the beginning of the nineteenth century were only cautiously uttered by the few in Western imperialistic circles. Only after the French Revolution were they given some hesitant application and it is only since 1850 that they have been promoted to leading colonial principles. Alexander's conquests realised at last the dreams of the Greeks. Aristotle thereupon did not hesitate to advise his pupil to adopt a markedly different attitude towards Greeks and towards Asiatics: Alexander was to show himself a leader to the Greeks, but a despotic master to the Asiatics.

Racialists in antiquity: assimilation

Aristotle's advice was not followed by his pupil. Alexander, when he had become better acquainted with his Persian, Macedonian, and Greek subjects, decided to adopt an entirely different policy. He became the advocate of a plan which might serve even in our day to remove the risk of racial or national wars. Alexander wanted every Greek and Macedonian to marry a Persian, and this was expected to result in a racial fusion making for peace within Alexander's dominions. But he died prematurely, when his scheme had hardly been put into practice beyond the circle of Macedonian commanders and Persian princesses. Not only did political practice reject the racialism of Aristotle, but leading thinkers equally condemned it. The great Alexandrine geographer Eratosthenes (born 276 B.C.) said that men should not be divided according to race, but according to moral character. He considered that whereas there were many undesirable Greeks, many barbarians, such as the Indians and the Persians, were completely

civilised. Plutarch also considered that the distinction of Hellene and barbarian should be based not upon race, but upon virtue and vice. Plutarch still placed the Greeks of his time higher than the barbarians, but one can see that he believed in a fundamental kinship which made cultural fusion a future possibility.

Alexander himself, although aiming at fusion from the racial point of view, does not appear, from the point of view of culture, to have wished for anything beyond assimilation. He wanted Greek culture to become predominant; all over his empire he founded cities of the Greek type from which Hellenism was to radiate. In a tract which, according to Bevan, was written many centuries after Alexander, it is said "He trained the Hyrcanians in the laws of marriage and taught agriculture to the Arachosians. He induced the people of Sogdiana to maintain their fathers and not to kill them, and the Persians to reverence their mothers and not to marry them. An admirable type of philosophy! Thanks to this, the Indians worship Hellenic gods, the Scythians bury their dead and do not eat them. Whilst Alexander was civilising Asia, Homer was his reading; the sons of Persis and Susiana and Gedrosia chanted the tragedies of Euripides and Sophocles". This tract, attributed to Plutarch, shows how the Greek world after Alexander conceived of Hellenism as a culture in which all the world could share. Cultural assimilation was in full swing. The Greeks, convinced of their own cultural superiority, did not think of studying the languages, literature, and art of other nations. All the best people in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt became Greeks in the course of the centuries following Alexander's conquests, but they were Greeks into whose mind had filtered the spiritual and religious patrimony of the East. Bevan quotes Tatian, an Assyrian who wrote about 150 A.D. and whose words show that for the very reason of these gifts it had given, the East felt a real sense of superiority over Greece:

"Do not take up so hostile an attitude towards the Barbarians, Hellenes, nor regard their ideas so jealously. What practice or craft amongst you was not first contrived by Barbarians? The Telmessians discovered the art of divination by dreams, the Carians prediction by means of the stars, . . . the Babylonians astronomy, the Persians magian lore, the Egyptians geometry, the Phoenicians letters".

And he ends with the challenge which so often mars exchanges of views between the East and the West in our own days:

"This is what I had to say to you, Hellenes, I, Tatian, the adherent of a philosophy according to the barbarians, born in the land of the Assyrians, educated first in your culture."

The Greek veterans have given us sufficient matter for reflection. They have taught us that a leadership which abandons racial pride can establish great things. But as long as it is unable to replace it by nothing better than by a feeling of cultural superiority, it can only result in rigid assimilation and pseudo-morphosis. It will cause a mental resistance, unspoken at first, till at last it utters itself as in the challenging *Oratio ad Graecos* of Tatian. For our time and for our aim such a policy is inadequate.

"In this combination of cultural exclusiveness and racial tolerance", remarks Bevan, "the Greeks seem to have resembled the French of to-day. The French, we are told, regard French culture as the valid culture for everybody, and when they have Oriental subjects like to turn them as much as possible into Frenchmen. But the colour feeling, we are told, is not found in any noticeable degree among the French, and when an Oriental takes on French culture he is accepted as a Frenchman on an equal social footing. If this account of the French attitude is true, it makes them like the Greeks of the Hellenistic age, and it seems almost the opposite of the British attitude.

"The British have larger cultural tolerance, in the sense that they do not try to make the Oriental peoples under British government give up their national modes of life and become Englishmen; on the other hand they have less racial tolerance, since they hardly ever accept a man of Oriental race as one of themselves, however much he may assimilate himself to the English pattern. There seems, indeed, recently to have been some change in the British attitude in this respect, but we may still say that the colour bar exists much more amongst the British than amongst the French. And if the French resemble the ancient Greeks, the British seem to resemble the Romans. In Juvenal, who represents the feeling of the old Roman aristocracy at the end of the first century A. D., you find pronounced racial intolerance. He is full of complaints of the influx of Greeks and Hellenised Orientals into Rome. 'The Orontes', says his well known line, 'has flown into the Tiber'."

We may observe, however, that Juvenal was more than a century behind his time. He proves, by his complaint, that fusion on

a large scale had become general even in the circles of the new Roman aristocracy. In the whole world the relations between the dominating and the subject populations were accompanied by a parallel evolution of racial pride, which had to pass through stages of closer acquaintanceship, greater understanding and sympathy. As regards the comparison of the French with the Greeks and the British with the Romans, it does not apply exclusively to their attitude outside Europe. The French have for many centuries made steady and large contributions to the culture of other European nations; their cultural generosity in the colonial world proceeds from a natural impulse. On the other hand it would be utterly wrong to interpret the British preference for splendid isolation as a tendency resulting from national or racial exclusivism directed against other nations or races. This preference for splendid isolation should rather be understood as a natural reserve, fully explicable by the trend of history, and characterised by its neutral colour. It is true that racial pride is not lacking in Western peoples, but the tendency to keep apart and to treat outsiders with haughtiness is quickly disappearing in the West, whilst in the East its vigour is still surprisingly strong. The clan spirit, the tendency for people in definite circles to cling together like grapes in a bunch and to treat all "the others" with definite exclusiveness is as pronounced as the exclusiveness of some London and New York clubs.

There is no group, no nation and no race that has remained free from this universal human characteristic, and this is precisely the reason why such heroic courage is required on the part of the great reformers of India, such as the leaders of the Arya Samaj, when they disregard caste distinctions in their own circle and fight against the severe division which distinguishes one from another hundreds of millions of Indians, and proclaims fifty million of them untouchable and impure ¹⁾. The West at no time has known, nor would it have tolerated, any such division that was based neither on race nor on natural differences. As far as Holland is concerned, like most small nations, it is temperamentally averse to chauvinism and racialism. This is of primary importance for the fulfilment of its colonial mission, because it naturally leads to

¹⁾ The estimate is based on the census of 1921. Cf. also Woolcott, *India on Trial*, 1929, p. 133, and Lajpat Rai, *Unhappy India*, 1928, pp. 96—98.

cultural tolerance. Holland gratefully accepts anything it requires from the French, the British, the Germans, the Scandinavians, and from everybody else, in the East or in the West. Although the Dutch assimilate whatever they appreciate they have never yet displayed any lack of creative talent nor of enterprise. Dutchmen easily see the good side of other nations and are able to praise and enjoy it. This makes it easier for them to appreciate and even to protect and encourage the cultural patrimony, the habits and customs, the languages and institutions of the autochthonous population of their colonies.

In their large colonial possessions, the British and the French have been moving in a similar direction. It is no exaggeration to say that the West has gone far beyond the East in defeating its own exclusiveness and in acquiring a truly democratic spirit. There is not one colonial territory occupied by different races or religions where, if one of the sections of the community were invited to take over the task of Western leadership, it would prove able to display towards the "others" the broadmindedness which the European authorities have shown for many years. It is the task of leadership to develop the sense of oneness, the capacity to co-operate which will one day join together these numerous exclusive units. In this respect the spirit of the West has already wrought miracles: even the exclusive caste system of India is beginning to become more pliable as a result of Western influence.

This is why the West has to set the example in everything that will help to deliver mankind from artificial distinctions. It must wipe out frontiers which have already become artificial, and only pay attention to those which, from natural causes, have a true claim to respect. It is the great mission of the West to prepare for social, economic, and political co-operation on a large scale. Western leadership cannot abstain from active intervention which will have to rid group loyalty of its negative exclusiveness and replace it by co-operation between groups.

C h i n a

The cultural centre by the Hoang-Ho, a civilised island surrounded by barbarians, as Maspero has called it, stood in a very different relationship towards its environment from ancient Greece. In the first case, the cultured nucleus was on a far higher

level of civilisation than its environment. It is not surprising therefore that in this nucleus a very strong cultural consciousness began to develop regarding the uncivilised environment. This consciousness may even be considered as a vital necessity, as an indispensable condition for the survival of the nascent and growing culture, and especially as an inducement for it to fill the vacuum around it, a task for which it seemed to be appointed. Without the conviction born from such a feeling the small cultural nucleus would have been swept away by the flood of surrounding barbarians.

Thanks to this consciousness the small centre was able to keep its gates closed to dissolving influences. It did not allow the demolition of protecting walls until its culture had radiated so strongly that the admission of foreigners into the heart of the growing nation could present no threat to its sense of cohesion. As in other world empires, national plantations or colonies of veterans were established in the midst of a barbaric environment. At the same time, entirely unredeemed tribes of barbarians were transported among populations that had already been penetrated with the spirit of culture. Thus the activating process of civilisation was stimulated at both ends. In his study dealing with China's attitude towards foreign nations Wu Hung-Chu traces the use of the Chinese equivalents of the term "barbarians" to the Emperor Shun (2255 B.C.) and concludes: "Obviously racialism—the belief in the inherent superiority of one race over another—was the fundamental basis of the attitude of Ancient China towards the outside world" ¹). When the subjected barbarians showed themselves willing, they were allowed, without hesitation, to partake in the blessings of Chinese culture. But any tendency to disobedience, to denial of the cultural leadership, was looked upon from a very different standpoint from that adopted by a Western power towards a local uprising: it was felt not only as a questioning of authority, but also as a sign of disrespect, and even as a religious offence.

It was in the religious conviction of the nation that knew itself to be chosen by Heaven that there resided the irresistible force which enabled a minority to cope with a chaotic barbaric majority unprovided with a similar inspiration. In many respects there was no

¹) In the "Chinese Social and Political Science Review", 1926, I.

need for such a culture to eliminate that which it wanted to replace. It was only necessary to fill, almost without friction, the numerous gaps which existed inside the surrounding barbaric world. In this manner a wide circle of Chinese cultural radiation spread from the initial kernel, before actual annexation by arms took place. Nowhere did this culture meet with its equal. It merely came and was victorious. The human sense of distinction had therefore little chance to adopt the sharper form of racial hatred and cultural oppression which, elsewhere, sometimes subsisted for centuries when the dominating population found that its pre-eminence and its culture were being challenged by other nations and cultures that were not so definitely inferior.

Moreover, from the racial point of view, the Chinese cultural nucleus was as favourably circumstanced as for instance Rome towards the western part of its empire, or Greece towards the populations of the north, and the racially kindred Persian nobility. The nucleus and the original barbaric environment were racially identical. The Chinese sense of distinction therefore only preserved its haughtiness towards what really was the foreign world, and adopted a racial attitude only towards foreigners, while all those within the wall were deemed to be brothers. The sole exception was that of some mountain tribes which refused to be assimilated and were therefore also considered to be barbarians. But apart from these few tribes in isolated and inaccessible regions all the autochthonous populations were civilised and assimilated successively, with the result that in domestic affairs there was no permanent antagonism such as develops in empires which contain striking racial and cultural contrasts. Confucius himself expresses the opinion that the real criterion of distinction is a cultural one. "It is advisable to treat in a barbarous way those feudal lords who perform barbarous rites and ceremonies, and to treat in a Chinese way those barbarians who have become Chinese" ¹⁾. In other words, even when there was no question of a definite rebellion or of disobedience, this was the criterion for distinguishing friend from foe. It is to Confucius also that the saying is attributed which really embodies China's conception of cultural behaviour towards its uncivilised environment: "Honour the ruler and subdue the barbarian". Mencius, the St. Paul of Confucianism,

¹⁾ Ibid., p. 18.

was even more drastic in his methods: he wanted all Barbarians to be changed into Chinese.

These two opinions taken together form the basis of the whole cultural mission of China. It is to this basis indeed that China owed its extraordinary success. It meant that, while no defection could be tolerated within the wall, the greatest benevolence had to be displayed towards outsiders who asked for admission. No foreign conqueror proved able at any time to measure himself successfully against the vigour which resulted from the application of cultural conviction. Each in turn became assimilated, but, once assimilated, the former stranger found no further obstacles nor discriminations in his way. Barbarians were made officials, either civil or military, and feudal princes: the fullest citizenship was open to anybody who had been received into the bosom of cultural solidarity. It is only when China met the West that it came into contact with a cultural conviction as vigorous as its own and one, moreover, which possessed greater force of penetration and expansion. Chinese culture had expanded gradually in concentric circles until it covered a gigantic territory; but in this process it had never been subjected to the strain and tension that were necessary in the West for the formation of states and for defence against Islam. There is no need to deplore the meeting of these two giants, even though it has occasionally resulted in friction and even in clash. The meeting of two such vigorous convictions is bound to lead to something good, and much advantage has already resulted from it even for the West ¹⁾. This will be truer still in the future when both have learnt to know each other better, for they have so much in common that they must succeed eventually in adapting their differences until a harmonious agreement has been reached which will contribute immensely to the successful construction of the great world edifice.

The Arabic Empire

In the world of Islam we see a process analogous to that which took place in Hellas and in China. It was rendered more acute by the cultural consciousness of the subjected and by the sudden transition from the Arab tribal spirit to the mentality of world

¹⁾ Cf. A. Reichwein, *China and Europe, Their Intellectual and Artistic Relations in the Eighteenth Century*.

dominion in the case of the victors. At the outset and until the Caliphate of the Abbasids, the conversion to Islam gave people a considerable increase of status. But Arabic chauvinism and racialism were not prepared to share their privileges with recent converts. An almost complete Arabisation was the implicit condition for the acquisition of social consideration, with the result that during the first centuries the process of assimilation went on steadily. The conquered renounced their language and their nationality, spoke Arabic and tried as much as possible to become Arabs. They would try to be adopted as clients into an Arab tribe and in the second generation the process of assimilation was well-nigh complete. Military Arab colonies, in which tribal organisation played an important part, fulfilled the function of wide flung cultural seeds in the midst of an overwhelming majority of subject nations. Polygamy, together with the client system and the liberation of converted slaves, contributed greatly to increase the influence of these colonies.

The Arab ruling race continued nevertheless to look down with haughty contempt, not only upon the subjects who had not been converted, but also upon the newly converted of other races and even upon the clients who did all they could to be taken for full-blooded Arabs. All non-Arabs were heavily taxed, they were never addressed respectfully and in conversation were mentioned only with contempt. If ever an Arab gave his daughter in marriage to a client, however high his position, he met with universal reprobation among the ruling race. This contempt led to misunderstandings and to fierce uprisings. It was the main reason why so many clients and Persians rallied to the Kharijites ¹).

An entirely new policy was introduced by the Abbasids, who favoured the oppressed party and placed their trust in the Arabised Persians and in the Arabs settled in Persia and in Khorasan, who had been completely leavened by the native population. Social distinctions disappeared, no longer was any value set upon pure Arab descent, henceforth Persians and Jews could rise to the highest positions in the state. Many clients succeeded in outshining the Arabs and introduced foreign ideas into the world of Islam. They rose higher also from a social point of view, and

¹) Khuda Buksh, *Studies, Indian and Islamic*, 1927, p. 120; Zydan, *Chauvinism of the Arabs*, (Buksh p. 120, note).

finally the discrimination under which they had suffered was a thing of the past. There even followed a reaction, similar to that we noticed in the Hellenised East when we quoted Tatian's remark. The foreign nationalities became inclined not only to claim equality with the Arabs, but to exalt themselves above the Arabs, because, so they said, only he was really noble who distinguished himself by noble deeds and by the nobility of his soul. Especially after 750 A.D., when the Persians and later the Turks also began to occupy high positions in the state, a rich literature of race war began to flourish. In the second and third centuries after Mohammed, Persians and others borrowed all kinds of weapons from the arsenals of sacred and profane history and legend, no longer to prove the equality of all, but to establish the inferiority of the Arabs.

Finally, however, there came an end to the battle of the racialists; neither descent nor colour formed any longer an obstacle to the achievement of rank and of power. Persians, Turks, Mongols, Berbers and negroes occupied the highest official positions. Islam gave an equal chance to all races and all of them made use of it to the best of their ability. It is a striking fact that in the end the Muslims began to display similar characteristics everywhere. The individual and social conduct and even the spiritual attitude of Muslims of different races and of different traditions reveal striking resemblances. Two Muslims from whatever country they may come will understand each other more rapidly than two members of any other international organisation in the world ¹⁾.

Synthesis methods of the old world

These fruits of ancient synthesis may convince our time that the difficulties in the way of synthesis are really not due to mysterious unseizable antipathies. They are not due to laws which prescribe racial hatreds, they are merely and simply the result of this human pride which even at home sets individuals against their friends, their neighbours, their subordinates, and against those who are less educated and less prosperous than themselves; collectively it puts against each other groups, families, castes, professions, classes, nations or races. The thing which will finally put

¹⁾ Snouck Hurgronje, *L'Islam et le Problème des Races*, 1922 (Verspreide Geschriften, I: IX).

an end to this collective pride will be the consciousness of kinship between one's group, nation or race and the outer world, the need to live in harmony with one's environment, which is a fundamental need of mankind, and deeper seated than the desire for distinction. We may rest assured, therefore, that thanks to the victory over space our time will prove able to defeat the desire for distinction by the power of synthesis. As regards synthesis in the ancient world one may ask whether a policy which has for starting point, not sympathy, but a sense of cultural superiority, deserves to be called a policy of synthesis. In practice, however, there is an analogy between the methods of the leading nations of the ancient world and those of the West in our own day. The synthesis of antiquity lacked the dynamic character of our period. All it could do, therefore, was to spread a web of unity across a large surface, beneath which popular life could everywhere remain unchanged, while no more was asked from people than that they should adjust themselves to the cultural sphere into which their leaders alone were entering. In those days an intensive policy of assimilation was not practicable, except for a few small and centrally situated territories. Even when the initial intolerance towards other cultures began to wear off it preserved a static character. One single spirit had permeated the world of culture, but underneath it there remained all the different ethnical and popular spheres, where a very slow process of natural growth was taking place, and from which no more could be expected than that they should maintain some contact with the world of culture and religion above them. In all these ancient empires there was a static policy of synthesis, a practice, rather different from what in our days might be expected from an active policy of assimilation, which established cultural relations of the same nature as those we have previously described when dealing with the village community and its connection with the central power.

What then were the methods employed by antiquity in its policy of synthesis? In the long run the system that was adopted, at least for the popular strata beneath the cultivated class, was co-operation on a footing of equality of race, ethnical units, tendency, manners, popular institutions, etc., of the different groups concerned. There were, however, some reservations, a few principles about which there could be no modification without definite

derelection of the duties and the consciousness of leadership. In this way China displayed a great tolerance towards all manner of local differences, even towards Buddhism and Taoism, provided always that the political order, which was one of the two fundamental principles upon which the state, society, and the family were based, was not endangered. If this guarantee was not available, warning voices soon recommended stern measures, and they were generally heeded. In the world of Islam, in a later period of its history, the process of Arabisation was given up, but the fundamental principles which were valid for all Muslims were preserved most jealously. In other respects superstition and custom among the populations were allowed to survive unhampered, although the cultured class acquired sufficient influence to make the laws of family and inheritance agree with Mohammedan law. On the whole this process of growth was left to natural developments, and the authorities did no more than encourage fusion by the foundation of cultural centres, by educating the sons of local grandees in the capital (as had been the case in Egypt and in Rome), and by founding plantations and colonies in conquered territory ¹⁾.

If this statically expanding influence clashed with conscious national and religious units, it had recourse to such radical means as did not affect its static character, like mass transportation of whole populations (Assyria, Rome, and China), or even extermination (a practice which Rome had repeatedly countenanced e. g. against the Belgae, Carthage, and Jerusalem). In the case of Carthage there was more than a mere struggle for hegemony. If the Romans ploughed up the territory of Carthage instead of being content with turning it into the capital of a north African province, this is due to the fact that they realised that no sense of kinship could ever be cultivated in this dependency. Difficulties such as this can only be defeated by a dynamic synthesis: a static synthesis is left powerless and seizes upon destruction as its only way out. It is not that all such measures can be attributed to a well considered plan of conduct, but there is no denying that certain of them do bear the hall mark of a policy of synthesis, and that the principal among them was always an endeavour to create a moral and national link or a feeling of conscious

¹⁾ Cf. L. Wieger, *Textes Historiques*, 1902, part I, pp. 266, 362, 395, 418 sqq.

cultural and religious connection which was able to keep together different populations. It is in this light that one has to consider the policy of Akhenaten. It is a mistake to consider this Pharaoh merely as an international dreamer and a humanitarian. He was far ahead of his time and was doomed therefore to fail; but in his policy there was a great conscious thought, the quintessence of which was fully appreciated by as matter of fact a statesman as Augustus.

The Egyptian Empire

At the beginning of the third millenium B. C., when the gradual increase of its power brought the Egyptian nation into contact with numerous populations that were very different from itself, it acquired a sense of consciousness of its own pre-eminence as an organised nation in the midst of barbarians ¹⁾. The Pharaohs had a proud sense of their responsibilities, of their duties and also of their superiority. In the century preceding that of Akhenaten Egyptian supremacy reached its high water mark; all surrounding countries recognised it and readily paid tribute. Over an immense empire there reigned absolute peace. Kings and their families, administrators and agents of the various subject nations and of the ruling Egyptians became connected by bonds of friendship and by marriage. Commercial treaties were concluded, ideas exchanged, plans, tastes, and views upon art and other subjects were compared. A great current of trade and of thought, of artistic and economic exchange henceforth circulated between the capitals Babylon, Niniveh, Boghaz-Koi, Cnossos and finally moved towards the delta of the Nile. "For the first time to our knowledge in the history of the world men become conscious of the advantages of a world peace and feel the blessings of a common policy: by common consent they entrusted its directions to Egypt whose military, political and material superiority they recognised. . . . In the same way as in modern times there was to be a European concert, there was, in the year 1500 B. C. an Eastern concert" ²⁾.

Akhenaten felt that this political union could not be complete without a common spiritual and religious idea. Peace for the East

¹⁾ A. Moret & G. Davy, *Des Clans aux Empires*, 1923, p. 214.

²⁾ *Ibid.* p. 341—2.

signified that the gods of various nations had laid down their arms and concluded mutual treaties. But order within diversity was not enough for the Pharaohs. They realised that to establish a more perfect kind of political union, a still more potent factor was required. A common cult for all their peoples was to be established; they were to be given an imperial divinity. That is why Aton, the solar disc, was exalted as the highest divinity by Amenophis, who changed his name into Akhenaten (he who pleases Aton). His ambition was to give to the empire a cult which was not specifically Egyptian, and which worshipped the dominating force of nature, a fit object for universal adoration. Akhenaten's divinity made no distinction between Egyptians and foreigners: all men were brothers and in the king's hymn to Aton they were all invited to worship him. "It was the first time in the world that a King called upon foreigners to adore the universal benefactor side by side with his own people. For the first time religion was conceived as a link which binds together men of different race, language and colour"¹). The Pharaoh's horizon had become extended to the extreme limits of the civilised universe.

The indirect administrative policy of antiquity

In Egyptian policy there was no need for a forced assimilation that penetrated deep into the life of the peoples. As, at a later period, belief in Allah and in his prophets could link a plurality of states, nations, manners and customs by one spiritual bond, so Egyptian policy also was able to leave a great amount of freedom to local traditions, institutions and culture, provided the one common religious principle was able to create a common nursery of spiritual and moral feeling and of national and religious kinship. The populations could therefore be left their independence and the towns and regions their institutions. There was no need for oppression. Pharaoh was satisfied with an efficient supervision which established order and peace, military security and economic prosperity. There was indeed something of a protectorate régime because the Pharaoh did not directly exercise his power, but made use of the political organisms which had been found by the Egyptians in conquered territory.

¹) *Ibid.* p. 348.

The Egyptian example is not isolated. In antiquity the only adequate way in which to establish a spiritual and moral bond between different populations was to join them into one unit on the basis of their religious conceptions. By proclaiming themselves imperial gods the Pharaohs and all other Oriental Rulers tried to realise in their own person this mystic or religious unity which formerly provided the strength of the clan, later the unity of the kingdom, and which could constitute now the link between all the peoples of an empire. Alexander the Great, the Ptolemies and the Caesars were to impose in their turn a similar cult of the sovereign; they too did it less out of vanity than in order to consolidate moral unity (Moret and Davy, p. 413).

Here we have then as long ago as three thousand years, a definite example of what in modern terminology we would call a policy of synthesis. It was born from the sense of fundamental kinship which was making its appearance; it grew through the recognition of the right of the habits and institutions of every people to an existence of their own; it reached its full growth when the conscious aim of policy became that of creating a sense of national and religious unity that transcended all individual differences. This was indeed a remarkable evolution of the mind. It displays a striking analogy with the development of colonial policy during the last three centuries, as outlined in our introduction. Everywhere in the ancient world as in the present this evolution followed essentially similar stages. It presents a solid ground for our feet and we can engage upon it without hesitation, in the conviction that science, philosophy, and history are providing us every day with further proofs that the way which has been followed so far is the right way, a way indeed which has been followed before, but which our own time, endowed with greater possibilities than existed in antiquity, may be able to follow right to the end.

The Roman Empire

In the Roman Empire the same mental evolution is to be found. Here again we see how significant for the development of domestic policy is the realisation of a basic kinship. In a contribution dealing with "The Influence of Christianity"¹⁾, Dr. A. J. Carlyle says:

¹⁾ In Marvin's *Western Races and the World*, pp. 108—120.

"Indeed there is no change in social theory more startling in its completeness than the change from the Aristotelian theory of the inequality of human nature to the conception of its identity and equality as we find it expressed by Cicero about half a century before the coming of Christ. . . . Men differ indeed in learning, but are equal in the capacity for learning; there is no race which under the guidance of reason cannot attain to virtue".

In a letter quoted by Prof. Stuart Jones from Cicero to his brother Quintus, who, in 60 B. C. was a governor in Asia, one finds a very remarkable sentence which shows how in those days enlightened circles already held noble views about the burden of the ruling people in relation to weaker ones:

"Had the lot made you a ruler over Africans, Spaniards and Gauls, — savage and barbarous peoples — still it would have been your duty as a man of civilised feeling to study their good and to serve their interest and security. But seeing that we are set over a race of men who not only possess the higher culture, but are held to be the source from which it has spread to others, we are above all things bound to repay to them that which we have received at their hands."

About a century later Seneca expressed the same feeling: "The slave is of the same nature as his master; virtue can be attained by all, the free, the freedman, the slave, the king, the exile. . . . The mind is its own, it cannot be given into slavery".

It is indeed remarkable to hear such ideas, addressed probably to a dwindling circle of dissentients, by men who are separated from us by twenty centuries. Is it not striking that these two thinkers concentrate their attention upon the two same points which preoccupy our own time, the intellectual and moral capacities of other races? As Dr. Carlyle points out, Seneca and Cicero "represent the general judgement of the educated men of their time. . . . The same principles were embodied in the jurisprudence of Rome as represented by the great lawyers at the end of the second century. Ulpian lays down the broad general principle that men are by the natural law equal and free. Florentinus treats slavery as an institution of the *ius gentium*, which is contrary to nature. Tryphoninus says that liberty belongs to the natural law". This author ends his review of Roman policy upon the same note which was struck by Professor Snouck Hurgronje after he had

considered the vicissitudes of the world of Islam. "The sense of human kinship, the possibility of human respect and affection, it is these which bring men together and which we hope and trust will remould the conception of the relation of Western civilisation to the other civilisations of the world".

It may be useful to examine not only the evolution of the Roman mind towards these problems, but also the measures which embodied their ideas. We shall again take for guide the article about the Roman Empire by Stuart Jones in Marvin's *Western Races and the World*. It fell to the Emperor Augustus to organise and to consolidate the gigantic empire. With great wisdom and prudence, he tried to make use of all available institutions and to cement them into one whole through the national idea. In the East he spared the ruling families, allowed them to continue to govern as Roman vassals, and linked their interests with those of Rome. He took care that the princes and the future nobles were brought up in the Roman fashion, and thus prepared unity of conception in measures of administration. He admitted educated Orientals into the civil service, taking care that those he had selected were penetrated with Hellenistic civilisation, because he believed in its beneficial influence on the eastern part of his empire. He perpetuated as much as possible the existing situation, with the intention of eventually annexing the subject states and bringing them under direct rule. He also included the Greek city federations in the network of his administrative system and transformed them into useful intermediate links with the central authority, while he made them the mouthpiece of local needs. He extended this form of administration throughout all the eastern provinces. In the western half (Spain, Gaul) political institutions were not yet sufficiently ripe to fit into an ordered administrative system. Augustus here had recourse to the extension of the Roman system of municipia, and the grants of extensive local autonomy. The institution of municipia relieved the central state machine of excessive labour and created interest and civic sense in the provinces. The population was thereby introduced to a higher level of civilisation, by which it could continually widen its social and political horizon. The unity of the state as well as local freedom were thus guaranteed as far as possible, both in the eastern and in the western half of the empire.

As regards the population, Augustus did not change the old policy of Rome which had always aimed at establishing an ordered graduation of status and privilege by which her subjects might attain equality with the ruling race. In backward territories the Romanised municipia had circles attributed to them within which they exercised jurisdiction in the name of the central authorities, collected taxes, and kept up in every way a continual contact with the uncivilised groups of populations which were gradually being accustomed to order and to more civilised conditions. Veteran colonies were founded everywhere as nuclei of Roman civilisation; the veterans who composed them were not Roman professional soldiers but natives who had followed the Roman eagle for a certain period and were in consequence rewarded with limited civic rights in conjunction with their membership of the newly founded colony. In every province in the West Augustus organised confederations after the Greek model, with a provincial council whose first task was to maintain the imperial cult. Men of talent from all nations and all races were called indiscriminately to all functions and honours, even to seats in the Senate ¹⁾.

The problem of decentralisation, which is so important in the colonial world of our own day, was solved in a highly satisfactory manner by these wise measures. But on the other hand no attempt was made to solve the problem of widening the democratic sphere of the population which had acquired civic rights. To afford them the opportunity by means of the representative system of taking part in the responsible conduct of imperial government was a conception which transcended by far the vision of that static world. This is perhaps one of the most serious gaps in the organisation of the state, and it eventually contributed to the decline and the fall of Rome. The mystic link between all the parts of the empire was too delicate to be able to keep the locally developing feudal and national tendencies within moderate limits inside the empire. Decentralisation may strengthen the centrifugal tendencies which must be balanced by a converging interest in central government and legislation on the part of the whole population, by civic consciousness, and by the conviction of all parts that they belong together.

¹⁾ Harmand, *op. cit.* p. 145, note; Prof. J. A. Smith, *The Contribution of Greece and Rome in "The Unity of Western Civilisation"*, ed. F. S. Marvin, p. 87.

Instead of such a dynamic force, always able to renew itself, as the representative idea, Augustus, like his successors, had at his disposal only the spiritual link. He borrowed a page from the book of deified Rulers, as Alexander and the Ptolemies did before him. The fact that a true Roman like Augustus, descended from the solid aristocracy of the Italian municipia, a thoroughly matter of fact statesman, realised the political significance of this spiritual link and tried to utilise it, throws light upon the world of ideas of his period. Prof. Stuart Jones approaches the most brilliant part of his lucid interpretation of Augustus's policy when he explains that in the West Augustus was the first citizen of a free state, but in the East he was a sovereign, i.e., something more than human. After the victory of Actium he received divine worship. He foresaw all the possibilities which this institution of deified rulership held in germ. He entrusted the city leagues of the East and the provincial councils of the West with the imperial cult, while in the cities of the West whose inhabitants had Roman citizenship he erected temples to Jupiter, Juno, and Minerva, upon an eminence which dominated the forum, in imitation of the Roman Capitol. This conscious superimposition of an empire-wide religious link lent great solidity to the Roman edifice and enabled it for centuries to resist all centrifugal tendencies.

Racialism appears to have confronted Roman policy with the same dilemma it presented to the Greeks a few centuries earlier. It was simplified by the Roman veneration for Greek culture, which sometimes prompted the Romans humorously to call themselves barbarians, and which had penetrated so deeply into the Roman world: witness the words of a poet, "*Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit*".

This veneration had really existed long before the Roman conquest of Greece. Towards the barbarians of the north the Romans in their turn had a feeling of cultural superiority which was tempered by the fact that they saw them as members of the same race. Towards the East their national feeling may have made them behave with a sense of superiority even when dealing with Greeks; but at the same time they found the Near East so completely Hellenised that in their respect for Hellenic culture they showed no more intolerance or arrogance than in Greece proper. The same does not apply to their treatment of the Egypt-

tians, who had not become thoroughly Hellenised, and were therefore foreign to the Romans both racially and culturally. Augustus humiliated them to the position of *peregrini dediticii*, to whom no civic rights and no autonomy was to be granted. They were subjected to arbitrary taxes and requisitions of service, from which Greek towns like Alexandria, and Roman officials, bankers, and merchants who had a privileged status were more or less immune.

In the province of Egypt, which was organised upon a racial basis, the burden of taxes rested mainly upon the natives who were apparently considered to be fit objects of obligations from which Romans and ex-soldiers were exempt. The emperor Caracalla went so far as to order all natives to leave the town of Alexandria and, when he granted the right of citizenship to the whole free population of the Empire, he specifically excluded the Egyptian natives. Racial dualism therefore had not disappeared from the Empire, even after Augustus had abolished many discriminating practices dating from the republic. But the racial divisions against which Cicero and Seneca had so vigorously protested were being obliterated one by one. More than this, the social barriers, which are usually maintained longer than any others, were gradually dropping. All races began to mix, the new aristocracy was of very mixed blood, and Professor Tenney Frank ¹⁾ thinks that in the days of Juvenal and Tacitus perhaps ninety per cent of the free plebeians in the streets of Rome had oriental blood in their veins. Statistics for selected towns in Italy, Gaul, and Spain point to analogous proportions. We may mention that it is to this extraordinary racial fusion that many people attribute the decline of Roman strength. They think that the serious and solid Roman character became overgrown by the more frivolous and hedonistic tendencies displayed by immigrants from the Hellenistic east. Similar views have been proclaimed about the consequences which resulted, at a later period, from indiscriminate mixing with the subject races under Arab rulers.

We cannot agree with those who reproach Rome for having followed an oppressive and forced policy of assimilation directed by a rigid bureaucracy. Like all other ancient empires Rome aimed at assimilation. But, with the static character of society, assimilation in practice always ended in becoming the synthesis of

¹⁾ *Race Mixture in the Roman Empire* (quoted by Stuart Jones, op. cit. p. 102).

things of different nature into a higher unity. The fact that nevertheless the West became Romanised as the East had been Hellenised is certainly mainly due to a process of natural fusion and to the fact that the political, military, and social organisation of Rome favoured a non-compulsory adaptation to Roman civilisation. Economically, mass production, encouraged by the existence of a world market where law and order reigned, naturally contributed to this process.

Education and the synthesis of antiquity

It would be a mistake nevertheless to exaggerate the depth of this assimilation. Events which took place after the fall of the Empire sufficiently proved the opposite. If Rome had been given another thousand years it might have achieved a cultural unity similar to that of the Chinese. However this may be, education, a unique instrument for influencing the mind, was not in Rome able to provide the needs of a highly differentiated society. The opinions quoted by Stuart Jones as to the value of Roman education are highly divergent: Sir William Ramsay and Camille Jullian are extremely critical, while Cumont and Haverfield praise it very highly. The latter consider that in the countries governed by Rome education was better under the Empire than at any period from its fall until the nineteenth century. Whatever may have been the truth, the nature of education certainly was not such that it could penetrate into the popular layers. Moreover there was a tendency to emphasise rhetorical alertness at the expense of everything else, which must have been more dangerous even than the one-sided literary education of the West as it was applied to the East in the nineteenth century. The idea that knowledge and social consciousness can be communicated downward, like a series of drops trickling down from the upper classes, is no longer held. We know that education must be a force that excludes nothing and nobody. Failing this it will cause a deep chasm between the educated and the society from which they spring: their knowledge will remain school-learning without practical wisdom, leading them to hold a fanciful, arrogant estimation of their own importance and making them despise honest work. The Roman Empire, which taught the rising generation mainly rhetoric, certainly did not do much to assist synthesis by

its educational system. In our time, with its tendency to imitate the classic period by an excessive reverence for rhetoric and linguistic gifts, the greatest care will be advisable in the performance of our educational tasks in the colonies, if we are to avoid the mistake committed by Rome.

It is significant that China created a remarkably intensive organisation for imparting education in a way which answered the requirements of the Empire. This system had an incredible influence upon the growth of a feeling of cultural interdependence within the Empire. As elsewhere, the theocratic idea formed the coping stone of political organisation; it was, however, a theocracy which had to be conscious of the fact that the bearer of the highest dignity was only the mandatory of Heaven. Throughout the East, the mystical link of all popular communities with the deified Ruler has played an indispensable part in cementing the political fabric. Until the personality can grow to such an extent that its civic sense transcends the group and understands and feels the nation no other link is thinkable. National and religious unity is identified with the Ruler; patriotism and fidelity find expression in the religiously coloured loyalty of his subjects. The Japanese term for government, *matsurigoto*, which means cult in the religious sense, illustrates the dominating significance of the religious idea in the organisation of the state. Until 1911 the same could be said of China ¹⁾. The internal strife in that country is mainly due to the search after a means of bridging the gaping chasm which resulted from the abdication of the Manchu dynasty.

In the third century B.C. the Ch'in dynasty had unified the whole country, and abolished feudal power. It tried to effect a complete break with the past by destroying as many history books as possible and by persecuting scholars. After its disappearance the Han dynasty and its successors, though preserving the administrative basis of the Ch'in rulers, once more decided to link the new order as closely as possible with the past and to make loyalty a national virtue, whereas formerly it had been merely a feudal duty. This enabled them to assure the indispensable harmony between the social and political order and the sense of cultural and religious oneness. To ensure the solidity of this organisation they introduced the democratic examination-system

¹⁾ Cf. P. Mathias Tchang, *Synchronismes Chinois*, 1903, p. IX.

which really offered free opportunity to all talents, an idea which also existed in the mind of the emperor Augustus, although he was not able to put it into practice to the same extent as China did. The system of examinations, which was gradually carried to a high pitch of perfection, opened the highest functions and dignities to every gifted man, without considering the title or the fortune of his parents or the power or importance of his clan, provided an honest mental competition marked him as a man of integrity and culture, able to act in a responsible manner. An impartial selection of the right man to fill the right place might well be considered to be the secret of the durability of every human organisation, and here we find perhaps the reason why China was successful where Rome failed. In the course of nearly twenty centuries China thus gave proof of an understanding which only reached the West a couple of generations ago, when it at last discovered the virtue of the system of competitive examinations. The old Chinese system deserves to be criticised on account of its conservatism, which took no account of the slowly differentiating needs of society and which was too apt to sacrifice the present to the past. But on the other hand it possessed one aspect on which our own time may well model itself. It emphasised the moral duties towards family, society, state, and world-order, whereas our time is too much inclined to stress the knowledge of facts instead of character and a cultural sense. Until recently this tendency expressed itself in the education given in our schools. Happily people are beginning to display more understanding and to blend the advantages of the present system with those of the Chinese.

Whatever may be the difficulties in the way of the Chinese population, whatever the differences in character, in capacities and in customs, the population of China is a cultural unit. This is the strength which will enable hundreds of millions, even though the mystic oneness with the deified Ruler has disappeared, to progress from the thousands of restricted group-loyalties which now divide them to one conscious national idea.

I n d i a

All these world Empires prove the possibilities that are open to the sense of kinship, and the strength with which it can unite

innumerable centrifugal forces into one great organisation. It might be thought, however, that owing to its caste system, India is bound to remain a striking exception to this rule. For it looks as though the extreme division of the caste system does not in the least fit in with the general course of development which we have been able to observe elsewhere. This would be true especially if the caste distinction, the prohibition of marriage, etc., really originated in and were continued by the racial contempt of the white Aryan conquerors for the dark skinned original population. The phenomenon would then be rather of the same nature as that which nowadays brands with public disapproval marriages between white and coloured people in the United States. In both cases the person who acts against the racial sense becomes an outcast, a pariah.

A glance at random at the rich literature which has been produced on the subject of castes will suffice to prove that this form of particularism, which belongs more to the spirit of the clan and of the family, to communalistic feeling, therefore, than to racialism, cannot possibly produce a serious social argument against the evolution of the synthesis idea in the empires of antiquity. For history proves that if, in India, those who brought culture into the country, — and who were more distinct from the autochthonous populations than happened in other world empires, — started with a sense of superiority and with a racialism of the purest water, better acquaintanceship enlarged the horizon in India as elsewhere. Appreciation, sympathy, and fusion, racial as well as social and cultural, began to take place in India too. It was owing to a particularism of an entirely different nature that their growth was arrested. Mr. Viswanatha says: "A spirit of conciliation and compromise seems to have pervaded the relations of the various peoples of India even from the beginning of her history, and the Hinduism of later times was the result of this absorption and assimilation of elements Aryan and non-Aryan" ¹⁾. One may feel inclined to admit the existence of this assimilation in the matter of culture and religion while denying it in the no less important matter of social life. There of course exists a splitting up into thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of sub-castes. It is true that they are all classified under the four big original groups,

¹⁾ S. V. Viswanatha, *Racial Synthesis in Hindu Culture*, 1928, p. 197 sqq.

the Brahmanas, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, Sudras, apart from whom there are moreover the pariahs. Even those who belong to one of the main categories cannot always intermarry, take food together, or perform in common certain ritual obligations and exercise certain specific professions. The temptation to attribute all this system to pure racialism is considerable: the caste system has been compared with the figure of a pyramid, the summit of which was formed by the numerous Brahman castes, while lower down were the dark-skinned Dravidic and Kolarian aborigines. But though a racial criterion most certainly prevails in the oldest dual division, it would be difficult to find it in the present caste system.

It would even be incorrect to consider the caste system as an ossified body which holds in its grip hundreds of millions of people with their descendants, until the consummation of time, and keeps them in one special position of the social pyramid merely as the result of their birth. Just as Professor Speyer called Hinduism the Proteus among religions, so one might call the caste system the Proteus among social systems. Relationships continually vary; one caste sinks deeper down, another moves upward, and a third one splits up into a higher and a lower caste. Maybe a new sect will give rise to a new caste composed of members who have left various castes, while the birth of a new occupation or profession may conceivably cause the creation of a new caste. But notwithstanding this continual change it is the selfsame Proteus, who modifies only his aspect, not his being. It is always the same hierarchic pyramid, with the Brahmans at the top, and divided into layers in accordance with a locally varied public opinion which accepts more or less the Brahmanic conceptions about behaviour, cleanliness, and occupation.

Of old there was a wide chasm between the white rulers divided in three classes — not castes — the priests, the warlike aristocracy, and the free citizens, who formed together the group of Aryas and, on the other hand, the subject race, called Dasas and later Sudras. In Vedic texts the latter were sometimes characterised as “the Black ones”, and also, owing to their short nose, the *Anasas* or noseless ones. Originally it seems to have been permissible to treat them in the most arbitrary manner, the murder of a Sudra not being considered worse than the killing of a peacock or even of a frog. It is probable that originally the *ius connubii* existed be-

tween the three classes of the ruling population. There are some who consider that the mixed castes resulted from the intermarriage of white and dark people and that, when once the fissiparous process had started, gradually every deviation or differentiation in the matter of feeding, cult, or profession was seized upon in order to create a new caste. Nowhere in the world did the human craving for distinction play so many tricks on mankind as in India ¹).

Undoubtedly there was a certain connection between the ancient division into three classes, priests, patricians, and citizens, a distinction which was not entirely unknown to the Persians and the Romans, and the caste system ²). Nevertheless many peculiarities of the latter cannot possibly be explained by a class factor. The further development of the castes must be sought mainly in the very ancient organisation of tribes, the tribe and family always bearing a sacred character which anxiously excluded all strangers, and which imposed very severe marriage rules, partly exogamous as far as families and moieties were concerned, partly endogamous within the tribe. Such regulations exist everywhere in the world and have also been observed among the tribes of the Dutch East Indies. The aborigines of India certainly also had a totemistic division of tribes into groups (which remind one of the Phratries of Hellas), which were in their turn sub-divided into clans. The autochthonous totemistic groups and the general Aryan division into tribal units may therefore have found points of contact with one another and this may have led to the fusion of all kinds of social and religious elements.

Sénart shows how in the Aryan conception of marriage the married couple are entrusted with the sacrifice connected with the family altar. It is upon this common conception that in the last resort rests the endogamy of the Hindu caste as well as the limitations imposed upon the classical family. It is a fact that in Greece, in Rome, and in ancient Germany, the laws and customs granted the sanction of a legal marriage only to a union with a woman of equal rank who was a free citizen. If the Roman patricians for many centuries refused the *ius connubii* to the

¹) E. Sénart, *Les Castes dans l'Inde*, p. 144; Sir Bampfylde Fuller, *Studies of Indian Life and Sentiment*, 1917, pp. 46, 47.

²) Sénart, *op. cit.* pp. 136—141; Kern, *Verspreide Geschriften*, Vol. XIII, pp. 3—18, published 1872, where class and caste division are still identified.

plebeians, this was not the result of patrician pride, but of the fact that, like the Vaisyas in India, the plebeians were soon mixing freely with the foreigners and that therefore religious scruples forbade marriage with them. Meals were at all times a sacred function among the Aryans: they were the produce of the sacred hearth-fire, the outward sign of the family community and of its continuity in the past and in the present. The meal was the religious act *par excellence*; the exclusion of outsiders had therefore no racial or class basis but a purely religious family basis ¹).

While elsewhere the genealogical division disappeared before the stronger notion of cultural and state unity, it became perpetuated in India as a result of the greater difference between the ruling population and its environment. It became and remained the exclusive basis of social relationship, even when racial fusion had pushed into the background the original racialist criterion. The mixed population, as well as that which had remained unmixed, was seized by the universally human tendency towards distinction. The fear of ceremonial uncleanness became an obsession, until it made people look for degrees of cleanliness and impurity even in the slightest differentiation of profession. Far from perpetuating a racial domination, the frontiers of caste run vertically and horizontally through the whole population with the most incredible variety. And the formation of castes has even become the appropriate means for incorporating autochthonous elements which were beginning to be assimilated into the Hindu community.

The Mahabharata already shows that a time came when the mere fact of birth no longer seemed a satisfactory criterion by which broad minds could measure a person's value. This is a supremely significant evolution because it tends to place personal merit above everything. In the frame of Hindu society it takes the same place as the rationality of Eratosthenes, Plutarch, Cicero, Seneca, Confucius, Augustus, and so many others. In a conversation between Yudhishtira and Nahusha, reported by Viswanatha, the former remarks: "A Brahmana is not to be known as such merely by his name nor from the accident of birth, nor is a Sudra by his. Where virtue and righteous conduct are found there is the Brah-

¹) Fustel de Coulanges, *La Cité Antique*; Sir Alfred Lyall, *Asiatic Studies*.

mana. A Sudra is he who is without them." Another opinion, also from the Mahabharata: "Not birth, not sacrament, not learning make one *dviṣa* (twice born), but righteous conduct alone." The author adds: "It was coming to be slowly recognised that what really counts is righteous conduct and not credal faith.... As these novel ideas and features appeared, a new criterion of caste came to be formed viz., conduct and occupation".

Once born in a lower caste every one of its members, be it only owing to his ignorance, to the influence of environment and to the effects of the professional life to which he is predestined, is compelled to live, to think, and to act like his environment. Progress can only be achieved by a group. But as soon as this happens, the group begins to despise all castes beneath it, however small may be the difference in customs, in manner of feeding, and in professional specialisation. Another caste will be despised instead of the first, so that in reality nothing has changed except an incident, and yet such an evolution is really the highest which can be aimed at from an orthodox point of view.

We may be justified therefore in ascribing the fact that in India this evolution of the mind was not as elsewhere crowned by the sense of social oneness over the sense of distinction to a set of circumstances which in other countries also might have given rise to a similar rigid social system. If for instance the Chinese clans had been endogamous, there would probably in the course of the gradual conquest of a continent have come into existence an exclusiveness which might easily have given birth to a caste system. But the severe exogamous ordinance compelled the clans to marry each other's womenfolk, as a result of which the clan exclusiveness found a strong counterpoise. In the Indian caste system one need therefore not seek for racialism but for a deplorable intensification of the group particularism which seizes hold of everything upon which it can feed. All possible causes of discrimination have contributed to its existence: race, cultural pride, the arrogance of conquerors, class spirit, tribal distinction, ceremonial cleanliness, sectarianism, differences of profession, territorial seclusion, etc. In the district of Poona alone, with only nine hundred thousand inhabitants, Sénart was able to count over 120 castes, i.e. 7000 members per caste, but even these were sub-divided into sub-castes which refused each other the *ius connubii*. The Brahmans

alone, in this small district, had 15 castes, each sub-divided again and with all the usual interdicts towards each other.

It is a regrettable fact that this social and religious development has brought into being a sense of kinship so restricted and so close. At village festivals, for instance, the lowest castes cannot be admitted to the common meal nor, in ordinary life, do they usually have access to the village pool, the school, the public ways. They are usually not allowed to settle within the village. The professions are also judged according to the degree of ceremonial impurity they entail. The contact of an unclean person who, according to Western conceptions, performs an honourable labour and at whose side we should sit down in any public conveyance without the slightest hesitation, is to the Hindu almost a catastrophe which requires thorough purification and lustration. Even the shadow of such a human being has to be avoided as though it caused pestilence to the body, the soul, and the mind. Yet it should not be thought that pariahs are unhappy because of their condition. If they form the most despised castes, yet they are by no means outcastes. For nobody is without caste: life outside such a group is entirely unthinkable. Pariahs belong to the wide group of lowest castes which varies from district to district and which are, no less than those above them, full of particularist pride. There are tribes which feed on dead animals they find by the roadside; to them it will suffice that one single and rather specially distasteful carcass is not admitted to their diet for all others who do not observe this distinction to be treated with contempt and proudly refused the *ius connubii*.

The castes are able to impose discipline upon their members because they are well organised corporations with chiefs, councils, a jurisdiction, carefully regulated attributions, usages, ceremonial, festivals. The penal sanctions at their disposal are fines, which may take the form of a collective meal to be provided by the culprit, temporary exclusion, and formerly in all probability also the death penalty. Exclusion owing to serious delinquencies is an extremely harsh penalty, because the condemned man loses all he has, his parents, his relatives, his friends, and his country. Even members of lower castes fear to be contaminated by him; nothing remains for him but to obtain admission to one of the lowest castes or to form a new caste with other outcastes. He is dead, and on

the sinister occasion of his exclusion his funeral is actually celebrated. This penalty of exclusion also exists in other places, for instance among the Nagari of Minangkabau in the Dutch East Indies. But there the government has interfered.

In India too the castes have lost some of their penal sanctions. This naturally tends to weaken the whole system, although it is too deeply rooted to make possible its complete disappearance without a spiritual evolution of the whole population. The moral forces which are now at work inside the castes must not be affected. A desire for a wider horizon must be fostered inside them, and they must be induced by their own conviction to break down the walls that surround them, so that, united with all the popular energy freed by the destruction of divisions, they may attempt co-operation on a large scale. After all that has been said it can be appreciated how difficult such a broadening out must be, and what courage Indian reformers display when they dare transgress the limits of caste. They are more than courageous, they are heroic; and many generations must continue to produce such heroes in growing numbers before this craving for divisions and distinctions will be overthrown.

S u m m a r y

Our survey has now come to an end. We have been able to learn a great deal from the empires of antiquity. We have seen how, even during periods of enforced assimilation, the limited amount of political and educational means and of instruments of transport restricted assimilation to the surface or to a few intensively influenced parts of these empires. The more moderate period which followed was one of synthesis between the numerous racial, ethnical, cultural and religious differences into a conscious notion of solidarity. This notion proved capable of such strong influence that it might have led almost everywhere to complete unity, had it not been that certain special centrifugal forces or the invasion of a foreign enemy necessitated stronger links than could have been forged at that period. In so far as in certain respects a far-reaching fusion took place, it proved to be due to a large extent, and notwithstanding the fact that the authorities favoured it, to a purely natural process. It may be true that with the disappearance of the spiritual sense of kinship the cen-

trifugal forces find it possible once more to blaze up and that the sense of mystical oneness thereupon proves rather to have been passively accepted than felt nationally and actively. Nevertheless the success of the policy that had been followed was everywhere greater than could reasonably be expected. Where, furthermore, religious kinship, as in the world of Islam, was perpetuated even after the end of political unity, hundreds of millions continued to feel joined together notwithstanding the fact that political distinctions had been added to the already numerous causes of division. This sense of unity manifests itself even in our own day in important matters and is able to call forth a co-operation with which world policy has seriously to count. Its importance therefore should not be under-estimated.

In the same way, long after the disappearance of the Roman empire, the *Pax Romana* continued to exist as an ideal for many leaders and thinkers in all countries. Now this spark glittering under the ashes has brightly flamed up again: the Phoenix has risen, stronger than ever. The League of Nations is taking hold of the many scattered threads and is weaving them together into one strand, which will no longer be cut through by external violence, because at last the defeat of space is uniting all nations, all races, and all cultures inside one horizon.

The lesson of the Past

The lesson taught by synthesis in the past cannot be applied without reservation to the present. The world-empires of the past that we have studied formed coherent spaces that were gradually expanding into territories often enough already open to the conqueror's culture, even before his political influence had reached them. The colonial world on the other hand is very distant from the mother states. There can be no question of a fusion of nations, such as was established elsewhere. There can be no creation of a spiritual sense of union embodied in the deified ruler, in a national deity nor in a community of religious faith. The first two propositions are unthinkable, while the third is not practicable because, however ardent the wish of every Christian to spread his faith, existing religions must be respected. For colonial policy stands altogether impartially towards the different religions, provided they give no offence to those who profess other faiths.

Moreover racial difference and racial consciousness are greater than in antiquity, with the possible exception of the Hindu and Arabic racialist periods. The difference of cultural development, especially from the social, economic, and political point of view, is certainly infinitely larger than it was in any previous world-empire. Existing cultures and religions, the memory of former grandeur, all limit the possibility of a fusion which formerly, when there was little, if anything at all, to displace, happened almost automatically. Therefore we can hope for no faithful repetition of the past: history never repeats itself in exactly the same way. This, however, does not matter: the utility of our historical survey lies in that it confirms the indications which had already been obtained from the data of modern science.

The past enables us better to understand the spiritual evolution of our own time and to visualise its importance for the future more clearly. It has taught us that an initial racialist period may be considered a historical necessity, at least as long as mankind as a whole suffers from the disabilities we have observed so clearly, which are apparently inherent in human nature from the Australian to the modern Occidental. We have further seen that an equally indispensable policy of assimilation based upon a cultural sense of superiority usually follows the first period. It is a progress in the direction of synthesis, because it recognises the potential equality which is ignored by racialism. In domestic policy antiquity too had its conception of synthesis, but in contradistinction to our own time it limited itself to a restricted frame, and continued to favour assimilation. Otherwise it remained satisfied with an attempt at harmonising resemblances and differences into one all-embracing sense of kinship. A large amount of tolerance was displayed in this connection. If further assimilation took place it was in reality, and however much it might enjoy official support, mainly the result of a natural free process of fusion which could be reciprocal. When a natural development in our period chooses Western elements and a Western tendency, there is no need to attach undue importance to the objection that will be formulated either by those who want to preserve human beings as natural monuments, or by those who would like the East to continue as it was 2,000 years ago.

The main principles of synthesis will find every leading nation

in world history most bitterly intolerant, whatever may be its tolerance in other respects. This is because leading nations consciously or unconsciously identify themselves with their mission; if it were otherwise, they could never carry it through. If the Arabic leaders had not clung to their profession of faith they would never have established anything. If the cultural centre by the Hoang-Ho had renounced its two great principles of social-religious and politico-religious order, it would immediately have been swept away by the flood of barbarians. Israel would have disappeared long ago had it not placed its Revelation above foreign gods, and India, Hellas, and Rome would never have fulfilled their cultural mission if they had not each of them made the acceptance of some of their ideas the indispensable preliminary for the admission of outsiders as citizens. As long as politically dependent nations are unwilling or unable to animate by their own strength the idea of synthesis, the leading nation claims leadership exclusively for itself. But as they prove more and more able to undertake the task these nations are admitted to all the functions, privileges and responsibilities, which formerly were the exclusive prerogative of leadership.

This is really the whole outline of the colonial policy of the future. Enriched by the experiences acquired from wise as well as from unwise measures, it wants in all consciousness of purpose to leave the populations as much as possible in the enjoyment of their own language, customs, and institutions. It wants to maintain the authority of rulers, chiefs, and headmen, and the people's attachment to territorial divisions and local autonomies, using them all in the construction of the great society and of political organisation. Racism and forcible assimilation it has left well behind. What might still remain of them has no more significance than that of a rudiment, a sign which reveals earlier phases by which the progress of the future will one day be measured. The way before us, the way which we are treading already, leads towards the dynamic synthesis that corresponds with our own period. If colonial policy wishes to realise the conception of synthesis it will have to cling to its two well-known principles. It will have to do this even more determinedly than antiquity because principles are implied which cannot impose a new loyalty from above, but which ask nothing less than a widening of the existing

spheres of social morality and an intensification of the urge towards improvement. This task is already claiming the enthusiasm and co-operation of the best Orientals.

The lesson for the future

The two great principles of synthesis in modern colonial policy are different from those of antiquity and yet related to them in some respects. They aim at introducing young nations born from ancient cultures and races into the world community, world economy, and world traffic. These principles are no longer the property of the spirit of the West. They belong to humanity, which demands universalism and which has long since begun to put an end to the transitory opposition between East and West. These two great ideas have been described already and we have found them in all the societies and religions we have examined. The first of them is reverence for the dignity of every fellow human being. It will have to be embodied in a sense of humanity which transcends all difference of group, family, caste, clan, village community, town, province, sex, age, profession, and class. It must be active and not visionary and express itself through civic consciousness. The second principle is the intensification of the dynamism which belongs to this wide sphere of human consciousness, and which borrows from every human being the power necessary for self-renewal and improvement from the spiritual, moral, intellectual, social, economic, political, technical, and material points of view.

As pointed out already the West itself has not yet reached the end of this evolution. It has still to liberate itself from class, jingoism, racialism, and from internal particularism, and will continually have to be on the alert against the danger that threatens disintegration from unsocial and anti-humanitarian individualism. But the West has a considerable start. The application of these ideas to national society has given it a rich experience which may be useful to others, especially in the colonial world. Colonial policy has only these two ideas at its disposal when it goes out to meet the portion of humanity for which it has made itself responsible. Its task can only be to direct all that is best and that was slumbering, waking, or even working, in the smallest communities and in the greatest religions, long before

our arrival, towards a wider sphere and an intenser social activity. It should therefore be acceptable to everybody in our period, and, although it may meet political aspirations to a considerable extent, it should guard against becoming unfaithful to its own inheritance and renouncing its duty towards those for whose welfare and future it still has to care.

As long as social morality, closely attached to a small group, caste, or community, can rest satisfied with social dispersion and seclusion, as long as the ties of blood and of the territorial connection of miniature societies continue obstinately to fight the cause of civic sense and patriotism, with a haughty and contemptuous particularism which excludes all constructive co-operation on a grand scale with people who are different because also cooped up in miniature circles of loyalty, colonial statesmanship has a sacred duty to perform. While waiting for the awakening of the millions, it receives among the number of its collaborators thousands of Eastern leaders who are able to rise to these great thoughts. And it will be able to transfer the reins to a democratic popular authority when the colonial territories in question can see, as a result of the labour of protection and of preparation, as wide a horizon as Western society has been able to conquer for itself; in other words, when they have acquired a national outlook. The end of human evolution will not yet have been reached when young and full-grown Eastern nations have taken their place in the world. But when that point is reached all societies in the colonial world will possess the dynamic force which makes leadership superfluous and marks them as autonomous collaborators. This patriotic idea need not as in antiquity be identified with the mother country. The richer varieties of political organisation of our own day make it possible for all parts of an Empire to remain linked with the Crown by loyalty without ceasing to be each of them a separate and distinct fatherland. Once the civic sense has risen to such a height and to such a power of tension, it stands upright in the world community as an equal representative of a group of humanity by the side of each of the others.

The lesson for the East

The Eastern élite, making use of the peace assured by Western leadership and of the evolutionary means put at its disposal, will

be able to make a convinced stand against the numerous forms of arrogance, indifference, seclusion, inertia, and oppression that exist within its own circle, and in this task it will receive the vigorous support of Western leadership. It must not listen to the voice of those agitators who represent the authority of the West as resting merely upon technique and cannon. Those who say such things have understood nothing of the secret of the West. No world empire has so far existed that was able to adopt the policy of synthesis followed by the West. All former efforts towards synthesis were identified with the dominating nation; that of the West is based upon the equal status of all the portions of the Empire inside that higher community which itself will eventually be absorbed in a world community. This changed conception represents an evolution of the mind which has cost 2000 years of struggle and which therefore deserves due appreciation.

The process of social expansion has begun already throughout the whole East and also in the colonial world. Clans, families, castes, village communities, all of them are beginning to feel oppressed by their seclusion. It is a movement which can no longer be arrested. Merely on the ground of the first symptoms of a widening of group morality, of which the symptoms are the display of a real sense of citizenship by a few of the best Orientals, colonial policy hastens to hold out as a certainty the eventual transfer of leadership. In British India the establishment of dyarchy, soon to be followed by responsible Government in the Provinces and by All-India federation, has even resulted in the partial transformation of the representative body into one that shares responsibility and the task of government. No stronger proof could be given that the West is not acting as a judge who decides his own case. There is not a caste, not a family, not a village community, not a clan, there is not a single ethnical or religious unit which would be prepared to display such breadth towards others or would even be allowed by its members to do so.

It may be asked whether this gift of the *toga virilis*, this share of responsibility given to the elements of progress in India, in the Dutch East Indies, and in the Philippines, should not be considered premature. This question may well be put, for between the era of development represented by such parliamentary or semi-parliamentary bodies and the period in which thousands

of small communities are still vegetating, there is a gap of centuries, in some cases even of millenniums. That is why many people are amazed at what they consider the irresponsible behaviour of colonial policy, which seems to adapt itself rather to the solitary personality than to the millions. Has it not, by behaving in this manner, created the impression that the process of social growth had already been completed, and that the aim had been reached, if not already left behind?

Let Eastern non-co-operators, who refuse to assist colonial policy, because in their opinion it has not gone far enough, reflect that questions like these are being asked by serious men, who are not out for national or personal interests. They are making it difficult for the champions of a progressive colonial policy to persuade conservatives who do not agree with it, but whose honesty and good intentions it appreciates, that its method, which looks towards the future, is right. After all, there is nothing shameful in the fact that the populations of the colonial world, which have still to pass through a process of consolidation and unification, such as has been going on in other Oriental states for centuries, have not yet reached the stage when a purely national government would be able to manage by itself or by using Western men merely in the capacity of advisers. Even so, efforts are being made nowadays everywhere in the colonial world to substitute Western advice or assistance for Western leadership.

In view of the fact that the driving force so far displayed is not yet sufficient to enable the population of a single sub-district to administer itself according to modern requirements without the assistance of the European administration, serious students have been inclined to take the view that the demands for a democratic popular government in a territory which is thousands of times larger than the small communities and which presents entirely different problems denotes an overhasty judgement and a lack of the sense of responsibility. It is to such rash claims that the conservative critics of colonial policy point when they try to prove that its evolutionary measures in the field of education and politics have been premature. People sometimes talk about a certain exaggeration in the burdensome outfit of the Western administrative machine in the colonial world. Those who claim complete and immediate independence often declare that administration, juris-

diction, and traffic need not be organised with such particular care. They speak about Eastern efficiency, which they oppose to Western efficiency. But there is no particular brand of efficiency. A railway system which has not taught its staff to take seconds into account might cause numerous disasters until nobody would care to entrust his life or his goods to it. A harbour which has not very efficiently organised itself will soon see steamers proceeding to neighbouring ports, while jurisdiction which does not put the slightest fragment of evidence into the scales is a reason for shame to a nation, and may easily lead to outside intervention. If all this is taken into consideration, it can be realised that an immense labour of devotion is urgently required for the unfolding of all available forces, for the acquisition of all knowledge and also for the activation of all the organs required by a large society.

As a first step towards this the thousands of small isolated societies will have to be guided out of their seclusion. This process will require the labour and experience of such a large number of well-trained people that the devotion of educated Orientals, if thrown on their own resources, would, at least for the time being, prove altogether inadequate. The best advice to be given to them is to seize with both hands the already existing opportunities for service. The careers, dignities, and success of many Eastern collaborators proves that opportunity is not lacking. The need of official servants, however, is limited in every country. What is mostly required is a multitude of competent agriculturists, merchants, industrialists, and members of the liberal professions. Without the development of a bourgeoisie, a conscious peasantry, and a progressive labouring class, a society lacks backbone, even if it be given all the attributes of democratic popular authority. To such essential points it is necessary to draw attention: and all progress will prove impossible if the Eastern élite does not assist its development. Constructive deeds will at once induce colonial policy to move further in the direction of responsible popular government than it has gone already, in defiance of the numerous protests raised against the alleged prematureness of the measures it has taken.

The lesson for the West.

However extravagant the action of colonial policy may appear,

it is the result of various strong forces, and especially of the steady progress of world-traffic. Somehow, customary law and the reading of the latest rubber quotations of the New York exchange do not go well together. World traffic will not reach a point of saturation; on the contrary, it will become more intense day by day. Faced with this growth that cannot be arrested, colonial statesmanship itself must make every endeavour to move forward. This task, however, cannot be limited to the measures of a purely economic nature for, without change of mentality, these germs of progress will find no suitable soil. Popular education therefore is necessary in every degree. An appeal must be made to Eastern energy to assist in keeping the expansion as uniform as possible. And no ready response can be expected to this appeal, unless the persons thus called upon have good grounds to expect that the efforts required from them will bring about an improvement in their own position. So far, those whose personal ability enabled them to distinguish themselves could count on no other encouragement on the part of the authorities than that of being incorporated in the government service. But are there no means by which not merely a few thousands of persons, but society as a whole, could be convinced that colonial policy really intends to open to everybody possibilities in which developing gifts can find suitable employment? Proof of good faith can only be given in the one direction where colonial policy really commands circumstances to a definite degree. By increased communication it has brought about harmony between world production and the economic needs of a growing large society. By education graduated up to the university, it has opened an intellectual sphere corresponding in width with the new economic sphere. By the creation of representative or partly responsible bodies culminating in an assembly which is really an advanced, though not yet complete, stage of parliamentary evolution, an equivalent advance has been made in the political direction. This is a deed which must draw our attention more than any other and remove all reasonable doubt as to the sincerity of colonial policy. The fact that there are still unsatisfied doubters in the East and conservative doubters in the West does not affect the wisdom of the policy adopted: it sees not only the present but also the future which is still hidden and towards which it is tracing a road.

To take as an example the establishment of the People's Council (the Central Legislative Assembly) in the Dutch East Indies. It cannot be said to be exclusively the embodiment of a desire to treat affairs of state in the limelight of publicity. Nor is it merely an attempt to make use for the public cause of numerous available Eastern and Western talents and capacities. Neither is it solely meant to provide rewards for Eastern loyalty and energy. Before anything else it is a promise given to the democratic unity of the future and a promise which proves the morality of colonial policy. It is, one might say, the creation of a magnetic field which removes all centrifugal tendencies from unitarian decentralisation and federalistic de-concentration, so as to teach every local consciousness how to move towards complete unity.

There are those however who think that the People's Council is more than a promise and that a semi-parliament is something too real and too drastic. They must learn to distinguish between the facts of the present day and the structural preparations that are being made for the future. As long as they cannot make this distinction they are exposed to the reverse mistake, made by some Eastern leaders, who imagine that the organic future is already realised in the mechanical present. In life and in society, that which is slowly passes into that which is going to be, and no sharp demarcation can be made between the present and the future. Once this is realised, and even if some difficulties are still felt about the method adopted, one will not be inclined to withdraw one's support from colonial policy. It will be understood that in the midst of the practice of life, this policy has to establish a balance between the present and the future. In this way the golden mean can be found, and it will with growing certainty present itself as the one way to be followed. The true policy of the present and of the future will then have been determined. The key to its success, the secret of the great world empires of antiquity which existed before East and West had become distinct, is the recognition of the kinship of mankind as a whole, the utter rejection of racial pride and of racial dualism which might be based upon discrimination instead of resting upon different needs. In the latter case the policy of synthesis will, of course, have to distinguish and should therefore not be considered to be applying intolerant discrimination, but, on the contrary, a most tolerant and wise dif-

ferentiation fitting in with the actual needs and aspirations of the various sections of the people.

If Aristotle's advice had been followed and if the original discriminating dualism between Roman citizens and non-Roman subjects had been perpetuated, if the policy of the Omayyad Caliphs had been continued, and the racialists on both sides had not buried the hatchet under the Abbasids, the embittered centrifugal forces would soon have broken up the despotic unity imposed from above and would have put an end to the expansion of any cultural or religious idea and even of political power and organisation. The actual location of these cultural nuclei would have disappeared. If the fair coloured Aryans had not, in India, desisted from their arrogant superiority towards those of a dark colour; if in China, the assimilated barbarians had not been admitted to complete citizenship, we may be sure that the great Hinduistic and Chinese cultures, far from spreading over immense parts of Asia, Japan, and the Malay Archipelago, would never have reached one hundred miles beyond their birthplace.

When discussing the method by which any synthesis or expansion of culture can be realised, one must never lose sight of the fact that racialism is not a characteristic only of our own West. We have quoted the opinion of ethnologists, who show how even the naked Australian feels himself vastly superior to other people; the vanity and self-sufficiency of human beings, not only racially and nationally, but even towards their nearest neighbours, would almost seem to be incurable. National, racial, and cultural consciousness, under the pressure and the contempt of foreign masters, frequently builds up for itself a defence which consists in a one-sided admiration for its own past. The more the racial arrogance of the dominating people excites the resentment of the conquered, the more unnatural and unreal will be the form given by the latter to the praise they bestow upon themselves. There is no greater obstacle to the realisation of the principles of synthesis than this frame of mind.

A certain consciousness and a conviction that one is treading the right road is indispensable to every human being, to every nation, and every religion. But this road need not be the same for everybody, even though in every case it makes for an upward direction. There is no place in the policy of synthesis for discrimi-

nation and for incrimination. But there certainly is room for the objective study of difference in inclination and tendency, of national characteristics, of social and cultural aspirations, so that, without passion or partisanship, a common endeavour can be made to discover the right form of division of labour and of co-operation, and to determine the limits of the share which everyone, in the East and in the West, must sooner or later take in this great co-operation. May this historical sketch have contributed somewhat to establish, by the side of the lessons we have already been taught by modern science, the conviction that everybody, whether of the East or of the West, has to follow the example which has already been set in so many respects by colonial policy.

Thus it is that, before the searching glance of the East and of the West, contemporary colonial policy deserves to be placed not only by the side, but in front of the policy of the ancients, as a genuine exponent of the doctrine of synthesis. Instead of an isolated empire, which outwardly knows only enemies and barbarians, and inwardly only provinces, there now stands a world community which has for its task the preparation of the great political world-union that is needed by the growing nations, and towards which the spirit of the West is moving. Colonial policy aims at the development of forces in the soil of the nations themselves in order to enable them, in their own interest and in that of the future world-community, to develop all the possibilities that are within them and that will allow them to shape their own forms of life.

CHAPTER VII

THE MODERNISATION OF EASTERN STATES

"Be faithful to thy Ruler and
obedient to thy parents."

Japanese Proverb.

The great directive of modernisation

Loyalty and piety are the two pillars which, in the dim past, supported mighty empires. Loyalty to the deified Ruler has everywhere been the spiritual cement for numerous communities and conglomerations which otherwise had no more than a sense of local cohesion. It embodied those universally human elements, the sense of distance and the power of reverence. In the religious and cultural units which were edified, for instance, in China and in Japan, these pillars rose taller and taller and grew in girth in the course of centuries. But, as everywhere else in the world, they reached at last their maximum carrying power. Here and there they are breaking down under the burden of modern society, but everywhere also new pillars are being constructed with feverish haste.

There are great dangers connected with these changes. It is so easy to over-estimate the strength of the new supports, and to discard prematurely the gigantic structures of antiquity, while others would like to cling to the old, even when it has become superannuated. Both parties, nevertheless, are not unwilling to reach a compromise, because, after all, they both want the same thing. The new architectural plans are accepted, but one section of the builders agrees to preserve all the old material that can possibly be utilised, while the other agrees not to sacrifice the harmony of the structure of the future to any worship of the past. We know, of course, that there is abundance of material available in

the old constructions, such as can be found nowhere else in the world. We are not only interested spectators who have come in order to pick up such information as becomes available; we want to learn everything that can help us and our overseas collaborators in the construction of the new edifice.

It will not be necessary to study every single one of these Eastern structures: to examine three or four will be sufficient. But before we turn to the leaders and industrious builders of these independent Oriental nations and ask them to define their standpoint towards the problem of synthesis, we must make a general remark regarding the nature and the absolute necessity of the evolution of the East along the path of synthesis. West and East are often hampered in their progress towards the synthesis of cultures by those who misinterpret the modern powerful dynamism and oppose to it the contemplation born from the religious feeling of mystical unity, which they consider to be the special characteristic of the East. As a matter of fact, there is no reason to oppose action to contemplation, because creation itself manifests the perfect harmony of the oneness to which all contemplation returns, and the continuous action from which all existing differences have sprung. The feeling of mystical unity, divorcing itself from action, tries to dissolve these differences within its quiet shadows instead of accepting them in the real spirit of truth, and reducing them to ordered unity. Pantheism of sentiment is a precious gift to human nature, but it is no more superior to active dynamism than the internationalism of the Middle Ages is to the living, dynamic internationalism of our own day.

In the interest of real constructive work we should make a stand against undue criticism of so-called Western materialism, i.e., we should establish a distinction between materialism and the conquest of matter, the frigid intellect and the harmony of reason and feeling, between hasty restlessness and self-possessed energy. We must be able to see how the most powerful spiritual forces have created Western science, organisation and technique and are now preserving them. The old Ku Hung-Ming, one of China's most remarkable thinkers, understood Western Science better than many a Western observer. "What impelled those men of science of Europe and what made them succeed in their work for the advancement of science", he says, "was because they felt in

their souls the need of understanding the awful mystery of the wonderful universe in which we live" ¹).

Let us mention only in passing that all criticism which misrepresents the Western love of Truth, from which its science, technique and organisation are really born, is also directed against the respectable labours of the great Eastern leaders and workers, who are none the less great for not having written or lectured on Eastern art, metaphysics, and philosophy. Why does no one speak of an Indian like Gupta, or about hundreds like him in India, China, and the Dutch East Indies? Is it nothing to devote one's whole life to the provision of good drinking water, which will enable hundreds of thousands of mothers to keep their children alive? Is it nothing to fight usury by founding co-operative organisations so as to save innumerable households from care and from bondage? Why should one honour only the Eastern poet and sage, and not the Eastern worker? Is he too matter of fact to deserve attention?

Stating the problem

The West, guided by its love of Truth, is building the moral basis for the great society of the future in the colonial world. Gradually it is able to teach all unnecessary exclusiveness how to lift itself up to the acceptance of wider units, and to coalesce into organically constructed federal and co-operative solidarities. This is the real task of colonial policy. Its nature is thoroughly moral in its aims, whether it be by spiritual or by material means that the authorities and their collaborators try to achieve them. Both kinds of means are necessary, if the aims are to be achieved, while there is no other way to maintain the balance between them. Spiritual development is not only threatened by materialism, but, at least for the time being, and to a far greater extent, by dependence upon matter, which only reluctantly allows its secrets to be torn from it. The misguided idealism which imagines that it is fighting materialism by objecting to the subjection of nature does nothing more than hinder the spirit of the West in its efforts to emancipate itself and others from matter. Our labour will therefore have to consist in easing the pressure exercised by matter, embodied in the thralldom to nature and in ignorance, and further in breaking

¹) *The Spirit of the Chinese People*, 1915, p. 17.

away the prison walls of spiritual, moral, and social restriction built up by the influences of environment.

Precisely the same considerations apply to the constructive labour which is taking place in the independent Eastern States. There, too, the work of synthesis is being performed. The same conviction which keeps us going helps the workers in those countries. It is only now that, the last hesitations and doubts having been removed, we can contemplate these struggles and feel unreserved sympathy for these companions in arms in their struggle with difficulties we know so well. Let us then turn our attention once more to the Eastern battlefield. In the East as in the West the only relation that really matters for the evolution of mankind is that between the individual and society. This is the social aspect of the problem, and in truth it is nothing but the expression of internal, spiritual, and moral forces. Patriotism, civic sense, group loyalty, mystical connection with the supernatural, with the world-order or with the Almighty, all these loyalties are born from the same human aptitude: they all bear a spiritual character which, in the West as well as in the East, is really rooted in religious feeling.

Intellectual morality has no roots. There is no omen more sinister than the preference given to the term "intellectuals" for designating those Orientals who have filled their brains with knowledge, but failed to observe and appreciate the household, the religion, the culture and the ethics of the West. That Western education should have such fatal effects is by no means an unavoidable thing: on the contrary, Western knowledge is one of the indispensable elements for the widening of the sphere of applied morality in our own societies as well as in those of the East. Traffic is another and equally indispensable means, although the narrow-mindedness of some idealists, who consider that railways, transport systems, etc., are not worthy of their attention, would have it otherwise. For without a good transport system no League of Nations organisation could be of the slightest use, the ideals of world fraternity could never be brought nearer realisation, and synthesis would forever remain a visionary conception.

In what follows we shall therefore study the means applied in independent Eastern States in order to activate their own moral and spiritual values, through the use of social, democratic and

humanitarian ideas, and to expand them into a social sphere that is as wide and as high as possible. We shall examine, with the same idea, the material and technical resources that are being used as incentives with which to enhance moral and spiritual capacities. Until recently these resources consisted of reverence towards the Ruler, who was the deputy of the Almighty, and of obedience towards the parents, a category which included all those whom age, or family and clan relationships had placed above the individual. We shall first analyse the ancient functions of these moral pillars in Eastern states and the evolution which they proved able to support by their own unaided force, while afterwards we shall stop at the changes and adaptations made necessary by the modern era.

Distinction between person and function

The thousands of group-loyalties, supported by piety, were quite prepared in their turn to revere the representative of Heaven. The Ruler indeed had only to concentrate upon the execution of his heavenly mandate, his *dharma*, by setting the example in accordance with the will of Heaven, so as to perpetuate the harmony which consists within the Empire, in maintaining peace and order, and, above the Empire, in keeping the population in tune with the world-order. When floods, drought or famine visits the land, the people feel that the harmony has been disturbed and look with confidence towards the Ruler who must restore it. If he fails, the people will soon discover that some of his actions have been the cause of the disturbance. If things go wrong still further, the conclusion will impose itself that Heaven has withdrawn its mandate. Loyalty then is no longer considered a religious duty which has to be observed in the individual group's interest. When the banner of rebellion is raised, hundreds of thousands will follow it and if the dynasty falls its mandate will be held to have passed to the victor. The result is only too frequently deemed to justify pious interpretations with a retrospective effect. He who is victor, the saying goes, is Emperor, he who is defeated must be executed as a rebel. Which does not alter the fact that loyalty towards the Ruler and obedience towards the parents—who include elders and heads of groups—forms the basis of public order, of all personal and collective virtues, and even of the continuity of culture.

This characterisation is of course somewhat simplified, and is not true in every particular. For at bottom it is not the concrete person who is concerned, but the function, the dignity, which, in its turn, is identified with the person who bears it. Now this may seem a case of hair-splitting, and yet it is of fundamental importance, because it introduces a nuance which places due emphasis upon the moral duties imposed upon the person by the function. The person's conscience, and public opinion also, realise this most precisely: they know whether the function of the Ruler, the official or the group-leader is performed in accordance with the standard imposed by these dignities. Due importance has to be attached to this public opinion.

On the whole, this consciousness maintains the personal relationship upon a moral level. Very much, indeed, will be tolerated from the person, for the sake of his function, because in principle those who owe piety and loyalty to that function have to obey as a private soldier must obey an officer. Only, the undefined moral rule and public opinion mount careful guard against excesses. Parents, chiefs, elders, teachers and officials are obeyed and honoured, apart even from their personal talents and character, as bearers of authority or as local representatives of the sacred power of the Ruler. Morality, therefore, is embodied in personal relations, whose reverent acceptance is in practice the whole of morality. There is no Western virtue but finds its counterpart in the East; but the cardinal virtue which all but absorbs these virtues demands the practice of morality within definite human relationships, which fall mainly inside the family, the clan or the caste.

It is natural therefore that on occasion this cardinal virtue should clash with other virtues: filial obedience and the faithful performance of civic duty cannot always co-exist. History reveals many an example of founders of new dynasties who, for the sake of justice, made themselves guilty of rebellion and of unfaithfulness to the cardinal virtue. This proves that moral conflicts sometimes arise, and may be approved of by public opinion. If the rebel is victorious, abstract justice is placed above the cardinal virtue of loyalty. But such exceptions do not affect the general rule: for the vast majority the demands of morality are embodied in definite relationships. It is but rarely that the individual will dare to

put his personal convictions against those of the community. The West itself has preserved one case where the individual is similarly precluded from the exercise of his own judgement: if in a country which provoked a war with its neighbour a just man enlisted in the enemy's army, even his best friends would brand him as a traitor.

The clan and the state

This parallel case can enable us to understand the group-mentality a little better. In the East the group is considered by its members much in the same light as we consider the fatherland. There are exceptions, no doubt, but in a moral conflict the chances are very considerable that a just man who renounces his little fatherland will be despised, punished, and cast out as a traitor. The result of this exclusive partiality is that the existence of a mediating third party becomes indispensable. Usually it will be the headman of the village, or one or more of the elders, or even the elders of a neutral village or clan. This third person will settle delicate matters and arbitrate in disputes and conflicts.

The clan spirit, so general in the East ¹⁾, tends to spread across the world wherever society is in a stage of evolution which still clings to genealogical relationships as social units. It tends to impart itself to all other forms of organisation. To the individual it lends a powerful support throughout life. It knows how to unfold great organising powers in the service of the group interest and against outsiders. To realise that union is might is indispensable wisdom for a static and mainly agrarian community, but as soon as evolution makes higher demands the limitations of this philosophy become evident.

Such union, indeed, always implies exclusiveness towards outsiders, a restriction which considerably limits the capacity for co-operation in the frame of a great society or a large organisation. It further implies the very marked dependence of the individual upon his group, to whose views he must usually sacrifice himself. A modern community can therefore not be based upon the ancient group connection. The persons who are called upon to perform the task of the higher authorities need greater freedom from the group

¹⁾ De Groot, *Het Kongsziwezen van Borneo*, 1885, pp. 103 sqq. Morse, *The Guilds of China*, p. 53.

connection. If in the West there is so much cause for complaint against party-spirit, how much greater will be the restrictions imposed upon politicians, officials, and industrial leaders by this group spirit! We, who have been able to entrust our judges with such large independence, because we can accept their integrity as the corner-stone of our judicial system, still recognise that, if related to one of the contending parties, a judge cannot be expected to sit. It is not that we doubt his impartiality, any more than we believe that a policeman would refuse to arrest his own brother or a customs officer to prevent his father from smuggling. When they act thus, these officials will be certain of the support of public opinion, especially if their task is particularly odious. Indeed, if an exception is made for international conflicts, we are able to fulfil the duties imposed by our conscience without fear or favour.

At the moment when modern state-development leads a country to the transition from group-organisation to the great society, we may expect to see an outbreak of nepotism, which, in independent countries, devoid of a strong central authority, must inevitably bring about internecine civil war during the period of transition. In official as in business circles the tradition of centuries has identified loyalty with personal relations and collective responsibilities towards the group. Let us therefore not pride ourselves upon our greater freedom from nepotism: it is no more than the automatic result of the powers of expansion which accompany social evolution. The example of the Caliph Omar, who placed able *maulas* above incapable Arabs, the democratic examination system in China, which opened exalted situations even to the poorest, and the rule frequently observed in the East, according to which descendants of princes of the blood became commoners after a few generations, all prove that merit did not always escape attention, and that birth did not open every gate in the East.

An Oriental state finds it possible by means such as these to create a certain counterpoise to the influence of nepotism. Nevertheless the social order continues to place the able man whose merit has brought him to a condition of power under manifold obligations towards his relatives and his friends. In a static society, where the power of the Ruler spreads over thousands of all but autonomous villages, stern morality such as exists within this

smaller circle is, however, the only and obvious means by which men can secure as much order, contentment, and harmony as are available within such an organisation. As long as no robber bands, floods, etc., demand co-operation on a much larger scale, the power of moral tension continues to be balanced by the claims of environment.

Everything, indeed, which transcends the small popular circles belongs to the duties of the Ruler. It is his duty to secure harmony within his dominions, with the world order above, to see to it that the calendar is drawn up, that the seasons are indicated, that the functions of jurisdiction and administration shall be performed. He would be unable to fulfil his task if the heads of the groups did not feel bound towards him by a piety similar to that which members of their group feel towards them. It is this loyalty to a higher order which links up all these thousands of detached units into a religious and political unity. In an agrarian country this order is, on the whole, perfectly able to satisfy all needs. In normal times it answers completely to the demands of morality.

As soon as social differentiation arises, and trade and industry call into existence numerous special groups, there is an urgent need for new expressions of the social morality, which embody themselves in the organisation of unions and of guilds. This change took place in China in ancient times, and more markedly in Japan from about 1600 A.D. At once, upon such a change taking place, it appears that the moral capacities which had had little opportunity to display themselves in the restricted frame of the closed households of agrarian communities, are capable of much greater tension and mobility than could have been suspected before. Such manifestations are of the utmost importance, because they give an indication of the powers which are everywhere latent, and which will, in the future, have to support the great Eastern democracies.

In a society which is mainly agrarian, these indications are found already in the loyalty towards the Ruler which enables the group leaders to place themselves above the interests of their group. No doubt, when these two loyalties clash, there arises a very delicate dilemma. Usually, however, something quite different from a question of competence or of authority is implied. For the Ruler represents the highest order and is identified by reli-

gious sentiment with the world-order, so that, in principle at any rate, there can never be a question about precedence between the two loyalties. None the less, the more powerful clans occasionally allow themselves to take another view of the matter.

Especially in Japan, where the feudal system brought the application of this principle, which applied especially to the vassal-princes, within the daily ken of the whole population, fidelity became so exalted a virtue that, especially in the circles of the *Samurai*, it transcended by far all piety or group loyalty. A faithful vassal, it was said, must be ready to kill his father, if the duties of chivalry command him to do this. "Fidelity knows no blood-relationship." This, of course, was only a manner of speaking, but the proverb emphasised the duty of loyalty towards a higher order, which was so thoroughly accepted in Japan that rebellion against the Ruler, which is allowed by Chinese morality, was not even tolerated *ex hypothesi*. The ordinary population may not have had a clear and conscious conception of the duty of loyalty. Obedience, according to these notions, was a rather passive and self-evident proposition. As, moreover, the absolute will of the Ruler carefully refrained from far-reaching interference, dilemmas but seldom arose in the course of everyday life. It was enough that the presence of a higher power was felt. Yet this morality, which imposed little or no action, was the creator of a consciousness which greatly facilitated the acceptance of the duties imposed by the advent of the modern era. Whenever it could be maintained, it proved itself to be a powerful lever which gradually and surely raises millions to the level of a strong civic sense, of patriotism, and of personality.

Towns and the clan spirit.

Let us now consider what happened when trade and traffic broke away from the more closed economy of agrarian communities. The mighty clans and the popular authority of the village communities were to a great extent excluded from the towns, because feudal and official authority existed to a much more marked degree in the towns than elsewhere. The instinct for cohesion now concentrated itself in the much less autonomous organisations of wards and of the trade corporations, which in many respects remind one of the European medieval guilds. If the urban

population had been able to break the ward-connection and had acquired municipal rights as in Europe, there is no doubt that they could, through the guilds which were continually increasing in strength, have developed an urban patriciate and that in the East also big Hansa towns would have arisen.

The autocratic and bureaucratic authorities unhappily did not allow this development, with the result that the townspeople remained embedded in their ward-organisation, while the guilds continued as purely professional bodies whose activities were restricted to matters of trade and industry. There was no single way open, therefore, to the full development of a conscious urban citizenship. In China the town remained a collection of villages with their own elders, who were as jealous of their prerogatives as were isolated villages. The wards resented any encroachment upon their rights. No real estate could be transferred without their approval, and often they were separated from each other by gates that were closed at night! It is true that the position of the ward-elders was somewhat restricted by the near presence of officials and representatives of the central government, although any attempt on the part of the latter seriously to interfere with acquired privileges was immediately resisted and usually prevented ¹⁾. Family connections moreover soon crept into the town, if they had not been present there from the earliest days of its growth. It was not long before the members of the guilds found that the professional connection merely replaced the clan connection.

Such complete dependence utterly prevented the growth of a conscious bourgeoisie. There was, in China and Japan, no struggle between feudalism and the central power, such as gave the European bourgeoisie the opportunity of exacting its privileges. When, after 1600, the development of trade and industry started in Japan, so that the rise of a free and powerful urban bourgeoisie might have become possible, there remained scarcely any question of feudal independence from the *shoguns*, who governed in the name of the Emperor. The bourgeoisie therefore could nowhere find a gap in which to place the thin end of the wedge that could have broken through the wall of absolutism and feudalism.

¹⁾ Williams, *China, Yesterday and To-day*, p. 151.

Towns and guilds

Such subtle shades, which often can scarcely be detected, hide dominating influences which may decide for ages to come the fate of whole populations. In Europe, during the period of the greatest guild activity, sovereigns were playing their peoples against the pretensions of the feudal nobility, which in its turn was often driven to ally itself with the burgesses against the centralising power of the King; while the people, conscious of their own claims, were often provided, now by the King, now by their feudal lords, with weapons by which they were enabled to secure a further step towards the municipal autonomy they ultimately reached. Thus it was possible that, in England, the common law should develop under the impulse of the people and become the paramount law of the Realm ¹⁾. Only in circumstances such as these or in the independent city states of antiquity, was such a growth of democratic consciousness, which carried it far beyond the exiguous frame of village republics, possible. In China such a possibility existed before the Ch'in dynasty (about 250 B.C.) which finally broke away from the feudal system. In Japan it existed until 1600 when the Tokugawa Shogunate seriously attacked feudalism. Before 1600, when in other respects circumstances were favourable, the country was still ignorant of commercial traffic and of money-economy. The Shogun took care to leave nearly all important commercial towns outside the fiefs of the Daimyos, so as to keep the economic power of the guilds, which were rapidly developing in these towns, entirely dependent upon himself ²⁾. In 1723 Yedo had already over half a million inhabitants, in 1787 nearly 2,300,000, while Osaka in 1665 had already nearly 300,000 inhabitants. What an excellent school for democracy, and how much wider a field for the development of freedom, initiative, and personality these towns might have been than the little village republics, if only circumstances had favoured them as in Europe! In Japanese towns a moneyed aristocracy came into existence, to which most Daimyos and Samurai became indebted, but this was not the way by which popular authority could become established.

Notwithstanding the existence of all these partitions the guilds

¹⁾ Morse, *op. cit.* p. 2.

²⁾ Miss Matsuyo Takizawa, *The Penetration of Money Economy in Japan and its Effects upon Social and Political Institutions*, 1927, pp. 51 sqq.

gave, both in China and in Japan, the best proofs of great organising talents. They regulated literally everything which concerned their trade and their activities, such as prices, quality, measures, market conditions, trade usages, holidays, the number of apprentices and the duration of apprenticeship. Their influence obtained facilities for trade, sometimes far away in the hinterland, such as no individual could ever have acquired. They mediated in all disputes between their members and tried to arbitrate also in cases where their members were involved with outsiders. They knew how to maintain an iron discipline by penalties, boycott, and expulsion, which meant economic ruin for the person affected. They protected, by their unanimity, the interests of their individual members. Even the powerful officialdom of imperial China could as little afford to enter into conflict with them as it could risk a clash with the clans of the countryside.

In the towns the guilds were therefore a bulwark against autocratic arbitrariness, as were the clans in the country, especially in South China. But it was to these circumstances that they owed their absolute dominion over the individual. "In Europe," says Morse ¹⁾, "the guildsman was also a burgess, and could appeal to the commune — the whole body of burgesses — to protect him from oppression by a portion only of the community. In China his only appeal for protection is to his own guild which is oppressing him. The Chinese guildsman has thus been debarred from transferring his activities to municipal Government in which he has no share or influence, and has been driven, if he would secure the protection necessary for his trading or his industry, to increase the strength of his guild in every way. The result is that he is helpless against the strength of his own making." The growth of the personality was therefore not as much benefited as it would have been in other circumstances.

The town did not give what it gave the West, but it gave an opportunity to apply, in a democratic way and on a somewhat larger scale, the capacity of co-operation which had been acquired in the genealogical communities. In the town of Newchwang, for instance, the principal Chinese bankers and merchants had founded the "Great Guild" which regulated local trade for the common benefit, in such a way that the whole commercial movement of

¹⁾ *op. cit.* pp. 5—6.

the town, and not only the special activity of one trade, was dominated by them. When commercial interests coincided so completely with the town itself, it is not surprising that, by the side of the guild activity, a highly useful communal interference came into existence: streets, drains, water-reservoirs, the control of common lands, poor-relief and charity became concerns of this unofficial municipality. Elsewhere such a development was rare. What really matters is that every widening of scope at once reveals the existence of a strong power of tension which can be applied forthwith, and which, in the future, will certainly also be adaptable to the larger horizons which are beginning to disclose themselves in Eastern states.

The group and personal initiative

Economically, the guild connection enveloped the separate private enterprises. But the creation of big trading, shipping, industrial or agricultural concerns, for which a dynamic relationship would have been the pre-requisite, was unthinkable in the circumstances which have been outlined. Apart from a few big firms, whose prosperity, both in China and in Japan, was usually due to connections with the feudal or official world, for instance by their being based upon the farming out of the rice tribute, the household on family capital available for somewhat extensive business undertakings was usually very restricted. The joint stock company, the secret of big enterprise in the West, which enables tens of thousands of people, unknown to each other, to call into existence vast organisations by putting in common their individually restricted means, could not be born in an environment where the family remained the basis of co-operation, while towards outsiders, personal confidence or the responsibility of the family and the clan formed the only basis of credit ¹⁾.

In so far as the family was able to fill the important posts in the business it was running with its intellect and its own energy, and could furthermore incorporate a number of outsiders by granting them admission, through personal connection, into its patriarchal circle, expansion of the business was possible. Beyond the possible limit of this enlargement further growth was inconceivable. In Japan there was a custom, which still exists, of streng-

¹⁾ D. K. Lieu, *China's Industries and Finance*.

thening the capacity of families which run a big business by adopting some of the ablest employees. This archaic social organisation gives the East an excellent way of adapting itself to demands which Western people find it by no means easy to satisfy. Indeed, it is amazing sometimes to observe how venerable archaic traditions have a way of becoming a suitable basis for ultra-modern forms of organisation. Here, indeed, is a proof that we need not listen too anxiously to those who would discard the old without further ado.

Such forms, on the other hand, also have the defects of their qualities. The family and the guild both stifle personal freedom and especially personal initiative: in other words, the development of strong personalities. Every phase in the evolution of the West is attributable to personal initiative, which is the secret of its progress and will remain the decisive element for its whole future. During the period of transition, while the East is catching up with the scientific, technical, and organising advance of the West, its preference for group-connections may be considered an advantage rather than an inconvenience. But, once the arrears have been made up, it will be essential for personality to become the social unit in every respect. No doubt there will be pessimists ready to declare that personality in this sense must never be expected from Eastern nations. This is a mistaken view. Social structure is the primary factor in determining the existence of personalities. When it changes, initiative will be set free. As long as Europe clung to the mechanical solidarity of genealogical, territorial and guild connections, personality found no place within its system. As Ashley put it: "Speaking generally, we may say that, in the late Middle Ages, the time had not yet come for the free play of individual enterprise ¹⁾."

In the East of to-day the group still dominates in all kinds of ways. Apart from a group the individual, e.g. the emigrant in a foreign country, feels absolutely derelict. But this situation is not destined to last for ever. Visibly, a change is taking place, and every modification in this respect is a symptom of interior mutations which are the concomitant of an entirely new attitude towards life. The power which will support this many sided evolution,

¹⁾ W. J. Ashley, *An Introduction to English Economic History and Theory*, 1906, I, p. 168.

which is being prepared in the colonial world also, is morality, and nothing else. Had this element not been found in the group organisation of the East, even the presence of thousands of men of genius would not have prevented the situation from being utterly hopeless. But it is visible, in the shape of filial obedience which can call forth the greatest virtues and sacrifices, of loyalty to the Ruler outside the group, and of loyal *esprit de corps* in business relationships. The three dominating aspects of morality, the social, the political, and the functional, which are the indispensable basis for the construction of a great society, are therefore present in the East.

It should not be thought that by some mysterious process personality will suddenly be made to spring from the group. Wisely led, circumstances themselves will take care that it appears. How many a dejected emigrant, who at home never thought independently of his surroundings, and who would never have displayed any initiative, has suddenly shown the greatest resilience, once he had escaped from group-oppressiveness. Unexpectedly, he displays energy and initiative of the highest order. The more the East is able to give room to developing personalities, the more also will it be capable of developing strong activity, tenacious energy, and rich initiative in every direction. Apart even from the case of those who escape the pressure of the group by emigration one sees every day how in the East itself opportunity creates personalities. The elders of the family and of the villages, the officials, the heads of big enterprises, by no means make the impression of being dependent and derivative souls. As soon therefore as society has become more differentiated, hundreds of people will be made to bear responsibility from an early age, instead of the few who are doing so now, usually in their maturer years. This circumstance by itself illustrates the process which is taking place and which will become increasingly observable during the period of transition, when the Eastern group-connection begins to pick up the burdens of ultra-modern forms of organisation and starts its upward march. Everyone who collaborates in modern enterprises acquires a much wider horizon by his work and his responsibility. The spirit of the West, which never reveals itself to the group, but only to the personality, allows itself to be carried uphill by the group, when it hides under the shape of modern organisations.

There is no need for it to attack the family or the group loyalty. But before the ascent has been half accomplished, it will be possible to make the existence and growth of the personality entirely acceptable to the group. There may be doubts or hesitations, but they will not be able to modify the process. When this stage has been reached, the personality which has reached consciousness no longer sees only the group and its traditions, but the whole mobility of social fluctuation and the patriotic idea which links them all up. It no longer sees merely the interest of the group, but the progress of society as a whole: and it is especially thereby that a strong active civic sense and patriotism can be born, by which the sense of unity, which had formerly been passively accepted, now becomes activated into a powerful consciousness permeated with the spirit of endeavour. This spirit, moreover, is able to re-create the mystical connection with the deified Ruler into a sense of reverence for the Ruler's dignity, lifting it up into a new reverence which is in tune with human dignity and with the reverence due to the Almighty.

From group to personality

When an Eastern Government builds up great state services such as the post, the telephone, the telegraph, railways, an army, a navy, branches of the civil service, state monopolies, irrigation, forestry, mines, agriculture, etc., and fosters the development of big private shipping, industrial, commercial, and banking organisations, it is looking after the material interests of the population. But it does more than that, it gives to the group-connection a wider field of action, of energy and initiative, and the indispensable opportunity of dissolving itself into personalities, which, without abjuring their connection with the smaller group, accept a wider sphere as the criterion for their thoughts and actions. Even the weaker members of the group will gradually look up to this higher order as an inspiration of their morality. Rigid conservatism thus loses its hold upon the members of the group. For the horizon of the old group was restricted; its seclusion made all change depend upon some exceptional spontaneous initiative. By the time the person who possessed such initiative had reached a position of responsibility he often had already been paralysed by the current inertia. As soon as this seclusion disappears, as will

automatically be the case when society begins to admit differentiation, initiative is liberated from its trammels. Modern organisation therefore means very much for the personality.

In agrarian communities the absence of large organisation enables the group-connection to survive much longer. The most energetic members therefore leave the country-side. In Japan the migration from the country to the rising commercial towns became very pronounced about 1700, and the authorities, notwithstanding the very drastic measures they took, proved entirely powerless. By the end of the eighteenth century the increase of waste land and the fall of the village population had become a serious problem¹⁾. We now hear serious complaints about the same evil in India. It is of course, an unhealthy development; the sounder way is for the countryside to be given a wider horizon. This can be done by encouraging popular education, modern co-operation and autonomy, and by providing a good railway-net and roads, so as to combat social and economic seclusion. As we have already seen in the fourth chapter, the spirit of the town must be brought to the countryside.

It is of importance, of course, that this evolution should never attack the germs of morality, but should instead stimulate them to grow, so as to be able to support the evolution in all its phases. Happy the country which, resting upon pillars both of piety within the group and of loyalty towards the Ruler, is ready for the period of transition. Innumerable clashes and catastrophes will be avoided, while the new construction is rising, and when, at last, the height of the ancient building has been reached, the whole burden can be transferred to the new organic forces which can still rise higher. The presence of these two pillars will enable those who remain outside the influence of the new era, or who cannot approve of it, to satisfy in their own way, as good members of the community, all the new demands of citizenship and patriotism. Those, however, who are able to see a wider horizon, will be in a position either to find a place in the new edifice apart from their group, or else, while remaining in their group, to establish contacts which will lead to the change from the old into the new.

It is especially in the countryside that this function is so enormously important. In the town it is the group itself which bears the

¹⁾ Takizawa, *op. cit.* pp. 80 sqq.

burden of evolution, but in rural surroundings this is the task of energetic personalities. The phalanx of which they form the apex is supported by the influence of the town, world traffic, the press, etc. Time works for them, but this does not alter the fact that their labour is exceedingly heavy and often ungrateful. They are the links between the authorities and the millions. It is owing to their endeavours that administrative measures are not rejected with ill-will by the population. They must therefore on no account be altogether removed from their rural surroundings, which, without their presence, would remain obdurate in their conservatism and their seclusion, and display more markedly every day their contrast with the centres of progress. The balance would be disturbed, and, moreover, the delay of all progress among the agricultural millions would cause stagnation and a consequent loss of the co-operation which is so necessary for good administration.

Everywhere the swelling tide of world traffic makes demands which sometimes necessitate an immediate intervention on the part of the authorities, without their being able to wait for the appearance of activity on the part of the population. No population likes this kind of interference: it makes them dissatisfied and rebellious. In such circumstances one can see how the old pillar and the new supports are really together saving the new edifice from collapse. Reverence for the absolute Ruler will move the population to submit to much that is mistakenly felt to be tyranny. Religious reverence, which also supports the group connection, will enable it to bear what is only an appearance of despotism, after it has borne so much real and selfish despotism in ages past. But persons who, living among these populations, are able to identify the deputy of the Ruler or the authority of the state with the national interest, see altogether different grounds for the measures of the government. They will endeavour to make their surroundings accept the view that the so-called tyrannical interference really proceeds from paternal interest, which must be accepted for that reason. If this leaven of enlightened persons is not available, there is every chance that sooner or later particularism will grow tired of interference, and, preferring the traditions of the group, will pass to open resistance.

National and colonial governments

A colonial government has to be much more careful not to offend the traditions and the authority of the groups than a national government, because its authority lacks the sacred character of the latter. It even deliberately lays aside many rules of etiquette for which it prefers more democratic forms. Nevertheless, even the Eastern Rulers who are the object of religious reverence, and to a larger extent still the leaders or groups of leaders who have been invested with republican authority or dictatorial powers, must take the forces of particularism into account, especially if, within the group loyalties, there are not yet to be found those enlightened persons who can assist in reducing the distance between conservatism and the Ruler's enlightenment.

No colonial authorities could possibly take measures such as have been taken by the President of Turkey. World-opinion would condemn them as a forced abolition of Eastern traditions and as over-hasty modernisation. The contrast would at once acquire a sharper form, because all kinds of racial and religious ends would be attributed to the foreign authorities. It is indeed a grievous mistake to imagine that the iconoclasts who attack Eastern loyalty, traditions, and religious forms are found in the colonial world for the excellent reason that prudence is, on the above mentioned grounds, much more required from Western administrators than from other supporters of the idea of synthesis. Though they may require no marks of outward reverence to be shown to themselves, they take good care to interfere as little as possible with the ancient group-loyalties and with the reverence for the sacred person of Eastern Rulers. This is why hundreds of princes still exist in the colonial world, especially in India and in the Dutch East Indies, although annexation of their domains would have presented few difficulties.

The Western authorities must also treat with the utmost circumspection customary law and the institutions which are connected with religion. But it would be a mistake to conclude therefrom that all Western authorities should as soon as possible make way for an Eastern Ruler to be appointed in their place. There would be no point in this, seeing that this new Ruler would not have the sanction of consecrated tradition. Besides, there would be other drawbacks to such a substitution. If in India or in the

Dutch East Indies an ancient dynasty reigning over the whole territory had been able to maintain itself under British or Dutch rule, the attachment of the population to the deified Ruler would have assisted the process of evolution to a marked degree, if he had decided to put his power at the service of enlightenment. Such devotion to the popular good has been displayed by the Rulers of Japan and of Siam.

There is, however, much division in the colonial world, a parcelling up into large, lesser, average-sized, small and miniature principalities. In Japan and in Siam more favourable conditions obtained. This would also have been true in China, before 1911, had the ruling dynasty not been foreign. If there had been a national dynasty, awakening patriotism would undoubtedly have rallied round an enlightened Emperor, and the state-conception would without much friction have evolved out of religious reverence. The fact that in the prevailing circumstances China was bound to lose its dynasty made the evolution more difficult. The gigantic proportions of the empire, moreover, contributed to the same result. Such facts might well be meditated by those who so glibly talk on incapacity when, in the East, an ordered state does not immediately rise up from the ruins of its predecessor.

China's task is gigantic. No state on earth, apart from the colonial world, has ever borne such a burden as now rests on the shoulders of China's leaders. Considering the difficulties that must be contended with, it is astounding that in the course of a few years such a strong national consciousness has grown up, and that in some provinces a foundation for a healthy organisation has been laid. National consciousness is the pillar which must take the place of loyalty to the Emperor. Of course, in the period of transition which began in 1911, clashes between individual ambitions that had suddenly lost their centre of attraction were inevitable. Every person invested with power was exposed to centrifugal tendencies. But it is owing to the national conception of an educated *élite*, supported by the sense of cultural unity which permeates every layer of the population, that political unity has since, by much labour and struggle, been realised again to some extent. It is only then that real reconstruction can begin, resting upon the ancient morality embodied in piety and group loyalty on the one hand, and on the new patriotism on the other.

For the time being, therefore, a purely democratic system is not yet possible. National feeling and a broad sense of citizenship are alive in very few persons. Gradually, however, they will spread, group loyalty will become citizenship, and then the millions will be able to bear responsibility by themselves.

The leaders, who meanwhile have still to carry the burden unaided, will have to thank particularism and conservatism for the main portion of the troubles with which they have to contend. But notwithstanding the appalling dimensions of civil warfare since the abdication of the imperial dynasty, China's evolution still seems better assured than that of any colonial territory that might be, like China, thrown on its own resources: a tradition of religious and cultural unity, dating from thousands of years ago, the traditional respect of all groups for one single central authority, and the spread of education across all group limitations are factors of fundamental importance. Wherever, as is the case in the Dutch East Indies, one of them is missing, the chance that a complete autonomous autochthonous rule, or even a less democratic system, may be safely established, recedes into a more distant future.

Great efforts will still be needed before the Indies have acquired the basis which made it possible for states like China or Japan to begin to pass from static to dynamic social conditions. In the first place the Indies require a powerful central authority to develop the idea of political unity among the millions who have never before, or at the best only during brief intervals, known such unity in the course of their history. To remove this Western authority, before the sense of unity has become alive in the whole population and can be supported by the strong consciousness of thousands of educated people, would be bound to have catastrophic results, far worse even than those which followed and may still follow the collapse of the pillar of reverence in China. For in China at least, as all those who have lent their ear to the murmurings of the masses well know, it is from the sense of unity that salvation in the long run may perhaps be expected. But when such a powerful tradition is lacking and has to be created all at once, immense difficulties apart from those met in China have also to be overcome.

The factors we have enumerated are of primary importance for

the political evolution of every nation. There are many other influences which often receive a large share of attention, while as a matter of fact they are infinitely less significant. To take the case of the Dutch East Indies, it is of great importance that there exists a certain cultural unity, e. g. in customary law, which is further strengthened by racial kinship. But there are all kinds of traditions which cut across this unity, and, compared to countries like China and Japan, where the whole population is saturated with the same cultural spirit, it is still very superficial. The Mohammedan religion, however little it affected the lower strata of the population, is probably more significant for the fostering of a sense of unity than racial and cultural community. But, like Christianity, the Mohammedan religion looks upon the whole vast circle of believers as the real unit. It is therefore entirely different from the mystic link with the deified Ruler which prepares the way for a national sentiment. In Japan and in China the process which continually fused units of different ethnical origin was easily observable. In the East Indian Archipelago a diametrically opposed process used to take place. Isolation caused various kinds of ethnical consciousness to issue from a complex that had previously acquired a marked racial unity. In British India a remarkable religious, cultural and social force had radiated from Hinduism, and, were it not that such a striking contrast between Muslims and Hindus had come into existence, this immense country would certainly be comparable to China. Another cause which prevented complete unity has been the creation of innumerable group differentiations, born from a caste system which prospered on a soil of exclusivism and self-sufficiency. Particularism and conservatism are therefore making much heavier demands on the forces of evolution, and religious fidelity to the Eastern Ruler is, in India, distributed over hundreds of focuses instead of being concentrated on one dynasty.

The Indonesian élite of the Dutch East Indies will have to pay attention to all these points. It will have to deepen and to enrich its cultural unity, it will have to lift up its racial unity to a patriotic sentiment by powerful co-operation, and, most of all, it will have to realise the indispensability of a central authority, which ensures administration, jurisdiction, education, coinage, traffic, etc., organised for the sake of unity, and must foster the bond

between the masses, which is still far too weak at the present time. This is the main purpose that is being kept in mind by Holland's colonial policy, and the creation of a Council of the People of the whole of the Dutch East Indies, the creation of university education, etc., bear witness to the existence of this conception. Whatever be the stages through which the people may still wish to pass of its own free will, colonial policy in the Dutch East Indies holds to the ideal of unity as an urgent summons to crown all these steps of evolution embracing the whole Archipelago, and culminating in a full humanity which will eventually be able to shoulder its duties as a member of a world-community. The maintenance of this Western authority is the *conditio sine qua non* for the creation of a sense of unity among all the disjointed fragments. It enables them to strive upwards without conflict until the people are strong enough to take over responsibility. Only then can the dome of unity which covers the whole building be left without its Western support, without breaking to pieces and crushing the masses below, because it will henceforth be carried and even be lifted up higher by Eastern strength.

This image also shows the danger of ignorance and over-confidence on the part of those who are unwilling to construct the necessary supports from below, but go instead to the masses with their revolutionary propaganda, inciting them to storm the building. On the contrary, those who wish to go to the masses must endeavour, to the best of their ability, to make a success of colonial policy, now that all evolutionary roads have been opened to them. They must foster greater confidence in the authorities. They must stimulate the people into responsiveness to the call of colonial policy: this responsiveness can manifest itself by social and economic progress, by the interest taken in popular education, by co-operating with measures taken for public health, rational production, and rural autonomy, and for the suppression of social evils. In this way contact between the particularist and conservative groups and the central authorities can be established. And there is no other way. For in those countries where reverence for the deified Ruler is not available as a pillar to support the fabric of state, and where there is no deep sense of cohesion between the many ethnic and genealogical divisions, the Western authorities create, radiate, and foster the idea of unity in all its forms.

Nor should it be thought that colonial authorities are really weaker than Eastern Rulers. It is true that they lack the absolute and sacred character of the latter and are therefore more exposed to the resistance of particularism and inertia. An enlightened despot may be able by decree to free Eastern women from purdah, from the harem and from the seclusion of the family. He may abolish ancient tribal institutions and proclaim equality for all. But, once all these innovations are accepted, there can no longer be any question of reverence for the Ruler's sacred will. For the things he abolished were quite as sacred as his own dignity. They were a part of the same ideology, based upon the same religious sense. If the Ruler attacks by his decrees one half of morality, he of course saps the other half as well. Any dissatisfaction that is caused by his measures will turn against him, and, the nursery of morality having been destroyed by his own action, there remains no single reason why disaffection should not turn into public resistance and rebellion.

For this reason, prudence is the highest form of statesmanship in Eastern states as well as in the colonies. Let there not be too many decrees. Education and assistance in the growing need for Eastern activity will better achieve the purpose. And let it be remembered that even so obvious a way for the broadening out of the spiritual horizon of the people as education is not without its drawbacks from the point of view of the Ruler's absolute authority. Once it has been awakened, the human mind no longer responds with the old passivity. Called by the will of his absolute Ruler to shake off through education his ignorance and passivity in order to become a citizen and a conscious human being, the subject will demand space for his growing mind in every available direction. An adult mind is unable to respect the absolute dominion of the group over the person or of one human being over millions of others. It is necessary therefore that education and organisation should build up an entirely different political and social order, for otherwise the mind which has been created will begin by throwing itself upon the absolutism to which it owes its existence, and, freed from the group, degenerate into unsocial individualism. Religious reverence for the deified Ruler must give place to patriotism and to respect towards the bearer of the princely dignity. This will be a new duality of exalted feel-

ing which will cause the new dynamic unity to rise up out of the old static edifice that rested upon its simple pillars, while the group connection must broaden out and enrich itself till it is re-born in the shape of citizenship.

Methods of emancipation: Women in the Eastern states

The emancipation of women is undeniably a most important approach to the acquisition of the sense of citizenship in the East. At the same time it presents problems that transcend in difficulty all those with which national or colonial authorities have to cope. The recent reforms of the Turkish Republic are a striking instance of this. Many of them are of the most drastic nature, although to all outward appearance they concern nothing more than a few externals, like the abolition of the veil. Sir Frederick Whyte rightly remarks that, if they had originated with a European power, they "would have set the Muslim World ablaze from end to end" ¹). These externals really have very little importance; what matters is the widening and the enlightenment of the popular soul. For feminine emancipation decrees can do very little; everything must be expected from education and leadership. In the process of evolution the freedom of women is no accessory. It is a criterion that dominates all others, because it allows us adequately to gauge the strength of the respect for human dignity on the one hand and of the patriarchal connection on the other hand. All members of the group are dependent on their community, but woman, who has no place outside her narrow social unit, is doubly dependent. Her personal characteristics can no doubt introduce a large element of variety into this state of dependency, but, in principle at any rate, her position is far more unfavourable in the group organisation than in a free household detached from the group. Her husband is her lord, his parents and other elders are her masters, for, without this discipline a true and strong group-life would be unthinkable, seeing that exogamy necessitates the introduction of outsiders into the group.

The significance of this situation will gradually become clearer. Without the rise of woman to the independence which can only be

¹) *Asia in the Twentieth Century*. Cf. also Maréchal Lyautey, in *l'Islam et la Politique Contemporaine*, 1927, p. 80.

found in the free household, social evolution is unable to go beyond a certain point. There is, indeed, no single Eastern state which has not been obliged, sooner or later, to turn its attention to this problem. It is so essential that we shall have to examine it before we turn our attention to the question of constitutional reform, however important that may be, because as long as it is not solved other reforms have little utility. Let it not be thought that woman is oppressed in the East, ill-treated and ill-used against her own will. She is not violently deprived of her freedom and of her own soul, nor locked up in a cage, against whose bars she flutters in a vain endeavour for the rest of her life. Such, perhaps, would be the situation if one of her Western sisters were placed in the same circumstances.

In the East, however, woman herself used to cling frantically to the old restrictions and prescriptions, which often seem to us irreconcilable with human dignity. That is why decrees are of so little use. When Rama VI of Siam took steps in order to introduce monogamy and to fight the institution of concubinage, the most vehement resistance came from the women, especially those of the highest birth. Yet the wisdom of this ruler cannot be sufficiently praised. Many a Western observer may rightly declare that such measures are ridiculous attempts at Westernisation, at least if the authorities rush forward upon such delicate ground with their decrees, instead of acting through education; but on the other hand one has little trouble in discerning that a gradual change of public opinion in this respect may be considered to be more helpful than tens of thousands of miles of railway lines. For although the concubine is usually well treated, and is satisfied with her position, and although many a principal wife will take the initiative herself in order to provide her husband with one or more concubines, this only proves that a deeply rooted custom exists, without affecting the fact that the custom imposes unnatural restrictions upon the process of evolution.

There is no Eastern country which cannot point, in some of the episodes in which the public was able to make a successful stand for human dignity, to instances of feminine political sagacity, heroism, or literary and artistic creativeness. If the Philippines have already reached an advanced stage of evolution, this is due in no mean measure to the honourable position occupied by

woman and to the resulting strength of the household. A social evolution which limits the feminine sphere of action to the most restricted circle, and does not even allow woman to exercise her sovereignty undivided in that small circle, places one half of mankind in a dispiriting condition of subordination. Woman's consciousness cannot develop, her interest is rarely stimulated, it remains restricted, and her mind remains open to all kinds of superstition, so that the educative force which might issue from her, if only her mind were open to a wide circle, is lost to society.

Popular education which neglects women leaves the real stronghold of inertia uninvested. One could almost say that it is even more important to free women from the shackles of ignorance than men, because the influence of woman upon the growth of the germs of the future is infinitely greater. If evolution finds in woman also a collaborator in the midst of the family connection, one may rest assured that harmony between the evolutionary initiative of the authorities and the action of the population will increase all along the line. Besides, the invaluable preparatory education of the household will precede social interference and thus facilitate the process of spiritual expansion. Innumerable sources of friction and conflict will thus be sealed up, and there will be no need of recourse to decrees which easily provoke resistance.

All this, as we have mentioned already, was attempted by Rama VI of Siam. He tried to give a more solemn character to the marriage ritual in order to convey to the whole population a sense of the seriousness of the conjugal link. He wished the sanctity of this link to rest securely upon a public opinion which would disapprove of its being broken. Divorce, which makes the life of the household insecure, was to be limited to a few unavoidable cases. Morality and progress would thereby acquire a considerable stability such as laws, police or despotism could never assure them. For he who undermines the household undermines everything, and he who strengthens it, without, however, encouraging the tyranny of the husband over his wife or of the parent over the children, has the guarantee of spiritual, moral, intellectual, and material progress.

By the same token a strong group connection, especially if the greater family lives together, and household life consequently has

no chance of developing, subjects social evolution to very serious restrictions. The group can achieve much, but not everything; at a given moment it must either make a desperate attempt to put a stop to progress, or else give place to the household. When Western observers criticise the subjection of woman in most Oriental countries, they must remember that a group connection based upon a patriarchal relationship makes such a situation necessary and also compensates much by granting a place of honour to the mother who has given a son to the family. The position of the woman is a concomitant phenomenon of the social structure, and does not at all imply contempt, even though, superficially judged, existing relations often seem to justify such an interpretation ¹). Moreover it has to be remembered that nature is everywhere more powerful than doctrine: notwithstanding the fact that marriages are usually arranged by the two families concerned, and that the young people are scarcely, if at all, consulted about their union, real love is by no means absent in many Eastern marriages. We may add that, notwithstanding the boasted superiority of man, there is no shortage of hen-pecked husbands.

Notwithstanding all this, a social system such as we have delineated imposes many constraints, and demands dependence and sacrifices for the sake of the family connection which would not be required by the household. Even when the family ceases to live together and there is in consequence a considerable weakening of the group, the group connection continues for a long time to influence unfavourably the position of the women. One hears, for instance, quite frequently remarks such as that the link with parents or brothers is much more important than that with the wife, and that blood-relations matter most. The continuation of the clan, of the family, is considered the prime duty and function of woman, and consequently a woman who has no children or only daughters is held in little regard. In such a world the institution of secondary marriages or concubinage is quite understandable ²), and also the fact that far more care is taken to protect blood-relationship than matrimony, with the result that often there exists a most lighthearted facility for divorce. In Mohammedan countries the man usually has the right to repudiate his wife with-

¹) Max Scheler, *Nature et Formes de la Sympathie*, pp. 271—2.

²) E. Tavernier, *La Famille Annamite*, 1927, p. 22, 31.

out giving any reason for his action. In Java there exists a conditional repudiation, which imposes certain obligations upon the husband and allows the wife to recover her independence if he does not fulfil them ¹⁾. But even with these restrictions repudiation can hardly form a sound basis for the life of the household, which is the foundation of every great society. In other countries again the family could separate husband and wife even against their will. Wherever, in the Dutch East Indies, owing to the existence of a matriarchal system or for some other reason, woman occupies a higher social position, there is a higher conception of social life.

When the family lives together, a woman is in practice the servant of her mother-in-law and of the other older women in the family. As long as she has no sons, life is too often made decidedly unpleasant for her. Women who have learnt to appreciate the value of independence, or who have received a modern education like their sisters in the West, would not tolerate such subjection for a day. The family organisation requires, therefore, a system of education of its own for the women. It is a system that has a special purpose: from early youth the girl is taught to respect her future husband as her lord; self-denial and obedience to elders are impressed upon her as the most essential duty. After her wedding, especially in countries with a very exclusive family spirit, she enters as a stranger into the midst of the group which commands her destiny. Without submissiveness she would never be able to fit in with her new surroundings. As long as the group is the bulwark of society and of morality, little can be changed in the position of woman. She has very little opportunity for unfolding her gifts, and is bound to become the supporter of a staunch conservatism. It is therefore of the greatest importance for the future of the whole East that the authorities and especially the *élite* should use all their influence for the improvement of the condition of women, for the strengthening of marriage and of the household, and for the better regulation of divorce, as soon as the group connection begins to grow looser. For if this took place before the household had grown into a vigorous unity, so that, for instance,

¹⁾ Van Vollenhoven, *Adatrecht*, I, p. 585; II, p. 187 sqq. Snouck Hurgronje, *Verbreide Geschriften*, IV, I, p. 90. Cf. also Th. W. Juyaboll, *Handbuch des Islamischen Gesetzes*, 1910, pp. 226—27.

divorce and repudiation would come to depend exclusively on the arbitrary will of the individual who has been freed from the group discipline, while on the other hand the inferior position of woman remained unaffected, the new society would be entirely deprived of its moral basis.

The Ruler of Siam therefore displayed real wisdom when he started reforms with this aim in view, but inertia caused him to fail, even though the whole country had been used to accept his absolute will with the greatest submissiveness. He ordered the registration of all marriages, and prohibited registration to take place if one of the parties was already married. He declared children born from unregistered unions to be illegitimate, thereby attacking the institution of subsidiary marriages. This, writes W. A. Graham, was "a deliberate thrust at a custom sanctified by immemorial usage and acquiesced in by both church and state"¹). The measure was received with strong passive resistance, especially on the part of the elder women of the upper class. The King found that the times were not ripe for his innovation and gave up his attempt at reform.

This is an experience which shows very clearly how the true method of synthesis must proceed. The measure, however well intentioned, was premature. The attitude of the women who would have profited most by it proves that by attacking customs the reformer seemed to be attacking morality itself. He was wise therefore to give up his reforms, for he would have contributed to the undermining of national morality and weakened the central authority which was called to embody the sentiment of unity. Experiences such as this prove that the watchword remains education, and that even despotic power could never be as powerful. If the Ruler had in the first place seen to the education of his nation, including the women, his measure would have been willingly adopted inside the group connection by a sufficient number of collaborators of both sexes.

The experiment in Afghanistan

Even the process by education is, however, not without its pitfalls. The experience of the former King Amanullah of Afghanistan, who tried to guide his people out of ignorance, seclusion, and

¹) W. A. Graham, *Siam*, 1924, I, p. 246.

isolation, is there to prove it. It is evident that in a state like Afghanistan particularism causes more difficulties to an enlightened ruler than in China or in Japan. For in the latter countries the group connection is of a higher order, and greatly disciplined, while general education had spread to such an extent, that the new ideas had a considerable chance of finding one or more elements of contact inside each group. In Afghanistan, as a result of the lower level of education, these elements of contact have still to be created or to be fostered very carefully. This is why particularism is entrenched much more solidly, can only be attacked from outside, and at the same time is much more sensitive about outside interference, and ready to answer it with passive resistance which may even turn into active rebellion. The situation is not unlike that created by Akhenaten who, in his reforms, did not respect the national and religious traditions of his people.

In Afghanistan, the Ruler realised that as long as the women had not been gained for the cause of progress, all the good that was being done with one hand was as it were undone by the other. A one-sided education divides the population into two camps, and the division will run through each family and each household. Woman, who as mother and as grandmother has a position of great importance, will naturally maintain and defend her influence all the more obstinately as her mind is cut off from the outer world and from the new ideas which are being evolved by it. The result must be that there exist two worlds of ideas, entirely separated, and all the hesitations and uncertainties which ensue from the simultaneous existence of two incompatible sources of inspiration will result from this. The young official, the teacher, the clerk, and even the political leader will have a different mentality when he is at home from what he has at his work. In the Hindu family, for instance, we may be sure that the older women who manage and dominate him will show little condescension towards novelty.

Those who wish to preserve domestic peace will have to pay due attention to the priestesses of the hearth, and will adapt themselves to the inevitable, submitting in turn to the demands of an archaic environment and of ultra-modern enterprise or state organisation. But this is a situation which cultivates half-heartedness and superficiality; it does not allow for deep convictions, to

which one is prepared if necessary to sacrifice oneself, and for strong principles, which one does not doff when crossing the threshold. Moreover, these contradictions are a constant source of dissatisfaction and irritation, in the bosom of the family as well as in the mind of the individual, who will lose his self-respect to such an extent that he cannot establish a reliable element of contact between the principles of evolution and those of the group.

All this was well understood by the late Emir of Afghanistan. He, who liked to call himself the first revolutionary of his dominions, believed that he had found the key in popular education, including that of the girls. But, when one is in possession of a key, one has still to gain admission to the door, and conservatism defends access to it like a growling hound. In Afghanistan the particularism and the anarchy of the tribes, the fanaticism of a powerful and jealous clergy, gave rise to organised resistance ¹⁾. The decree by which women became entitled to choose their husbands gave rise to a formidable revolt of the southern tribes and the clergy compelled the government to close down the newly erected schools for girls.

It is striking how, again and again, the same difficulties arise in the path of the enlightened Eastern ruler and of the colonial power. When there is friction in the colonies, parliamentary criticism at home so easily overlooks this fact and attributes to the "colonial sphere" difficulties which very often have nothing to do with it. Yet, in Afghanistan, we see even the absolute will of the Ruler meeting with a furious revolution, for which, we may be sure, the women who were to profit by his reforms were not less responsible than the mullahs, the headmen, and the elders of the tribes. Government by decree is met with resistance wherever it is applied. Here is a vicious circle: education is needed in order to weaken particularism from within, while particularism, instinctively aware that education spells its end, fights it tooth and nail. The authorities who are confronted with this vicious circle cannot always patiently abide their time. They will have to make a choice between the various policies that are open to them. Each solution will have its merits and its demerits, which must be carefully weighed against each other in the light of every material circumstance. There are sometimes knots that have to be cut, and the principle

¹⁾ Maurice Pernot, *L'Inquiétude de l'Orient*, in *Revue des deux Mondes*, 1926—27.

to be observed is that on the whole colonial authorities have to be rather less drastic than national governments. The Ruler of Afghanistan failed, when on his return from a journey to Europe he reopened the girls schools, introduced modern dress and tried to abolish the veil, one knows with what results. Reforms that are extremely difficult even in so modernised and disciplined a country as Turkey can be effected only very gradually in backward Afghanistan.

The main thing for a reforming government is that there should never, and especially during the period of transition, exist any doubt as to its justice and its determination and capacity to maintain public order. There is much intolerant particularism that will oppose on principle any kind of novelty, and will allow its centrifugal tendencies to run riot, if there is no strong hand to keep it subdued. At the same time an enlightened government takes care to close all exits by its strong authority, so that the energies which are working themselves loose from the group connections do not go to waste, but take the only direction that leads to unity. Patience will be the prime requisite, in order not to irritate unduly the centrifugal tendencies of particularism. Progress must needs be slow, and much will already have been gained if, impressed by the strength of government, it desists from its offensive against the central authorities. Once this point has been reached, it will gradually become possible, by using the various educative means which are at the disposal of the central government, to foster the development of the household, the personality, the sense of citizenship, and the idea of unity, until the strongholds of particularism crumble down under the steady internal need for unification.

E m a n c i p a t i o n i n J a p a n

If one takes into consideration the fact that colonial policy has to be more careful than any national Eastern government, that the freedom of speech, of meeting and of the press, which it feels compelled, owing to its own views about absolutism, to grant to its populations, does not tend to make its task easier, and that in tropical and sub-tropical territories there are special problems which countries like Japan and China have tackled long ago, one will have to admit that colonial policy has achieved far more than

might have been hoped for some fifty years ago. One often meets with assertions to the contrary. Westernisation, some will say, pointing to the example of Japan, is the obvious way to create a great modern society, and government by decree is the indicated method. "What is the good," they ask, "of bolstering up these corrupt, often ridiculous institutions? Make a clean sweep of the lot!"¹).

All over the colonial world these extremists, who would even like to abolish the whole family system by decree, make themselves heard, and it is always to the example of Japan that they point. They are under the impression that Japan owes its prominent position exclusively to the introduction of Western political institutions, of a Western social organisation, of Western enterprise, industry, and technique. By introducing the same institutions everywhere in the East, they think, the same results could be obtained. The problem, however, is not so elementary. On the contrary, the example of Japan gives the strongest possible support to the claims of those who choose the golden mean for colonial policy.

To begin with, there is not a single Eastern state that could meet modern influence in such a condition of utter preparedness as Japan. The isolation of 2,000 years had favoured the fusion of several racial components into one harmonious racial and national connection, which had pronounced characteristics of its own. The separation from the Asiatic continent did for Japan what the North Sea and the Channel did for Great Britain: it prevented foreign occupation and a too strong outside cultural influence. Only such cultural elements as could adapt themselves to the nature of the people were admitted by way of natural and gradual selection, with results that were highly favourable to the balance, the independence, the inner self-possession and solidity of the national character. The Japanese process of selection always reveals an attitude that is above the foreign or the domestic culture, that objectively weighs advantages against drawbacks, does not slavishly cling to the old, if it has become supererogatory, and does not ape the new and the foreign from the moment it comes in sight. The Japanese character has no exaggerated sense of super-

¹) Temple, *Native Races and their Rulers*, p. 30.

iority towards others, but it does not lack confidence in the basis upon which its own state and society have rested for centuries.

Climatologists agree that the Japanese are greatly favoured by their climate: they are energetic and apply this energy to the devoted practice of certain virtues. The fidelity and self-denial of Japanese women have been praised by foreign writers, the fidelity of the samurai, who divested himself as easily of his life as of his robe for the sake of his overlord, but who on the other had was at any time prepared to reprove his lord in vigorous language in case of dereliction of duty, gives an idea of the moral strength of the nation. To this day fidelity and obedience form the moral basis of Japanese society. The old nature-worship, embodied in reverence for the world-order according to the doctrines of Shinto, grew into a cultural unity with ethical Buddhism, and formed a conception of life which was practical without ceasing to be lofty.

Politically, the country was unified by the spiritual tie with the deified Ruler, who was reputed to be descended in direct line from the goddess of the Sun. After 1600 the government was in the strong hands of the Tokugawa-Shoguns, who had compelled the feudal lords to cease their age-long strife and to recognise the central authority to a much larger degree than had been the case previously. The administration was entrusted to the chosen body of Samurai, who worked partly in the territory directly administered by the Shogunate, partly in the service of the feudal overlords. As a result of this feudal system with its well-organised administrative corps, the authorities were able to intervene in the life of the population which lived in the ancient family and communal connection to a much larger extent than could have been conceivable in other Eastern States where so little direct influence was exercised by the Ruler's representatives upon all the isolated communities that their existence was barely noticeable outside the towns.

In close connection with the mystical relationship between Ruler and nation there was, then, a strong and very real political structure, consisting of the ancient hierarchical popular authorities within the groups and of a feudal administrative body consisting of a few hundreds of thousands of Samurai families, a few hundreds of overlords (Daimyos), and the Shogunate, which exercised the civil prerogatives of the Emperor. After 1600 it is impos-

sible to speak of independent little states, even though the administration of their fiefs was left almost undisturbed in the hands of the Daimyos. Japan was a real unified state, which combined to perfection the advantages of feudalism and of bureaucracy ¹⁾. Owing to the tranquillity, the order, and the unity that were enjoyed by the whole Empire for three centuries, the former social and political isolation of these fiefs which used to satisfy all their own needs, and only exercised the professions required for the satisfaction of local requirements, gradually came to an end. Breaches were battered in the economic self-sufficiency of these small units, and trade began to link them together. Production became more and more differentiated from consumption, and traffic grew in intensity. Money appeared in social life, and with it differentiation. Large commercial cities arose, with the usual influence they have upon the human mind. In the cities, the guilds everywhere were taking the place of the old genealogical and territorial connections, and became the creators of new functional connections with a very different outlook.

As usual their development was accompanied by much suffering for the population. Miss Takizawa describes this process very strikingly in her work *The Penetration of Money Economy in Japan*. The old bonds were not broken without shocks and the new were not established without pain. Nobility and chivalry were not sufficiently schooled to be able straight away to grasp the significance of the great economic laws which were beginning to work under their own eyes. They looked with amazement upon this transvaluation of all values, without being able to read the writing on the wall. They had controlled the movements of rice, the principal medium of exchange, and rice was becoming an article to be bought and sold like others, its price depending on the available supply of money. As a result of the obligation imposed upon great feudal lords to keep their families in residence at Yedo and to appear at Court every other year, they were always greatly in need of money: at Yedo they had to pay cash for everything, and as a result the demand for money rose and depressed the value of produce, and of rice in particular.

¹⁾ A brief review of the interesting transformation of bureaucracy and feudalism, and of the continuation of archaic clan traditions in Harold S. Quigley, *The Political System of Feudal Japan*, in "Koloniaal Tijdschrift", March 1928, pp. 132—144.

A new power, the moneyed aristocracy, was rising. Even if Japan had not, at a later date, suddenly seen the West before its gates, a new political organisation would have followed feudalism after a period of transition spreading over a few centuries, as was the case in the West. The nobility became debt-ridden and the traders acquired control of their granaries. The new families of capitalists were better fitted for utilising their hold upon the national rice-production than the isolated feudal lords. They manipulated prices, especially in times of scarcity, to such an extent that practically the whole national wealth eventually passed into their hands and into those of fellow capitalists. About 1800 they possessed fifteen sixteenths of it. The rural population and still more the town labourers suffered tremendously from this process, with its continual rise of taxation. There were repeated revolts. In 1837 rebels set fire to Osaka, and wrought vengeance upon the merchants. "Thus", says Miss Takizawa, "in the period when the struggle between the merchant class and the Samurai was scarcely ended, there was already evidence of the beginnings of a struggle between the capitalists and the wage-earners, a struggle which has been growing in scope and intensity ever since."

The Japanese restoration

On the eve of its meeting with the West in the middle of last-century Japan was, then, in the midst of a process of evolution which was pointing in the same direction as that which coming events were going to prescribe so imperiously to the leaders of national policy. The Shogunate had played its part, it had cemented, unconsciously, the political, administrative, social, and economic unity of the country to a degree which approximated to the conception of religious and national unity embodied in the Ruler. It is no wonder that all these new forms of consciousness looked for a common frame and found it in loyalty to the Ruler. Faced with a vigorous national movement, the Shogunate disappeared into thin air. A new consciousness began to animate the ancient loyalty with its dynamism, and the Emperor came forth from his seclusion and was received with jubilation by the whole nation. Supported by a consciousness of unity which after three centuries had matured out of the traditional sentiment of unity, he was

ready to be the bearer and the outward sign of this new unity

Although the imperial dignity apparently remained unaltered throughout the historical period, there was in reality a fundamental difference, and the position of the Emperor after the Restoration was the result of an evolution which had lasted for centuries. Group exclusiveness had been weakened to such an extent that it could safely be preserved as a precious element in the national future, and feudalism, similarly rendered innocuous, had established a valuable and direct connection between the sovereign and the individual subject. Feudalism, moreover, and chivalry, had been largely freed from isolation, while the closed produce-economy had made way for the traffic of national trade. Well before the start of the new period particularism and inertia had therefore been put to flight in Japan. The soil for a consciousness of unity had been worked for centuries. Even in 1600, before this evolution began, Japan was organised in a manner more intensive than any other Eastern or medieval state has ever known. Ballard rightly observes: "Japan has been potentially a Great Power from a date antecedent to the political creation of most of the states comprising modern Europe. Her strength remained in abeyance, but it was there nevertheless. . . ." ¹⁾ And, as we have pointed out already, Japan did not halt on the road to progress. Its further development rapidly enabled it to climb the steps which separate a potential from an actual Great Power. All this was done by the nation's own strength. It is for these reasons, too, that the great reforms of 1867 and 1871 were achieved without undue friction.

L o y a l t y

In 1868 the Shogunate was abolished. From this moment, the new consciousness of national unity rallied around the old spiritual focus embodied in the imperial dignity. The overlords became officials in their former fiefs. Even this transitional form disappeared in 1871, when the central authorities assumed the right of appointing every official. The samurai had to sacrifice their traditional feudal status and function, and they became the backbone of a national army, a national police, and a national administration. It is not without reason that this unique change over has

¹⁾ G. A. Ballard, *The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan*, 1921, p. 3.



struck with amazement and admiration all foreign observers. "What manner of people were these", asks one of them, "to whom a national peril would bring forgetfulness of their immediate personal interests!"¹⁾ We can answer this question by remembering what has been said of the Japanese in the previous pages. The mystical sentiment of unity became a national consciousness of unity as a result of an evolution which covered centuries, and which weakened the group particularisms and feudalism from inside. It is therefore an absolute misrepresentation of the truth to attribute Japan's meteoric appearance on the firmament to the adoption of Western institutions. In reality, fifty years ago, many colonial territories were not even in sight of the point reached by Japan in 1600, not to mention 1871.

It is furthermore not true that Japanese leadership sought its salvation exclusively in Westernisation. It accepted Western science, organisation, and technique, it adopted certain political institutions, but it strengthened the national foundations in order to enable them to support the growing great society. In its constitution, in all the forms of its new organisation, in its educational system, in all imperial rescripts, it placed before everything else the golden words: loyalty to the Ruler and obedience to parents. Shintoism freed itself from Buddhism as a system of social and political ethics, which, however, is not devoid of religious elevation. It is sometimes said that a new Shinto religion was made up deliberately for political purposes, rather in the same way as the cult of *Divus Augustus*, outlined in our previous chapter²⁾. A religion cannot be created like this. The main elements of this ethical code had been present from ancient times: they are related to some important doctrines of Confucius, and moreover, they can be traced all over the world. What took place was merely an acceptance of the consciousness of unity, which, as was obviously necessary, was given a sharp outline, a clear formulation, and a precise code of behaviour. In a word, the prevailing national system was given a concrete ethical expression.

In all Eastern states the land belongs to the Ruler, and he is entrusted with mediation between the world-order and his dominions. In Japan, moreover, the dynasty descends from the

¹⁾ Robert P. Porter, *Japan, the new World Power*, 1915, p. 79.

²⁾ B. H. Chamberlain, *The Invention of a New Religion*, 1912.

divinity which created the country and the nation. The Emperor is the direct descendant of the original ancestor of every Japanese and therefore the head of every Japanese household ¹⁾. These conceptions now were plastically expressed by the erection of more than a hundred thousand Shinto sanctuaries, while those that already existed received a special national sanction. It is in these that the deceased Emperors, princes, and loyal subjects, and a few natural deities, which also coincide with the ancestors of the Japanese nation, were worshipped. A national cult was thus established, in which loyalty and piety form the basis of the ethical system, while religious consecration is not lacking. The cult of national Rulers and heroes is the first duty of every good subject and citizen, which is inculcated into him all through his school years.

It is difficult to express how valuable the preservation of the precious pillar of national unity has been for Japan. Rarely has a more striking testimonial been given to the truth that morality is the basis of all organisation and especially of all organisation on a large scale, among which political organisation is the principal. In the country, where the notion of unity contained in the idea of patriotism was still too abstract, the conception of unity kept the form of mystical connection with the deified Ruler, while, for the educated, the way was opened to a deeper and more conscious reverence for the Ruler's majesty and for all the greater and smaller links which attach every true patriot to his beloved fatherland. All the memories of youth, which formerly would only have referred to the family, could now identify themselves with the national idea, and concentrate themselves into personal loyalty towards the Ruler. The sense of distance which is manifested by reverence is so closely akin to the mystical bond that it is impossible to distinguish between them, although centuries of evolution really separate them.

A university professor will find it possible, in this way, to give expression, with the same words as a simple peasant, to the same sense of loyalty, although their mentalities are altogether different. The educated man suffers no harm if his sense of loyalty has a different and richer meaning, for it acts in the same direction as that of the peasant. On the contrary, it acquires a greater power

¹⁾ Stephen King-Hall, *Western Civilisation and the Far East*, pp. 279—296.

of tension, while the ideas which emanate from it become infinitely more delicate in their variety. But for the plain person the sudden attacks against the imperial majesty, which are now being launched by communist propaganda, are nothing less than disastrous. The authorities have been right in strictly guarding against dangerous thoughts, for it is these which threaten a wisely planned evolution. It is as though one suddenly took away the faith of a plain Western countryman who has always tried to act in conformity with his Christian beliefs. All the instincts which have been bridled suddenly burst out and demand full licence. Even the wise are heard to lament the disappearance of faith, for although wisdom sins as little as faith and is therefore not threatened with the danger of losing its reverence, it realises with great acuteness of vision that a source of harmony, of natural morality, and of spontaneous virtue is obstructed by unbelief.

Let us hope, therefore, that this harmonious evolution towards a full humanity, which will have so great an importance for the whole community, will be able to defeat the daemon of communist irreverence, in the same way as China is with great pains trying to fumigate its nests of communism. The political wisdom which, in Japan, supported the pillar of unity, showed the same respect for the other pillar of the state, piety in family relations. As the horizons broadened out, a corresponding moral force and with it, an intellectual perception, had to be fostered, so as to enable the individual to resist the gusts of wind against which formerly the family structure was able to protect its inmates.

P i e t y

While in previous centuries the unity of the family had been assailed by the growth of money-economy, the Restoration of 1869 used every available means for preserving the piety which could be the more effective as a cement now that it was to a considerable extent purged of exclusiveness. A parallel process in our West is that of the internationalism which fights jingoism but respects patriotism because it is a nursery of virtues and of diversified cultures. The family, which used to exist as an economic unit, had felt the bond which kept it together gradually growing weaker in the course of the centuries preceding the Restoration. The hundreds of trades which were developing proved able to

produce many articles so cheaply that domestic industry had to give up competition and, not without hesitation, the market was opened to outside produce. The patrimony of the family no longer provided the only means of subsistence, which had compelled the members to cling together and to accept a definite hierarchy as the only means of making such a communal life tolerable. One must remember that usually many members with their wives and children, often unto the third generation, lived together.

The growing division of labour began to make it possible to earn one's living otherwise than by agriculture. Capital earned by commerce or trade lacked the sacred character of the family field and could more easily be divided between heirs, whereas the law had always placed severe restrictions upon the division of the land in order to prevent the formation of a proletariat. Younger brothers who formerly had to live with the first-born could go their own way and seek for a better livelihood elsewhere. Money was exercising an immense influence and was affecting the whole social order. Similar causes have had similar results in the Dutch East Indies. Those who had thus acquired an economic independence felt little sympathy for the old co-operation which they no longer needed. Consecrated traditions faded away, the respect for the old-fashioned mouthpieces of popular authority became difficult for these worldly-wise persons, whose example, moreover, was infectious.

Now Japanese statesmanship in the days of the Restoration made no attempt to revert to the closed economy of the Middle Ages. It realised that there was no magic formula for arresting the incoming tide and gave its attention to the dykes which would at any rate protect the fertile land. Strengthening the protection of group-loyalties, it allowed the stream to come nearer, and even began to harness its strength for the common good.

The Japanese family and the individual

The group is still powerful in Japan. It may seem incredible, yet it is a fact that to this day the "House" or family is the pillar on which rests the powerful commerce, industry, shipping, and banking organisation of Japan. There may be drawbacks to this situation which does not, perhaps, give full scope to the development of the personality, and because much initiative in conse-

quence remains unutilised; moreover, women cannot be for society what they have been to such a marked degree for the group. But the advantages are endless.

As regards the position of women, there is an interesting study by Miss Kikue Idé ¹⁾, who examines the possible means by which greater freedom and consciousness can be acquired by women without affecting the moral basis of society. The family is, as she clearly discerns, the corner stone of the social edifice. The Civil Code, according to her, grants the head of the family almost absolute rights over its members including the wife. Only with his consent is a change of domicile of any of the members possible. Women are placed in an inferior position, parental rights lie with the father. If Civil Law tries to blend a regard for individual rights with the preservation of the family system, and nominally adopts monogamy, it nevertheless makes provisions with regard to illegitimate children which prove that monogamy is not strictly adhered to. The wife is ranked with minors and abnormal persons.

The similarity of these statements with those of the literature of Western feminism is striking. Conditions such as those mentioned by Miss Idé are not unknown in the West. It is not so long ago that in Holland the blood-relations of a husband who died intestate were treated more favourably than his widow. Such arrangements result from a social order which attaches more importance to blood-relationship than to marriage, and they are not the result of any basic disregard for women. Miss Idé herself recognises that in Japan the law has done all it could for women, but she considers that since these reforms there has been further progress to which the state of legislation does not correspond. It must be admitted, then, that the law has not caused stagnation, but that it has made possible such a development of the personality, in the case of women too, that it is becoming irksome for this very reason.

As a remedy to this situation Miss Idé demands votes for women. But she points out that the idea of women's suffrage is individualistic, whereas the family system is altruistic. "This makes the women's suffrage movement in Japan unique in its problems, for it is not merely a struggle for establishing women's rights in politics and in laws, but it involves the modifying of the legal family system." This is a serious problem, which is also arising in

¹⁾ *Japan's New Woman* (Pacific Affairs, Aug.-Sept. 1928).

China. For as soon as the Japanese women achieve their victory, the old family unit will become impossible, not only politically, but socially. The only conceivable units will then be the household, the person, and free associations of persons. There can be no question that independent women, as one meets them in Europe and in America, could not continue to submit to the discipline of the Houses. Even life in common with many others, and in a complicated relationship of dependence, will be inconceivable. It is a striking proof of the harmony of Japanese evolution that the growing consciousness of the members of the groups, including their women, has been able to preserve the balance notwithstanding the loosening of the family tie. The evolution which has been taking place has not tended to create unwholesome contrasts nor to perpetuate intolerably irksome bonds, as appears from the fact that notwithstanding the greater consciousness of men and of women, the number of divorces is actually decreasing ¹). This affords sufficient proof that the moral basis for a sound domestic life based upon the household is becoming more solid, and that the position of women is developing towards the level which it must occupy in a society which is based upon the personality.

The fact that such problems are arising proves how fast personality has been developing in Japan. Like the clan connection, the traditional family connection will disappear. It will sacrifice itself for the good of the nation's future and will, presently, abdicate in favour of the household and the personality to which it will entrust this future. But we are not yet quite so far. The "House" still lives in people's minds. It demands self-denial and obedience, not only from the women, but from the men, and it is entitled to demand them, because it is still able to give so much in return. This appears most clearly from Allen's excellent study²), from which the following is taken:

"Whereas in Europe and America the individual is the unit of society, in Japan it is the Family which constitutes the unit. And by the Family is meant, not merely a man, his wife and his chil-

¹) G. C. Allen, *Modern Japan and its Problems*, 1928, pp. 178—9, statistics of divorce. For the Western attitude to these matters, cf. Max Scheler, *Nature et Formes de la Sympathie*, pp. 271, sqq.

²) Allen, op. cit. pp. 35 sqq.

dren, as in the West, but the whole group of relatives by birth and adoption. Now this Family group or House has very great powers over its members, and is an important body for the good government of the state. It is not only a larger unit than its Western counterpart, but it is also a more highly developed and vigorous part of the social organisation. An individual cannot act on his own initiative in the important affairs of his life, but he must subordinate himself to the will of his Family and place its welfare above his own. His education, his marriage and his career will all be subject to its dictates. If he is in alliance with it, it adds strength to him; if he should venture to oppose it, he can be crushed and ruined. To be cut off from one's Family is as disastrous in its consequences as excommunication in medieval Europe. Yet the Family is not a despotism, and its head, though powerful, is by no means an autocrat. Indeed, he is rather the mouthpiece of the Family than its leader; for the machinery through which power is exercised is the Family Council, which consists of the group of relatives called together to decide on some question affecting one of their number. They will sit round in a circle over their "hibachi" (or fireboxes), smoking their diminutive pipes and drinking tea, and they will talk round and round the subject until a common will emerges."

This sentence says more than would a long theoretical description of the legal family-system. It leads the reader into the very midst of the family-council, with its plain procedure and its irrevocable decisions, which also are found in the Hindu castes and the *nagari* of Minangkabau. Allen then continues:

"This system must obviously rob the individual of freedom and initiative; but the decisions of the councils are not necessarily harsh. The Family . . . concerns itself with matters which are within the purview of the state in other countries . . . But the grip of the Family on its members is strong and their subordination to it complete . . . When a young man reaches a marriageable age, his Family undertake to find him a consort . . . On the surface the system appears intolerable to a European, for little liberty of choice seems to be allowed to those most concerned. Yet in practice the system seems as successful as most marriages can be expected to be . . . But the prevalence of shinju (or double suicide) among the young Japanese shows that the system is by no means uniformly successful. Shinju is, indeed, practically the only reply left to a couple whose mutual affection has brought them into conflict with the wishes of their families. No wonder, then, that the Japanese point to such affections as destructive to loyalty and social morality."

The family looks after all kinds of things which are indifferent to the heart of the young people. Once social development has made women more independent, and places less difficulty in the way of intercourse between the sexes, it will be impossible for the family to preserve its influence and its organisation. Women's suffrage is anything but an external matter: it is a sign of fundamental modifications in the social system and in the family. Does one imagine that a woman who can choose by herself her representative in municipal, provincial or national assemblies would allow others to choose her husband? For a period such contradictions may subsist, but there can be no doubt that as an economic and political unit the family will eventually become atrophied. When the Western observer reads that the family group retains part of its control over its members even after marriage, and in the old days could separate married people merely because they were fonder of each other than of the group, he experiences a feeling of revulsion. As soon as a similar horror, caused by a growth of the sense of personality, is felt in the East, the reason for it will disappear. For the group would give way as soon as there were a general revolt against its methods.

Against these infringements of his freedom the individual can place considerable advantages which result from his connection with the group. The family accepts responsibility for those of its members who fall into distress, and all its resources are brought to the relief of unfortunate members, if required. Japan therefore needs no system of Poor Relief or of Unemployment Insurance. The Japanese trade unions require no strike funds, because members on strike can obtain assistance from their family groups. In the Dutch East Indies this is also the case.

"It is clear", says Allen, "that the Japanese family group provides a much more effective buffer between the individual and society as a whole than does a Western family. . . . If the individual loses a capacity for initiative, he is provided with a social training of a very valuable kind. It is this training which makes the Japanese so brilliant in co-operation and organisation, and so imbued with a sense of social responsibility."

This conclusion, of course, is of the highest importance for colonial policy, for co-operation and organisation are the two elements on which the possibility of building depends. Let this be a

warning to us not to listen too much to those who want to undermine the group instead of guiding and smoothing the delicate process of evolution. For a long time, meanwhile, the group remains indispensable for the creation of personalities. When personalities begin to be full-grown, the group will die a natural death.

Big enterprise and the state

The social structure formed by the family, the village community, and the clan, with the mutual assistance born in these nurseries and unfolded in the wider sphere of trade and commerce, proves to be the bedrock of Japanese nationhood, and not the institutions borrowed from the West. It is clear, now, that Japanese statesmanship has succeeded in strengthening the pillar upon which the old morality rests, although without giving way to exclusiveness. As we pointed out before, this change could not have happened at a more opportune moment. For the West had reached a stage when, owing to the incredible extension of state machinery, decentralisation and de-concentration had become indispensable. This is of course a phase to which Eastern communalism can adapt itself very easily; the archaic institution forms the natural nucleus for modern local autonomy, and co-operative schemes can be made to fit in most admirably with the ancient social forms. At the same time government interference and public enterprise also adapt themselves with remarkable ease to Eastern idiosyncracies. In the West, personal initiative created thousands of organisations under the spur of free competition. But it became necessary for the state to make gigantic efforts in order to keep abreast of the times, and to ensure harmony between the innumerable little states that were arising within the state. Essential organisations such as posts, railways, telephones, telegraphs, etc., were drawn within the sphere of the state, while the duty of harmonising all interests and the need of protecting the consciousness of unity led the state to an ever growing amount of interference. Thus it was able to keep in touch with the needs of society with the assistance of the press and of political representation. Without personal initiative, this development would have been unthinkable.

Now it would appear at first sight that the loose organisation

of the Eastern state would have been unable to cope with such a situation. But, as Allen points out, the East was helped over its difficulty by the existence of the powerful state-organisation of the West, born out of personal initiative, by the end of the first half of the nineteenth century. The West was there, as a model structure that could be adopted by every Eastern government that had enough power to do so. The pioneer work had been accomplished, and in many instances an almost perfect instrument was waiting for those who wished to use it. In Eastern states personal initiative was well-nigh unknown, but the management of its own affairs by the group existed in a manner all the more marked. This is the key with which sixty years ago static communities gained access to the dynamic sphere. It was therefore very lucky for the East that the West appeared before its portals just at the time when the West had acquired a form of organisation which so eminently applied to Eastern circumstances.

Western commercial, industrial, shipping, mining, and banking enterprise had grown to such a degree of influence that they operated in a sphere which was so important for the state that government interference became more necessary every day, and personal initiative, confronted with the incredible complexity of all these economic activities, was compelled to sacrifice a certain amount of its freedom. Everywhere combines, trusts, companies under the direction of administrative boards arose, and free competition gave way to governmental regulation.

"Now Japan", says Allen, "since her appearance as an industrial nation, has found the whole stream of economic tendencies flowing in a direction most congenial to her. . . . Her people had for centuries been trained hard in loyalty and obedience. Though deficient in individual initiative, they had a bias towards co-operative action as a result of the social system in which they had been reared. . . . Entirely free from a tradition of *laissez-faire*, they looked to the state to take the necessary steps in the introduction of Western industrialism, and their social traditions caused them to turn naturally to the governmental regulation of their economic life and to methods to the elimination of competition. Thus if England afforded the best example of nineteenth century industrialism, Japan may be considered in one sense at any rate, a typical country of modern industrialism" (p. 106).

The four powerful *tozama daimyos* of the clans of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa, with a few other daimyos whose ances-

tors had preserved a rather detached attitude during the Shogunate and who had not sacrificed their economic independence, had caused the fall of the Shogunate, and the burden of the re-organisation desired by the Emperor naturally came to rest upon their shoulders. Without the faithful and able knighthood which had been accustomed for centuries to responsibility and administration the backbone for a modern organisation would have been lacking. With such a body, however, the success of the new order was assured beforehand. The state took the initiative in every direction and has preserved it in many respects up to the present. Schools were established in order to give the nation the necessary technical, financial, commercial, and nautical knowledge. Western experts, advisers, and teachers were engaged in huge numbers, chambers of commerce and commercial museums were organised. Production and export guilds were established, their scope was extended in the course of years, and at present there are over a thousand of them.

Functional organisation therefore proved able to adapt its natural growth to the new conditions, and rendered splendid service to the modern system of production, while the religious characteristics of the classical guilds which are still in existence everywhere continue to be valued in the same way as the ancient territorial connections in the villages and in the wards of the cities. The more one studies the wheels of the new machine, the more one sees that all that can be used of the old is allowed to remain. There is no form of loyalty, obedience or co-operation that is not treated with reverence, and to this is due the phenomenal success of Japan¹⁾, as well as to the fact that its evolution long before the Restoration was in reality tending towards a centralised state which soon left every Eastern state and every colonial territory far behind it from the point of view of organisation.

From the schools that had been founded by the government presently began to come the young men who in their turn helped to expand the new edifice, by working in the numerous enterprises which had actually been started or else encouraged by the State. There they had acquired the experience which gave rise to a modern industrial and commercial class. This class became increasingly influential in the state, and authority is gradually passing

¹⁾ Cf. Count Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan*, 1910.

from the clans to the new middle-class. Like the state, the family is proving able to cope with the needs of the new era. Whenever big enterprise transcended the capacities of the individual, the group provided the frame for continuing his work. Great business families came into existence, closely connected with the government, and their businesses are often referred to as semi-official concerns. The Mitsui family, with its banks, shipping lines, mines, and factories, or the Mitsubishi firm with its banks and industrial concerns are instances of this tendency. It is always the capacity of the Japanese group for corporate action which explains the success of these remarkable business concerns.

The whole modern system of production rests upon group loyalty. All those who work in big concerns feel connected by innumerable threads to the leaders, in a way which differs altogether from the anonymous, if not less faithful, sense of loyalty of a Western bank clerk. In the West, the personal relationship plays little or no part at all, while in the East it is all-important. We have seen how Japanese firms strengthen themselves by adopting their most efficient employees into the controlling families. Such situations have been severely criticised by Western observers, who have spoken of oligarchy and bureaucracy, and who say that the Government is hand in glove with Big Business. One might reply by asking whether all the things that have been achieved already are not sufficient to earn the greatest admiration for those who performed them. What else could the Government have done? If one takes every factor into account, one must conclude that the Japanese government displayed profound statesmanship. It is remarkable that the synthesis of old and new has taken place without shocks. Only because full political responsibility has not been straightaway given to the nation have there been no fatal convulsions.

There is movement and progress, even now. In economic life, especially at Osaka, numerous independent bodies have been formed which side by side with semi-official enterprises are daily taking a larger share in affairs. A conscious bourgeoisie is growing; like it, the workers are organising and acquiring influence. The countryside is also being drawn into the forward movement owing to the autonomy and the co-operation that are being encouraged by the government. The reform act of 1925 has extended the

franchise to 10 million new voters, in order to enable the whole adult male population to take part in public affairs within the frame of the present state organisation and by legal means, and women have recently been accorded the vote in municipal, local, and prefectural elections. All this mobility and freedom will eventually mean the end of the family as the social unit. When the moment arrives, the sense of citizenship, the national idea, and the personality will have become so thoroughly alive in a great number of people that the disappearance of the family system will not cause any shock or confusion.

During the stage of transition, however, the autocratic system remained indispensable. It resided in the Emperor, while the administration was mainly entrusted to the Satsuma and Choshu clans, who filled the posts in the army and the navy and, through the extra-constitutional body called the Genro, dominated the cabinet and its policy. Legislation was entrusted to the Lower House in which, originally, the samurai of other clans predominated, while the Upper House was composed of former daimyos. The ministers were not responsible to Parliament, and, whenever the budget was rejected, that of the previous year was automatically continued. Strong parties could therefore not be formed, and furthermore nobody could reach ministerial rank who had not been a member of the bureaucracy and passed certain specified examinations. It is clear that an oligarchy had kept the reins of government in hand. Western institutions had been adopted, but without any intention of also taking over a democratic régime for which the country was not considered ripe. One should not call this a masquerade; it was a preparation for the future, a school for democracy. Even to this day the political interest of the population is not great. It must be awakened gradually, and in a sufficient number of persons, before anything can be expected from popular government.

When, in 1889, the leaders of Japanese policy summoned a popular representation, they did not mean to imply that the nation was ripe for democracy. They merely wanted to indicate the promise of the future, and their action was in no way inconsistent or incompatible with the preservation of an oligarchic system, with extensive government intervention, and with the performance by officials and police of many activities which we in the

West would leave to private initiative. Strict supervision of the press, of associations, of the labour and peasants movement was continued. Criticism which calls all this a thin democratic veneer entirely misreads the situation. The representative bodies originally were not representative in the Western sense. Even to-day parties are more concerned with persons than with principles. The idea of a parliament in the Western sense was perhaps a century ahead of the feelings of the population, and the representative chambers therefore embodied a promise, which could not be fulfilled before a complete civic sense had been acquired. The Japanese nation has understood that a grateful acceptance of the opportunities offered by its leaders, for the development of an activity of its own, provided the real means of advance towards popular authority. The goal is every day coming nearer within sight. At no time has the position of parliament been interpreted as the result of usurpation and answered with negative obstruction.

The nation saw in the granting of parliamentary forms a precise definition of what was to be the national patrimony, which would be placed in the hands of the young ward as soon as he came of age. The West is used to see in parliamentary institutions the crowning of an evolution, the recognition of the culmination of social growth. This mistake is also often made in the colonial world, when the significance of representative bodies is misinterpreted. If a century hence the population in the Indies reaches the stage of evolution which enables them to possess a really representative democratic government, they will have finished in the space of one century a progress which has taken the West nearly a thousand years. Even Siam and Japan could not have done what they did in the course of sixty years without Western assistance. Let the example of Japan open the eyes of the Indonesian élite to the things that really matter, and let them realise that the task which awaits the colonial authorities is ten times heavier than that of the Japanese leaders. The élite has as its task to assist the colonial authorities, so that they may lead the millions of its backward brethren to a condition in which they will really be able to choose their own representatives.

Local autonomy, East and West

Lack of discernment, the fault of those who cannot distinguish

between the promise of democratic government in the future and its actual existence, is also the cause of a confusion between archaic Eastern village communities and the modern village and town autonomies. The Eastern institutions based on customary law provide an excellent starting point for democratic modern decentralisation, but nothing more. There is indeed a necessary tendency towards decentralisation and de-concentration in the West as a result of the unburdening of the Western state. But the devolution of powers towards town and village administration which is the result of this new tendency has nothing in common with medieval local democracy. For, at the present time, in the West, the citizen is a member of the national community, and places its synthesis above that of province, county, town or village, above his group or union, above his family. He sees all these as sections of the great community. Even those few whose minds have not yet broadened out sufficiently to grasp the significance of the greater society, and who do not look beyond the village or the town, do not feel the slightest objection to the free admission of outsiders. They have no thought of warlike expeditions against other towns or villages. As a matter of fact, the simplest of them have some acquaintance with the idea of world peace. The man of the West hates tolls and similar obstacles to free intercourse to such an extent that he finds it difficult to visualise the life of the East with its towns within walls and all its sectionalism.

It is, indeed, particularly naive to identify the village republic and the modern commune or urban or rural district. A religious reverence for customary law, for instance, will only be found in the medieval mind. It is only the closed produce-economy that can be satisfied with the ancient forms of co-operation described in previous chapters. The modern era need not disturb the best among these consecrated customs and loyalties, but over and above them it requires something more. It demands a much higher form of co-operation, based upon an economical division of labour or a rational system of production, which is not merely based upon genealogical or territorial cohesion. The modern era attaches importance to the abstract idea, not merely to personal relations. Like the Middle Ages, it demands from the small community an activity of its own, but it extends the scope of that activity much further, and wants it applied to the interests of the

whole nation. It wants to continue building upon the existing basis, and not to hark back to a past which can no longer live. This is why everything that savours of a definite return to the village republic has to be rejected. Everything that merely bolsters up the disappearing system of mutual assistance based upon and limited by customary law deserves to be condemned. But what can never be sufficiently encouraged is the increase of a flourishing autonomous village life in the modern sense, and of co-operative societies. There indeed will be found the point of contact between the old and the new.

The method followed with so much success by Japan is based upon precisely this principle. Although the Japanese village is in many respects constrained to take hints and instructions from the Prefecture, it nevertheless possesses an extremely rich autonomous life. But it is tuned in to the national life. Had this not happened, the authority and the state would have had to be supported until the end of time by a bureaucratic oligarchy, the very thing which the zealots of the "village republic" loathe most of all. Robertson Scott, who conjures up in a very striking way the lively spirit of the Japanese village, described how educated people devote themselves to the encouragement of social virtues, of civic sense, patriotism, and co-operation in many directions ¹⁾. It would be a good thing if in other Eastern countries, such as the Dutch East Indies, educated people followed the example of the Japanese. Only in this way can they achieve the withdrawal of government interference without unfavourable effects. It is not in representative bodies, dyarchy, Councils of the People, Philippine Assemblies, and so forth, but in the village, in the town, in local autonomy and co-operative societies, in the strengthening of the matrimonial link and of the household, that the future is being shaped. The spheres of high policy are still far too remote from the people. Only a few score of particularly able men, whose assistance is eagerly sought for by the central government, can find a place in higher politics. Even without the existence of universal suffrage they easily come to the fore, and they are well able to advance the interests of the people.

Popular education, however, is a sphere of activity that is open to tens of thousands of big and small leaders, who can assist in

¹⁾ J. W. Robertson Scott, *The Foundations of Japan*, 1922, pp. 16 sqq.

changing the ancient village communes into strong village autonomies which dovetail into the greater unity of popular authority. This is happening already in Japan. Co-operative and other societies are flourishing, and they work not merely for material improvement. There are, for instance, in many villages rural Young Men's Associations, whose members meet every morning at five for gymnastic drill. Their purpose is to teach themselves discipline, to harden their bodies, to cultivate a keen enjoyment of life, and to encourage the habit of retiring early, in order to prevent loitering, extravagance, and vice. The members undertake to fulfil their religious duties, to honour their parents, to do their work to the best of their capacity, and to avoid visits to *sake* sellers and to *geishas*. It is an endeavour, not without naivety, perhaps, to achieve collective morality, which proves that the real form of transition from group-morality to conscious personal morality has been found.

Then there are the organised distributions of prizes for agriculturists. Rewards are given to those who succeed in getting the highest proportionate return from their rice-fields. Manures are bought co-operatively, by-products are disposed of *en bloc*, and standard marks are applied to goods in the hope of achieving a special recognition for the local produce in the markets. The village girlhood also has its unions, with mottoes like "Good Women and Good Mothers", and these unions too demand self-denial from their members. Among all these novelties, the village-meeting and the ancient forms of mutual assistance continue to exist. New sanctuaries are constructed, schools and bridges are repaired. It is a harmonious fusion of the old and the new. No valuable element in the old order is sacrificed, but the familiar sphere is activated by the continual infusion of a new dynamism.

Let us mention another instance of the manner in which the Japanese Government has to adapt its policy of evolution to this rustic simplicity. In the same way as in the Dutch East Indies the authorities try to encourage better cattle raising by the distribution of prizes to the owners of the best specimens, the Japanese Government organises exhibitions and competitions for agricultural produce. Conferences on cultivation are convened by the Prefecture; there the most successful way of laying out new rice-fields and other topics of the same nature are debated. Robertson

Scott describes one of these "meetings of skilful farmers". Every body who spoke did so with great pleasure, and the audience took copious notes. "The originator of these gatherings, Mr. Yamasaki", says Mr. Robertson Scott, "told me that he was more than once moved to tears by the merits and pure hearts of the farmer speakers".

The villagers, apart from exchanging their experiences, realise that there is a wider world outside their own, and go back full of new ideas which they communicate to others. The population spontaneously reacts to such methods. In other directions similar experiments could be made, and a magnificent task in this field awaits the Eastern élite in the colonies also. In Japan, at any rate, the government owes to its educated class that an active and keen popular organisation has sprung up rapidly side by side with its bureaucratic administration. To give an example, taken at random, one village, of 2,000 inhabitants, described by Robertson Scott, has apart from an official administrative bureau and a village sanctuary, sixteen other sanctuaries and three Buddhist temples. There are four fire-engines manned by 155 firemen, there are 12 soldiers with the colours, 40 reservists of whom 37 had been honourably mentioned, two doctors and three midwives, a sanitary commission of 23 members. The budget is 5710 yen; there is a fund against famine, there are two co-operative societies, a Young Men's Association, a Buddhist Young Men's Association, a Women's Society, a society for village development, a society for old boys of the elementary school, two savings societies, a society for encouraging morality, and an association of people who wanted to shine by setting a good example to their fellow-citizens. Ninety-nine persons are contributors to the Red Cross, and twenty-four are members of the Patriotic Women's Union.

Self exertion

When one looks at these foundations of the life of Japan, one realises how thoroughly healthy the nation is, and how great the forces at its disposal. In almost every village the memory of Ninomiya, the rustic philosopher of the previous century, is honoured, and the farmers forgather in order to study his ideas. The Japanese Government has done everything to spread the wholesome philosophy of this devoted peasant among the population.

The same spirit, again, is revealed by the existence of associations of ex-officials, whose aim it is to assist the active officials in their task by influencing the population and furthermore, by doing what they can to enhance the prestige of all those who ever were in government service, and therefore of the public service itself ¹).

Obviously, to foster such a spirit in villages and in towns requires far more energy, and means infinitely more for the national strength, than the construction of the state organisation, of railway systems or of gigantic business concerns. Every strong autocratic government can do as much with the help of foreign experts, but it is quite another thing to dynamise the popular spirit as Japanese leadership has done. No doubt official initiative and official supervision still play a large part, but it is evident from what precedes that self-exertion plays an ever-growing part. In the colonial world also self-exertion is becoming a guiding thought, and, quite rightly, it is being found the only force that can activate social life and prepare society for modern conditions. But many men in the East and in the West are inclined to interpret self-exertion as being tantamount to the revival of communalism and village-states, which would be the very way to entrench self-sufficiency, particularism, and inertia. What is needed is that the village-communities, far from becoming self-contained and independent, should feel most definitely dependent on the bigger organism of which they are only a small part.

There are others who would like to leave Eastern populations severely alone during a certain period, and to make the village communities so completely independent that no official would ever show himself within their territory. But this could only be done, consistently, by abolishing all world-traffic, by doing away with all schools except the little Koran or other religious schools, by restoring the walls and the gates around each village. As soon as it is realised that such a supremely logical attitude would also be supremely absurd, it will be understood that the only alternative is to give an intensive lead to the indispensable process of self-exertion. Indeed, every believer in self-exertion must agree that the Japanese village, which is the supreme embodiment of this principle, could not have become what it is without the many

¹) J. W. Robertson Scott, p. 22. Cf. also *Keyserling, Reisstagebuch*, p. 583.

functions exercised by government agents. Without assistance, the small autonomies could never find their way towards the bigger unity and towards the co-operation which is necessary if they are to face the strenuous conditions of the modern era.

If merely to leave the small autonomies to themselves is not the same thing as to encourage self-exertion, it is equally true that government interference does not at once call forth self-exertion. Government care, as exercised to-day, supersedes local co-operation in many respects. This makes it desirable that new fields of activity should be found for the local autonomies. If, for fear of excessive interference, this duty is neglected, the result will be the atrophying of the village. It is essential, therefore, that guidance should not be withheld. The importance of government interference becomes palpable when one reflects to what extent state action has secured order, peace and quiet, and safety. One of the main reasons for village co-operation, that of safeguarding the life and possessions of the members of the community, has consequently disappeared. Similarly, by taking charge of jurisdiction, the central authorities have relieved the local bodies from another responsibility. What indeed will be left of the village republics in Japan, China, Siam, India or the Dutch East Indies, once they have lost a great number of more or less important functions? Practically nothing beyond a series of administrative subdivisions and of family groups without public functions, which is precisely the kind of development that must be avoided. The golden mean must everywhere be sought. To put an end to isolation, to make the popular units fit in with the activities of the state and of society, and yet, at the same time, to stimulate their self-exertion, are indeed tasks which demand great administrative talents.

The popular activity which can thus be called into being must not be put exclusively in the service of the state; various new functions must, however, be entrusted to the local autonomies. The main idea should always remain that the desire for autonomous exertion must be made serviceable in the first place to local needs and to co-operation on a large scale. An interest must be fostered in the establishment of various societies, in better methods of production, in credit, consumption, and marketing on a co-operative basis. The need for assistance from the Eastern élite

cannot be sufficiently emphasised. The example of Japan shows what can be achieved and the requisite methods to be adopted. There, a real sense of citizenship has evolved out of early communalism. The village headmen and counsellors are elected by the population, towns and villages settle their own budgets, and regulate their domestic concerns, in accordance, no doubt, with general rules laid down by the government, but nevertheless with a considerable latitude for local initiative. The task thus delegated to these bodies by the authorities is fulfilled in the most satisfactory manner.

J a p a n ' s s y s t e m o f e d u c a t i o n

A large part of the success achieved in the communal sphere is due to the system of popular education, which, in the words of the Imperial Rescript of 1869, had to be so general, that there should remain no single illiterate family in any village, and no single illiterate member in any family. Illiteracy has entirely disappeared in Japan, although the script is infinitely more complicated than the 26 characters of our alphabet. Education mainly tries to inculcate citizenship, patriotism, and virtuous behaviour. For all boys and girls education is compulsory. The elementary school has a programme which covers six years, while innumerable technical schools serve as an introduction to practical life. On leaving the elementary school a pupil can sit for an examination which admits him to the secondary school. The number of successful candidates depends on the need for intellectual workers; in this way the creation of an intellectual proletariat is prevented. If anything, the selection to-day is still too liberal.

Applications for entrance to the secondary schools are always very numerous. Allen says that there are sometimes as many as two thousand candidates for two hundred vacancies. The curriculum at the secondary schools covers five years. And at the end of the fourth those who wish to be admitted to the higher education must once more pass a competitive examination, after which the successful candidates are admitted to a so-called high school which prepares them in the course of three years for the faculty of their choice. The secondary school is also a preparation for higher schools of commerce, higher technical schools, etc. The only way in which richer people are favoured is

by being able to secure private tuition which increases the chance of their children at examinations. But talent, industry, and character are bound to come out on top with such a system. As Allen notes, there is no "cleavage between schools and colleges on class lines. . . . Within the institutions, filled though they are with boys from many different social classes, there is a fine spirit of *camaraderie* and a complete absence of snobbishness. The students live simply, and school opinion does not permit any kind of display, even on the part of the most wealthy. The system is, indeed, a remarkable product of a country which is generally regarded abroad as lacking in a democratic spirit". The Japanese system of education is as valid a criterion of democratisation as the grant of certain political rights and capacities, and in the eyes of many thinkers of our own age it is more valid than universal suffrage and a parliamentary system.

The lesson of Japan

Japan has adapted the old Chinese examination system with all its advantages to the demands which a great and differentiated society makes upon education. There is an all round opportunity for talent to develop and fructify, and although official circles originally were composed of the members of mighty clans, they are always ready to welcome talent. So also are the great business families. The group spirit is visibly losing its exclusiveness; it is being transformed into a civic sense which, blending with group loyalty, is devoid of narrowness towards outsiders. All this is taking place without commotion, and Japanese statesmanship is showing how the synthesis of old and new can come about gradually without therefore being left behind by the times.

From all their officials, even the village policeman, the authorities expect a far-reaching interference with the people, because they know that to wait for self-exertion would take too long. Nevertheless, the Japanese countryside has become a model of self-exertion, because by careful leadership personality and the democratic spirit have been fostered without the sacrifice of the two ancient virtues of loyalty and piety. A quiet reconstruction of the national edifice has been made possible owing to this strengthening of its foundations. Some disadvantages may accompany this method. But they are transient. The Shogunate was

indispensable until consciousness of national unity became universal. In the same way as it has disappeared, the clan spirit will also go; it is already wearing away, as can be seen by very numerous indications. State interference, as King-Hall points out, is apt to foster manipulation in favour of special concerns ¹⁾. Political life is freest of this drawback in periods of complete *laissez-faire*. The inevitable characteristics of a period of transition will disappear when the nation reaches a stage of political ripeness. It is precisely because that stage has not yet been reached that full democratic responsibility could not be introduced.

When Mukerjee, in his *Democracies of the East*, says (p. 184) that "the first failure of parliamentary government is seen in the establishment of a cabinet which is independent of parliament", he makes the mistake of concentrating his attention too exclusively upon the representative body, as if it were the only expression of the evolutionary process. On the contrary, it is only in the last instance one should look at it, because when it can be turned into a real Parliament the whole evolution has been achieved, and the seal is set upon the completion of the nation's growth. Parliamentarism is therefore not, as so many people in the Indies seem to believe, the beginning of the cycle, but the crowning and final phase during which the quiet growth towards popular consciousness can at last be clad with the *toga virilis*.

The untimely growth of too strong personalities, who would have disturbed the social harmony, is prevented by the steadying of the ancient social basis and by a system of education which fits in with it, while at the same time a regular development of personal consciousness is encouraged in every layer of the population. For the formation of un-social individuals, on the other hand, there has been very little room. The big problem of fitting the group into the great society has been solved in Japan without anarchy or individualism. No doubt many problems will still arise that will test the statesmanship of Japan's leaders. The international propaganda of communism remains a real danger. But when the crisis comes, Japan will prove able to defeat it. It triumphed over particularism and inertia and it will also triumph

¹⁾ *Op. cit.* pp. 115—128. Cf. also Yukio Ozaki, *Japan's Defective Constitutional Government*.

over individualism, because at no time has it placed moral progress behind material progress.

If Japan has thus far been less liberal towards the labour movement than the Western industrial states, and has not encouraged labour organisations, critics at home and abroad should not lose sight of the fact that in the East the trade union problem has an entirely different aspect from that which it presents in the West. The Western employer achieves stability by agreements with labour leaders who can see the whole problem and have a sense of responsibility. But in the East this altogether modern sense of discipline is not yet general among the workmen, and a much higher degree of general education and a rational sense of responsibility will be necessary before it is achieved. There is scarcely any *esprit de corps* as yet, in the modern sense, among the workmen, and they are still far too easily swayed by extremists, because among the mass of them there are still so few fully developed personalities. But there can be no doubt that the remarkable spirit of sacrifice and of loyalty, the spirit of compromise and the consciousness of national unity will be able to find the way which will secure the respect of human dignity in the labourer in town and countryside.

Japan, then, can teach a great deal to the colonial world, and especially to its Eastern élites, in particular the need for loyalty and obedience. But it should be understood that Japan owes much of its strength and many of its virtues to the political, social and economic evolution which preceded the period that opened in 1868. Moreover, the fact that it is a compact insular country has had a great influence on its population. In India and in the Dutch East Indies the problems are on a much larger scale. Besides, the colonial authorities are too often, quite mistakenly, treated as enemies by the nationalist movement which, in Japan, is naturally on the side of the authorities. India has a size and a population which by themselves would give to its problems the dimension of the Chinese problems while the Dutch East Indies, with only the population of Japan, are spread out over a vast space. Moreover, in the Dutch East Indies there is not the political, cultural, and religious unity which has existed to such a high degree in Japan and in China for many centuries. In the case of India, the caste system presents a special difficulty. Politically,

Japan, China, and Siam are in a more favoured position than India and the Dutch East Indies, which have not had a traditional dynastic unity and will therefore find it more difficult to live up to the idea of national unity. India has its Indian States, which would, no doubt, if the Round Table Conference had not struck upon a solution consisting in a blending of the idea of All-India federation with the principle of almost complete independence of the States, have shown some hesitation in accepting the idea of unity ¹). The problems in the colonial world are as yet really more difficult than those encountered and solved by Japan.

C h i n a

The struggles of modern China give an apt illustration of the fact that, as soon as circumstances change, there are other entirely different problems which have to be dealt with. The great European states have an area equal only to a Chinese province. The surface of Turkey is one tenth of that of China, its population only four per cent. Solutions which will apply to one country therefore are not necessarily the best for another. The problems of China have sometimes been compared with those that would accompany the foundation of a centralised state composed of the whole of Europe. If this comparison held good, centuries would still have to elapse before the goal came in sight. But it would be better to compare the problems of China with those that had to be tackled by the founders of the fundamentally homogeneous United States of America. There exists a certain provincialism and a conscious tie between the inhabitants of each province, which manifested itself, for instance, by the fact that formerly at Peking the inhabitants of each province had their own organisation and buildings where they met. But the provincial consciousness is not so strong that it could give rise to separatist feeling. Whenever, in the course of recent years, some province or other has proclaimed itself independent, there were special reasons which dictated the decision of local military leaders. In so far as the population took any interest at all in these proceedings, it remained entirely averse to the splitting up of China into independent states. There is a tradition of unity but also a tradition which imposes

¹) See K. M. Panikkar, *An Introduction to the Study of the Relations of Indian States with the Government of India*, 1927.

respect for provincial and local autonomy. Both traditions can be duly respected, because the province, the village, the guild, etc., can be made to fit into the bigger society that envelops them all.

There are many people who hold the view that the difficulties experienced by China in preserving or restoring its political unity prove that its political capacities are inferior to those of Japan. They forget that China is twenty-five times as large as Japan, while Japan's national consciousness found a ready focus in a dynasty which was believed to have ruled for more than 2500 years, an immense advantage over China, which had to begin by turning its national consciousness against a foreign dynasty. Feudalism, which was the cause of incessant wars in Japan until 1600, had been subdued in China two centuries before the Christian era. This was a great advantage, but it was never put to good use, because the Chinese Emperor limited the task of the authorities to the bare minimum. Almost everything was left to the population itself, as is well described by H. B. Morse in his standard work on *The Trade and Administration of China*, where he says (p. 59sq):

"Apart from the regular visits of the tax collector, it is doubtful, if the actual existence of a government is brought tangibly to the notice of a tenth, certainly not a fifth, of the population.

The remaining eighty or more per cent live their daily life under their customs, the common law of the land, interpreted and executed by themselves. Each village is the unit of this common law government, the fathers of the village exercising the authority vested in age, but acting under no official warrant, and interpreting the customs of their fathers as they learned them in their youth.... The official head of the village is the Tipao, Land Warden, nominated by the magistrate from the village elders, but dependent upon the goodwill of his constituents.

Several small villages may be joined under one Tipao.... while a village which, as is often the case, consists of the branches of one family holding its property in undivided commonalty will have naturally as its Tipao the head of the family. The Tipao acts as a constable, and is responsible for the good conduct and moral behaviour of every one of his constituents; he is also responsible for the due payment of land tax and tribute.... The town is considered as a collection of villages, being divided into Chia, wards, each with its Tipao, whose duties are the same as those of his country colleague. The town has, however, its commercial questions, but these are almost, if not quite, invariably settled by the Guild

concerned, in accordance with Guild rules, and are seldom brought to the cognisance of the officials."

Here again the responsibility of genealogical and territorial chiefs is the corner-stone of the social edifice, and as long as the sense of cohesion is so strong, this responsibility is not too heavy to bear. It is, furthermore, the main cause of the discipline which is maintained within these groups, and which, inside the family, gives rise to the primary virtue of obedience and filial piety. It is upon this virtue and upon the sense of communal cohesion that society and culture have been based for thousands of years. As Monroe remarks, "The unwritten constitution assigned by tradition all rights to the local communities which were not assigned by tradition and use to the distant central power" ¹).

Social and political structure: Family and clan

This local self-government normally assures the rest and the peace of 80 per cent of the population, the remainder being the 75 millions who live in the 1500 towns of China. One should, of course, not talk of village republics and democracies in the sense which would attach to these words when applied in the West. The management of local affairs is not left to the people themselves, but to a few persons. Towards the outsider, the village is represented by a village head who is designated by the inhabitants and whose appointment is sanctioned by the mandarin. Inside the community, the elders, who are the heads of the various family groups, see to the execution of what has been decided either by the district mandarin or by the village council. The key of the administrative system is a graded responsibility. The family is the unit in the village, but in so far as various families are descended from one common ancestor, they may form a clan which sometimes covers fifty or more villages. While, inside the family, there is strong discipline (which modern legislation has preserved in part by upholding the organisation of the family), the system of the clan is democratic. E. T. Williams, in *China Yesterday and To-day*, says:

¹) Paul Monroe, *China, a Nation in Evolution*, 1928. Cf. also Nicholas Roosevelt, *The Restless Pacific*, 1928, p. 206 sqq.; Williams, *op. cit.*, 1923, p. 66 sqq. Cf. also Y. K. Leong, *Village and Town Life in China*, 1915, and Arthur H. Smith, *Village Life in China*, 1899, p. 226.

The recognition of family unity and authority would seem at first sight to encourage the adoption of a monarchical and autocratic form of government. To a certain extent this is true, and the family has been made the pattern of government. The Emperor stood to his people *in loco parentis*. The people were regarded as his children and taught to reverence and obey him. . . . The local official, too, the representative of the Emperor was called the *fu-mu-kuan*, that is to say, the father-mother-official. This tendency towards autocracy, however, was greatly modified by another feature of family government, the clan-council. The head of the clan was not an autocrat. All heads of families in the clan participated in the discussion and decision.

The custom of meeting together to discuss clan affairs, the practice of settling these affairs themselves without appeal to the state, and the tendency even to ignore and over-ride the political authorities by executing judgement upon an offender and by waging private war — all this tended to produce in the family as a unit a feeling of independence and a capacity for self-government. This tendency towards democratic feeling and action seems to have been stronger than that towards submission to autocracy, for it is in the south where the family is most thoroughly organised and the clans most powerful that we find democratic sentiment most generally nourished and expressed. In the north, moreover, where family sentiment is weaker, we see a willingness to submit to autocratic rule.

This is not difficult to explain. In the south of China the individual submitted to the rule of his own clan, and was trained to look upon the authority of his clan as superior to that of the state whenever there was conflict between them. But he also participated in the councils of the clan, and he thus became a ready believer in popular government. In the north the authority of the father was admitted but there was less family consultation, fewer well organised clans, and consequently less experience in settling matters among themselves. . . . This difference in regard to the organisation and authority of the family ought to be borne in mind when we have our attention called to the present struggle in China between the extreme liberals at Canton and the conservatives at Peking. Bertha Phillpotts, in her *Kindred and Clan* says of the clan in Europe: Where adhesive kindreds persist into the later Middle Ages, there the peasant or townsman tends to be free. Where, on the other hand, the solidarity of the kindred disappears early, there the liberty of the individual suffers and seigniorial rights make their appearance. This statement is equally true of the history of the clan in China.

There are, of course, other differences too between North and South, ethnical, climatological, and geographical, which explain

the greater intelligence, spirit of enterprise, and liberalism of the South, but there is no doubt that the social system is a dominant factor.

The village

It would have been difficult for the territorial village organisation in China to have adopted an autocratic form, owing to the restricted amount of official interference and the strength of the clan connection. The co-operation which has come to be established between the villages is based upon mutual consultation. Important questions like the regulation of markets, and arrangements for holding them by rotation in different places, are then settled. In rural life the market is of the greatest importance. It is the only means of breaking the daily routine. Especially in larger villages, where tens of thousands of visitors flock together, a meeting place is provided for the inhabitants of a large radius; while pedlars and traders come from great distances, and represent the outside world. Then there is co-operation during harvest times, for guarding the fields and punishing thieves. The popular tribunal deals with delinquents, and nobody would dare to disregard its sentence. For an appeal would only bring the case before the district mandarin, who would be sure to support the village heads.

These forms of co-operation hold a promise of rural autonomy, which will be a reality once a better organisation is formed which will incorporate them in larger units. Infinitely more than what has been achieved will have to be done, and this can only take place with help from above. Villages and village federations naturally have but a narrow horizon, which can only be widened if the state, the province, or the district removes from them the character of isolated little states and directs their energies towards the dynamic functions of autonomy and self-government. When this happens conservatism, which is so strong within the little circle and can only be weakened by visits to the market, will give way everywhere to better methods of organisation. The influence of the family and the cult of the ancestors have in any case fostered a vast amount of conservatism. Conservatism has the religious sanction of the ancestral cult and must therefore be taken into account. Far-reaching reforms and over-hasty modernisation would

have fatal effects upon the religious sense, unless care is taken to enrich the spiritual inclinations as well as the intellect, in such a way that the balance between the old and the new is preserved.

China and Japan compared

Piety towards the elder members of the family and the cult of the dead ancestors are the most prominent characteristics of Chinese society. In China too fidelity to the Emperor was in principle a cardinal virtue, which could not in practice transmute itself into a strong consciousness, because the authorities remained aloof to such a considerable extent. If one compares this situation with that of Japan, one finds that there, owing to the persistence of the feudal system, fidelity was the leading principle in all clans, and in almost half a million Samurai families, which were bound to influence the whole nation by their example. Precisely as in the West during the Middle Ages, the ordinary population in Japan, during the troubled times before 1600, when each Daimyate was a political foreign enemy to every other Daimyate, depended on feudal protection and in return forwent much freedom and gave its fidelity. After the establishment of the Tokugawa Shogunate the situation changed and peace reigned without interruption. Marriage outside the Daimyate, which had previously been forbidden, was allowed, trade and traffic ignored internal frontiers. The feudal states began to be departments of a centralised state, and they no longer thought of fighting each other, although the feudal system with its martial spirit and its traditional duties was preserved.

The autochthonous sub-structure, which is so important for the modernisation of every state, was very different in the two countries. They both had mystical connection with the Ruler, which connection was never destroyed by the feudal system in Japan. But there a very strong authority existed in the feudal states, exercised by the Samurai who were in the service of the Daimyos. The whole population was daily reminded of the duty of fidelity and endeavoured to practise it even more than the duty of piety. Everyone learned not only to see the feudal districts, but even the state as the real unit, instead of merely the village and the family. The mystical unity became more palpably confirmed

by the political and administrative structure, which gave to the former the seal of reality.

In China the political and administrative unity was larger, in principle, but it did not express itself in the shape of governmental interference, with the result that in practice tens of thousands of "village republics" were almost completely independent. The feeling of unity embodied in fidelity to the Emperor could therefore become a significant principle only for official and educated people, while, for the vast majority, obedience to the elders of the family and the clan remained the guiding principle. No doubt, in the course of centuries, the *hsien* or administrative district became in the popular consciousness a territorial unit for which a feeling of attachment was felt, but the strong sense of solidarity connected with the fief in Japan never existed in the districts of China. For the people the district-mandarin could never occupy the position of the overlord or the Samurai in Japan. A good mandarin was honoured like a father, but as mandarins were frequently transferred to other districts no strong link, like that established with a feudal family, could ever exist.

No more was necessary, in Japan, than that the feudal lords should become officials for a strong and centralised state to come into being. The metamorphosis had been prepared by three centuries of unity under the Tokugawa Shogunate. In China difficulties unheard of in Japan have to be overcome, and the élite has to build up national unity from the bottom. By keeping this fact in mind, one will judge more temperately of recent events in that country. The fatal results of a loose political structure resting upon very small territorial units can be seen by the periodical disasters such as floods and famines which visit China¹). Only organised co-operation on a large scale can adequately deal with such contingencies. Once the resources of large areas have been pooled in the service of their common interests, China will have little difficulty in keeping the Hoang-Ho within its bounds and in applying its canalised rivers to the treble purpose of traffic, of evacuation of superfluous waters, and of fighting periodical droughts.

¹) W. H. Mallory, *China, Land of Famine*.

Transition in China

There would have been no advantage in reviving the feudal system in China. No doubt small principalities and fiefs would have given rise to popular consciousness in larger territorial units under a stronger authority, but in an Empire of such gigantic dimensions no central authority could ever have the power to control feudalism. There would have been continual wars and struggles between the overlords, and no more chance than under the existing system of a flourishing trade and of permanent co-operation. The state system with its officials was therefore the most suitable for China's needs. The examination system and the educational system which fits in with it have developed a sense of cultural kinship. The district occupies already a large enough place as a territorial unit in the popular consciousness to allow us to expect, after some further period of preparation, the establishment of district autonomy upon a democratic basis and even of provincial autonomy. Moreover, there is an ever growing circle of educated people who place the unity of the country above everything else. It is upon the élite that the future depends, for the task of communicating this consciousness of unity to the whole nation rests on its shoulders, in preparation for the time when the interests of the Empire can be confided to a democratic popular authority. In expectation of this eventuality, it will be possible to leave, as in the old days, a good deal of responsibility to the village, and further to apply the policy of modern decentralisation to the town, the district, and even, as much as possible, to the province. But meanwhile, the central state authorities, with their local representatives and the legislature, are not yet responsible to the people, who must still learn to adapt themselves to the idea of national unity and to express themselves in a manner free from uncertainties.

The leaders of the national party intend to be for the time being the depositories of authority. Founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, this party would have to carry through its task of re-organisation, in accordance with his well known three principles. There would be three periods, the first of which, the military, was, in 1928, believed to be nearing its close but again militarism, which is nothing else than the outcome of nepotism and the family outlook of group particularism, has disappointed the well-wishers of China.

The second period is that of construction, which serves to prepare the third, or democratic period ¹⁾. Criticism is levelled even now at what is called party-government and oligarchy, as though the price paid for the premature introduction in 1911 of Western democracy had not been expensive enough. The road which has now been taken, though beset with appalling difficulties, seems to be the best, because the disappearance of a national dynasty has made it necessary to find another approach towards national unity. If one does not take the heavy odds and other incidentals into account, one will see that Chinese statesmanship is really trying to take the same direction as that in which the Japanese centralised authority, as well as the Indian and colonial world elsewhere, is moving or intending to move.

It would be supremely short-sighted to want to introduce a democratic system by decree, without first troubling to find out whether the millions are able to bear such a heavy responsibility. It does not greatly matter whether, in the meantime, it is an absolute Ruler, the direction of a party, an oligarchy, a dictatorial president or a colonial government which holds the reins in hand, till the growing sense of unity has matured and a strong sense of citizenship exists. For at bottom they all act with the same wisdom which has been acquired by experience. The universality of these principles ought to open the eyes of some critics to the fact that many problems are by no means exclusively colonial or inherent in Western usurpation. We are concerned with the human problems of organisation struggling against inertia, of unity against separatism, of citizenship against group-egoism. Would it not be strange if in this conflict of the ages the same questions did not continually arise and ask for analogous solutions?

Loyalty and piety in China

These considerations cause the spectator to feel a warm sympathy for the arduous upward march of Eastern states and make him feel that the Eastern élites are allies in the fight for synthesis. He will realise that as far as China is concerned he is looking at a particularly arduous struggle, because the venerable pillars of antiquity were shaken when the mystical link with the Ruler

¹⁾ Dr. Wang Chung Hui, in "Sinwanpao", Oct. 10, 1928, translated in *North China Herald*, Weekly Ed. Oct. 13.

disappeared. Should the Chinese élite have accepted a new dynasty? Or ought it to have sought salvation in the arms of a strong man? There is a craving for the strong man, in the colonial world too, where people too easily forget that a strong man can only maintain himself if he leans upon the loyalty of his environment. Though the nation might have accepted a new Ruler, the Chinese élite felt that, where its ideal was a consciousness of unity, a return to a mere sentiment of unity would not do. It is looking forward, and time is on its side. Moreover, China has for centuries considered the Imperial dignity in a more democratic sense than most other Eastern countries. The Son of Heaven always had to realise that the voice of the people was the voice of Heaven, and the nation has always remained conscious of the existence of this principle, which was so clearly laid down in the emphatic pronouncements of Confucius and Mencius. This may only be a subtle variation of absolutism, not sufficiently pronounced to cause a strong popular reaction against every form of despotism. Nevertheless, it forms a background which gives more form and reality to the organisation plans of the Chinese reformers than would have otherwise been possible.

It is precisely this principle, however often disregarded by absolutism, which has caused the cardinal virtue of faithfulness to be embedded in morality, and to be concerned not only with the Ruler but also with the people. In view of the fact that all organisation must rest on a moral basis, we are inclined to conclude that it was from this source that China's élite drew the energy which must actuate it, since the Imperial pillar has foundered.

It was evident, even before the event, that the disappearance of the very centre of Chinese life, the imperial dignity, would be accompanied by serious upheavals, because all the centrifugal forces which it had kept in order would be let loose. The old philosopher Ku Hung-Ming, who was so imbued with the importance of the dignity of the Emperors that he refused to cut off his cue, because, although a symbol of national subservience, it was also a mark of respect to the Emperors, used to say that the Manchu Emperors were more inclined to Chinese culture than many Chinese Emperors had been, because they paid the utmost regard to tradition. He considered ¹⁾ that duty and loyalty was to

¹⁾ *The Spirit of the Chinese People*, pp. 42 sqq.

the average Chinese population what a belief in God was to other nations. It secured the continuity and permanence of society and the immortality of the race. "A Chinaman", he wrote, "who knowingly forgets, gives up or throws away the code of honour, the *Ming fen ta yi* in the State Religion of Confucius in China, which teaches the absolute Divine Duty of Loyalty to the Emperor or Sovereign to whom he has once given his allegiance, such a Chinaman is a man who has lost the spirit of the Chinese people, the spirit of his nation and race: he is no longer a real Chinaman".

This opinion reminds us of the view of Dr. Rivai, quoted in a previous chapter, that an Indonesian who denies the power of magic is no longer an Indonesian. Both these thinkers are writing in defence of the old spiritual zenith, which has called forth so many virtues from the nursery of morality. Of course, if they merely wanted to tie the mind down to a form which can no longer harmonise with the requirements of the spirit of the time, one could not so readily agree with them. For it is the spiritual inclinations and the moral values, not the form, which have to be preserved. Both the West and the East must learn from their own past that there has been at all times a need for dropping certain forms that have become out of date. Real conservatism must also preserve the wise readiness of our ancestors to give up the worn out parts of their inheritance in favour of the new acquisitions they are making.

If, in China, the virtue of reverence was directed of old towards the Emperor, this does not imply that since the Emperor has departed, reverence will have no further opportunity for expression. On the contrary, Chinese religion and ethics are in many respects so elevating and sublime that the virtue of reverence is in no danger, provided always that the authorities keep atheism at arm's length and use education for moral as well as for intellectual improvement. The way in which godless communism has been repelled contains a promise that China's leaders are seeing the danger and every friend of China may well pray that they will be able, in future too, to carry out the function with which they have been entrusted.

Happily, the other pillar which supported the social fabric has been preserved intact. Filial piety has remained. Ku Hung-Ming said: "... as the essence, the motive power, the source of real

inspiration of the Church religion, Christianity, is the love of Christ, so the essence, the motive power, the source of real inspiration of the State religion, Confucianism in China, is the love of father and mother, filial piety, with its cult of ancestor worship." This is a view shared by many others, and most leaders at the present day profess it unreservedly. As Richard Wilhelm shows in an eloquent page ¹⁾, Sun Yat-Sen recognised its value, and saw that it was the life-source from which the Chinese people continually drew rejuvenating virtue. It links up the past and the future, and renders possible the preservation of tradition without lapsing into rigidity.

From all this it appears that, *mutatis mutandis*, China's difficulties are not different from those experienced elsewhere, and that their solution is being sought in the same direction: by making the old and proved genealogical, territorial, and functional forms of organisation fit into a new synthesis which gives more room to personal initiative and personal gifts. It is absolutely necessary that all over the world a place should be given to the co-operation which is living in the people. These co-operative forms are not the same thing as institutions, they are above all the organs and the seat of morality. Let us beware of allowing these organs to atrophy, before a better organ can be held in readiness which can be adapted by the social body, and until it is clear that the old form is no longer capable of doing justice to the wealth of a spiritual life that is blossoming with renewed vigour.

Reform in Siam

Let us end our survey of the Eastern states with a brief review of the reforms which have taken place in Siam. Great things have been achieved there by a succession of Rulers. The first who saw the necessity of reform was King Rama IV (1851—68) who opened friendly relations with Western States and encouraged trade and traffic. He began to build roads and canals and encouraged education. His son Rama V (Chulalongkorn) followed in his father's footsteps. After a Western education, he had studied personally the administrative systems of India and Java. His reforms were drastic and many-sided. He abolished slavery, reorganised, with Western assistance, the judicial system, taxation,

¹⁾ *Op. cit.*, pp. 188 sqq.

local government, education, and the army, and began to build railways. As Graham remarks ²⁾, this development "welded . . . the once loose agglomeration of doubtfully loyal feudatories into a nation whose homogeneity was beyond the dreams of any former ruler of Siam". After a reign of forty-two years he died in 1910.

His son Rama VI, who had studied in Europe, continued his task with the same devotion. If one is asked how it was possible for an Eastern people to perform so much in such a brief period, the answer is not far to seek, in view of all that has been said in the previous pages. First of all, the nation had the privilege of having in succession three wise Rulers with strong characters. Secondly, there existed the ideal root of patriotism, a mystic bond with the Ruler, which was the more strongly felt as Siam is not a large state. Thirdly, this bond imposed absolute fidelity and obedience, in such a way that, provided he has good advisers, the Ruler can indeed work miracles. Graham remarks that

By far the most important factor in the social organisation of Siam is the absolutism of the monarchy, an absolutism which, though outwardly modified by the constitution decreed in 1874, and veiled behind that consideration for his subjects which is His Majesty's chief concern, is as complete in spirit to-day as it was in the darkest period of tyrannical oppression which the nation has ever endured. The monarchy demands now, as it has always done, the most complete submission of the entire people not only to every decree issued by the King, but, in theory, to his lightest whim or caprice, and the hereditary instincts of the race prompt it to render such obedience without question and without resentment, no matter what sufferings such obedience might conceivably entail. By very ancient custom . . . not only was all the land in the Kingdom the actual property of the crown but every human being living within the frontiers of the state was considered a mere chattel of the King, who had absolute right to dispose of the person, property or life of all such in any manner that might seem best to him.

As a rule, however, the Ruler only demanded direct labour for a limited number of days, and accepted from those who were exempt payment in kind, rice, pepper, wood, wax, oil, etc. This produce was placed in warehouses and sold to foreign traders. The Ruler had the monopoly of foreign trade. Much corruption prevailed, taxation and forced labour were badly organised, so that the

¹⁾ *Op. cit.* p. 220.

burden on the nation was heavier than it need have been. The whole system was abolished and in its place compulsory military service and regular taxation in money was introduced. The public gambling houses were closed and usury was extirpated as far as possible, with the result that the social conditions of the lower classes were altogether changed. A sturdy and independent class is now growing up which owns land and deposits money in the banks.

Method of transition

King Rama VI set himself the task of doing away with social exclusiveness. He began by adapting etiquette, which had hitherto demanded that in the presence of the prince people should prostrate themselves, to the requirements of human dignity. The Ruler and the princes remained sacred persons, but the distance between them and ordinary people is gradually being lessened by education and free intercourse. The King did much in this direction by his interest in sport. He conducted parades, and lectured in the clubhouse presented by him to the force. The movement he inaugurated, which soon incorporated a prosperous boy-scout organisation, aimed at familiarising the country with the corporative idea. Sport is having a healthy influence, bringing about free intercourse, discipline, devotion to the honour of the union, while in the course of competitions people become used to a larger circle of interest.

Particularism and inertia are not lacking. We saw them at work in an earlier section. The ignorance of the lower orders makes them slow to realise the advantages of freedom. Popular education will have to make a change here, as well as corporative life and discipline among officials. The leaven, at any rate, is already at work. Meanwhile, the Rulers have not attempted to westernise their people. Even the sport movement has been ingeniously connected with the famous and popular associations for voluntary war service which used to exist among the nobility. This procedure is typical of all reforms: there is always an attempt to link up the new with the old.

The establishment of a modern system of registration is another example of the same method. In 1916 the King declared that every Siamese must adopt a surname, and announced that he was

prepared to find one for anybody who did not want to choose for himself. This overcame the reluctance felt by many to take the step on their own initiative. In the indication of patronymics family history, the exploits of ancestors, or the district from which the applicant originated were taken into account. Of course, it would not be possible to manage everything in the same patriarchal way. Once the system runs smoothly, every healthy initiative of the authorities will be unreservedly encouraged. As Graham remarks, "the people now realise that the King is indeed passionately attached to the traditions of his country, that his intention in pursuing Western methods is only to adopt such foreign customs as may contribute to the happiness and material welfare of his people, and that the very last thing he desires is to see the nation divest itself of its own ideals". This explains how one day the Ruler will be present at a football match, while the next the people can gaze upon him, clad in sacramental robes, ploughing a sacred field, in order to indicate the seasons and the time for field labour to his people.

Assistance from the West

It stands to reason that the progress made in Siam would have been impossible without education and assistance from the West. Western science, devotion, and experience have all along assisted the Ruler in the work of reconstruction, and prepared national forces to take over the task of popular education. But all the experience of the West would have taken centuries to percolate down to the people, if the absolute will of the Ruler had not facilitated its task. Only thus has Siam been able to jump several centuries of evolution. This does not mean that it has solved all its problems. The whole re-organisation rests upon a small élite, composed of the ruling house, its nearest surroundings and the upper class, which in its turn rests upon the absolute will of the King. For the main portion of the population, which lives by agriculture and fishing, with just a little home industry, the village community is a self-sufficient world, where mutual aid still remains the rule, although there is no such strong family organisation as in China or Japan. All the higher administrative organisation comes from the central authorities, and it will be a long time before district and provincial autonomy will function in a satisfactory manner. A law of

1896, of which the experts speak very highly, has regulated the village autonomies and given them a place in the administrative system.

There is a strong gendarmerie, organised by Danish officers. The need for such a police force in the countryside is somewhat surprising: it results from the time-honoured custom by which professional criminals bought impunity from the officials. Thus there existed, at any rate, a check upon their activities. With the re-organisation of rural officialdom this check disappeared and there was an alarming increase in violent crime of every description. Without security and official honesty, rural progress, of course, is unthinkable. There is no incentive to saving, no effort to improve one's position, when one knows that, sooner or later, a greedy official or a brigand will seize one's hard earned savings.

Religion and education

Southern Buddhism, which succeeded in imposing a higher moral level and in creating a feeling of cultural unity, was a most important factor in the preparation of modern reform. The total population is about 10 million souls, of whom 120,000 are Buddhist monks. Nearly every Siamese boy has at one time been a boarder or a day scholar at one of the Buddhist monasteries, where he receives an elementary education embracing the three "R"s and the rudiments of the Buddhist faith. Even to-day nearly the whole population becomes, in this way, acquainted with the lofty conception of life and the high moral standards of Buddhism.

There is also, now, the nucleus of a good general system of education. The monastery schools have some 150,000 pupils, the elementary government schools some 40,000, and the secondary or continuation schools have 11,000. The continuation schools prepare their pupils for commerce and industry, the secondary schools teach English, and prepare for scientific studies in special schools, where administrative, medical, and technical sciences and literary and other subjects are taught. These schools were incorporated as faculties of the Chulalongkorn University in 1917. The organisation which will eventually and gradually mould national forces able to take over the work of Western advisers, experts, and organisers is therefore already functioning.

It is indeed a merit of the Siamese nation that it was ready to learn from the West without sacrificing its own traditions. The fact that Siam never displayed the pettiness which is unwilling to learn its lesson from those whom evolution has favoured and enabled to teach others is due to its enlightened Rulers. At present about a thousand Siamese are studying at the universities of Paris, London, Berlin, and Vienna. In a few years' time they will return to Siam, ready to take over the task of so many Western helpers whose aid will no longer be needed. It is a pity that so far Siamese women, even in the upper class, have been deprived of similar advantages. As long as this disparity between the sexes remains, the work will have been done only by half. For it means that most women cannot yet be, to the fullest extent, the companions of their husbands, that a most important and indispensable element in the solidity of the conjugal link, so important a basis of social life, remains absent, and, most of all, that education inside the household cannot be made to contribute towards the evolution of society.

Economic aspects of Siamese reform

The population, meanwhile, is enjoying security, order, and peace. Its position is indeed a privileged one: there is fertile land in abundance, and the population, which lives on agriculture and fishing, can still increase threefold before there is any need to have recourse to industry as a means of subsistence. The Siamese are contented, happy, and do not need great exertions in order to obtain their livelihood. A result of this is, naturally, that the Siamese have no share in the trade and industry of the country, and that there is a complete lack of capital. There is no middle-class at all. This is of course not a desirable situation, because all initiative has to come from above. Without a plurality of independent professions and of progressive labour side by side with them, a society remains poor, undeveloped, and monotonous, while there can be no question of popular authority in large districts.

There is also no chance of improving the economic position of the people while the popular lethargy lasts. The Government has encouraged the silk industry, and called in the assistance of Japanese experts, but its efforts were of no avail. The rice-trade and the peeling are in foreign hands, and the number of middlemen

is vast. The improvidence of the Siamese often compels them to sell their crop in advance, a procedure which is mainly to the advantage of the usurers and the immigrating Chinese. There may be people who will congratulate Siamese agricultural labourers on their peaceful enjoyment of their own occupation, while they leave the hustle of trade, navigation, and banking to foreigners. But politically and socially this is an unhealthy situation. There is a lack of balance, and a chasm remains between the conceptions of the population and those of the leaders. There is no interest in the public weal, because the breadth of outlook which is born of national science, big agriculture, trade and industry is lacking. The press also is still in embryo.

It is clear, therefore, that now that, with Western assistance, the Government has built up a good state organisation, and has at its disposal properly functioning public services, the real task of popular uplift must still begin. Education, co-operative societies, and the widening of economic insight will help Siam to a large extent. Credit associations are already at work, and, as the population is now familiarised with clubs and associations it will be possible to popularise them. They will form a nucleus for co-operative organisation which can market agricultural produce and secure for the peasant large profits which now find their way into other hands.

The lesson for the colonial world

We have come to the end of our review of the movement of synthesis in the Eastern states. None of them, as we have seen, has completed its evolution by reaching the point when free rein can be given to the human personality. In almost every state one absolute will, in China, one party, commands or struggles for supremacy. But everywhere much hard work is being done in order to lift the population up to a real civic sense. All these states are on the way towards the realisation of the democratic idea and some of them have already made striking progress. Before re-organisation began, all these states possessed one great advantage, a basis of unity which was lacking in the colonial world, where the dawning tendency towards unity is still too much inclined to turn against the authorities. If these authorities withdrew from the colonial world, it would at once become patent

how negative the basis of unity still is, and how all the particularisms which are hidden by a common difference from the Western authorities would at once become conscious of all that divides them among themselves.

Colonial policy is placed in the difficult situation that while it endeavours to develop a creative, organising, and positive consciousness of unity, many of the seeds it is sowing show a tendency to produce a negative and destructive feeling of unity which is directed against it. Apart from all the other difficulties which are unknown in Eastern states this presents the colonial authorities with what seems to be a continual dilemma: the choice between handing over the reins of authority to the Eastern princes, the chiefs, or the élite, or the suppression of all agitation against the existing authorities, the withdrawal of all democratic liberties, and the arrest of the process of evolution. The Eastern states show which is the right way out of this dilemma. For their experience reveals how, in the course of the process of evolution, which they themselves have called forth, the absolute authorities are conjuring up a spirit which will eventually refuse to recognise them. As soon as the individual person steps forward from the group which has thus far kept him under its sway, he will find himself directly confronted with the central authority. If, by leaving the group, he has lost his social reverence, he will be disrespectful and probably even rebellious towards this authority.

This is why care must be taken that the group dissolves into personalities, not into unsocial individuals, and the group and its morality must be protected, as has been done in Japan and in Siam, and as China intends to do, until, by a natural process, it becomes superfluous and atrophy sets in of its own accord. The sooner political leaders in the colonial world realise that there too this is the indicated way, the better it will be for themselves, for their compatriots, and for their national aspirations. There is no political short cut towards real independence, but there is a good road, prepared in advance, which will lead the honest and devoted crusader of evolution to the summits. The stronger the conviction among the élite that there is no other way, the more general and conscious will become the urge to apply all liberated energies to the ascent along that way alone. There will then be no need to arrest the process of evolution; the way out that has been shown

can be followed, as no doubt everybody in the East and in the West will wish it to be. But, as the experience of Eastern states has proved, the indispensable condition for continuing the evolution is that a strong central government should be maintained. For the greater the speed of the ship, the harder the pilot must maintain his grip on the tiller.

Let there be no factious criticism by those who look on from the shore. Let them remember how favoured the position of Eastern states is compared with that of the colonial world. Evolution in the Dutch East Indies, for instance, had to start from a point which, in remote antiquity, China and Japan had already left behind. And let the colonial authorities not be ashamed of what they have already achieved! Almost everywhere they have created a state organisation, an administrative system, great public services, public enterprise, a system of communication, order, and safety, such as would do credit to many a Western state. They have used, to this effect, a personnel of which the majority is Eastern, and Eastern talent has been fostered and developed in Universities and by more or less complete systems of education which open opportunities to the best Oriental talent.

Moreover, in many territories they have taken in hand real democratic reconstruction, from the village autonomies upward, culminating in proto-parliaments which have a considerable influence already, such as, in practice, no Eastern government has yet yielded to its subjects. In connection with this development one finds in many colonies a large freedom of opinion, of association, and of gathering, unequalled in any Eastern state. At the same time popular education is progressing with gigantic strides, while numerous measures are encouraging national systems of production, and self-exertion by means of co-operative societies, etc. Would it be possible to do much more?

Let all who can seize the opportunity, which is greater and more glorious than has been offered to any nation in the course of past history. Let it be shown that Eastern energy and devotion are not prepared to be eclipsed by the constructive deeds of the West. If one feels inclined to do so, one can invoke the example of Japan, but not without emulating the virtues, the devotion, and the sense of duty of the whole Japanese nation, remembering that at one time that country was centuries ahead of the colonial world, and

that now there is ground for hope that it may be caught up, as the reward of much strenuous work. To call forth from the popular soil such a spiritual and economic progress automatically creates political responsibility. This is the law of nature, which applies over all the world. On the other hand, the outward show of political independence can never really give the satisfaction obtained by directing one's own fate, unless it is accompanied by social and economic self-exertion.

For this reason, sufficient tribute can never be paid to the enlightened and quiet workers. The newspapers of each colonial metropolis should regularly inform their readers of the activities of local workers in the colonies, and tell how they founded a school, a hospital, a good daily paper, a library, a bank, a co-operative society, a women's union, how they started an agitation against child-marriage, or propagated sound views about agriculture, hygiene, etc. Nothing is unimportant, for small things often enough are more difficult to achieve than big ones.

It is these modest workers who are the real bearers of synthesis, of evolution, of the uplift of the innumerable people who are still oppressed by matter, and whom they are leading to a fuller humanity. It is more difficult to join ten persons into a modern and efficient co-operative society than to induce ten thousand unenlightened people to serve the cause of antithesis.

We have now reached the end of our review of the Eastern Allies of the movement of synthesis. We have learned much, especially from China, Siam, and Japan; we have contemplated fundamental truths, and we have seen how, notwithstanding varying circumstances, the very basis of colonial policy, for the leading nations, for the Eastern élites, and for the populations, is contained in these words: Loyalty towards the bearers of unity, piety towards the inheritance of the forebears.

CHAPTER VIII

EVOLUTION IN THE COLONIAL WORLD

"A people only achieves stability after it has acquired collective consciousness."

GUSTAVE LE BON.

Sentiment of unity and consciousness of unity

This dictum of Dr. Le Bon perfectly summarises the conclusion we were able to draw after our review of the movement towards synthesis in the ancient world and in the Eastern states. The Ancient World endeavoured to ensure the stability of Empires by creating a feeling of unity, of cultural and religious cohesion which drew its strength mainly from its mystical content. It was much the same thing in the myriads of small genealogical and territorial communities, which rested not so much on patriarchal authority as upon mystical kinship between the members and their respect for the tradition of their fathers. The uniformity of daily life, the isolation of these small societies, the small differentiation in labour, talent and conceptions, contributed to the permanence of a kind of family feeling within these communities, which may have left a certain freedom to the individual within the framework, but was decidedly exclusive towards the outside world.

The large empires had therefore the dual character of autocracies that were centralised on certain points, and of very loose confederations of thousands of units, which one might almost call republics. In the East, the empires had no means at their disposal for forming real unified states. Owing to the prevalence of produce economy, the ruler received only a percentage of what a modern state gathers in the way of taxation. An expensive state organisation was therefore out of the question. Roads remained a rarity, trade and traffic were restricted to a small radius, with the result

that the small communities remained self-contained little republics which were but seldom in contact with the central rulers. Yet, in the minds of the millions, these rulers lived as the representatives of the world order and as the defenders of the peace.

Until the present day, in different Eastern states, this mystical link has remained a more important element of unity than administrative organisation and the strong arm of the centralised state. In Japan and in Siam the latter are only an instrument which in all layers of the nation mobilises and concentrates in a moment forces that have remained almost unused in the past. Especially as far as the masses are concerned, it is this mystical feeling of unity, the cement of ancient cohesion, which is nowadays, to an increasing degree, acquiring the opportunity of unfolding its powers to the full in deeds of loyalty and morality such as otherwise could only be expected from the fully conscious personality.

In the colonial world, gigantic areas are now being drawn into an evolutionary process whose magnitude far surpasses the relatively far smaller radius of local cohesion of Adat communities and of the mystical union with the Oriental Rulers that still plays a part in principalities. As a result the lack of a source of inspiration for the feeling of unity such as would be required by the colonial world of to-day made itself strongly felt. It was therefore all the more necessary, in accordance with Le Bon's principle, to find a substitute for the feeling of unity which was missing. If the colonial Powers were not successful in this task, they would never be able to transfer the leadership to the Eastern peoples. From the moment the Western authorities completely withdrew themselves, the separate loyalties would find themselves unable to collaborate within the framework of a larger society. They would even come into conflict and destroy the structure of unity already established by Western leadership. As long as there remains a spark of sense of responsibility among Western nations, such a dereliction of duty cannot take place. Whatever were their original motives in going to the East, they now have obligations towards the weaker and divided populations, towards the world and towards their fathers. They must obey the call of leadership, which consists in the protection and in the preparation for self-defence of these peoples. As soon as the consciousness of unity enhances the thousands of loyalties, and persuades them to sacri-

fice their exclusive isolation in order to unfold their long pent-up capacities in a dynamic mobility, the task of leadership will have been accomplished. In this chapter we shall have to examine the way and means by which this great aim can be brought nearer.

After all that has been said in previous chapters about the inter-dependence of all the parts of the social complex in its religious, social, intellectual, economic and technical aspects, it must be clear that unity in the colonial world has a many sided aspect. Many religions, local patriotisms and economic standards can find place side by side in the unified state, but the stronger the contrasts that subsist between them, the stronger also will have to be the links that join them together. The idea of synthesis implies supreme tolerance, and this greatly facilitates the task of colonial policy. Every form of loyalty is welcome, as long as it is prepared to divest itself of its exclusiveness.

The universal human craving for division must give way before the greater and more universal law which makes everybody strive for harmony with the circle in which he lives. These two opposite forces can be balanced by broadening the sphere of the small loyalties to such an extent that they will reach the limits of the territory over which a Western unity has been imposed from above. Leadership must therefore on the one hand protect the old associations and on the other persuade the individuals within them to demolish the walls which separate them from their neighbours and to replace them by a fence through which it is not impossible to pass if the present circle becomes too restricted.

Colonial policy must aim at bringing the isolated stronghold in contact with a wider sphere. It must establish a different and organic society, and it will therefore, in view of the fact that social complexes are indissolubly connected, have to accept all the consequences of the development. Intellectual growth, while society would otherwise remain as it is, would soon cause it to fall into amorphous pieces. Progress of a purely economic nature would be inconceivable. One-sided advance would in any case break up the old society without being able to create a new one in its place: the advance must be simultaneous along the whole line.

Developing the consciousness of unity

Thus far, colonial policy would appear simple enough. But as

soon as one begins to examine the methods by which this evolution can be achieved, one enters upon controversial ground. There is, again, no lack of voices to disapprove the methods that are being applied, or to criticise the distribution of available forces. It is pointed out, for instance, that in many colonial territories, notwithstanding great efforts and the spending of millions for popular improvement, little individual progress has been made by the population. One would almost be led to believe that colonial policy is open to reproaches because of the numerical increase of the colonial population, unaccompanied by an equivalent moral, intellectual and material advance. Some people are perturbed, because in the course of a century the population of Java has grown from four to forty two millions, while otherwise its level has not much changed. Extremist propaganda tries to prove from these facts that colonial exploitation still continues.

It is clear, however, that the increase of population is itself the best proof of the remarkable devotion of the authorities. It is equally clear that a fast growth of the population may quite well absorb and even over-tax the energy of the authorities and of private initiative. If, even at the time of compulsory cultivation in Java, this increase continued, save for a brief interruption, one can well imagine what must have been the conditions during the preceding thousands of years of autochthonous rule. The Eastern Rulers must have failed in the task of government, which, as is admitted throughout the world, everywhere assists the growth of the population. Wars and guerilla wars, diseases, natural calamities, and the excesses of despotism continually diminished the population, while the static structure of society, in which closed produce-economy was the rule, was utterly impotent to resist such evils, which can only be fought by the concentration of forces and the consciousness of unity of dynamic societies.

The sense of unity in its triple aspect

The exploitation of over-population for propaganda purposes is less important than the phenomenon itself. Able writers have examined its significance in various colonial territories, and for the Dutch East Indies the work has been done by Professor Boeke¹⁾. This savant, who has a wide experience as adviser of the

¹⁾ J. H. Boeke, *Het Zakelijke en het Persoonlijke Element in de Koloniale Welvaartspolitiek*, in *Koloniale Studiën*, April 1927.

Popular Credit System, considers that in Java the influence of the measures taken by the authorities has been absorbed, as it were, by the increase of population. His explanation tends to show that there has been a process of growth which no doubt testifies to the existence of strong governmental activity, but which in fact acts in a too one-sided direction. Let us take a concrete example. Suppose the authorities are successful, by means of irrigation works which may cost untold millions, in increasing everywhere the available arable land. After a few years all this land becomes once more densely populated. The fields are divided between a steadily growing number of descendants and soon the available labour is too large in proportion to the existing means of production which lie within the reach of the population. It is just possible that this over-population may compel sloth and self-sufficiency to pass the point of inertia and thereby assure differentiation of labour, more rational production, and more energy and initiative.

All this is possible, but it is not a development that will take place of its own accord. For another mentality is necessary before the remedy of rationalised production can be chosen. It can only be conceived by people who have a sense of the future and who are not hemmed in by the present. They must first learn to think and to act for themselves and rise above dependence upon the group. They must have contemplated wider horizons and have escaped the seclusion of centuries. All such new characteristics and modes of thought are only to be conciliated to a very restricted degree with the frame of mind that lives under traditional conditions of group-solidarity. They require the growth of personality, which indeed is only an aspect of the increasing sense of unity. The problem can also be put in another way which shows even better that apart from its moral aspects it also has a practical one. It is the need for self-exertion, to which sociologists of all countries have pointed as the indispensable pre-requisite for the mental and spiritual progress of hundreds of millions of our fellow human beings in the colonies. If one really wishes to help somebody, one must enable him to help himself. Only when there is danger in delay should direct help be given. But even then assistance should never degenerate into charity.

Over-population and depopulation

Professor Boeke and many others base upon this consideration the demand that colonial policy should by its assistance develop self-exertion, the precious gift which can fructify a hundredfold, while assistance which does not create or develop it is tantamount to consumption of capital. No one, of course, would reproach colonial policy for having fought war and pestilence and for having prepared a place in the sun for tens of millions by its works of irrigation, hygiene, etc. But the question that is being asked is whether any advance has been made by throwing into the world a few more millions who will dispute one with another for every bit of soil, and squander their energies in extracting from it a precarious livelihood. And the main disadvantage of this state of things is that, according to the critics, the population will become dependent to an increasing extent upon the organisation, the science and the technique of the colonial authorities. What, they ask, is the advantage, if fifty million people instead of five have to struggle for their daily bowl of rice? Moreover, will not the carrying capacity of Western leadership become over-taxed, if the population does not develop sufficient backbone to support itself?

This gives a remarkable aspect to our problem. While everything is being done to educate the population to the consciousness of unity, to personality and to self-exertion, a part of the activities of the authorities appears to result in making it still further dependent upon Western leadership. Even more remarkable is the fact that from various South Sea Islands and from Africa warnings are being received against interference on the part of the authorities, which is alleged to result in the dying out of whole populations, because the new order puts all the old out of joint and saps the will to live. These entirely opposite phenomena point to the influence of change of environment, while incidental differences are enough to explain how modifications can take such divergent directions. Those who only look at externals will cry "down with Western influence", unmindful of the fact that elsewhere the same influence is accused of causing over-population.

In both cases the conflict of the times is at work, and the universal human inertia is fighting the impetus of foreign influences, though these can nowhere be kept out. If the authorities remain

passive, old races begin to lose their vitality. The same happens to nomads and hunters who are suddenly made to settle down to an agricultural life. They must die out unless the younger generation is immediately able to adapt itself to the new environment. It is not enough to open new opportunities: those concerned must be made to see and to utilise them.

The same applies to territories where the population is growing in numbers without making any individual progress. However much the available means are increasing, production continues to aim at what is immediately required, and although safety becomes greater and disease is kept down, this merely means that more children can grow up and find a livelihood. In other words, all that happens is that production is raised in accordance with the needs of consumption, which is merely a static expansion by which nothing fundamental is changed. If the authorities remained purely passive, a one-sided use would be made of the expansion of material opportunities, which could never outpace the static process, leaving the population in precisely the same situation as before. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, in the case where depopulation as well as in that where over-population threatens, that the population itself should be persuaded to widen its sphere of action, and to rouse itself to energy, initiative, and self-exertion.

The personal and the objective element

It becomes easier now to understand why a population begins by reacting in a static manner to government measures which aim at the mass, as well as to those which, like education, agricultural information, credit, co-operation, etc., are more specially meant for the individual. The authorities are often rebuked for acting far too much along wholesale lines, instead of addressing themselves exclusively to energetic persons. There are certainly incidental cases where such a reproach is deserved. But on the whole it is unfounded. To begin with, energetic persons are extremely rare, and government care is bound therefore to be directed towards the masses. Once personalities have been produced, the mass-stage is past, and, let it be added, thanks to the policy which called them into existence. For this very reason the mass-policy does not deserve to be condemned. But the question may certainly be asked whether the time has not come for a more se-

lective statesmanship. Only a detailed study of all available data regarding the economic activity of a people can provide a reply to this question.

The unfolding of the personality through self-exertion will be the crowning of the work of colonial policy. Far from postulating it as a *conditio sine qua non* and as the starting point, one should understand that it is the ripe fruit and the completion of the task of leadership. With self-exertion the personality has been achieved and with the personality the consciousness of unity, which terminates the part of Western nations as educators. To reverse the process would only lead to a premature differentiation in welfare policy, before the ancient territorial connections have been made sufficiently supple and loose; while to recommend passivity or a diminished activity on the part of the authorities might easily cause the loss of large tracts of territory, nearly conquered for the good cause of progress, and without any compensating increase of self-exertion. Here and there official intervention may have gone too far, and may have stifled a certain amount of initiative. But on the whole all the experience acquired in the colonial world shows that initiative is still sadly lacking and can only be called forth by determined official intervention.

After all, the critics must once and for all make it clear where they stand. Is it really because of official intervention that all popular initiative is stifled, or is it the population which is lazy, incapable, unable to improve? Colonial policy considers that the peoples are just what can be expected, and that they must be changed, because otherwise they cannot keep afloat upon the current of world events. In Eastern states as well as in the colonial world there have undoubtedly been cases of excessive activity on the part of the government or of the administration. Excess of zeal is always wrong, but, in view of the immensity of the task to be performed, these things are of subordinate importance. Over-zealousness must be tempered, every needless and untimely infringement of Eastern customary law and authority must be avoided; but the other extreme should also be eschewed. No child would ever learn to speak if it were left severely alone; the incessant talk of the mother calls forth a capacity for self-exertion, which is the triumph of a long, patient, and wise education that brings out the child's potentialities into the light of day.

The real cause of all disappointments does not consist in the alleged incapacity of Eastern peoples, nor in the mistakes of the authorities, but merely in the unfounded expectation that a task which is truly herculean can be accomplished by magic. It may appear simple enough to entrust the population of a village with a small bank, to combine a score of people into a co-operative society, etc. But it is not a structure that has to be erected, but a complex of living cells, in which matter is unable to keep life chained up. The germ of the connection based upon Eastern custom is constructed altogether differently from the cell which is needed by the Eastern society of the future. The former is intimately related with all the properties of the blood which are transmitted by heredity. In the mutual assistance within the genealogical, territorial, and functional communities, a more essential motive force is hidden beneath the utilitarian. It springs from the world of the soul, from the feeling of kinship and the loyalty of certain personal relations. It is a force outside the sphere of rational thought and of economic calculation.

It is a general mistake to place upon one line the village republic and the Western village-autonomy, Eastern corporative and Western dynamic democracy, the sentiment of unity and the consciousness of unity. It leads one to look for a powerful consciousness and for capacities where there is really no more than a series of potentialities, either latent or no more than rudimentarily developed. This mistake leads one to brand official assistance, which is so necessary in order to develop these potentialities, as a supererogatory or harmful interference. If, under the influence of such misapprehensions, the needed Western assistance is cut off, and stagnation or worse results, one will see no way out and a paralysing uncertainty will set in. If only the true situation is understood, one will be agreeably struck by the sight of the abundant growth of new and promising cells. One would rejoice even at the birth of a small but modern co-operative society of only ten members, because any such dynamic union signifies that a step is being taken beyond the reach of the old traditional connections, that mobility is finding its way into social life, and that a new power of attraction is beginning to work between persons who are moving with greater freedom. Morality is being freed from the restrictions imposed by a static circle. It is being lifted

up into abstract and absolute principles, which are everywhere making possible new, intimate, and fruitful collaborations.

Official abstention and official guidance

It is in lifting up static morality into abstract and absolute principles that one will find the key to the success of autonomous Eastern communities in the new domain of activity which our time must add to their traditional field of autonomy and self-government. The whole mentality of the villagers must be changed if they are to become capable of fulfilling the new functions with which they are being entrusted. Every man in the village is interested in the traditional festivals, and the co-operation necessary to organise them is regularly forthcoming of its own accord. But the modern duties of these units do not belong to the inheritance from their fathers, which speaks with a voice audible to all the villagers. Some see their necessity, others only their utility, others remain indifferent, and not a few are definitely hostile. Thus divisions creep into the village, for the easy-going way in which a plan was given up if a strong minority objected is no longer available, because village life is now being connected with the larger society, a painful process which imposes the need for yielding to distant and invisible interests.

At the same time, labour differentiation and development are breaking the old uniformity of minds and of interests, with the result that the traditional co-operation within groups also becomes much less popular. During this extremely difficult period of transition the realisation of what is the interest of the village must gradually foster a new sense of duty which, detached from persons and from traditions, is ready, merely for the sake of the public weal, to make the same sacrifices and to give the same co-operation that used to result from consecrated use and age-old cohesion.

If they are thus inspired, the villagers may sometimes be performing operations similar to those performed for twenty centuries by them, although a world may really lie between these two actions. Such a world separates the maintenance of the village sanctuary and that of the modern village school, participation in the traditional young men's and young women's unions which prepared festivities and membership of a modern co-operative society for

the buying of seeds, manure, and agricultural implements. Such a world, again, separates public labour or incidental contributions in kind or in money to further specific communal interests, from previous assessment and regular payment of taxation, with a view to balancing the annual village budget. And a similar distance lies between the respect paid to the mother as a symbol of everlasting group-procreation and the respect paid to woman as such.

Never, without administrative guidance and interference, could the point of inertia be passed in time. This is why headmen cannot help accepting the dual function of traditional and administrative chiefs, whose authority is supported from outside and above. Even autonomous Rulers do not escape this influence. All those who stand above their surroundings are chosen as points of contact on which the vast net of unity that is being let down over the whole country can be fastened. The administration has again another duty which results from this method: there is a tendency among those thus selected to display too much independence towards their fellow members in their communities, and the authorities have to moderate the very spirit which they are calling forth, and this they can only do by maintaining a constant supervision.

A policy of abstention can serve no good purpose, unless the colonial world is surrounded by a wall. Administrative influence, however, should always be exercised through the chosen points of contact. It is more important to have a thing half done by the population, if it is done with joy, than to have it performed to perfection under administrative compulsion. Nor can abstention and interference be arbitrarily applied. They must form a consciously applied alternation, instead of being two opposite policies. The careful gardener knows when to water the plants he tends, and when to leave them to themselves. Abstention must always be a phase of tense expectation, a period that is really as active as the next stage of interference.

If the village autonomies, the district councils, the co-operative societies, etc., do not yet, in India and in the Dutch East Indies, function in such a way that they can be wholly entrusted to the people or their representatives, this does not justify the conclusion that something is wrong either with these peoples or with Western leadership. For as soon as the time arrives when the force of

the people will be able, without supervision from the authorities and without paternalism, guidance or control, to carry entirely or almost entirely the burden of village autonomies and co-operative societies, the task of leadership will have been accomplished. For the existence of a flourishing autonomous and co-operative village-life postulates in our day the existence of a sense of the future, a strong local patriotism and wide sense of citizenship. Where these exist, there will also be found energy, initiative and the inclination to work for the public cause, and there can be no lack of great leaders whose talent excels that of the millions, although it rests upon them. In such circumstances Western leadership will be able, with full confidence, to hand over its task to the Eastern leaders whom a nation, ripened into consciousness, will delegate to the seats of responsibility.

So, once more, we find that the enemy is particularism and that government activity must always aim at the development of self-exertion among Eastern peoples, while this self-exertion remains the aim, and not the starting point of the whole evolutionary process. The period of transition which must lead to this noble end demands a perfect administrative organisation, careful supervision, prudent guidance, and intimate daily contact between Western leadership and the population. Supervision of its leaders by the people can take place only to a very restricted degree, because there is still too little interest, and too little desire for active collaboration. This, indeed, is an important difference between static and dynamic societies. In Western dynamic societies where there is such an intricate complex of interests, the state is also bound continually to interfere in order to protect the community against sectional interests, but in the West this interference is in reality directed by the citizens themselves. This is the very reason of the existence of parliaments, and of all the other rights, such as freedom of the press, of association, of petition, etc., by which the population can exercise a check upon the all-pervading influence of the state.

I n d i r e c t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

In the colonies, however, until some twenty or thirty years ago the population had very little say in the administrative measures of the authorities, which had to be all the more extensive as they

aimed at the development of its capacity for self-exertion. This constant Western interference runs the risk of creating a sense of psychological oppression. The only method by which for the time being this sense can be lightened, if not removed, is by the indirect form of administration, which avoids direct orders from European officials to the Eastern population. The population remains under its own headmen, chiefs, and rulers, with its own institutions or with indigenous officials, and all that is done is to develop these leaders to such an extent that they can co-operate in fitting their small spheres into the larger society which envelops them. They will find it relatively easy to detect the line of least resistance and to make all novelties as acceptable as possible. They may not always be equally successful, but this matters little so long as the ancient circles and their administrations have been respected. This procedure greatly increases the chances of speedy evolution.

In their traditional field of action the small circles never lacked self-exertion; but the amount of activity required by the needs of our days remains far above the reach of this type of village wisdom. If now the movement of evolution is linked up with the older forms of activity, the living force of self-exertion will be preserved, while, of its own accord or under a discerning guidance, it will choose new forms which are necessary for a wider activity in the local sphere, and also for useful activity far beyond it. In other words, self-exertion implies indirect administration, with all the differentiation according to needs which this implies in matters of jurisdiction, taxation, education, etc. All administrative interference, which at first sight would seem to imply a diametrically opposed policy, is, in reality, inspired by this fundamental idea.

Those who are so fond of self-administration that the mere existence of officialdom in every form irritates them may find some consolation in the fact that it is a principle generally accepted in the colonial world that, although European officials come into direct contact with the population, they have generally by their side indigenous officials and headmen, through whom all that constitutes definite interference takes place. In this large body of rulers, chiefs, and indigenous officials the autocratic and bureaucratic element is intimately united with the real Eastern aris-

tocratic and democratic element ¹⁾, because the population is really bound by innumerable threads to these fellow countrymen whom, rightly or wrongly, it considers to be the bearers of sacred authority. It is difficult to determine precisely to what extent the powers of all these chiefs are derived from their traditional or from their newly acquired administrative authority, and the question has only a theoretical importance. What matters is that colonial policy, in maintaining Eastern rulers, chiefs, and headmen, is able to make use of all existing loyalties to the advantage of the consciousness of unity. Its problem is to strike, in so doing, the balance between complete abstention and unlimited interference, and it will succeed when it is continuously realised that well nigh every question that arises is of an educative nature, and must be decided with due regard to local circumstances.

Division of labour

Notwithstanding the fact that social consciousness and personality are, within definite limits, present in the smallest Eastern communities, colonial policy would never be successful if there were not a powerful factor which gives greater strength to its activity in favour of the individual, through education, credit-facilities, co-operation, and the granting of political organisation. It is the factor to which the West itself and every society in the world owes its possibilities of development. Needless to say, we mean the increasing division of labour, of which we have already spoken in the second chapter. Without it even the strong lever of education could not find a support in the daily life of the people whom it wishes to develop.

The knowledge born from education and the consciousness to which it gives rise would not profit their owners much, if the small societies where they live prevented them from making use of their new acquisition. They would present a real problem for the traditional chiefs of small societies, and sacred festivals, mutual aid, and old custom are scarcely calculated to withstand the searching glance of intellectual analysis. As long as small societies remain isolated economic units, where everybody can more or less satisfy his own requirements, this new knowledge can find

¹⁾ Noto Soeroto, *Schets van een Aristo-Democratisch Staatkundig Stelsel voor Indonësië*, in the Jubilee-number of "Oedaya", 1928.

no employment. The educated people therefore cannot acquire experience, and this only serves to widen the gap which separates them from their environment. How can they learn to put water in the generous wine of the ideas acquired at school or at college? No doubt, their idealism is to be preferred to premature indifference and selfishness, and the sentiments of Eastern youth deserve respect, even if they are sometimes more than a little one-sided. Lack of balance is often due, in their case, to the particular disturbance inherent in a period of transition.

Of course, critics will find a new ground for their complaints. Why do not the authorities keep education in step with the needs of society, so as to prevent certain persons from being estranged from the environment where they might have been happy? There is no doubt that all public authorities must endeavour to establish a balance between education and social needs, as was done, for instance, by the Chinese examination system and by the modern methods of selection applied in Japan. But in a society which is developing at a speedy pace it is not always easy to look so far ahead that the right balance can be guaranteed beforehand. Is there not also an intellectual proletariat in the West? The only available method is to assure social and economic progress to such a degree that there will come into existence a differentiation of needs, and with it a real need of trained brains to perform the functions necessary under the new dispensation.

World traffic

In these circumstances we have reason to be gratified by the fact that world traffic makes foreign energy available for the purpose of stimulating Eastern society, and for differentiating it in a manner which would have been beyond the capacity of national or colonial authorities. For as soon as under this influence a multiplicity of professions and of duties comes into existence, society is more than ready to absorb all the useful knowledge which is available. Not only does it, thereby, fill up an actual gap, but at the same time it allows all its layers to be permeated with the indispensable leaven of personalities produced by education. Soon this process will make society more flexible and mobile, and more organically connected. Education, therefore, proves to be a necessary preliminary for social and economic organisation in a

modern sense, while the progress of trade, communications, and rationalised production is in its turn necessary in order to create a *raison d'être* for educated personalities.

Division of labour is the great driving power which, by differentiation of talent and by the unfolding of energy and initiative, helps the forward march of society. But these outside influences would be very slow in their action if the authorities did not assist the process of penetration by an extensive system of roads, canals, postal, telephonic and telegraphic connections, and air routes. Roads are the beginning of social development on a larger scale. Without them, the small local group egoisms could never start the process of fusion. No wonder that colonial and national authorities in the East pay so much attention to the question. What can an official, who may be at the head of a territory as large as two English counties, hope to achieve if the population under him cannot even be benefited by the establishment of a central market because they cannot reach it? How can he ever expect to end the fatal stagnation which results from isolation?

It is impossible, as we have seen so often before, to expect progress from sectional and one-sided endeavour. An educational policy will achieve nothing if the roads are neglected, and the opposite is equally true. Enlightened authorities must always balance their care for the school and for the road, which are but two aspects of one and the same policy.

Labour as a form of taxation

There is, therefore, good reason for pointing out in passing the serious contradiction in the attitude of those who, with the best possible intentions, applaud every endeavour to foster education, while they are strongly opposed to all efforts to strike a balance between the claims of the school and of the road, because a part of the roads has been made or is being kept up by so-called forced labour, which they consider a kind of slavery. In the past, Eastern rulers, who made no distinction between their own revenue and that of the state, made much use of tribute in the shape of labour. But we are concerned with the present, and with situations of a different nature. In the Dutch East Indies, at all events, there now exist even in the Indonesian States regional treasuries, which are described as follows by Mr. H. J. Spit: "The basis of this institu-

tion is the idea of combining modern administration and colonial decentralisation, and of separating the finances of the state from the personal revenue of the Ruler."

In view of the fact that the states' budgets, like the central budget, place the public interest before all else, one can no longer speak of forced labour in the sense of slavery, although this erroneous conception is still current, and gives rise to much misunderstanding. No more is meant than taxation in the shape of labour. Money taxes mean that the tax-payer must work perhaps a whole month, in his profession, in his office, in his field, or behind his counter, in order to collect the money with which to pay his tax, while in the other instance he has to work for the same or for a shorter period, usually on the roads, for the sake of his own community or sub-district.

If Eastern society everywhere had reached the stage when all labour, services, and values could be measured in terms of money, colonial policy would have achieved a large part of its task. In various regions this stage has not yet been reached, and we should rather be surprised that the transition to money taxation is progressing so fast. The authorities are not prolonging the old situation a day longer than is necessary. It is owing to their initiative that the change has been taking place gradually and for many years. If, in territories where money economy has scarcely, if at all, penetrated, taxation in money is demanded, many tax-payers have first to earn the money by unfavourable business transactions with more worldly-wise persons or by labour for other persons, who of course as a rule will be strangers. Money, in such a case, is not a means of exchange, but an object which must be acquired for its own sake, in the same way as efforts would have to be made to get hold of a piece of silk if the authorities suddenly had the whim to demand payment of taxation in silk. The result is that undesirable and irksome private obligations of service may be created. Indeed, it is not necessary to know much of the relations which exist in these primitive environments to realise what a degree of economic dependency may soon become the fate of those who have been freed prematurely of the obligation of tax-payment by labour.

Tax-payment by labour is a thorn in the eye of every authority. It is representative of the primitive stage of closed produce-

economy with all the economic backwardness this implies. Were the objections only economic, they would be cogent enough. But there is more significance in the fact that mental development is also affected by it. As soon as the authorities are able to do so, they always abolish this form of taxation, either by enabling those who are liable to service to buy off their obligations, or by the levy of a special road tax, or by charging the central or the local budgets with the item of road construction and upkeep. As division of labour makes progress, there is an automatic diminution of tax-payment by labour, because professions and trades which demand the wholetime attention of a man cannot be neglected by him for a month.

Moreover, in a differentiated society payment in money is no longer an insuperable difficulty. Soon enough it becomes the easiest way for everybody to satisfy his obligations. In the period of transition there are sometimes difficulties due to the fact that a part of the population prefers to pay in money while another is not yet able to do so. Sometimes no free labour would be available in the locality where it is required, which would mean that the authorities would have to transport labour at high costs, or would have to send up the wages in the affected district. All the circumstances must therefore be taken into account, and sentiment must never inspire premature and detrimental measures.

Some people suggest as a way out of the dilemma that fewer roads should be built. The irony of the situation is that by diminishing the possibilities of traffic the division of labour, with the circulation of money which it would have brought about, is arrested, and that less than ever will there be an alternative to the payment of taxation by labour. Others would be ready to perpetuate this form of taxation, provided the authorities paid wages for this labour. This amounts to removing from the inhabitants of backward regions all responsibility for the development of their own territory. For how could wages be found, except by higher taxation of other territories, where money-circulation has already penetrated? Such strange methods would, moreover, be tantamount to giving a population grants in money and asking it to pay this money back by way of taxation.

In countries where, as in some backward regions of the Dutch East Indies, labour is still demanded in payment of taxation, it is

not used for government enterprise, but only for the satisfaction of special local traffic requirements. There may have been, on occasion, an exaggerated amount of road building, but this is a mistake of practice which does not affect the validity of a healthy principle. The principle itself is the recognition of the working of economic influences which favour progress in the shape of division of labour, and, as we have seen, of education. All factors are connected, and if one wants the one, one cannot reject the other unless one is prepared to face a one-sided and unbalanced development.

Foreign influence and Eastern economy

The economic influences which can penetrate Eastern society thanks to world traffic are therefore indispensable allies of the authorities; while influences which delay the division of labour can only obstruct their work. The unfavourable influences have more chance of developing in the colonial world than in the Eastern states. This is due to two causes. First of all, ancient differentiation of labour has, with the exception of various parts of India, as a rule not taken the dimensions in the colonial world which it acquired centuries ago in Eastern states. In the second place, the ordered conditions, the facilities of communication and the friendly attitude adopted since the middle of last century towards modern capital enterprise and knowledge by the colonial authorities have given rise to a larger amount of foreign enterprise in the colonial world.

In our review of the Eastern states we have seen how Japan and China had progressed in the course of centuries. About 1850 Japan already had money circulation, flourishing cities, trade, and hundreds of active guilds. As soon as Japan was opened to outside trade influences, a strong feudal body stood ready to organise public enterprise and to prepare the untutored forces of the country for the performance of their task in trade, mining, shipping, industry, etc. The stimulation of world trade, in consequence, profited the Japanese population itself. Similarly in China since about 1860 world traffic has found a ready soil in a commercially developed country. The Chinese were ready to act as middle-men for foreign traders, and their energy and commercial acumen enabled them to develop their other economic pos-

sibilities. Siam, however, was in a less favourable position. Big industry and commerce, and even intermediary and small trade are almost exclusively in foreign hands. The mentality of the population will have to change very considerably before this situation is altered.

In the colonial world the greatest variety obtains. In the Dutch East Indies, conditions are not particularly favourable to the Indonesian population. Almost the whole middle-class consists of foreign Oriental groups, while big trade and industry are almost exclusively in Western hands. Social and economic organisation does not yet allow a free interchange between capacities and functions. Foreign Orientals, Chinese, Arabs and others hold in many regions an almost exclusive monopoly of the activity which is usually identified with the petty bourgeoisie and the middle-class. No doubt, nobody excludes the energetic Indonesian from retail trade or from big enterprise, but the fact that the bourgeoisie is composed of more than a million Asiatic foreigners exposes the enterprising Indonesian from the very start to a well-organised competition with experienced and worldly-wise people against whom he, like the Administration until some years ago, was powerless.

There is, of course, no question on the part of any of these non-Indonesian groups of a scheme to keep the Indonesians in economic subjection. The situation is entirely natural: foreign capability filled the gaps which existed and must do so until division of labour has become more developed. Indonesian society has, on the contrary, benefited to a considerable extent from the dynamising activities of these outsiders, while the pressure of the growth of the population could be better withstood owing to the increased earning power derived from these new sources. The situation, however, is now changing. Indigenous energy has begun to develop: the example of foreigners, roads, education, and money-circulation have widened the outlook, and during the last twenty years or so aspirations have become perceptible which convince us that the point of inertia will soon be passed and that, with the necessary assistance, many people will be able to develop.

This is why the time has come when group-isolation of Occidentals, autochthonous and other Orientals must increasingly go by the board. The authorities have set the example by opening the

state service to everybody, thus giving to tens of thousands of Indonesians an opportunity of rising above the level of the small agriculturist, the fisherman, or the wage labourer. But this is not enough. Colonial policy must endeavour to preserve a healthy balance and must therefore appeal to all those who labour in the sphere of foreign economic enterprise to assist its activities. This assistance can be formulated as the recognition of the right to work of all those who have the necessary talent, character, and education, not only in the government service, but in European banking, industrial, agricultural, and shipping enterprises, and in the service also of the large Eastern foreign groups which are active in the colonial world.

It must be remembered that as long as the social separation of these large racial groups continues to impose an economic and functional division, social demarcations will continue to be unnatural and rigid. Interests which belong essentially together cannot amalgamate, and sooner or later, under the influence of certain propaganda, contrasts will come into existence which every society ought to avoid. "To make a man a conservative, give him something to conserve", says the Dutch proverb. Again it appears that by the most matter-of-fact standards all the teachings of duty and conscience are being confirmed. Nothing is more appropriate for emphasising the real unity of interests, for withering the propaganda of hatred, and for securing a good spirit and sound development in business than to interest the labourer in the results of his industry. This truth is equally valid where it concerns the meeting and co-operation of races, especially when they have been re-grouping themselves as different classes in one single society. Only by establishing harmony between their different aspirations shall we succeed in keeping disruptive propaganda, which thrives wherever division is rife, at arm's length.

The right to work

Much more is at stake than a fight against pernicious propaganda: the future development of society is our concern. We have seen in a previous chapter that colonial policy did not want racial fusion, but free careers for all those with talent. Similarly it wishes to see for every capable man an opening in the business and occupations of the middle-class or in big enterprise. When all functions

are monopolised by particular racial sections, the situation which arises is comparable with the acidity of a soil which is covered with a ferrous layer. Eastern advisers, accountants, doctors, engineers, employees, supervisors, and administrators should in the future be lacking in no big Western concerns in the East. Indonesians must also find a place in the businesses of Arabs, Chinese, Indians, Japanese, and other Orientals who are established in the Dutch East Indies. The Indonesian horizon must be enlarged so as to embrace every economic capacity. Indonesians and foreigners will then feel a community of interests in which everybody works according to his capacity, and there will grow one single society, with innumerable functions that are distributed over the different groups to such an extent that every interest can be felt by all groups as one that concerns the whole community.

Essentially, this is already the case at the present day. Foreign energy is rendering immense services by selling imported articles and by buying up domestic produce. Big enterprise gives work to hundreds of thousands of people, while foreign business fills the treasury with the taxes it pays. By assuring the profitable utilisation of the capital invested in traffic, irrigation, etc., it assists the authorities to such a degree that a serious restriction of its capacity to produce would result in an appalling decrease of welfare work and general development by the authorities. At the same time modern enterprise is having a considerable influence upon some prosperous indigenous crops. Every educated Indonesian can see this coincidence of interests, but fusion could be very considerably increased.

In this connection we may mention the measures taken by large agricultural enterprises in order to enable the population to benefit otherwise than merely by ground-rents and by wages. Much is being done for popular hygiene and improved housing conditions, by contributions for the building of mosques, religious and other schools, by enabling people to attend special training courses, by opening libraries and distributing good literature. Large enterprise also gives rise to all kinds of indigenous trades, such as smiths, carpenters, stone masons, cartmakers and wheelwrights, brick-makers, etc. While various other subsidiary requirements like that for packing materials provide small shopkeepers with a livelihood. A stronger peasantry may arise, if this policy is fol-

owed. We shall return to these questions in our second volume, which deals more especially with the Dutch East Indies. What appears most clearly from these considerations is that the question of foreign enterprise and indigenous labour must not be decided merely from the point of view of the present-day interests of the population, but with an eye to future developments.

It would indeed be surprising if educated Indonesians, Orientals who have proved able to occupy positions of trust in so complicated an organisation as that of the government and especially of the civil service, could not come up to the highest standards in other positions as well. Besides, testimonies are available from leaders of big industry to prove that this is already the case. It will be good if all those who are able to influence the course of affairs co-operate consciously with the tendencies of evolution by doing what they can to turn society into one functional whole by opening continually greater possibilities to Indonesian talent. Private interests need not be neglected to this end. It will be found soon enough that there need be no clash between policy and profit.

Together with the fostering of co-operation between all groups of the population, whose economic activity must be detached as much as possible from racial or national distinctions, an equally great influence can be exercised by a healthy co-operative movement on the part of the population itself. Better methods of production, more commercial spirit, more co-operation will not only give a more scientific and rational basis to agriculture, which remains the real means of existence for the population, but they will also point the road to world-markets and enable the Indonesian to play the part to which he is entitled in retail trade, commerce, and industry.

The results of division of labour

Division of labour with its rational methods of production, its foresight, and its organic solidarity is everywhere the basis of modern, dynamic society. Let the East preserve all its religious, genealogical, and territorial loyalties, but only upon the economic pillars of division of labour can it construct the society of the future. Without these pillars, the whole social fabric will crumble down if the moment arrives when the West withdraws and no

longer supports the unity it has imposed from above. It is because of the importance of this economic evolution that we have given so much attention, in the previous chapter, to the care with which Japan organised its economic reconstruction.

Let all those whose enthusiasm for complete political autonomy cannot be restrained try to realise that the economic vibration of a society indicates the pulse of the inner strength of the whole organism. In his great work *De la Division du Travail Social* Durkheim has shown the far-reaching effects of division of labour upon the mentality of a population. Let those who doubt read his eloquent pages on its spiritual and social consequences (p. 100), and on its significance in the evolution of the principle of private property (154). We may also mention what has been written in this connection by the Dutch Professor Gonggrijp¹), who declares: "In the same way as the mastery of mind over matter implies division of labour, division of labour implies development of technique and of exchange", and, further on: "Parallel with the economic change from barter to money-traffic there is a change of the magical and mythical into critical and scientific forms of thought. Childish association becomes severe causality, and the vague and merely quantitative turns into the precise and qualitative. In brief, there is a change which of course is never complete, but which always characterises itself by rationalisation and arithmetisation."

Division of labour has still another and greater merit. It breaks through genealogical and territorial connections. We know how village-communities can live side by side like little nations which will consider every outsider a foreigner and allow him to spend the night in the village territory only after long considerations and palavers. But division of labour weaves threads between all these isolated groups, which are gradually absorbed into larger economic connections, a process which in its turn is bound to have far-reaching mental, moral, and social results. This is precisely the development which colonial policy must welcome above anything else, for without it all creations like universities, provincial councils, the legislative assembly, etc., will remain hanging in the air. All societies are like pyramids, where every layer rests upon

¹) *Schets eener economische Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië*, 1928, Volks-Universiteitsbibliotheek, nr. 41, p. 241. Cf. also Scheler, *op. cit.*

the previous one. What will be the good of the apex, if instead of being supported by the rest of the edifice, it remains suspended merely by the assistance of the Western authorities? It must rest upon the mind and the will of the people. The static structure must be re-constructed, and it is trade and traffic which will strengthen the impulse towards renewal.

The relations between communities will be profoundly altered. In primitive societies, as Malinowsky shows in his *Argonauts* (pp. 81—104), there are mainly inter-tribal relations. In cultural areas the bazaar-trade, loans, etc., cause a greater looseness, although relations still maintain to a certain extent the character of all-round contacts between villages, families, etc. But as soon as division of labour sets in, relations are entered into by isolated persons or by interested groups of persons who live in different villages and districts, whose interests form invisible circles which are lifted up, as it were, from the territorial connection, are guided only by reason and whose direction is thoroughly dynamic. The same thing which is happening on a small scale in the East is also taking place in Europe, where, by the side of national connections, innumerable relations between persons, corporations, industries, banks, societies, universities, and so on, transcend national boundaries and give rise to a healthy internationalism which could never have been brought into being by inter-state relations. Just as this internationalism does not produce individuals without a fatherland, so inter-communal relations need not destroy ancient loyalties in the East.

It stands to reason that certain changes will indeed take place. Persons whose interests no longer coincide with those of the ancient groups will attach less importance to the old mutual assistance and group-consultations about their own affairs, which are increasingly acquiring a purely personal character. Minds become more critical and attach less importance to consecrated usages, and, as a result, the opinion of the popular heads will no longer be accepted without question. Such symptoms are already everywhere perceptible, and are often interpreted as proof of demoralisation. This they need only be if the new conceptions and aspirations cannot be made to fit into the process of growth.

What is taken for demoralisation is nothing but the wearing off of the mechanical solidarity of group members bound together by

uniformity, which naturally precedes the development of organic solidarity in other and sometimes much larger circles. Organic solidarity will be animated by much larger dynamic forces and will find its roots in the different functioning of individuals and groups. The wearing off of mechanical solidarity is the *conditio sine qua non* of this new consciousness. There is no need, therefore, to regret it, although at first sight it may cause some concern for the future.

Static majorities and dynamic minorities

It must be remembered that, as long as the persons who can lift themselves out of the group-connections are still too few to exercise an effective influence, the group cannot be sacrificed to their interests. It remains the nursery of morality, and will remain so for millions of people and for many decades. The growth of life will eventually see to it that when the time has come to put an end to the compromises between static groups and dynamic minorities, this will be made abundantly clear. Such compromises, meanwhile, are indispensable. The authorities will help to bring them about, although at the same time they will safeguard, to the best of their ability, the consecration of traditional communities, duties towards communal interests, and respect of ancient customs and laws. They will favour the development of local autonomies in a sense which will make the ancient authority based on customary law grow together with modern methods, while a fusion will be established between ancient custom and rational methods, ancient mutual assistance and modern co-operation. Village councils and higher autochthonous bodies will, moreover, continue to be entrusted with a certain amount of jurisdiction, and with other ancient functions in which a place can also be found for more progressive personalities, which can serve as elements of contact.

Only those who can join rational thought with a respect for ancient usage, who can preserve their contact with the outside world and yet keep a warm heart for the consecrated group connection, can work as a leaven inside Eastern society. If, in their worldly wisdom, they are prepared to put on one side all sense of reverence and of duty, they can provoke only a process of fermentation. One of the best criteria by which such elements can be judged is their capacity to inspire confidence in the fellow-

members of their group. In such a case, it will be a good method to grant to a group the right to elect a few members to sit with the traditional members of its local council, provided a certain amount of supervision is maintained in order to prevent intimidation and undue pressure, and to obtain a free pronouncement on the part of public opinion. This offers a splendid opportunity for those who wish to make themselves useful within their own circle. And they will only be successful if they have preserved their respect for old usage. For a whole community cannot simply take its views from an individual. In this way the educated few can exercise the quiet power which, gradually and without shock, will modify society.

These progressive elements find their greatest utility more especially when representative bodies can be created for larger units, such as village confederations, district councils, etc. They then form the links between the group-connection and the wider sphere. But for this function again the first requirement is that close contact with their original environment shall have been preserved, that these progressive elements enjoy the confidence of their group and can therefore be instrumental in opening a wider horizon to them. By encouraging the co-operative movement by every available means, the authorities can establish a most valuable link between the old and the new, between group loyalty and the progressive individual. Thus co-operation must be as many-sided as possible. It can be useful to the whole community, e.g. for educational or hygienic purposes, or, more frequently, it can address itself to a varying majority (agriculture, irrigation, the buying of seeds, manure, implements, the sale of produce, standardisation and marketing, etc.). In the long run it can, even more frequently, be directed towards a definite group, either inside one community, or else consisting of persons who live in different places but have common interests and a common desire to progress.

The studies of Professor Boeke and of Baron van Lijnden ¹⁾ point to the need for the authorities to give special encouragement to progressive individuals. The latter utters a warning against a policy which "believes that it can lift up a whole population"

¹⁾ W. E. K. van Lijnden, *De economische Ontwikkeling van den Inlandschen Landbouw*, Ind. Gen. Nov. 6, 1925, i.a. p. 91.

because this is the very way to delay progress. It is possible that there is already more need for differentiation. But on the whole a period of mass-work will first be necessary to create a certain consciousness and a certain mobility, in order to allow of the formation of the personal element.

As soon as welfare policy can differentiate between the homogeneous mass and energetic individuals, the first stage of the process of economic evolution is closed. In the second stage a richly varied and collective life will develop, which in its turn must greatly hasten the process of evolution. For the richer and the more many-sided the system of unions and societies, in which political societies will be the least important and, provisionally at least, the most superfluous, the easier will be the process of dovetailing the old and the new, as happened in Japan. The possibilities of co-operation in this connection are inexhaustible.

It is necessary above all other things to strike a just balance. Economic development must stand in readiness, as it were, to absorb the capacities and initiative that have been called forth by education, while economic development without the fruits of education means a disruption for which there is no compensation. Education, though initiated by the authorities, requires the enthusiasm and collaboration of the Eastern élite. Apart from ordinary schooling, it consists in the spread of rational technical knowledge, with or without practical demonstrations, among the adult population, encouragement of unions, including those which aim at social life and sport, but most particularly in many-sided co-operative societies, so that finally there will be a metamorphosis from isolated territorial and genealogical groups into autonomies full of vitality, above which federations and large territorial connections will spread their widening circle. Step by step the leading spirits will thus be conducted from isolation into unity.

The village autonomy, which must fit in as closely as possible with the old connection, not only as regards territory but also as regards its activities, is an ideal lever in the process of evolution. If it is made into a success, half the task is accomplished. This is a sufficient reason for using the old connections for the good of modern needs. Thus a magnet is created which attracts the more energetic and progressive persons and makes them more useful in their own environment. In the old "republics" there would be

no place for them, but the autonomies which are growing out of the ancient loyalties will need them very much, as long as they take care to keep contact with them as well as with the wider sphere with which their glance has become familiar. It is impossible to bestow too much attention upon the village autonomy. The more functions that can be entrusted to it without over-burdening it, the better. For the richer its sphere of activity, the more will the interest of the members be roused.

These members will find that they need not look upon their society as an atrophied organism. They must be given the means to make it arise like a phoenix from its ashes. Given the disposal of financial means, the power to regulate their own household, granted also some measure of jurisdiction, they will all feel concerned in the progress of their community. The old communities will be preserved, but made serviceable to modern needs. But the ancient republics have to be completed in two respects. As a result of the process of mental and economic differentiation, these territorial units can no longer remain the exclusive sphere in which all forms of social and economic activity can find adequate employment. While these units will be entrusted with as many autonomous and self-governing duties as possible, they must be relieved of all functions which are outside their competence and which, therefore, hamper their growth and that of the differentiation of interests. People who have no cattle will not be particularly interested in co-operative dairying. This is why it would be a mistake to entrust co-operative dairying to the village autonomy, which must devote itself to its fullest capacity to really common interests, and should not be used for private or sectional purposes.

The three levers of colonial policy

In the same way as the village autonomy is too large and unwieldy for dealing with interests which are the special concern of one or more persons in its midst, it is too small for handling certain interests which are too great for its powers and concern a whole circle of villages. Irrigation, the distribution of drinking water, health, the provision of trained nurses, the maintenance of central schools with continuation classes or schools for vocational education could not be profitably organised by an isolated

village. This is essentially the task of a union of villages, and again, as far as possible, it should be performed inside those greater territorial units which have the consecration of tradition.

One can conceive of many such common interests. Relations must always be kept as flexible as possible, in order that all energy, initiative, and material can be utilised as economically as possible. Certain definite contacts can effect this suppleness. For instance, persons who play a prominent part in the co-operative movement can be placed upon the larger autonomous bodies. Looked upon from this aspect, the terms autonomy, self-administration, co-operation, district council, etc., begin to tingle with life. We see the spirit of the West blowing into empty forms and animating them, and turning the ancient territorial, religious, and genealogical connections into active and creative organisms. At the same time we see the three great levers of colonial policy at work: the educational, the social and economical, and the political. We shall begin to understand that wisdom's truest counsel directs Western leadership to keep these levers in motion at the same pace and with consummate prudence, so as to ensure the gradual elevation of Oriental society. In this chapter we shall have to study the functions of each of these levers separately.

E d u c a t i o n

Let us now enter into these small worlds, in order to observe at closer quarters how the educational measures of the authorities are trying to effect an imperceptible transition from the static to the dynamic phase. We are met at first with the criticism which attributes a disruptive influence to popular education. But, as we have pointed out, economic progress would have an equally disruptive effect, unless education indicated to social energy the way towards the new citizenship and political unity. Criticism against education as such is therefore inadmissible, unless education definitely outpaces the social and economic differentiation, or affects ancient loyalties before the new columns of citizenship and sense of unity have been built up.

Popular education must therefore adapt itself to the environment of the pupils, while all higher and technical education must keep in contact, as closely as possible, with the need which the great society has for educated forces. In this way alone can the

creation of an unabsorbable surplus, which feels unjustly treated and becomes idle and disaffected, be prevented. It stands to reason that a nice balance cannot always be preserved. But the extension of educational facilities must at all times form the subject of exchanges of views between various branches of the administrative service, so that re-adjustments can continually take place. Schools of a certain type, of which the need has clearly appeared, and for which the number of candidates is much larger than that of vacancies, may nevertheless be preserved in their present number, without any attempt to provide further facilities if it can be foreseen that any other policy would produce more trained pupils than can find a place in society. It may seem hard to disappoint so many candidates for higher education. But the example of Japan shows how, in a most progressive country, where thousands apply for places in the higher schools while only hundreds are admitted, there may nevertheless come into existence a grave surplus of trained forces ¹⁾.

Quoting the Report of the Calcutta University Commission of 1917, Lord Ronaldshay pointed to the same danger. In Bengal, in a population of about 45 million souls, there was about the same number of students preparing for a university degree as in the United Kingdom, although only 10 per cent of the population can read and write. A high proportion of the educated classes consider a university degree as the natural goal of their ambition, and seek it by studies almost purely literary in character, which scarcely provide a direct professional training. The Commission of 1882 had already called the system top-heavy. Similarly, another Commission, in 1902, made vain efforts to "divert the constant growing stream of Western educated students from the literary courses which they insisted on pursuing". Western education, however, has also had beneficial results, although naturally many people would have preferred a less one-sided development. Mayhew ²⁾ considers that education has been "essentially vocational, grossly utilitarian in fact, at the cost of cultural efficiency". His views are really a confirmation of those of Lord Ronaldshay; he merely completes them when he says:

¹⁾ See *Onderwijstoestanden in het Verre Oosten*, Ind. Gen. Oct. 8, 1926, and Creutzberg, *ibid.* Jan. 19, 1923.

²⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

The course is sternly practical. It is not general culture but the study of the English language that reduces so lamentably the time and energy available for work calculated to affect the material condition of India. Let it not be supposed that this intensive study of English has any immediate cultural aim or value. The cultural aim was no doubt deliberately emphasised by Macaulay. But, in fact, it is hardly in evidence save in the most advanced stages of specialised University courses in English.... The present tendency, in lower stages, is to concentrate attention on the vocational and utilitarian side of English. For reasons completely beyond the control of the educationalist it is necessary to give the high school boy such knowledge of English as will enable him to follow University instruction and professional and technical courses through that medium. Or, if his education ceases with the high school course, he must be able to hold his own in English conversation and correspondence.

As Mayhew remarks, "the price paid for this asset is heavy, being nothing less than comparative neglect of other subjects of really equal, though to the Indian mind subordinate, pre-vocational importance". And it is therefore that Lord Ronaldshay, whose views entirely agree with Mayhew's, declares:

And, quite apart from any question of the medium of instruction, the whole system of education is completely divorced from Indian culture and tradition. The high school and undergraduate courses are essentially Western courses, unrelated to Indian life as it was lived before the advent of the British. They are rigidly mechanical and altogether lack that intimate relationship between teacher and taught which was an outstanding feature of the indigenous system.

Rabindrinath Tagore writes in a similar vein, and considers the British authorities responsible for the fact that cultured society in India has now become a society of people with degrees. "The bird has been taught to consider its chain as an ornament, merely because it rattles with a fairly good English sound" ¹⁾. Here, once more ²⁾, we find the question of ultimate responsibility, which goes far beyond that of the relations between the British educators and the Indian élite, and which is repeated throughout the colonial world. Macaulay never thought of pushing Western cul-

¹⁾ Tagore, *Une Université Orientale*, in the series "Feuilles de l'Inde", Vol. I, pp. 1—33.

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ture into the background by putting in its place linguistic studies and a mere hunt for degrees. What the authorities had in view was to form leaders who, basing themselves upon their knowledge of the needs of their fellow-countrymen, would be able to help them in their arduous upward march.

D y n a m i c i n f l u e n c e o f e d u c a t i o n

The real explanation of the one-sidedness of the ambitions of the élite lies elsewhere. As in Japan, in Siam, in Afghanistan, and in China, the initiative had to come from the authorities, and in a far more many-sided and intense way, in a manner, during the initial stages, far more exclusive than in the natural process of development which had taken place in Europe. It was a matter of course, therefore, that the acquired knowledge could, during the first ten or twenty years, be placed at the service of the population only through official channels. It is only after this influence has been working upon the population for many years that a stage is reached when possibilities are gradually displayed which invite private initiative. India has already reached this stage and the hunt for degrees and for government posts no longer satisfies the ambition of youth. Trade, industry, agricultural enterprise, the liberal professions, science, art, literary and philosophic labours play an ever growing part, and it is precisely because these activities are not imposed from above that society itself is coming more into its own. In our own time of growing Eastern initiative it is not right to condemn former methods by the standards that now prevail. A century hence it will be quite as easy to condemn government leadership concerning the co-operative movement as dry Western system worship.

Meanwhile, the time has now arrived when an ever richer private Eastern initiative can put its hand to the plough and, in so doing, count upon the consent and the willing co-operation of the millions, when it is preparing to broaden its own culture by a movement of renovation, which, half a century, ago, would have been fanatically rejected by the masses; and when this initiative is preparing to bring the blessings of health and education, of rational agriculture and home-industry, a many-sided co-operative life and a flourishing autonomy to hundreds of millions of compatriots. And it is precisely for these reasons that nowadays

the need is felt on all sides for new lines of direction, for re-orientation of the activities of the authorities.

Dynamising Eastern culture

It is evident that a system of education which gives to the East only Western externals without bringing it the spirit of the West, or without doing everything possible to make the soul of the East into a living social force, is dangerous. Pseudo-morphic monstrosities are unfit to live. As Tagore has remarked, what the East knows of scientific and literary Europe does not go beyond the grammar book and the laboratory. Yet, all the Orientals who have really penetrated to the sources of Western culture have become men or women whose names resound through the East and through the West, for they have become noble fruits of the synthesis of cultures ¹).

The West, with all its powers, science and technique, has grown out of the soil of Christianity, moistened with the dew of three cultures, and quickened in its growth by the strength of the monogamous household and of the respect for the dignity of every human being. Whenever the West fails, its failure is due to a disregard of this inheritance. The Oriental who adopts Western thought must adopt it in its entirety, or else he must enrich the inheritance of his fathers with the inspiration of the West which never supplants nor disfigures a culture. There is no likelihood that an Oriental who has learned to see the inner meaning as well as the externals of Western culture will ever lose his moral balance. Soon enough the supporters of the idea of synthesis will make efforts to inspire their own culture with life, and to select the very best it contains, in order to make a new and inspiring whole of it.

It may be asked whether this view implies that all educated Orientals must steep themselves in Western culture, and even adopt the Christian religion as a preliminary to fulfilling their task of leadership. The only possible answer is that everyone will have to decide, according to his own lights, from what source he will obtain what is required for his own growth. But there is one inescapable truth: the spiritual inspiration that is needed by the man who wants to be able to support Western science, Western social organisation, Western progress, and Western political insti-

¹) See a list of such persons in M. T. Z. Tyau, *China Awakened*, 1922, pp. 29—30.

tutions and turn them into a blessing for his own people must be particularly strong.

The two ways by which this can be done have been tried with varying success. Even among the peoples that are called most primitive, relatively small circles have become, in the space of one lifetime, familiarised with the spirit of the West. But the study of Professor Allier ¹⁾ shows with what difficulty this has been achieved. He rightly remarks that a complete self-renovation is indispensable, if the new code is to acquire any significance. If less is done, there will sooner or later be a reversion to the past. But once the right process has taken place, there will be an incredible outburst of energy in a society which only a few years before was primitive and where customs unworthy of human beings still prevailed.

Everything, even the language, begins to change. In secluded communities the language is attuned to proximity. Just as in a film that is moving too slowly all action is seized in its most concrete and detailed aspects, to such a degree that the continuity almost eludes the spectator, there is also an over sensitive perception of the slightest gradations, much to the detriment of the general and the abstract. It is surprising, therefore to observe, under the guidance of Allier, the process by which the concrete language becomes inspired, as a result of the devoted labour of one single lifetime, with a new spirit, which enables it to harbour ideas of the highest abstraction, to which even the Western languages can give utterance only with the greatest difficulty. Similar observations made in various countries prove sufficiently that no limits can be put to the possibilities of this evolution, and that a real spiritual influence can perform wonders, and must therefore precede or at least accompany social evolution and intellectual education.

Popular education

If colonial authorities have themselves to act from a neutral point of view, they will lose a considerable chance of accomplishing this spiritual reformation. They must therefore follow the example of Japan and of Siam, and that which China also is proposing to set, by inculcating in the children the importance of spiritual and cultural values, and of religion in general. Some people

¹⁾ *La Psychologie de la Conversion.*

take another view and would like to make the popular schools of the Dutch East Indies, the so-called *desa* schools, into exclusively utilitarian agricultural schools. But this is a mistake. Children must be made to feel at one with their environment, but they must also stand a little higher, develop more independence of thought and action, and be able to embrace a slightly wider horizon.

Professor Brim ¹⁾, one of the leading American educationists, says that "it is the task of elementary education to acquaint the child with life in its wider aspects, with its many opportunities, and its rich variety of interests and forms of human service. Education must seek to prepare him for a larger individual growth and social membership". Of those who only want utilitarian agricultural training, he says:

They aim from the first to make him a member of a group. They emphasise the differences, the qualities wherein his parent group is unlike others, instead of strengthening the bonds that unite him to all people. They centre his attention upon local problems, instead of creating interests for him common to the group with whom he must co-operate. They develop occupational ability rather than ability to participate in the problems of social progress.

The three aims of popular education are clearly indicated here. If it fulfils them, it will prepare the dynamic future by creating a sense of citizenship which is active inside the group, but radiates outward, without ceasing to feel at home in its own environment.

It is precisely those who have learned something and can look a little farther, who are filled with respect for the old traditions and yet have an open eye for possible improvements who must remain in the village as contented, modest, but progressive members. This is the way to create strong village autonomies in the place of village republics. There is ample opportunity to create habits, views and conceptions, for instance by school gardens, which will be of particular use to agriculture. But this natural fashion of adapting education to the environment is not the same thing as specialised and exclusive technical agricultural education. Mayhew remarks on this subject:

Expert agricultural opinion is opposed to any specific agricultural instruction in village primary schools. Competent and experienced teachers cannot be secured, the expense is prohibitive, and

¹⁾ C. G. Brim, *Rural Education*, p. 208.

there is no time for it. All attempts at it have been superficial and justly ridiculed by the locality.... It is agreed that, in the absence of technical instruction, something can be done to adapt the curriculum and methods to local needs and circumstances. Village schools can be "ruralised"....

The principal task of the popular school is not to increase the sum of knowledge. The formation of character is its prime aim. In his *Village Schools in India* (1926) Mr. Olcott makes four suggestions with a view to ensuring that this end shall be borne in mind. He wants (a) to emphasise cordial community life in the school at all times, (b) to furnish practice in village service, (c) to give the children instruction in village rights and duties, (d) to strengthen their consciences and motives through vital religious instruction and worship. Similar demands are made by every local worker. It is obvious that instead of neutral education, the state will have to allow all the teaching to be permeated with reverence towards the majesty of creation and with enthusiasm for social duties. For, when the ancient connection is becoming looser, the first duty of all education must be to provide the new cement. Otherwise selfishness and mutual distrust, of which there are already so many traces in village life, will spread to hundreds of millions of people. Olcott says that in the Indian village there are nowadays in any case many reasons which divide the people among themselves.

Apart from the spirit of co-operation, energy and initiative are also essential requisites. As Olcott remarks:

Indian villagers have many virtues and weaknesses of a passive nature. Through the compulsion of the caste system and various strong social traditions, they display tendencies toward implicit obedience, temperate gentleness and patient resignation, fatalism, easy discouragement and superstition. Most of them are hopelessly at the mercy of natural forces, of irrational tradition, and of money-lenders and others who dominate their lives. Consequently, they easily slip into a state of mental lethargy, in which they rely blindly upon custom and authority, instead of thinking their problems through, or persistently carrying out their purposes.

While the formation of character, co-operation, and an interest in village conditions must be aimed at, all this must be done without attacking authority in the village, the family, and the caste. They must be respected as the inheritance from the fathers, which

may not be despised, but must be enriched and adapted to modern requirements. Needless to say, education must also include the girls. In Mayhew's opinion the neglect of this precept has made popular education, so far, insufficient as a lever for improvement. There are other causes, however, of which the principal has been mentioned already, the slowness of the process of mental transformation. Nevertheless, Mayhew's opinion deserves the most serious consideration: "No force works more strongly against Western civilisation than that of the uneducated women of India".

Confirmation of these views can be gathered from all sides. In 1922, the Commission of Enquiry of Fraser and others also emphasised the necessity of the formation of character and of education permeated with social spirit ¹⁾. Howard declares that "the most formidable obstacle encountered in making practical use of the results obtained at the experimental stations is the unfavourable economic and educational condition of the Indian village" ²⁾. This author also points to the danger of anti-government agitation which is most successful in backward regions. Mass-education is in his opinion the only remedy. In Indo-China the French government have followed the example of their Siamese neighbour and called upon the assistance of the Buddhist Church for the adaptation of the school to the needs of the environment. Bell comments upon this in the following words ³⁾:

They feel that the best vehicle for the grade of instruction which is suitable, at present, for the mentality of the mass of the peasantry is the Buddhist school that is attached to almost every temple in the country. The curriculum of these Pagoda schools is of the simplest nature and is mainly concerned with the gentle and humane rules of life taught by the Buddhist catechism. The children learn to read and write in their own language and to do elementary arithmetic. There is no teaching of French and the instruction is limited to the present needs and conditions of the Indo-Chinese peasantry.

The strengthening of popular education, which is also the wish of the Jerusalem Conference is, moreover, the only way by which the draining of village life towards the towns, a tendency which

¹⁾ See its report, *Village Education in India*, 1922, esp. p. 75 sqq.

²⁾ Albert and Gabrielle Howard, *Indian Agriculture*, in "India of To-day" series, Vol. VIII, pp. 58 sqq.

³⁾ Sir Hesketh Bell, *Foreign Colonial Administration in the Far East*, 1928, p. 94.

fills Tagore with apprehension, can be arrested. Social equilibrium can only be ensured if during the coming years all attention is concentrated upon popular education. All knowledge is useless and even dangerous, if it is not subordinated to these aims. It were better to have no education than to cut the school off from its daily environment.

It is easy enough to see the truth of these assertions, but to put them into practice is not such a simple matter. Who will bear the expense of a general system of education? It is being realised everywhere that one of the first conditions for creating a popular interest in education is to make the population bear at least a part of its cost. What can be got for nothing is never appreciated to the same extent as things for which money has to be spent. American experience is very definite in this matter. The rural school must represent community education, community incentive, and community support, even to the point of sacrifice. These excellent ideas have been embodied in the educational policy of the government of the Dutch East Indies. But they have not yet fully materialised ¹⁾. For, if the village population had so much insight and interest that it was prepared to make large sacrifices for the school, the battle would be half-won. The big task is still to create sufficient interest and this can only be done by influencing the adults.

Howard also remarks that "an attempt to force education on an unwilling and hostile population would only court failure, and lead to the waste of money on a colossal scale".

Well-meaning people have thought that to teach children agriculture would be the best way to interest their parents. But experience has proved that this is a mistake. Such education only suits older children, and for most of the pupils it is not needed. When the parents pass the school garden, and see what their children have been doing there, they will be inclined to shake their heads and to say that the children might just as well have spent their precious time in helping their parents. There is room for technical and agricultural schools in the Dutch East Indies, but they need only come in the second instance.

Popular interest in education

The fact that parents want to use the labour of their children

¹⁾ Creutzberg, Director of Education, in a speech before the Council of the People, June 21 and 22, 1918.

and do not like to send them to school is only one of the difficulties. They are too ignorant to realise the utility of schools, and too poor to make sacrifices for it. These difficulties are considerable enough to discourage many workers who began full of enthusiasm. Hence the necessity for the policy of synthesis to advance all along the line. But if economic progress forms the necessary basis for popular education and popular education is necessary for economic progress, we find ourselves once more within a vicious circle. In the southern states of America, education and raising the economic standard of the countryside are two horns of the same dilemma, which was solved by a vigorous policy of co-operative agricultural demonstration work.

Compulsory education is no solution. It can be introduced in a few very advanced districts, as is happening in India, but generally speaking it is impossible before the environment is able adequately to co-operate in its application. Neither must one burden the school programme with a hundred and one subjects, in the hope of giving it a greater all-round utility. If too much is attempted, passive memorising will be encouraged. If obedience, self-discipline, and the utility of co-operation are successfully inculcated in the children, the school has fulfilled the main part of its duty. The rest will follow of its own accord. The position of the school and of the teacher in the village will be of great importance in this connection. The teacher must, for some time to come, be a propagandist outside the school as much as a leader inside. He will be successful only if he can really feel at one with his unsophisticated environment, entirely aware of its needs, its conceptions and its aspirations, and shares its life almost completely. Howard even considers that the school teacher of the future "should be drawn from the village itself and that he should live, dress, and speak like the people among whom he will pass his life. His pay must be adequate and his position in the community must be one of honour." The Dutch East Indies Government fully shares these views, as appears from the speech of Mr. Creutzberg in the Council of the People, to which we have already referred.

The popular school as a social centre

The elementary school will have to become a "community centre", as it is already in the Philippines. There, says Dr. Nieu-

wenhuis, the teacher has become to a large extent what the friar used to be, and the school building itself is a living organ in the communal body ¹). The Indian Commission of Enquiry, to which we have already referred, similarly says:

One of the most marked characteristics of schools in certain needy areas of America is the variety of the social functions they perform. In some defective communities the school is temporarily attending to most of the duties of the home, the church, and other social institutions. . . . In still larger ways these schools may take the whole community as their field of education, and attempt to make up for defects in social organisation. This does not mean that these schools have lost sight of the fact that their primary and distinctive function is to teach, but it does mean that it is recognised that the school is often the agency through which community advance may be most effectively stimulated. It does not mean that such schools wish permanently to assume the functions of other institutions, but that the school is peculiarly suited to draw the community together, and to nurture social advance and inspiration along some particular line, until a new institution rises up to carry on the new development. When once the district board or the co-operative society, or the church, has sprung up or awakened to the new opportunity, the school will gladly relinquish its leadership in that particular direction. In India, where the villagers have such enormous needs along every sanitary, economic, social, and religious line, the mission school should be equipped to respond to the need for social leadership and community service. A teacher, especially in a mass movement area, should take for his school the whole community in which he is living, not merely the little children who irregularly frequent a certain building. For a large part of the education needed in the impoverished villages of India is adult education, leading hesitant personalities to throw themselves in some positive way into the social regeneration of their little world. And, just as the school is helpful to the parents and all the cultivators of the neighbourhood, so these should in turn be helpful to the school, repairing and enlarging the building, lending it land for gardens or demonstrations, and providing it with proper equipment.

It will always be necessary to beware of excessively ambitious social programmes which wish to exploit the school or the teacher. At the same time it must be remembered that society is still too simple and too little differentiated to allow education to be treated as an entirely separate function. A splendid task is therefore reserved for the teacher in the popular school. If the Eastern

¹) *Op. cit.* pp. 87, 174, 175.

élite consecrated itself to this work, the course of evolution would be shortened by a century. Indeed, before the disappearance of illiteracy, a flourishing autonomous and co-operative life cannot be achieved. But illiteracy will not disappear before the population itself has been gained for the good cause.

The teacher does not stand alone in the vanguard of evolution. If he does his duty, like the German teacher who, it is said, forged the German nation, or like the Japanese teacher, he will release the innumerable forces which are impatiently waiting to move forward. All authorities, whether European or Eastern, ought to show, each time they visit the village, how completely aware they are of the importance of its school. And when, owing to the inability of a number of villages to support their own school, a central school is established for several villages, the point of view adopted need never be exclusively educational, because an eye must always be kept upon the other sectors of rural development. Popular, as well as technical, education must always be looked upon as a component part in the frame of the whole evolutionary complex.

This is too often forgotten and Howard is right in pointing out that there is much fragmentation of effort in all that is being done for the village. A horde of minor officials all deal piecemeal with its problems. One visitor deals with co-operative credit, a second with improved seed and implements, a third inoculates the cattle, a fourth inspects the school, a fifth preaches the advantages of sanitation and so on. There is little or no collaboration between them. Howard would like all these activities to be carried out by one agency. It is questionable whether this wish could be carried into effect, but this much is certain, that if they were all in close contact with one another, and especially with the authorities who organise education, the benefit would be considerable.

Western education

Let us now look at education of the Western type. Many people accuse Western education in the East of uprooting its pupils and of attacking their morality. What has taken place in the mind of a promising boy, to make his fellow countrymen as well as the Western observer consider him a *déraciné*? Let us once again recall the saying of Doctor Rivai: An Indonesian who does not believe in

magic is no Indonesian. We must of course not take the word magic in its narrow sense; it implies the whole social-religious complex, which can inspire the highest classes as well as the simple agriculturist. Once this complex has been lost, one may indeed talk of uprooting. But can mere intellectual knowledge have such far reaching effects? After all, the motive power of morality is not intellectual. Intellectual reasons for our actions are generally proffered in support of a decision which the interior arbiter has already taken quite independently. Nor can one convey to other people a moral conviction, unless a chord in the moral complex of their conscience is made to thrill in response to one's remarks.

This is the reason why familiarity with Eastern custom, conceptions, proverbial wisdom, and everything in which the imponderable plays a part, can become so fertile of contact and create self-exertion in response to a real conviction, instead of a soulless performance and passive obedience. Seen in this light, the phenomenon of uprooting as a result of sheer intellectual education becomes very understandable. Western education will of necessity break many of the vessels in which tradition has been transmitted to the Eastern lad. As his analytic causal and genetic power of thought increases, his confidence in the consecrated source will wane. The bridge to the world of the soul is destroyed and intellect bars the way:

Then there only remains room for intellectual and causal, hence, usually, opportunist, thought and action. But this precisely lacks the deep unassailable conviction which does not hesitate nor doubt, as a purely reasoned intellectual conviction will do, as a result of every new fact or interpretation. Personal and social morality then are calculated and constructed according to considerations of utility which are subject to daily variation. Among the multiplicity of currents, theories, and fashions, and especially as a result of the propaganda which makes use of this situation, the intellectual, precisely because he wants to be nothing but an intellectual, becomes a ship without a rudder, unable to find anchorage. This is how moral dislocation comes about: there is nothing mysterious about the whole process.

Western education based upon the idea of synthesis

The West too has its intellectual anarchy due to those who have

deified reason and forgotten that reverence must remain the basis of all knowledge. If the East is to be safeguarded against this anarchy, it can only be achieved by pointing out a wider horizon and a higher zenith to the Eastern capacity for reverence. The religious feeling must learn to look upon the great society as the field for noble work. It is by the preservation of this reverence that the connection between educated persons and the people will be made to endure in the future, while it will cause the coming evolution to take its roots in the popular soul.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that Western education in the East must adapt itself to social conditions in the East, but it must look beyond them and aim at developing the personality. Western knowledge and familiarity with Western languages must enable the pupils to see the place of their own growing society in the world, but, at the same time, it must also preserve and strengthen their attachment to this society. It is only in this manner that a living consciousness of unity, connected with the popular soul, can come into existence, and it is only thus that Western knowledge will react favourably towards Eastern culture and society, instead of turning away with haughty disdain. The real purpose of the idea of synthesis is not to compose a mosaic of Western and Eastern cultural elements, but to enrich the inheritance of the East by teaching wholesome criticism and proved methods of construction. As Mayhew puts it so strikingly: "Instead of an emotional impulse towards the West followed by an equally emotional reaction Eastwards, we should have had from the start a critical but hopeful attitude towards the West combined with a critical but reverent attitude towards the East".

The advice given by experienced authors is always the same: there must be a simultaneous process of adaptation to the environment of the pupils and of ascent above it ¹⁾. This maxim applies to all educational work, whether social, economic or political. The pre-requisite of success is always that the work should be connected with what is already in existence, and upon that, by better methods and larger knowledge, unfold a stronger sense of citizenship. It would be remarkable if this rule did not apply to

¹⁾ Prof. Louis Verlaque, *Notre Colonie*, 1928, passim; G. Hardy, *Une Conquête Morale*, 1917; L. Vignon, *Un Programme de Politique Coloniale*, 1919.

Western education, which is nothing but one of the means by which all the dispersed forces can be persuaded to join into one mighty whole, where all the capacities of soul and of spirit, of intellect and of ability can develop.

Once these views are applied, there will be little difficulty in deciding which languages are to be used for education. Eastern languages may never be neglected, because otherwise the pupils will lose contact with their own culture. At the same time, by being also taught English, French or Dutch, the future leaders are enabled to enter into a wider cultural community. Even in the Dutch-Indigenous schools of Western type, 32 per cent of the lessons are for these reasons given in an Indonesian tongue. At examinations it must be made clear that as much store is set upon knowledge of indigenous languages, culture, customary law, as upon that of Western languages, social and economic questions. Education must not adapt the aspect of a Janus *bifrons* turning Eastwards and Westwards, almost from hour to hour. On the contrary, both aspects must grow into one in accordance with the living idea of synthesis ¹). This is a matter where the teacher's personality and the method of education and of the school inspection can do more than anything else.

Disadvantages of neutral education

The fact that the colonial authorities have to do without the spiritual force of religion in the education they have organised deprives them of the element which has assured the success of Western education in Japan. Mayhew's profound analysis (pp. 210—211) sheds a vivid light upon this shortcoming:

The writer's personal view is that moral progress in India depends on the gradual transformation of education by explicit recognition of the Spirit of Christ. All that he has seen of Christian mission work in India, with all its admitted shortcomings, has convinced him that work inspired by some such aim can alone supply the necessary basis. Recollections of mission settlements where communities, raised from sullen apathy and suspicious resentment to a life of cheerful activity and service, testify wholeheartedly to a triumph of light and love over fear and superstitious ignorance, are before him as he writes this. Christianity is a very vital force in India to-day.

¹) J. A. Jonkman, *Indonesisch-Nationale Grondslag van het Onderwijs ten Dienste van de Inlandsche Bevolking*, 1918.

And, discussing various social evils, he adds: "Nothing but the spirit of Christ will give the courage and will-power that a campaign against these weeds requires".

For it is a fact that the strength of the West is rooted in Christianity. Directly or indirectly, everyone undergoes its influence. But the colonial authorities which aim with all the means at their disposal at the development of Eastern moral and spiritual strength are deprived, in the fulfilment of this task, of precisely this fundamental force, which has so largely contributed to making the West what it is. In view of existing circumstances the authorities themselves can change nothing in this situation, wherefore it is all the more urgent that the moral forces which Eastern youth can find in its own culture should be developed, so as to generate reverence for the majesty and mystery of creation and a real sense of citizenship, which will arise when the way towards social evolution and towards respect of the dignity of all fellow-human beings has been shown.

There can be, to this end, separate teaching of ethics as a special subject in the curriculum, as is being done in Japan and in China, or, still better, the whole education can be impregnated with the idea of reverence and the feeling for society and mankind, as is also done in Japan. The latter method is of primary importance for it is not a matter of teaching a subject called "ethics" or "civics", but of creating habits and conceptions of life which can find a useful function in society. Even when teaching arithmetic it is so easy to take one's examples from life, and to strengthen the sense of union with life, while at the same time preparing the mind for individual analysis, which respects traditions, and, for this very reason, wants to vivify and transmute them, in order that they shall continue to radiate living and active forces. By sport and other means, the school must develop what Mayhew calls "the idea of corporate unity and individual responsibility for the welfare of the whole", a principle which, together with the encouragement of self-exertion, is very much to the fore in the educational system in the Philippines.

It is not necessary that the school-going youth should have its civic duties drummed in without respite. What should be done is to form habits, which presently are carried away when the pupils enter into a larger life. Such habits will be of more value for the

co-operative movement and for the development of autonomy than any kind of school knowledge. They will also be decisive for the social sense of the teachers, officials, and members of the liberal professions, of the lower-middle class, the political and journalistic leaders who have been formed at Western schools in the East. The plant will continue to grow in the direction which it has once been made to take. This is why the teacher's task has an element of priesthood. His personality will have to give to the school that social and moral sanction which will enable it to tend the Eastern social and religious germs with which it has been entrusted.

E d u c a t i o n a n d p o l i t i c s

While it cannot be denied that exclusively intellectual development is always harmful, and that during a period of transition education must of necessity give a larger degree of consciousness to certain subversive sentiments, we must beware of attributing every symptom of discontent to the influence of Western education. Every kind of education makes a breach in the wall: it is not responsible for the things that penetrate through this breach. The most desirable influences might penetrate through it, but as it happens, the Eastern élite is very unlucky. No sooner has it established contact with the wide world than unbridled currents pour in with the greatest violence. Only strong swimmers can keep afloat in this whirl. It is impossible to command the wild elements: the best that can be expected from good seamanship is that the vessel shall be kept afloat and away from dangerous shoals.

Discipline among the crew is the most necessary thing in these circumstances, and that is why education is more indispensable than ever before, because by no other means can reverence, civic sense, self-confidence, and self-exertion be developed. Education must therefore be a prime object of government care. It must be directed by people who have not only special knowledge of pedagogical methods, but also of statesmanship and sociology, and a great familiarity with the economic and political development of society.

Nor should those who are in charge of educational policy lack the true statesman's courage, which allows them to decide when

to meet and when to disregard the feeling of the population. The question of the language in which education is to be given is fraught with controversial sentiments and has to receive continual attention in all colonies. It is one of those problems which prove so clearly how common these cultural difficulties are in all colonial countries ¹⁾. Politics are hopelessly mixed up with them, and it will be the task of the Eastern élites to purify the atmosphere and to put an end to "the criticism that merely shakes public confidence and alienates goodwill by the imputation of political or racial motives". Politics and sentiment must interfere as little as possible with education. There is sufficient material available for an impartial study of the problem on its own merits. And this material leaves no doubt as to the truth that on the one hand the people's own language and culture must be respected, while on the other a Western language is indispensable as a means of approach to Western thought. A Western language is therefore a means, never an end in itself.

In view of the fact that Western knowledge is needed for leading functions, Western education should be made available; but due regard should always be had to the real needs of a simple society. In Indo-China the French policy of education follows a steady line in this direction. Sir Hesketh Bell mentions in this connection "the determination of the French in Indo-China to restrict secondary education, as long as possible, to those who are likely to make proper use of it". Similarly, higher education is limited to "those who can be absorbed into the public or industrial life of the country". Apart from this wise restriction, which ought to be imitated by every Eastern and colonial government, it is also to be desired that all advanced education should remain in touch with Eastern culture, so that the knowledge it imparts may enrich and deepen the culture of educated Orientals themselves.

The mind of the East and world evolution

In the same way as Oriental production must seek the way to the world market, Eastern life must enter into contact with

¹⁾ For this section, see: Bibliothèque Coloniale Internationale, 9e série, *l'Enseignement aux Indigènes*, Tome I—II; E. Tavernier, *La Famille Annamite*, 1927, p. 88.

world-evolution. Japan and China have instilled new life into their archaic writing-characters, in India a new literature is being born, which has rightly been called the fruit of synthesis, and the élite of the Dutch East Indies will have to follow suit. If a fraction of the energy spent in political activity were devoted to creations of the mind such as were produced by the ancient Javanese and Malays, there would already be a striking literary renaissance in the Dutch colonies. It would soon be realised that the works of synthesis greatly hasten the moment when the final goal will be reached, and that moreover they create a real *joie de vivre* by their useful activity which benefits the country and the people, while antithesis can only result in bitterness for those who preach it, and stagnation for the society to which they belong.

We shall examine these and many other cognate problems in greater detail when we come to the educational policy of the government of the Dutch East Indies in the second volume of this work. Suffice it now to point out how important education, rightly understood and rightly applied, can be for the spiritual, moral, intellectual, and material fructification of the principle of synthesis. The time has come when this principle is being recognised, now that Eastern peoples are beginning to move of their own accord, and have shown that they will follow in their turn the call of the spirit of the West, which once awoke the nations of Europe from medieval slumber.

Education and welfare policy

We have already stated that apart from education, there are two other means at the disposal of the authorities for fostering the growth of personality, self-exertion, and the consciousness of unity. These are the co-operative movement and social and political emancipation. We shall now examine these aspects of government activity. As we pointed out, education is but one of the three levers with which the social level can be raised, and it is necessary to move them all, gradually and together. When Dr. Nieuwenhuis writes ¹⁾: "A country is not flourishing because it has a low percentage of illiterates, but it has less illiterates because it is prosperous", this remark is not without truth, and when Mayhew says ²⁾:

¹⁾ *Op. cit.* p. 302.

²⁾ *Op. cit.* p. 151.

"Till the problem of India's illiteracy has been more practically faced it is useless to expect in the masses any widespread substantial change of industrial outlook", the pronouncement also is not without truth. But the true outlines of progress are best drawn when emphasis is laid upon the indissoluble connection which exists between education and social, economic, and political development. For the unfolding of a national economic insight non-educational or semi-educational agencies, such as the co-operative credit societies, social service organisations, and industrial, agricultural and forestry departments of government, are more useful than the whole staff of elementary school teachers, in the opinion of Mayhew, who qualifies his statement by the following remarks:

But the adoption of a more sympathetic and intelligent attitude towards the nation-building work of these departments, ability to read and understand their pamphlets and appreciate their demonstrations, and a general disposition to hearty and useful co-operation depend mainly on the evolution of compulsory and efficient education.

and he continues:

There is much, besides, of economic value that the effective teacher could achieve, such as the art of cleaner and healthier living, appreciation of the need for more intensive and intelligent cultivation of thickly populated areas, realisation of the appalling economic results of the superstitious veneration of the cow and of the superiority of productive expenditure on new methods and implements over hoarding or non-productive expenditure on marriages.

This passage shows the fundamental importance of education and even of the disappearance of illiteracy for economic progress. But education and the disappearance of illiteracy cannot assure this progress by themselves. On the contrary, if they outgrow economic progress, there will be, as we saw before, a serious disturbance of social balance. As Mayhew remarks, the enthusiasts in India have often "acted upon the assumption that an industry can be created by training men to practise it". Even in the case of articles of consumption production does not automatically create demand. Forces which cannot be efficiently utilised before there is an important change of mentality, social order, economic insight, and organisation must not be created before their time.

Methods of an entirely different kind will be required, and it is to these that we must now give our attention.

Co-operation as a lever of welfare policy

The instrument of evolution which is the co-operative movement, let it be mentioned to the honour of Christian thought, has been recognised by several prominent Christians as a supremely valuable educational element, the blessings of which were worthy to be communicated to the rural populations of the West. We may recall such names as Bishop Grundtvig, the prophet of the North, and Father Raiffeisen, about whom Butterfield says ¹⁾:

Here again, a religious leader, conscious of dire economic need and social injustice to his people, evolved a plan by which their most pressing difficulties could be remedied by themselves chiefly in the spirit and by the method of co-operation, an essentially Christian doctrine.

The European and the American countryside have been dynamised by the co-operative movement to a degree which nobody could have foreseen. We have already mentioned what it has done for the Japanese agriculturist, and there is no doubt that, as soon as it has learned how to handle this lever of progress, the colonial world will be able to advance with great strides. Of course, progress cannot be as quick as it has been in China and in Japan. But, although the colonial world has to make up for great arrears, it will ultimately reach the goal. In India there are already nearly a hundred thousand co-operative societies, especially societies for credit, a brilliant success when one considers that it represents the work of only thirty years. Many new fields of activity have still to be touched by the co-operative movement. It must make the population more independent, both as consumers and as producers. In many other respects the movement can give it the capacity of doing great things, and thus prepare it for an active participation in the work of village autonomies and of higher communities, which, after all, are nothing but co-operative societies of a more complicated nature. A wide vista thus opens before the protagonist of this movement, which unites all the good elements in a perfect harmony: the spiritual, the moral, the intel-

¹⁾ Kenyon L. Butterfield, *Christianity and Rural Civilisation* (Jerusalem-Conference, part VI, p. 29).

lectual, the material, the economic, the political — all is contained in this germ and starts simultaneous growth.

The co-operative movement is of infinitely greater importance for the East than it has ever been for the West. It will eventually break through the iron ring of usury, will compel the payment of fair prices, if necessary by entering into the world market; it will be able to standardise its produce in accordance with the requirements of the world market. But furthermore it will catch into its net, and therefore also into those of the new autonomies, all the elements which are breaking away from the old, crumbling, traditional bodies. Sometimes it will even prove possible to use the co-operative movement, during the period of transition, in order to slow down the process of disintegration while at the same time effecting a new orientation in the right direction.

Self-exertion here finds an unequalled field of action. The conviction that, even while circumstances are so greatly changing, they are able to achieve something themselves will spread among the population, especially among more energetic persons. But co-operation, which in the West joins individuals who stand detached from each other, means still more in the East. There such detached individuals usually do not exist, because everybody is by birth a member for life of some group or other. These groups are exclusive, and notwithstanding their many-sidedness, they are becoming less and less able to satisfy all the needs of the individual. Some of the obligations imposed upon him will become a burden, while the unwieldy group cannot perform the acts which would really assist him. The ancient connection therefore has still a place in the feeling of people, but otherwise its traditional domain is at the same time becoming too large and too small. The individual becomes acquainted with wider spheres of interest and notices that private social and economic requirements can be satisfied soonest when a small number of persons with similar interests, living in the same locality, decide to work together. All the individuals for whom the ancient connections have become too rigid can now, either with other members of the group or with members of other groups, join into a more conscious and personal, as well as more purposeful, co-operation.

These new forms of co-operation rejuvenate the old connection owing to the energy of its more progressive members, and they

direct it towards co-operation inside larger corporations or connections. Co-operation therefore breaks the rigidity of the old bond, while it continues to honour such of its old strands as are still fit for use. This saves the individual from acquiring an anti-social character, a matter of the highest importance in the changing East.

No Eastern leader of importance can remain indifferent to the co-operative movement. It is a criterion by which the real élite can be recognised. People who fight for a place in the limelight, while they ignore the most pressing needs of their compatriots, are bad leaders, who give stones for bread. Extremist propaganda, which prevents them from doing their duty in the economic field, where their assistance is so urgently needed, is indeed an unpardonable offence.

Indifference and abstention

Next to actual antagonism, the greatest enemy is lack of interest within Eastern society for its own cultural possessions and for the good of its own people. Professor van Vollenhoven, Professor Mukerjee, Mr. Gupta, all complain of this indifference to the things for which they care. It exists not only in the colonies, but even in Eastern states. Professor Mukerjee writes¹⁾: "Co-operative credit has so far proved its utility, but the intelligent and the upper class still hold aloof. . . . the general press takes no interest in it."

Gupta addresses this class when he remarks : "We cannot all be leaders, but surely we can all give a lead to our more backward brethren who are lagging behind us in the race of life. If we all took interest in some scheme or other to which I have referred, think how much that will mean. . . . Above all", he adds, "let us help to create correct public opinion in the country with regard to the relative importance and intrinsic value of the different shibboleths which are being held up as ideals before the people."

It is upon the social workers that Western leadership relies when it transfers responsibilities. If they are left in the lurch in their fundamental labours, the building operations will proceed very slowly, and when, under such conditions, the West relinquishes its functions, before even the first stones of the social foun-

¹⁾ *The Foundation of Indian Economics*, 1916, p. 418, 431.

dations have been laid, the East would only gain a semblance of independence in this case, for, as Gupta remarks,

"the laws of political evolution are as inexorable as those of the physical world and to attain true freedom progress must be internal. With more than 80 per cent of the people sunk in ignorance and struggling against squalid poverty and a prey to decimating disease and epidemics it might almost seem a cruel mockery to speak of the rise of an Indian democracy."

The need for active interest

Many people will at once conclude that in view of this indifference the government will have to undertake the task itself. Much has been done in this direction, but the real thing remains to be accomplished so long as Western leadership cannot influence the minds of the people, a thing which can only be done through the assistance of educated Eastern leaders. Let us not forget that whatever is undertaken by government must be done mainly by officials. There is a limit to the amount any country can contribute towards the upkeep of its administration. Taxation would become an intolerable burden if it had to provide enough officials to run the whole co-operative life of the country. As it is, immense sums have to be spent on education, and in this direction alone more is needed than can be raised by taxation.

It is clear, then, that the population itself must be made to progress economically, and that the authorities must be able to count upon the collaboration of tens of thousands of Eastern volunteers, who, each in his own modest circle, perform the work at hand. Herein lay the secret of Japan's success. There, every elementary teacher worked with zeal for the development of the whole village, for the co-operative movement, and for the furthering of the social sense in general. What, moreover, would there be left of the principle of self-exertion, if colonial authorities had at their disposal untold millions with which they could pay for the costs of an extensive officially organised welfare policy? Let us admit once more that welfare policy cannot yet do without official guidance and supervision: the time when this will have changed is drawing near, but it is not yet. We must not under-estimate the enormous powers of absorption of all that is static towards dynamic energies. Nevertheless, it remains true that pure administrative interference has its serious drawbacks, and that the of-

ficial will rejoice with all his heart when Eastern leaders are ready and able to take over a large part of a task which can no longer remain administrative.

To whom does the field, prepared by Western leadership and well-nigh ready for more delicate labour, call, if not to Eastern leaders? In several territories the heavier labour of preparation has already been performed. Let the field not be left waiting too long for the forces which are being trained by the same leadership for the more delicate labour of culture. And be it remembered that nothing which is one-sided can lead to harmony: one can give too much education, make too many roads; suddenly acquired individual wealth due to the cultivation of tea, coffee, or rubber during a period of boom has in various respects proved to be rather harmful to Eastern society. But there can never be enough co-operation. All its educational power assists economic development, all the material prosperity which results from it has a spiritual and moral character. In brief, co-operation leads a band of thoroughly wholesome young forces which are eminently fit for the task of building up a really human, moral, and prosperous great society. If we read the experiences of men like Professor Mukerjee ¹⁾, we shall realise how necessary it is to bring life back to the Eastern village, and how, in his opinion, while a change of character, a higher economic, social, and moral standard of life among the rural people is what is required, there is no movement "fraught with greater potentialities for the moral and economic betterment of villages than co-operation." And such is indeed the direction in which we must move. What is wanted is not the production of a perfect *homo faber*, but of a higher endeavour towards the vindication of the divine image that is in Man.

C o o p e r a t i o n b a s e d u p o n c o l l e c t i v i s m

The effects of an active co-operative life, then, are by no means only economic, but also social and moral. Proceeding hand in hand with education, it shows us the reduction of two distinct lines of evolution into one complex, and is thus an admirable example of the tactics of synthesis. Its effects can be observed in every Eastern village where it is introduced. For there is no village in the East where the communal spirit does not subsist and offer numer-

¹⁾ *Op. cit.* passim, esp. p. 417.

ous points of contact for the new enterprise. The example of Japan has shown how the sense of cohesion, which works through ancient territorial and genealogical societies, can enter into touch with dynamic activities. We have reason to rejoice, therefore, in the fact that, after many hesitations and difficulties, the government of the Dutch East Indies has promulgated special regulations for Indonesian co-operative societies.

Professor Mukerjee unfolded in great detail the idea of adapting the co-operative movement to society, both economically and politically. In his system village co-operation envelops all the many-sided aspects of life: credit, production, distribution, and consumption, spiritually as well as materially. But as he remarks:

The village community cannot be revived in India, but the economic ideal which underlay it can be revived. That ideal may be expressed in the modern language of co-operation thus: ethically the consumer transcends the producer. The producers represent one class of society, but all classes are consumers. The village community represents the interests of consumers, and if these interests differ from those of the producers, the former prevail. Thus if the producers combine and misuse their monopoly power by forcing heavy prices, the village community is a most valuable defence of the consumers.

The whole passage (p. 435) from which this quotation is taken is well worth careful attention. It shows the ideal of village co-operation worked out into its extreme consequences, and looks forward to a future with tens of thousands of small economically organised village republics which will have taken the place of the former social, economic, political and religious units. Such a sketch can serve as a background for the co-operative idea, but it can never provide its content. For too much stress is laid upon the pluralistic idea, which would only lead these myriads of isolations into unity by means of the federative method. Such a conception of the society of the future is still far too static; federation is a good scheme, but by itself it is too exclusively horizontal, and does not aim at the spiritual elevation which gives men the power of tension they require.

If economic or political federation can bring all the blessings which Professor Mukerjee and many others expect from it, it will have to be dynamic, and to be dynamic it must utilise the educational means which have been enumerated above and which we

shall mention later on. Without exception, all these means aim at a widening of the horizon, a raising of the zenith and an intensification of moral force. These means are perfectly appropriate to the end in view, but when they aim at a widening out in every respect, and can bring it about, there is no reason for choosing instead the isolating self-containedness of the village and the caste, the clan, etc., as the sphere of action, with federation as the only representative of dynamic force. For this would be a method full of contradiction instead of a powerful and harmonious working plan which would in no way disregard the rights and the usefulness of the village sphere. It is a method that proceeds with hesitation, when what is needed is a conscious and determined impulse.

In no respect can the village remain the isolated and self-contained unit it has been in the past. Village energy and village talent will increasingly outgrow the limits of village activity, however far it may reach. Nor can all the needs of the village be for ever satisfied by them. Let the village not enter, with its co-operation, into a territory where competition could be nothing more than short-sightedness and the squandering of national energies. It should also not over-burden its programme with functions which are within the competence of smaller groups and not within that of the whole mass of the village.

It is indeed time to realise that, though the present has its roots in the past, it cannot be buried, either politically or economically, in the past. It must at last be understood that relations which are now glorified in the East as highly exceptional utterances of the previous communal spirit are in reality the same as those which existed in the West, before it really had become the West. Even in the third phase of medieval development the territorial and economic isolation of towns with their surrounding country still existed to a high degree in Europe. This was the age when corporative democracy was in its place¹). But medieval conditions cannot again be brought about, and therefore these situations cannot return. For the solidarity which supported the corporations of the Middle Ages was possible only while the corporations preserved their communal characteristics. But from the birth of big industry things changed: there was nothing

¹) Durkheim, *De la Division du Travail Social*, pp. 164 sqq.

urban about it, and it could not adapt itself to a system that was not made for it.

Now the methods of production and the world influences of our age which are from every side invading the East are even less applicable to little village states and to village economy. In the East the transition cannot be as gradual as it has been in the West, where inter-regional division of labour had started developing as early as the fourteenth century ¹⁾. As Durkheim points out, the movement has spread ever since. Whatever territorial limitation men attempt to impose upon economic developments, such artificial frontiers are soon over-run.

One can conclude with the same certainty that as world traffic imposes different methods of production upon the East, and creates thereby an entirely different organisation of life, the old frame of family, caste, clan, and village-republic is bound to shiver into fragments. Those who feel alarmed at this tendency, and try to catch up the crumbling materials in order to reconstruct them in accordance with the most modern building technique, and to consolidate the ancient self-sufficiency as a wall which will be impregnable to the spirit of the time, are altogether mistaken. It is not because the joints are getting loose that these buildings are falling down: the joints are working loose owing to the pressure exercised from inside by the changing spirit of man.

Let us remember that most revolutions have not been caused by an exceedingly bad government just before the revolution. For there are times when the most bloodthirsty tyrants have been accepted without demur, while two generations later the humane grandson of the tyrant has been overthrown. It is usually because a changed spirit disapproves of a form of government which is perhaps far less oppressive than that which preceded it, that resistance against the system breaks out. Would it then be advisable, now that a time of sociologically and historically unavoidable changes has arrived, and has caused old connections to grow loose, to return towards the old instead of encouraging that which fits in better with the times? This would lead straight to revolution.

The old may be supported and even consolidated, but it will have to be lifted up and made to find its place as a part of the large

¹⁾ Levasseur, *Les Classes ouvrières en France jusqu'à la Révolution*, I, p. 195.

frame of unity. And it will soon be found that such a policy, and not the policy of the village-state, will prevent the village from being drained of its best forces. Village and town will learn to look upon themselves as part of the great whole, and from another aspect, as a society which contains many individuals and groups with a sphere of their own. There is no possibility that any village in the world could perform competently all the functions with which Professor Mukerjee would like to entrust it. Nor is there any need that it should. Village life will be all the livelier if it is not compelled to organise itself solely with a view to its own consumption. It must participate as far as possible in the whole national activity and contribute to it in a modest measure. In Western villages we see, in our own day, humble agriculturists, horticulturists, cattle breeders, and small industrialists establish contact with national and world demands, either directly or through local and more centralised markets, auction halls, dairies, etc., without there being any question of village organisation. Similarly those who are interested in the buying of seeds, manure, etc., form special organisations without needing a special municipal organisation. Village production that aims merely at village consumption rings the death knell of talent and energy. Prices that vary from one locality to the other cannot be maintained at a time when traffic has put an end to static economy ¹⁾.

The intimate connection between local consumption and local production is wearing off. This is an exceedingly painful process which pre-supposes a drastic spiritual and social change. In no small measure the temporary decline of the village is due to this decay of primitive home-industries. But those who want to make foreign imports responsible look only at the outside of things, and are seeking the remedy in the wrong direction. This deep seated process cannot be affected by propaganda for the antique spinning wheel, which, however, may continue to serve important economic interests, or by the burning of imported cotton goods. Overpopulation may also become connected with this process, because it is really a question of the relation between available labour and available means of production. And modern means of production cannot be provided by the authorities; they demand a

¹⁾ Van Gelderen, *Voorlezingen over Tropisch-Koloniale Staathuishoudkunde*, 1927, p. 20.

drastic mental and social preparation. As soon as the population of Java or India, where rural life is still open to great improvements, has reached the social maturity necessary for the application of methods for increasing production which are already available, there will be no further question of over-population, apart even from the fact that social maturity is at the same time the fundamental condition for the revival of a flourishing village life.

Once the co-operative movement is familiar with all these deeper truths it will not feel inclined to carry on propaganda for methods that belong only to closed produce economy or for economic action based on village production. If it did, it would soon lose its bearings. And let us realise that even when ambitious and all-embracing schemes have been abandoned, much will still remain upon the programme of the village-community. In the Dutch East Indies much is being done for the encouragement of institutions for village credit, which establish a natural link between ancient communalism and present-day rational co-operation. By the side of such institutions, and soon even in front of them, co-operation will find its place, and open an avenue to the more progressive individuals who want to develop their initiative in the fullest freedom, either inside or outside the old genealogical and functional corporations into which they were born. These bodies will continue to exist, and, at the outset, they will even form a kind of protecting wall round the more personal co-operative system. They can retain several of their functions and, owing to the more mobile element introduced by co-operation, they will establish new contacts among themselves.

Through education to co-operation

However one conceives of co-operation, whether based upon ancient communalism or dovetailing into it, one will always have to look upon education and guidance of the population as its necessary pre-requisite. It is possible, therefore, to accept Professor Mukerjee's views upon this subject when he says ¹⁾:

We want not only the form, but the spirit of co-operation. Unfortunately in our country the people do not know the most elementary matters of business.... The object of co-operative education should be the formation of co-operative character and

¹⁾ *Op. cit.* pp. 432 sqq.

opinion by teaching the history, the principles of co-operation, and also the training of men to take part in industrial and social reforms.

Mukerjee wants to invite teachers, schoolmasters, professors and university students to address the working folk on subjects connected with co-operation and its social and economic importance. But this urgent task would require, in India alone, a hundred thousand members of the élite. It is very disappointing to find that the "intelligent and the upper class still hold aloof". The neglect of this educational work has, in the opinion of this author, caused credit banks to be organised on unsound co-operative principles, while many of the organisers of the co-operative societies lack the knowledge required for their task.

There is no denying that these difficulties exist: but does this not prove that the possibility of an all-enveloping village co-operation, creating small economic states within the state, disappears with the admission of these obstacles? Not everybody is equally open to good advice and education, nor does everybody possess the energy to study and try new methods.

Mr. Mukerjee also declares that co-operative credit has been unduly over-emphasised, while agricultural co-operation, co-operative purchase and co-operative sale have been left in the background. But this is not by accident. The need for cheap credit, especially for consumption, is the most general phenomenon in a static society which is still partially in the closed produce economy, but has already become too varied to be satisfied with local products, and where mutual assistance no longer adequately supports the individual in the difficulties of life. Requirements and need of money must therefore increase rather suddenly, while at the same time the reserve of labour and of communal possessions which stand behind the individual are no longer so freely available, owing to the loosening of the ancient ties. Production, however, which to a far greater extent than consumption is dependent on a change of mentality, continues for a considerable time to aim merely at food consumption, so that it cannot supply the needed money. It is not surprising therefore that in the Dutch East Indies pawn-credit enjoys such popularity¹⁾, and is given the preference in indigenous society over

¹⁾ Prof. Boeke, *Pandcrediet als Kleincrediet*, *Kol. Stud.* Feb. 1919, p. 48; J. C. van

personal credit from money-lenders, who ask for such high interest, and over credit institutions, because of the supervision, the formalities, and the strict conditions which these impose.

The need of money is so general throughout the colonial world that the British authorities were well advised to look upon co-operative credit as the thin end of the co-operative wedge. Results have justified this view and all the forms of co-operation which Professor Mukerjee demands and many other forms which serve no economic purpose have developed around the nucleus provided by credit. Credit is necessary for the development of the independent spirit which must provide the basis for a sound co-operative movement: it is the only way to put an end to indebtedness and to usury. Co-operative insurance provides an instance of the higher demands made upon the minds of people. It pre-supposes a much greater development of the sense of the future than mere co-operative credit, which must therefore come first in order to prepare the way for more complicated forms.

Co-operative credit, moreover, finds a field of action in every place, while co-operative purchase requires a greater acquaintance with the inner life of the village, real business knowledge, and more intricate accountancy. If these co-operative societies are small, they can only remove one middle-man, which scarcely affects the level of prices. Lack of experience will also prevent the buyers from finding the importer, and the smallness of their purchases will in any case compel them to buy from intermediaries. Co-operative sale often meets with similar and other difficulties. Contact is necessary with buyers, who will profit from the seller's lack of experience and his ignorance of world prices. The Japanese system by which a number of villages standardise their produce and appoint a common agent obviates these difficulties, but elsewhere the people are not yet ripe for such methods. Yet, in the Dutch East Indies, they are already being applied here and there. Severe discipline is required, in order to keep the quality of the product up to the mark; so also is a new type of loyalty: without this the members rush and sell elsewhere the best of their produce and only hand inferior goods to the society. Moreover

Hartingsveldt, *De Banken van Leening op Java*, *Kol. Stud.* Feb. 1918, p. 1—13. J. Keers, *Kol. Stud.* Dec. 1927, p. 367 sqq. These studies show that an appreciable part of pawning-credit actually serves as normal business credit.

preliminary handling and warehousing may be necessary, as well as other operations which make co-operative selling much more complicated than co-operative credit.

Professor Mukerjee considers that the thin end of the wedge is provided by the village shop, which is to be at the same time a co-operative buying and selling society. Again, intricate and accurate administration and knowledge are needed for this, while there are serious pitfalls. A change in fashion may induce the villagers to go and buy clothes in another place if they do not like those available in their shop. For the village cannot be kept isolated. Indeed, there is no forcing the pace of the co-operative movement, and it cannot be admitted that the whole village is its only possible basis.

The fact that in India co-operative credit has been a success among the peasants, while it means so little for other classes such as the small industrialists, proves that it must provide for a need felt by the population. This is essential for its success. It must find points of contact with the ancient social structure and with tradition. It should never be imposed as a foreign unwieldy body, but must find a place in the most intimate relations of a simple rural society, and has in particular to keep in view the fact that the human factor dominates all others. At the same time the old forms of mutual assistance, of which there are so many in the Indies and also in China, do not necessarily provide an adequate basis for the needs of modern co-operation. The mentality upon which customary co-operation and modern co-operation are founded may outwardly appear to be the same, but the one is related to the other as the germ to the fully developed and fruit-bearing tree.

What is needed is that the germ should be induced to develop, and, as always, adaptation and devoted care are needed for this purpose. If forced growth is to be avoided, so is indifference. The time has arrived for a colossal concentration of effort, for the adoption of a great plan, which will embrace all nation-building activities like agricultural information, demonstration by means of small model-farms managed by specially trained peasants, popular credit systems, popular education, co-operation, popular health and autonomous activities, in one vast complex, and enable them all to achieve their ends in a perfectly harmonious distribution of parts. For the present, it will be impossible to do all this

without the experience acquired by the authorities and by the officials, whether European or Eastern. It is not they who stifle self-exertion: in Japan the officials have functions that touch much more closely the life of the people.

It would be another thing if the authorities were considered to be the main element in the plan. Then there would never be a change favourable to the development of popular consciousness. The number of people who waver between the two extremes of paternalism and total abstention is amazing. Many of them, in all other matters, are perfectly aware of the virtue of the golden mean. Let them realise that this doctrine also applies in the colonial world, and that the officials, in their right place, can help, and indeed must help in the great plan which will give suppleness to the rigid structure of Eastern society.

The organisation of co-operation

Professor Mukerjee feels that as long as the personal element is not sufficiently developed, much of the most useful material for co-operative progress remains unavailable. His views are borne out by Howard ¹⁾, who says:

The fact must be faced that in the uplift of rural India not only its soil, crops and cattle, but also its people must be considered. The first step is to study the village community. This is now being done and a good many results are available. These can be summed up in a few words. The people of rural India are for the most part uneducated, illiterate and almost incapable of thinking for themselves. The majority are born in debt, live in debt and die in debt.

It is true the villagers are being assembled into groups by the Co-operative movement primarily with a view to freeing them from debt. This however is only the first step in integration so that the larger problems of the countryside can be attacked. Some of these community questions such as the re-alignment and fixing of the holding; the installation of a general system of surface drainage, the development of intensive agriculture; the co-operative management and sale of irrigation water; the establishment and maintenance of definite grades of produce for the locality; the provision of better roads and their maintenance, must now be considered.

Here are subjects for rural co-operation which can often find a highly suitable basis in the old village organisation. The ancient

¹⁾ *Indian Agriculture*, Vol. VIII of the 'India To-day' series, 1927, pp. 74, 22.

organisation of irrigation sometimes even transcended the village. In the isle of Bali, in the Dutch East Indies, irrigation did and does not belong to the competence of the village, and is entrusted to a special union of interested farmers. We see how, for the purpose of this important function, a form of co-operation came into existence, unaided, which is no way inferior to an organisation on a purely communal basis. Like the latter, it adopts a character of authority. This shows how in the sphere of agricultural policy, the co-operative movement will find the heart of the population already beating and provided with a tradition with which one has only to fit in in order to use it for more modern purposes.

Howard has pointed out some other subjects that are of considerable importance for agricultural co-operation, such as the purchase of manure, seed, labour-saving implements, standardisation of produce, construction of storage houses, etc., and the prevention of the breaking up of the land. The agricultural atmosphere which permeates these activities makes it possible to achieve a close contact with ancient loyalties. The success of village credit-institutions in the Dutch East Indies after twenty years of guidance and supervision is a clear indication of this. Howard shows how, provided the cause appeals to the popular imagination, or has been sufficiently prepared by propaganda and education, much can be accomplished in a relatively short time, and how a break can be made with harmful traditions. An example of such traditions is the habit which exists in India of parcelling out the fields to such an extent that there are villages in the Punjab where people own twenty or thirty little pieces of a few square yards each. This causes enormous loss of time, increases the chances of friction and of quarrels, and makes it much more difficult to guard the harvest. Irrigation in such circumstances becomes an infinitely complicated business.

Howard indicates the way to deal with such a situation :

It is obvious that the first condition is the willing consent of the cultivator, as nothing in the nature of compulsion is practicable. The question, therefore, arises: Is it possible with an illiterate peasantry to obtain agreement on such a matter? Twenty years ago the answer would have been: Most emphatically no. To-day the position is much more hopeful. In the Eastern Punjab, Calvert

has recently succeeded in forming Co-operative Consolidation of Holdings Societies which have met with a considerable measure of success. In 1923, work had been carried through in 126 villages. Over 20,000 acres, divided into 35,000 scattered parcels of land, were consolidated into about 4,500 fields.... The benefits conferred by the re-arrangement are clearly recognised by the owners and cultivators. Improvements which were once impossible are now in progress. The great value to India of this Punjab experiment does not however concern the material but the psychological domain. If it is possible, under efficient leadership, to produce these results amongst uneducated peasants in a locality which has enjoyed less than a hundred years of settled government, how much more may be confidently expected when to these advantages are added the benefits of education? The significance of Calvert's experiment lies in this. It holds out hope for the future and supplies the answer to those who say that results which depend on community efforts in India must always be impossible.

Looked upon in this way there is no longer a vicious circle, but a plan of action that fits and is well rounded off. There must be no "fragmentation of effort", no "horde of minor officials". More attention must be given to the human factor contained in the individual and in the village as a whole: a system of co-operative demonstration must be evolved for the villages in which "the same agency supplies credit for the express purpose of carrying out improvements in production". The policy which tries to ensure a close connection between the co-operative movement and village units and which treats the multifarious problems of popular self-renovation as a single whole, which answers to the views both of Mukerjee and of Howard, is the right one. Within this frame there is ample choice between the various forms of co-operation. In thinly populated districts the soil is waiting like an immense capital, while, in densely populated areas, where this capital is lacking, a change of mentality is the pre-requisite of improvement. For here intensive cultivation, selection of seeds, the growing of market produce, and most of all loyal co-operation provides the only solution. In any case, the population must be shaken out of its torpor. We must not wait for self-exertion, we must call it into existence. Let all who can take part in this great social propaganda, and political autonomy will look after itself. Let the thousands of educated people who are now wasting their efforts in passing useless resolutions go to the country, in the lit-

eral sense of the word, not as sowers of distrust, but as sowers of the seed of co-operation among the people themselves and between the people and the authorities, for it is only from such a seed that a national future which is worth having can come forth.

Rural development

As regards co-operation between the various branches of public service that are concerned and other organs, Howard insists on "dealing with the Indian village and its fields as a single subject". He sees the cause of much waste of effort in the fact that all separate action has aimed at "some particular aspect only of a much larger question", while there has been "little or no co-ordination between the various agencies at work". "What is required", he says, "is a special fund for Rural Reconstruction into which both annual contributions and surpluses can be paid. Such a measure would ensure the continuity of effort, would establish confidence and would do much to attract and retain the necessary ability for dealing with rural uplift". He wishes to knit together all forces, including those of autonomous organisms and administrative bodies, but he wants their collaboration in this work of development in such a way that, with their great familiarity with the needs of the population, they can serve the good cause without allowing the element of authority to come into the foreground, which would harm the development of self-exertion. This opens a perspective for the golden mean of the future, situated between exclusive official interference and extreme self-determination.

In the first place it will be necessary to determine what the autonomous bodies can perform, with the help of the administrative officials. Only results can make it possible to judge, and there is no need to abolish with undue haste these deserving bodies of officials whom the people themselves have gratefully called "the steel frame of unity". Such also is the advice of Gupta, in his interesting work *The Foundations of National Progress*. He begins by establishing a close connection between rural autonomies and the co-operative movement. There must be no "lamentable fragmentation of effort", and there is "no antagonism either in principle or in practice" between the two organisations — the rural Union Boards and the rural primary co-operative societies. He

sketches a highly promising nucleus for future development starting from below, an intimate collaboration between small autonomous unions of villages¹⁾, which are established only after a strong but well directed propaganda and at the request of the population itself, of co-operative societies, of the Circle-Officer, who acts as the agent of the District Magistrate, and of the Sub-Divisional Officer, especially in his capacity of adviser and controller. There are also District Boards and Local Boards which exercise a general supervision over the administration of the Union Boards within their jurisdiction. There has been much agitation against interference with the Union Boards by the administration and its agents, the Circle Officers, but, according to Gupta, "the members of the most progressive Union Boards themselves, far from resenting the presence of Circle Officers, welcome their assistance and co-operation, and the people of the localities concerned are now realising the material benefits to their Union from the small sacrifices which they make in the shape of contributions under section 37 (b) of the Act" (p. 224).

The combination of Union Boards, village units, co-operative societies, the administration and technical branches is first rate policy, which is sure to produce brilliant results in the future. Gupta would like to split up the administrative corps, i. e. the functions of the Circle Officer. Like Howard, he would like to see the creation of a separate administrative branch, the "Rural Development Service", where younger administrative officials would work exclusively as "Circle Development Officers", without having any police or fiscal functions. Their training would have to be different, they would not be grounded in law, but in elementary agronomy, hygiene and sanitation, co-operative questions, etc. In any case, even if there is to be no such splitting up, Gupta wants the practical schooling of the future Circle Officer to take place on a Government Agricultural and Cattle Farm or under the Registrar of Co-operative Societies or the Director of Public Health.

¹⁾ These are newly created administrative autonomous units in India. They have a board of from 6 to 9 members, a territory of about 10 sq. miles, and a population of some 8,000 souls. They correspond with the Javanese Sub-District. Thirty Unions form a circle with a circle officer as administrative official. Above the Union Board comes the Local Board with a territory of two Circles. The local official is the sub-divisional officer, equivalent to the Assistant Resident of Java. Three sub-divisions form a district under a District Officer (the Resident of Java) and a District Board.

He need not become omniscient, but must acquire more familiarity with his essential duties.

One is bound to agree in the main with the views of this real supporter of the policy of synthesis. He is not one of those who want to do away with the administrative corps; on the contrary, he ties it fast, with hundreds of knots, to the village autonomies, the Union Boards and the co-operative movement. He wants to familiarise it by a practical training with the evolutionary part of the administrative task. He pleads for the appointment of a small selected staff, consisting of one agricultural, one educational, one sanitary and one co-operative agent, with which the Circle Officer, as an ideal liaison officer of the central and provincial government, its local representative, central or provincial services, autonomous organs and co-operative societies, would be well able to start and to continue an uncommonly strong and many-sided evolutionary action. Autonomy is not pushed into the background by this process; it is strengthened, because it is entrusted with the execution of well considered activities in accordance with its own desires. Eventually, when the movement has grown, the autonomies will be able to appoint their staffs themselves, but for the time being Gupta's solution is, as we shall see, the only right one.

Co-ordination of the forces of evolution: The need of a working plan.

What is the task which the Union Board must undertake, once it can count upon the assistance it requires? We have already mentioned the advantages of this Board over the District Board, and its great advantage over the village organisation upon which Professor Mukerjee would mainly base his system. It is essential that the territory of the Union should be much larger, and yet small enough to be able to create an interest for the work among the population of the village. We know already that the village is too small for extensive work, and too large to prevent all manner of differentiation from arising in its midst. The village society should spread its wings, like a hen over its chicks, over the co-operative societies within its territory, and the Union should do the same. They will foster and protect the varied co-operative societies that will presently multiply under their care.

This road allows for the existence of many other roads, all running parallel, but in the same direction, indicated by the principle of synthesis, all of which can help to deliver Eastern societies from the oppression of particularism, inertia, superstition and ignorance. Let us penetrate more deeply, under the guidance of Gupta, into the sphere of the Union Boards.

To begin with, each Union Board should have a Union Farm with about 20 bighas of land. It will be very desirable if the Union farm could be run by a central agricultural co-operative association with feeder associations in the interior of the Union. Special facilities should be given to the central agricultural association for getting loans from Government under either the Land Improvement Act or the Agricultural Loans Act. With the farm there should be a seed store where manures and seeds should be stored for sale. The farm should be chiefly used for the growing of suitable kinds of seeds and fodder crops. A few selected breeding bulls, specimen milch and draught cattle and calves should also be kept at the farm.

Wherever practicable we should have a Demonstrator of the Agricultural Department in charge of the farm. But if so many Demonstrators be not available the Secretary of the Union Board should receive some practical training in a Government farm, and kept in charge till a qualified Demonstrator could be employed. In the Rangpur District we trained some Union Board Secretaries in our Government farms, and they were very useful for general agricultural work of their Unions. The Demonstrator in charge of the Union Farm should also have some training in treating the ordinary diseases of cattle, and should be able to inoculate and protect cattle against infectious diseases as it may be too costly to entertain a separate staff for elementary veterinary work of the Union. The Union farm should be utilised for the practical training of the boys of the central Union school to which I shall presently refer ¹⁾.

It stands to reason that the men who are connected with agricultural instruction, and also the leaders of courses of instruction and agricultural teachers of the Central Union School must be familiar with the secrets of agricultural pedagogics. They must know the mentality, the daily life and the language of the peasant, and also the various ways in which it is possible to influence the minds of the people ²⁾.

Next to the Union farm Gupta wants a "second municipal insti-

¹⁾ Gupta, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

²⁾ A. J. Koens, *Landbouwpædagogiek*, Kol. Stud. April 1927, pp. 266—277.

tution for the Union", a "Union medical store and depot for anti-malarial work, and a centre for anti-kala-azar injection work under a Union medical officer".

The officer should also be in charge of rural sanitary and preventive work of the villages in the Union. In the case of the Union medical institution also it will be most desirable if it could be organised jointly by a central co-operative health association and the Union Board. The central health association should have feeder associations for anti-malarial and sanitary work in the important villages within the Union. As a matter of fact the whole scheme of rural reconstruction work should be based on the joint foundations of the co-operative organisations and the Union Boards.

This last sentence is the keystone of the edifice; it should never be lost to sight, for it is of the highest importance in the evolution of the colonial world and the Far East generally.

As a third municipal institution of the Union he asks for:

A central Union school with accommodation for the training of 100 to 150 boys. The Union farm should be utilised for giving practical agricultural training to boys of the central school, and manual work on the farm on alternate mornings should be compulsory for all boys. For this purpose the boys should be divided into two batches. There should also be an industrial class attached to the school, where survey, carpentry, smithery and some useful and profitable cottage industries will be taught. The attendance of half the boys alternately at this class every morning should also be made compulsory. A central girls' school should also be established in some convenient village in the Union. The total annual cost for maintaining the farm would roughly be Rs. 1000, of the Union medical and health institution Rs. 1000, and of the two schools Rs. 2000, or a total roughly of Rs. 4000. If there are to be 6,700 Unions in the Province (Bengal) we shall want two crores and sixty-eight lakhs of rupees for the introduction of the scheme, the major portion of which may have to be found from provincial revenue. Fresh local taxation would therefore be necessary, but if the money to be raised by local taxation is supplemented on a generous scale by grants from provincial revenues and if the entire sum is utilised for the benefit of the Union concerned I do not think there will be any serious objection to the imposition of an additional local tax ¹⁾.

The author perhaps treats financial difficulties too lightly, but his ideas are all the same of great value. We have now passed

¹⁾ Gupta, *op. cit.* pp. 230—1.

in review three different conceptions, those of Professor Mukerjee, of Howard, and of Gupta, which, notwithstanding their differences, have many points in common. There is nothing to prevent Mukerjee's village activity from being completed with the co-ordination of central co-operative associations and of higher autonomous bodies to which sub-districts and districts (and in Java, regencies) have been appointed as their sphere of action. There is nothing to prevent Gupta's Union activity from fitting in most closely with the little village-communities and with the small co-operative societies working under their influence. On the contrary, Gupta's exposition continually refers to village organisation and village co-operation as the living roots from which the growing trunk receives its strength. These three writers agree in recommending most urgently the intimate collaboration of all evolutionary forces, and emphasising the need for educating people to self-exertion. They all want adaptation to existing institutions and loyalties, and they establish a connection between education, popular credit, co-operation, agricultural education, and local autonomy. Howard and Gupta moreover recommend a fixed working-plan and want a separate department for Rural Development in order to secure unity of direction, of execution, and of collaboration.

One may ask, of course, whether such a separate branch of the administration will be necessary everywhere in the future, but this question, which affects technical matters of organisation, does not affect the fundamental necessity of an intimate collaboration between all the services concerned, between organisms and officials, in whatever way this collaboration is brought about. The fact that in the Dutch East Indies the direction of popular credit and co-operation has been put under one control is an application of this principle. Co-operation with the service for agricultural information is on the increase, and the wish, expressed in the annual report on Popular Credit-Service for 1927, that the indigenous trader and industrialist may also be assisted by this organism shows that an analogous contact with industrial information will soon be required. The most favourable results may be expected from this official collaboration, not only for the popular co-operative movement, but also for the whole progress of the population. And in view of the fact that popular co-opera-

tion concerns not only agriculture, cattle raising, fishing, trade and industry, but also popular education and the elementary teacher, and is moreover connected with the lower autonomies and the welfare activities of the administration, it is obvious how desirable a close contact must be all along the line. Popular health and the veterinary service should not be excepted from this co-ordination. On a smaller scale this is already taking place in the case of the sub-divisional banks in the Dutch East Indies, which will acquire better means for performing their task when the plans of re-organisation decided upon in 1926 have further materialised. What has so far been accomplished will grow in the future, because the autonomies are now being drawn into the movement. It is but one example of the great collaboration for the realisation of the magnificent plan for the spiritual and material evolution of the Eastern peoples. For all along the line the ranks must be closed in the most intimate co-operation as the main condition of success.

With all due enthusiasm, however, for plans that are to cover a period of ten to twenty years, and must be looked upon as belonging to one vast complex, it must be remembered in the first place life sometimes takes very little heed of such plans and that, in such cases, it may not be sacrificed for the sake of the plan. If all the local workers who are busy in these matters of rural development could come together in one commission, they would be the first to recognise that although the main lines can be sketched out, practice must have the last word. But, provided narrow-mindedness is avoided, a vast working plan and the lessons of practice are not incompatible: the closer the contact between experience and the forces of evolution, the greater also the guarantee that the plan will pass successfully through the test of practice.

The financial aspect of every plan must be given earnest consideration: Eastern society has but limited means to carry new burdens, and this is a blessing in disguise. These young societies possess few reserves available for expansion and new enterprise, with the result that newly opened fields of activity must be thoroughly exploited before further ventures can be undertaken. If it were different, if, for instance, some benefactor were able to place every year at the disposal of the colonial auth-

orities some hundred million pounds, this would only produce a glut, an unhealthy situation such as affects a hitherto prosperous concern which has suddenly inflated its capital at a period of boom and whose constitution is inadequate to bear its enlarged responsibilities. Every plan of action where a wise balance is not maintained between the budget of expenditure and the share which Eastern society can shoulder by itself is harmful, even if it combined all the virtues of the systems of Mukerjee, Howard, and Gupta.

The capacity of Eastern societies nevertheless does not provide a perfectly clear basis for social activity, because there is an adventitious element which has to be taken into consideration. World currents and Western enterprise exercise influences which prematurely affect, sometimes unfavourably, some of the reserves of strength of the old constitution. A new equilibrium has to be found against these influences by expenditure which has to be incurred by the authorities in the interest of indigenous society. A reasonable taxation of these foreign enterprises restores the psychological balance. But those who would like to over-tax them are going too far. The fact that these enterprises might succumb under such a process of blood-letting is not the main objection: the fundamental mistake would be that persons outside the people themselves would provide too great a portion of the means by which evolution must proceed. Under such unnatural circumstances the forces of evolution are bound to become destructive.

Provided these reservations are taken into account, the idea of a working plan on behalf of rural development which considers all evolutionary activities as one great whole is a very attractive one. Sir Hesketh Bell has justly pointed to the continuity of French policy in accordance with a definitive plan of action ¹⁾. Howard, as we saw, also emphasises this need for rural development, because it would "assure continuity of effort, would establish confidence and would do much to attract and retain the necessary ability for dealing with rural uplift". The weakness of the policy so far followed is, in his opinion, due to lack of a clear

¹⁾ Hesketh Bell, *op. cit.* p. 191.

cut financial scheme. The Dutch statesman Colijn also advocates a budget policy which aims at an adequate welfare policy. Only a working plan, in his opinion, can inspire the necessary confidence. In periods when for various reasons progress has to be slow, there can so easily come a feeling on the part of the onlooker that there is no desire to go on with the work. The existence of a working plan would restore confidence, and, moreover, it can often hasten the pace of progress.

The main condition for progress must always be that the various public services concerned should work together, in a manner similar to those that have been outlined. It is of less importance to know how this official co-ordination on behalf of popular co-operation shall be organised. If a Department or Service of Rural Development is indispensable for the permanent co-ordination of all evolutionary forces, it will undoubtedly be created sooner or later. But there are many ways by which the same aim can be reached. Nor should it be thought that such co-ordination is in any way a new idea. It has existed for a long time, but it is only now that it has become a really practical possibility. So much had to be done, and so much preliminary labour was necessary, that concentration upon minutiae was until recently the first requisite. It is only now that the period of consolidation, of work in serried ranks and along the whole front, can begin. The preceding pages must be taken as a description of the actual development of colonial policy, rather than as a line of argument. It is necessary sometimes to cast a look forward at the further development of policy in order better to understand the forces that are at work.

We have already seen that Gupta does not want the premature abolition of the administrative corps. What he wants is to link up the administration even more tightly with the execution of the great plan of rural development by the specialisation and the preparation of the Circle Officers. We may remark in passing that, as we shall see in detail in the second volume, the system of training in the Dutch East Indies already encourages to a high degree the development of this interest and this practical bias by which an active participation in rural development is vigorously assisted. But for Gupta this is not enough. He considers that in his country the European administration has well nigh lost its con-

tact with the population as a result of the Indian reforms. He therefore pleads for an intensive contact between the administrative officials, the lower autonomous entities, and the co-operative movement, and for a similar contact between the European administration and popular development. "How normally to repair the impaired position of the District Officer", he writes, "is in my opinion one of the most serious administrative problems in Bengal" (p. 232). As regards the system of district administration, he is strongly opposed to too great a hurry in introducing any drastic changes into it, because this officer has acquired a position akin to that of the popular chiefs. He thinks, therefore, "that there is a very strong case for . . . rescuing the district administration from the state of chaos and uncertainty into which it is in danger of drifting", and he wishes to reach a state of affairs which will make the District Officer consider himself "to be the Development Officer of his district". There are other reasons than those adduced by Gupta for following his advice. The premature or excessive replacement of civil service officers by autonomous organs would in the period of transition inevitably lead to a police state, for, during this process the administrative official would be deprived of his patriarchal position and of his natural means of approach to the heart of the people, so that Western leadership itself would have lost its best line of contact and would soon have to lean on the police organisation.

In the Dutch East Indies co-operative credit until now has been beyond the horizon of the population, and popular credit, together with small banks and even pawnshops, has to meet the lack of capital. But private credit is like a millstone round the neck of progress, because it encourages usury. Popular credit has not the educative value of co-operation, but it may provide the necessary link between ancient co-operation with its many drawbacks and modern co-operation with its psychological difficulties. This may be illustrated by the following facts.

In his book on *Village Life in China*, A.H. Smith tells us something about the ancient co-operative credit system which exists in that country and about its drawbacks. He describes how, when a man requires a lump sum of money for a wedding, a funeral, or some other purpose, he gathers his friends and acquaintances and forms, if they are agreeable, a co-operative credit society, by mak-

ing an immediate contribution, whereupon, at some future time, a similar levy is made in favour of each member in succession. The difficulties due to the fact that the first beneficiaries try to avoid meeting their liabilities afterwards are proverbial. They prove that immense disappointments are unavoidable.

This verdict contains a far more serious warning for modern co-operation. If the authorities do not take upon themselves to guide the first steps of such popular co-operative credit schemes, these must fail miserably. To begin with, if the number of members is too considerable, each member feels his personal responsibility in a smaller measure, while it becomes more difficult to keep an eye upon the credit-value of each member. Many of them will join only in order to obtain cheaper credit for purposes of consumption. No doubt, from the personal point of view, this is preferable to usury. But the practical result would inevitably be an increase of capital debt, while the aim of co-operation is precisely to free the population from debt, and to increase production to such an extent that it results in a certain degree of prosperity. It pre-supposes the will to progress, for instance by better manuring, seed-selection, etc., etc. The will to progress is still lacking, and so the means and methods available are left unused. In their work *Wealth of India* Wadia and Joshi definitely declare:

The success of the movement pre-supposes economic conditions which are absent in India, for there are no savings of the agriculturists which can be mobilised and there is also a lamentable lack of education and consequently of desire to save on the part of the agriculturists.

Complaints of this kind explain how there really is something to be said for the system of popular credit organised by the authorities in the Dutch East Indies as a link between ancient collectivistic co-operation and modern individualistic co-operative credit systems among the people under supervision of the authorities such as exist in India and in the Philippines. In the Dutch East Indies there have been continual endeavours to give a co-operative character to village credit, to allow the people themselves to administer the institutions dealing with it, but it has always been found that administrative supervision was indispensable. In every colonial territory supervision by the authorities has been neces-

sary, if they were not actually compelled to interfere more directly. This interference has given to all measures by which lack of capital is being allayed a generally educative character directed at the masses, and more useful therefore in wide circles than would have been the activities of private banks or of co-operative credit societies free from official control.

Of course, this system has the result that regulations and forms of organisation have been evolved which are more suitable to the masses than to the middle-class which is now being born. It stands to reason that the right way must be to work for the one without neglecting the other. The development of a progressive middle-class must be increasingly encouraged by a selective co-operative system¹). For it is this middle class which, as everywhere else in the world, must perform the innumerable social functions which, in its absence, fall upon the shoulders of the colonial authorities. And as soon as economic understanding and especially the sense of responsibility, by which the co-operative system stands or falls, has increased, as soon as the burden which will be imposed by the coming years can be visualised as clearly as those of to-day, every borrower will know how to discipline himself, whereas discipline now has to come from above, with the result that co-operative and popular credit both bear an amphibious character.

The sense of responsibility

Though the co-operative movement has made greater progress in India than in any other part of the Orient with the exception of Japan, there is still, even among the population of India, little question of debt redemption. It has been estimated that at the present pace it will take another 300 years before India pays off her agricultural debt. Gupta advocates "more attention on the part of central societies to improve the quality of the members of village societies, coupled with exercise of proper control over the supervisors". He says that the general body of members still leave affairs almost wholly to the committee, which in turn transfers the powers to its chairman, secretary or to some other member. He calls for a greater sense of responsibility amongst all mem-

¹) See the annual report for 1928 of the Dutch East Indies Popular Credit Organisation which pleads for a greater amount of attention to be given to the middle-class.

bers. Indeed, it is clear that if this sense were there already, every reform, even the grant of complete Dominion status, would be possible.

The co-operative system itself is doing much good, not least by encouraging precision and a sense of the future. Progress, however, remains too slow, because whilst the flesh is weak, the spirit cannot be called willing. The *Mahajan* or money-lender still lends 238 rupees against one lent by the co-operative credit societies. Moreover, as H. Wolff declares, in his work on co-operation in India, dry rot has got into the movement, which threatens to do serious damage.

"The bulk of the people to be dealt with are still, after all, terribly illiterate and ignorant, and do not really understand the principles of Co-operative Credit. Government officers are so much mixed up with the business — becoming indeed so more and more — that the raiyat (i.e. the population) naturally comes to look upon the society as a government institution, financed, of course by the Government with public funds, and therefore not requiring repayment until debts are forcibly collected — an institution in which the raiyats themselves are 'members' only pro forma, having no responsibility and no voice."

In such societies very little remains of the co-operative idea, of the moral basis of co-operation and self-exertion, with members who are indifferent and leave everything even to unreliable members of the committee upon whom the authorities have to exercise an ever stricter control. It should not be said that this control is the cause of the trouble. The officials and inspectors have intervened merely because otherwise everything would have gone wrong. Those who arrive afterwards, and after a brief look round see that the authorities are really supporting the whole structure, and that the population itself feels very little for the novel idea of self-exertion, and imagine a causal link between these two sets of facts, are making themselves guilty of utter misrepresentation. There is indeed a causal link, but it works in the opposite sense.

The report for 1927 on the Popular Credit system in the Dutch East Indies says that a great difficulty in the way of establishing a rational credit system is that those who are interested are still largely unconscious, and have not yet reached the stage of rational thought. Even that portion of the population which has energy and capacity for economic foresight suffers from this defect. They

seem unable to run an orderly system of bookkeeping, they won't separate their household and business, and have not the slightest idea as to when their need of money will be non-existent, large or greatest. Such views expressed by really well informed people show how much the mind has still to change. We must beware of the opinion that rational insight and cool, calculating intellect is the only thing that matters. The credit principle requires more than this. It is not the idealistic conception of life of the Oriental that hampers his efforts to subdue nature, but the narrowness of his social horizon and the limited capacity for co-operation which results from it, because co-operation must be based on a morality which does not issue from the group spirit, but is more impersonal and universal. This is why spiritually and morally the horizon must be widened first of all. Without a broader sense of citizenship a rational credit system is as impossible as it is without experience of organisation and a sense of the future.

That is why Eastern experts do not favour the suppression of supervision on the part of the authorities. Wolff remarks that occasionally when inspectors come to examine things, they may be told that the bank books are burnt, while they find that the members have been instructed not to present their pass-books, because if they do they will be made to pay by the inspectors. Of course, under such circumstances, scrutiny becomes a farce. While such situations are possible, one cannot understand how people who want complete independence within twenty-four hours would manage if their wish came true. One wonders what would happen if these people who consider that Western guidance is superfluous were suddenly thrown on their own resources.

Supervision and control

A healthy interest in public affairs can only be brought into existence very slowly, especially when public affairs have for such a long time been limited to a very restricted circle with its traditional functions. With all the weakness which still adheres to its co-operative system, India may congratulate itself that it has proceeded so far, because the movement will soon have created hundreds of thousands of small organisms, of which the population will eventually realise that they are its very own. As yet, of

course, there is the initial difficulty that, so far as co-operative credit is concerned, the population fails to see this and seems to think too often that there are only government institutions financed with public funds. An organisation for Popular Credit as in the Dutch East Indies, which is genuinely a municipal government institution, is still further removed from the goal; it is still in the mass-stage and will have to pass this transitional stage successfully before the ground is ready for co-operative propaganda.

Wolff does not like institutions that are exclusively run by the authorities. The man who is taught to trust *takavi* (i.e. government credit), he writes, is not likely to become a co-operator, any more than is an habitual beggar liberally encouraged with doles likely to become a sturdy worker. It is not by using an air-bladder and safety belts that a man learns to swim. The author agrees that in the first experimental period these forms of government assistance are unavoidable, but, as he remarks, "the factor of production above all others to be strengthened and stimulated is the man himself, not his purse. And such a factor is to be strengthened only by putting the man upon his responsibility, as muscle will grow strong only by exercise". He continues "The machinery to be provided could be supplied only by the people themselves who were to profit by it. . . . It wants to be alive, an animate machine, with capacity for thought, knowledge, and a keen sense of responsibility". He insists upon this idea of responsibility, and makes it the basis of the whole movement. Unhappily it is a sense which is still entirely lacking. The dry-rot which so easily creeps in where this sense is lacking is the best proof that the co-operative movement, even after having been properly launched, can grow into a great success only after patient and persistent efforts, control and supervision.

If we want, at the end of this section dealing with the co-operative movement as an instrument of progress in the colonial world to realise once more the immense difficulty of the problem which Western leadership is tackling, we cannot do better than remember in what different circumstances the co-operative movements of the East and of the West are placed. In the European countryside and towns the co-operative movement has brought to millions of people blessings which neither government assistance nor universal suffrage could have given them. In the East, too, the same

results will eventually be achieved. But let it not be thought that what could be brought about in the West in such a brief time and almost without government assistance can happen as easily in the East. In Europe co-operation was a natural movement. Whenever certain social forces have accumulated in a society, there comes, sooner or later, a great mind, a Raiffeisen, a Grundtvig, a Plunkett or a Knapp, whose word and action suddenly give shape to what was still indefinite. Economic individualism had become discredited, and the idea that strength lies in union had taken its place. In the East there are no individuals to unite: everything rests upon groups, but upon groups whose inspiration is very different from that of the co-operative movement. Another great difficulty is, as we have already seen, that there is no strong middle class in the East, and that the task which would naturally fall to this enlightened and public-spirited category of citizens has therefore to be performed by the authorities.

What is needed, therefore, if we may once more repeat the idea which is really the core of our argument, is a spiritual self-renewal, such as will be brought forth by education, agricultural pedagogics, and co-operative practice. And to nobody does the call for exertion, for the spread of enlightened views and the practice of the good example go forth more directly and with more insistence than to the Eastern élite. Who better than they can make the population understand how much the ancestral practice of "one for all and all for one" is, in our period too, the key to progress, provided the limited horizon of the social circle is broadened out and group loyalty widens into a sense of citizenship? In the Dutch East Indies the encouragement of the cultivation of various commercial plants such as tea, sugar, tobacco, copra, coffee, rubber etc., by the population has already developed the economic sense, caused the creation of capital and prepared the population for a better appreciation of the blessings of loyal co-operation. There is no doubt that in the coming years much progress will be made along the road that has thus been opened.

P o l i t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n

For the great work of development which must eventually enable the colonial world to take its rightful place in the world of the future three powerful instruments are at the disposal of the colo-

nial authorities. Two of them, education and the co-operative movement with all it implies, we have already examined. The third is the construction of Eastern autonomous and self-governing units, and it will now be our task to see what can be done in this direction. These units, as we have already discovered, will be able to play a significant part in the co-operative movement, because they are really nothing but territorial co-operatives with multifarious duties. But they have still another aspect: they are the nurseries of the democracies of the future. They must, gradually, be enabled to carry the burden of the ordered unified state, and only when they have reached this stage can there be a question of transferring government responsibility from Western leadership to the peoples of the colonial world.

Viscount Bryce remarked that: "Democracy needs local self-government as its foundations. That is the school in which the citizen acquires the habit of independent action, learns what is his duty to the state, and learns how to discharge it"¹). But the wisdom of these words is by no means sufficiently realised by Eastern leaders. National politics present a greater glamour, which has deprived municipal government of a large proportion of the talent and the inspiration it requires²). In such circumstances the population does not profit by the existence of an élite, although it has contributed from its scanty resources to the development of its educated class.

Yet it is to the smaller bodies that attention has to be paid in the first place, because the larger ones will then be able to look after themselves. If the lower organisms of autonomy and self-government among the population are to be a success, they must be supported by local patriotism, just as the central government must be carried by a strong consciousness of unity. They call upon the sense of citizenship of all those who belong to them, and for this reason they must adapt themselves, as much as possible, to the existing circles of loyalty and cohesion. This is not a plea for a return to medieval conditions, but an argument in favour of the adaptation of tribal, customary, official and feudal circles to modern requirements, from the point of view of territory,

¹) Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, I, p. 320.

²) K. T. Shah and G. J. Bahadurji, *Constitution, Functions and Finance of Indian Municipalities*, p. XXI.

persons and functions. It is not suggested that this process of adaptation can always be followed in the literal sense. Modern and future requirements, especially from the economic point of view, may frequently impose the choice of territorial limits that do not coincide with those that existed in the past, when economics played a minor part. But where modern needs diverge so largely from the Eastern style of construction, it is all the more necessary that we should only modify where it really cannot be helped.

Viscount Bryce, who probably wrote without any thought of colonial conditions, says ¹⁾:

When co-operation in the work of protecting and managing the affairs of the community is being organised, every actually existing kind of local self-government, however small its range, ought to be turned to account. Every social or economic grouping, every bond which gathers men into a community helps to form the habit of joint action and that sense of a duty to others which is the primal bond of civic life. If any existing local or social unit is fit to be turned into an organ of local self-government it ought to be used. If there is none such, then such an organ must be created and entrusted with some control of those matters in which a neighbourhood has a common interest. Small areas are better than large areas because in the former men can know one another, learn to trust one another, reach a sound judgment on the affairs that directly concern them, fix responsibility and enforce it. . . .

It is striking how perfectly these words apply to colonial situations. Mukerjee and many other Eastern writers hail the Western tendency towards decentralisation because it corresponds so precisely with the basic idea of the small territorial units of the East. Mukerjee ²⁾ warns all reformers in India against the errors of Western democracy, and urges them to

try to build up a safer and surer political edifice from the bottom on the foundations of our village or caste panchayats, occupational guilds and other local or non-local bodies and assemblies, casting out the abuses and evil customs which have clung to them, and educating the people along newer and broader spheres of political endeavour in response to the demands of a wider civics and a higher nationalism.

Mukerjee's criticism is especially directed against the central-

¹⁾ *Op. cit.* II, p. 505.

²⁾ *Democracies of the East*, 1923, p. 167.

ised bureaucratic state which would stifle all self-exertion in the lower autonomous units, and against the parliamentary system, where he detects a party system which becomes increasingly unreal and is based upon an individualistic suffrage which has lost practically all contact with the living organisms and the stronger aspirations of the nation. He even holds that lack of contact has been encouraged by recent political reforms in the East and has resulted in perpetuating the inertia of the masses. What Mukerjee wants is a pluralist state-organisation, where the corporative democracy leaning upon federative connections would maintain the ancestral sense of cohesion, and even strengthen it as a political basis of unity instead of the individual and atomistic unity which forms the basis of the monistic Western centralised states. He will not have "decentralisation conceded by a central government, but real decentralisation which reveals the growth of federalism", or, as he explains in another passage, "real powers of self-government, not those limited and qualified powers delegated . . . from above, a half measure which is at once discouraging and demoralising" ¹⁾.

Eastern corporative democracy and Western dynamic democracy

Some of these criticisms are certainly not unfounded. But we must remember that in the second half of the Middle Ages Europe also had its village republics, with their own administration, justice, police, regulation and communal grounds, and that it has also known associations of occupational connections and local autonomies. We have to ask ourselves whether these institutions did not become atrophied because of an inner necessity which will also eventually apply to the East. And the answer to this question is, that the change in the West was not due to chance. When the ancient corporative bodies had gradually to permit the emancipation of the person and of personal property and to grant personal initiative, endeavour, opinion, and freedom, the new individualistic rights introduced all kinds of alien elements into corporative democracy. The process was no doubt speeded up by the influence of absolutist doctrines regarding the state and the individual and by the ideas of philosophers and economists in the

¹⁾ *Ibid.* p. XVI and 36.

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but all these factors were themselves only symptoms of a larger process. We have seen in previous chapters how traffic opened up a wider sphere and called forth correspondingly wider needs and interests, which could only be catered for by national or even international organisations. Such organisations automatically relieve all lower communities from many of their functions, with the result that a number of ancient communities will lose a corresponding amount of the loyalties they used to command. Everybody acquires greater mobility, the social unit becomes the individual or rather his household, and innumerable new connections, such as societies, religious bodies, clubs, political parties and co-operative societies claim new loyalties. Meanwhile, the territorial circles continue to exist, albeit in a completely new relationship towards the state and the individual, and their functions, limited to the narrow field of such interests as the members of these highly differentiated communities may still have in common, must acquire a far more superficial character.

Those who complain about an alleged vacuum between the omnipotent state, by which they mean the bureaucracy, and the atomistic individual, are guilty of a one-sided judgement which is already affecting Eastern thought to-day. Far from there being a vacuum, there is between the state and the individual a space that is highly loaded with tensions and forces of diverse character. The omnipotent state enthroned above a passive mass of disconnected atomistic individuals is a fiction. This "unworldly" bureaucracy consists of citizens who remain in the midst of society. Like everyone else the official meets with all the ideas which keep eddying through society. And the official is not the only person who influences the course of events. The effect of a book, a play, an apt article written in a popular journal by a savant is sometimes more considerable than the activity of a whole government department. One well-documented "letter to the editor" from an enlightened citizen, a resolution passed by some popular society, may often enough influence policy to a marked extent.

By sending a few members to parliament the dynamic democracy of our period has by no means reached the end of its possibilities: its invisible influence penetrates everywhere. The parliamentary form of government, based upon individual suffrage,

which is a very important expression of democracy, need not, of course, be its last word. Society has once more organised itself in innumerable connections and relationships, in a way which might make it conceivable that all the possibilities of the Middle Ages could be used for modern purposes of policy and administration.

There is no doubt that the present-day party system presents some serious defects ¹⁾, because the increased variety of social differentiation cannot be adequately reflected by it. The mysterious force of a dynamised democracy and a distribution of seats according to capacities and talents will no doubt one day present a way out of the difficulty. In all countries leading minds are busying themselves with these problems. All systems grow old, but the good democratic idea will know how to give itself new forms when the time is ripe for change.

It takes time, however, before new forces are able to enrich and adorn the old order with new organs. But we need not doubt that all the earnest civic sense which is striving to rejuvenate the democratic idea and to give it new life will eventually find a way. Is it possible, in view of all that was done at the end of the Middle Ages, and also during the last three quarters of a century, to speak with Mukerjee and others of "attempts to force political systems and methods, which have been not wholly successful in the West", and of the "errors of Western democracy"?

Many so-called mistakes are not mistakes at all, but unavoidable phenomena which draw the attention only of those who refuse to see that if these developments had not taken place much worse would have happened. Perfection cannot be achieved in this world and we must beware of identifying imperfections with one particular system, unless it is clearly proved that they are more particularly stimulated by that system.

Furthermore, one cannot expect that the national states in the East or the colonial administrations can produce systems which contain every attractive feature and every perfection that is called for by a particular school of thought. Some people want in the first place the preservation of ancestral communities, and believe that these communities have always been idyllic, while the truth is very different. They want, moreover, the improvement

¹⁾ J. Biemond, *De Grondslag der Volksvertegenwoordiging: Individualistisch of Organisch?* 1922.

of the health of millions of people, the preservation of public order, security, economic progress, electric power, and good roads. They further demand popular and technical education. In short, they want the advantages of the simple and patriarchal village republic but also all the blessings of modern methods. No doubt everybody has the right to wish for a combination of the advantages of two entirely different social orders. But he must, in that case, be reasonable enough to recognise that some of the principal advantages of one order of things may well prove to be the main obstacle that prevents the other scheme from giving the benefits that were expected from it.

Change and transition in Eastern society

A few years ago there could be seen in every Chinese town, pious old folk who went out every morning with a basket and a hook and picked up every scrap of paper on which there were written or printed characters. These they carried to an incinerator bearing the inscription "Honour the written Word". But how could this tradition continue, when China is flooded with millions of newspapers and books? Here and there, an obstinate worshipper of the past may still go out on his daily round, but most of them have realised the futility of their task, and Chinese town-life has lost an interesting figure.

This disappearance is symptomatic of the change that is taking place everywhere. Hundreds of similar phenomena could be enumerated, and they all point to a radical modification which is altering the very foundations of life. Who can tell all the social and psychological results of the appearance in a village of new methods of agriculture, of the arrival of a sewing machine or some other novel importation, of a newspaper, or of a returned emigrant?

Those who condemn everything that does not immediately fit in when the authorities are trying to find adequate links between past and future are usually farther away from truth than the authorities. For nothing fits to a nicety during a period of transition, neither the old nor the new. A sudden reversion towards the past would have immense disadvantages, for the East has already travelled much farther away from the past than many who only notice outward appearance can realise. It can no more

go back than we can return to the Germanic Mark or the medieval city republics. To believe that by federating hundreds of village spheres which would be allowed to preserve all their self-containedness one could create a higher popular sphere which in turn could federate with others is as absurd as to believe that out of one hundred chicken eggs one could hatch an ostrich.

In the same way as the West is groping after a dynamic democracy, the East is groping in its popular spheres after the expansion of a corporative democracy, which must be rejuvenated if delegations and federations are to give it an expansive and upward tendency. But at the same time the press and freedom of expression promote the spread of views about individualistic democracy which exercise entirely different influences. This is the source of the real difficulties of the present age, and it is the reason why, unless the authorities are strong, the old will be entirely demolished without any new building material being evolved. The East has to pass through two simultaneous crises at once: that which Europe experienced in the fifteenth century, and that through which it is passing in the twentieth. It is perhaps not an unhappy circumstance that these two crises coincide, because they can exercise upon one another a softening, one might almost say a homoeopathic, influence if they are directed with the wisdom we have admired in the case of Japan.

Real statesmanship must, therefore, place as little stress as possible upon individualistic democracy during the period of transition and do all it can to effect a direct contact between corporative Eastern democracy and the hyper-modern stage of organic democracy, not by any means only in politics, but also in the daily life of the millions who have so little to do with politics. What a fallacy to think that one can lift up a population merely by the thin and brittle thread of politics! What is needed is the daily and continuous work that will raise people to a higher level. As Professor van Vollenhoven has expressed it ¹⁾:

With patient and good guidance of the communal or solidary feeling of the Javanese the round-about way from communistic law via individualistic law to community law may be eschewed or shortened, in the same way as their existing communal institutions like those for common fields and meadows and the village ad-

¹⁾ *Het Adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indië*, I, second part, p. 654.

ministration of the soil offer a point of contact for social and economic policy.

To this precious hint the author adds the warning that "They who want too much, or want the new things to be too beautiful, want nothing at all". Expressed concretely, his advice amounts to this: the utilisation of popular education in order to create a sense of citizenship and habits of co-operation, the development of the co-operative movement in all its wealth, and the policy of making people value and utilise the old and the new autonomies as big co-operations and the incorporation of all these things in the larger unity of the state and the great society.

If these views apply to popular institutions like the villages, the families and the castes, they apply equally to the ancient principalities which still subsist in the Dutch East Indies in the shape of self-governing Indonesian states. Van Asbeck advises the Dutch to use their influence in those states only with the greatest circumspection ¹⁾, and this view was already adopted in the annotations to the decree of 1914 dealing with the Indonesian states, where it is said "A thorough understanding of the existing organism is necessary before one proceeds to introduce new organs, which may be desirable in our opinion but which do not fit in so well with what exists".

This passage really gives the only guiding principle that is applicable to the whole colonial world in all its parts. In one of his most recent studies Professor van Vollenhoven expresses this idea in the following words: "Decentralisation and deconcentration in the East will not merely have to consist in Western contributions as is being increasingly recognised. It will have to fit in to a considerable extent with the traditional Eastern communities". Only by obeying this precept can the Scylla of rigidification in the worship of an obsolete past and the Charybdis of the uprooting of Eastern communities by Western institutions be safely avoided. The example of Japan and the development which has taken place in recent years in the colonial world, first unconsciously and then very deliberately, show the method which must be followed.

In his work, to which we have already referred, Altekar confirms this conclusion with great emphasis ²⁾. He feels that the

¹⁾ F. M. van Asbeck, *Onderzoek naar den Juridischen Wereldbouw*, 1916, p. 56.

²⁾ A. S. Altekar, *A History of Village Communities in Western India*, 1927, *passim*.

democratic idea has acquired in common parlance a too exclusively political significance. In reality it contains more than the mere notion of universal suffrage and parliaments: its very basis is the recognition of the dignity of every human being. Therefore it is necessary to open as wide an opportunity as possible for every talent to unfold itself for the common good. Sound general popular education is, in consequence, as much part of democracy as universal suffrage. The care of popular health, local autonomy, and even the co-operative movement are also genuine democracy. It is owing to them that a dynamic growth has taken place for which some of the earlier forms of political democracy have become too narrow. But the democratic idea nevertheless holds good, even though in some respects a revision of democratic practice has become necessary.

Altekar breaks a lance for a more modest plan than that of Mukerjee. Where the latter wants to construct a federal state from a number of very small units, Altekar merely wants to consolidate the village communes because they are valuable in themselves. He regrets that the village headman has lost his significance, that the village council has disappeared, that the village tribunal is forgotten, and that the village treasury no longer exists. He approves therefore of efforts like the Bombay Village Panchayat Act of 1920, and rejoices to find in it a sign that the importance of a revival of local group co-operation is again receiving recognition. He complains of the fact that notwithstanding the transfer to the villages of many municipal capacities, including even the right of taxation, the measure so far has had no success. In many places the villagers were even opposed to the establishment of Panchayats because they might involve new taxation. So it is after all the villagers themselves who oppose the progress of democracy. Professor Mukerjee is of opinion that the lack of success is due to the fact that this modern decentralisation does not correspond with ancient customary law and ideas; he wants a complete and therefore reactionary return to the past. Let us quote what Altekar has to say about the ancient village administrations, which were

natural outcomes of the forces working within and the conditions obtaining in the old village communities. If we try to understand the secret of this success, the problem of the future revival will solve itself. The villagers in the past regarded themselves as mem-

bers of a big family. In a family the misfortunes of any one member are the misfortunes of all. If a person suffered from theft, the rest of the community would ultimately make up the loss; if a Balutedar could not get sufficient grain, the community would not leave him to starve; it would sanction a suitable grant from the village funds. The Balute system embodied this conception of the village being a big family; in a joint Hindu family, every member works for the family and the family provides for him; similarly in the old village community, the carpenter, the smith, the shoemaker existed for the village and the village in turn provided for them.

This subconscious feeling of all being members of a big family had naturally produced a sense of harmony and goodwill among the villagers. Factions and feuds were few and far between. The sense of family brotherhood, the dread of being exposed and punished by the local Panchayat as a mischief-monger, the absence of economic jealousies and rivalries had all combined in producing a remarkable atmosphere of mutual harmony, regard, and goodwill and thus prepared the ground for the successful working of the Panchayats. . . . This public spirit and habit of co-operation was further fostered by the policy of the Central Government. It allowed the greatest possible scope for Local Self-Government. Decentralisation was carried to the extreme limits. There was no Local Board or Public works department; the villagers therefore had either to sink the village well themselves or to go on without one. There was no education department; the villagers had either to manage a school themselves or go on without one. Kings would refuse to settle civil disputes through their officers; villagers therefore had to make their own arrangements for settling them.

Owing to this policy of the Central Government, the villages had to evolve some machinery for the discharge of these communal duties. All will no doubt co-operate in the works of public utility, but still there must be some persons to organise, supervise, guide and control. And to whom else should the villagers turn for the discharge of this onerous and thankless duty if not the village elders, who on account of their age, experience, influence, work and sagacity naturally appeared as the best fitted for the task. There was no question of election. . . . the elders were the most competent to do the duty and nobody dreamt of questioning their power. . . . They, therefore, came to be entrusted with the powers with which the community was endowed, and thus has arisen the village council. It was a natural outcome of the various forces working within the community. It was the direct result of the decentralisation policy of the Central Government. It worked successfully because there was harmony, goodwill, public spirit and the habit of co-operation.

Village autonomy past and future

This is indeed a full size portrait of the village republic with all its attractiveness and all its limitations. The term village republic is here of course only used in a restricted sense: there was no idea of legal equality or independence about it. This sketch shows by itself why there can be no question of reviving this antiquated institution. There are factors of a very different nature than the mere imitation of the past which must have their share in determining the policy of the authorities.

Altekar involuntarily gives too flattering a picture of the old relation between the central authorities and the village republics, when he speaks of the decentralisation policy of the central government. Decentralisation is a dynamic conception which found no place in India, China, Japan, or medieval Europe. No doubt it sometimes happened that the Ruler would entirely suppress popular authority as a result of a whim, and that the little republics then became atrophied into merely inert localities. But a despotism that is spreading out its tentacles does not deserve the name of a centralised system. And, on the whole, notwithstanding much arbitrariness, the Ruler usually left the village alone, or even protected it and assisted it in its more ambitious enterprises. Centralisation and decentralisation may be entirely deleted from the vocabulary of the ancient world. Even the confirmation of the choice of a village headman by the Ruler or his representative only aimed at sanctioning the principle of single responsibility which made the *primus inter pares* an instrument that was easier to handle as well as easier to find. Everywhere there is the same static image. How could it have been otherwise, since the authorities lacked the means to conceive of their task in another way or to perform it differently?

Nowadays it is the fashion to attack the authorities for their continuous intervention. And, to be sure, if the authorities had followed the example of their Eastern predecessors and had not endeavoured to secure public order, had not worked for irrigation, education, popular health, etc., and had kept aloof from the work of the local courts of justice, the village republics might still be prospering. More, however, would be required in order to guarantee them a continued existence. World traffic and imports would have to be arrested, because otherwise all concessions to the

past would have been made in vain. The Balute system cannot endure if money penetrates into the villages; the old uniformity in conceptions, functions, knowledge, and property becomes impossible when popular education and differentiation of function cause a greater variety of talent and of wealth, and the old mutual assistance based upon custom becomes impossible as soon as progress introduces money-economy.

It is clear therefore that colonial policy cannot take the backward road. Altekarak also realises that his attractive idyll belongs to the past, and in the true spirit inspired by the idea of synthesis, he looks deliberately into the future: "In the modern age of individualism and sectarianism", he says, "the revival of the old family feeling that existed among the villagers is almost impossible". He sees everywhere a lack of harmony and goodwill, and in its stead, "jealousies, rivalries, quarrels and intrigues". These he attributes to the new awakening of the consciousness of the rights of the individual unaccompanied by the consciousness of the duties of the individual. And, indeed, this is the core of the problem. No wonder that the author hits upon the right solution. A strenuous effort must be made to inculcate, instead of the ancient feeling of cohesion, the sense of civic responsibility. It is the only necessary thing, the remedy in whose absence nothing can be performed, but which, once it is present, can cause the ancient corporative democracy to change into an animated autonomous life full of promise for social as well as for political advancement.

The author then proceeds to examine the means by which this necessary sense of civic responsibility can be fostered. At the head he places education, and next co-operation, neither of which, after all we have said earlier in the chapter, requires further elaboration. The government must also "evinced a genuine desire to delegate its powers to the local bodies", while, in view of the lack of formalism of the villagers, the working rules of the village councils must be made considerably elastic. Modern democratic machinery must be popularised among the villagers. Another and very important thing is that the villages should no longer be drained of their best elements. As Mukerjee points out, nearly 85 per cent of the population of India live in the country. There are only 2150 towns with over 5000 inhabitants. Similar proportions prevail throughout the East.

Although easy to express, this desideratum cannot be so simply put into practice. Can one prevent the more energetic villagers who see no future in the unmoving village from seeking better employment elsewhere? It cannot be done and should not be tried. There is only one method, which is the economic improvement of the villages themselves by making them, as Altekar suggests, economically more self-reliant. Reform of agriculture on American lines and cottage industries would provide the best means, according to this author.

However true Altekar's advice may be, it nevertheless emphasises how impossible it would be to build with only the village as a basis. Where must these hundreds of thousands of villages get the system of education which will break down the walls of particularism and inertia, their teachers, and the masters and professors who must train them? Once more the simile of a pyramid applies. This popular basis is its most important part, and yet the higher layers and the apex also claim our attention. Who, again, must start and encourage the cottage and village industries, who will organise the road system and finance all the necessary works? Not a federation of village republics, for village capacity remains village capacity, to whatever extent one adds villages together.

Outside influences have destroyed the old cement, and outside influences will also have to provide the new. The central authorities must play their part, for they cannot leave everything to the villages. There can be no question of allowing the village to spend all the revenue it has gathered. The authorities must receive a portion of it for the work they do for the common good. As special sections of the task of the authorities are handed over to the village, the portion retained by it will become more considerable. But when Altekar suggests that all functions can be restored to the village, and significantly enough in view of all that has been said and written against labour as a form of taxation, shows himself willing to restore this method in favour of the village finances, he shows that he has excessive expectations. The village administrations will never regain their ancient glory, and even family and tribal connections are doomed to grow looser owing to inside pressure. It is precisely when village development becomes a success that an increasing number of persons within

the village will find that their social, economic, intellectual and political horizon spreads so far beyond the village that they will not be satisfied to leave the decision about all that concerns them to the village administration.

What is needed is not a convulsive clinging to ancient forms, but a prosperous educated rural population with a sufficiently strong local sense of citizenship to make it labour for all the interests of the village, and yet with a sufficient general interest among the better educated to make them endeavour to establish and to preserve contact with wider circles and even with the great society. The ancient forms are needed as points of contact only because they are the consecrated receptacles of morality, which may not be broken prematurely. They are only the means, never the aim. Those who place the old as such above the needs of the living human being would be more at home in a museum. Their advice is as fatal and will cause as chaotic conditions as the agitation of the extremists who imagine they can create the new after dynamiting the old. Kerala Putra may well say: ¹⁾

When Indian politicians talk of institutions suited to Indian genius, it means one of two things, either a constitution indigenously developed without outside ideas and influence, or a natural development from purely Indian institutions. Both of these, if one may be permitted an expressive vulgarism, are pure moonshine. The development of a constitution on a purely Indian basis is an impossibility. Village government, caste panchayats, and ancient republics are all undeniable facts, but it is no more possible to go back to them so as to develop an Indian constitution, as it is to make the Ganges flow back to the Himalayas.

All existing loyalties must be utilised, but they must be made serviceable to modern requirements and also to future developments, because world influences penetrate the popular mind from all sides and world traffic does not come to a standstill. Everybody needs education. But can it be expected that when education enables the villagers to read the press, which at present is more revolutionary than evolutionary, the growing generation can preserve or rather re-capture the mentality which is the first condition for the respect of the old authority based on custom? Only if this authority acquires new functions by the side of the old, and can develop in new directions according to the new requirements.

¹⁾ *The Working of Dyarchy in India 1919—1928*, p. 111.

All construction, whether spiritual, moral, social, economic, intellectual, technical or political, will therefore have to be considered as one coherent whole; there must be no division of effort and of attention, otherwise the work done on one side will merely destroy that done on the other.

When big representative assemblies were created in the colonial world many people declared that the authorities had started at the wrong end. Even the smallest village organisms, it was thought, leave still much to be desired; yet governments were erecting high political structures as though the work of social and economic construction was already almost achieved. Many people will agree with those critics who think that a beginning should have been made at the bottom. But relations are too complicated in the colonial world to look at things in such a simple manner.

While on the one side are hundreds of millions of people whose capacities will be taxed to the utmost even by running the machinery of village autonomy, yet it was on the other side equally plain that village autonomies would not suffice, if the authorities had to be relieved of part of their task and all available talent and civic sense were to be given a field of action. What was needed was a single plan, which, while all due emphasis was placed upon the frame of unity of the future, would nevertheless at the same time encourage a free growth from bottom to top. There had to be a colourful variety underneath, which, striving upward, could more and more divest itself of local patriotism, until, reaching a definite height, it would lose its liability to the power of gravity and adapt itself to a sense of unity which harmonises everything.

A u t o n o m o u s s t a t e s

Such a plan already exists in its main lines and is already being partly executed. There is no contact, as yet, between the decentralisation which is working down from above and the living popular units which are climbing up, and until this contact is established, there may be a mechanical structure, but there is no organic life. There is indeed an immense variety of autonomies. Among them the most striking perhaps are the self-governing principalities of the colonial world ruled by princes and even, in the case of India, by mighty and almost independent poten-

ates¹⁾. Western leadership exercises its influence in these states too, and some authors even speak of intervention as a settled policy, and conclude that the political officers who reside at the courts of these rulers are the real masters²⁾.

Apart from these larger principalities, the Dutch East Indies also have small indigenous states, which were originally either genealogical units, villages, village-leagues, or federations of village-leagues, and which have been sometimes recognised by the government as autonomous states. Some principalities in their turn may consist of small principalities which send representatives to a council where the Ruler is *primus inter pares*, unless he has actually taken to himself practically all power. There is a slight variety in the influence exercised by the population upon the government of these principalities, but the pattern is pretty uniform, because Eastern Rulers like popular authority no more than the population likes government intervention in the affairs of its small republics. The authority of the Rulers offers points of support which can render great service in the work of construction.

If these Rulers could be gained for the cause of evolution they would exercise a considerable and powerful influence. Dr. Haga, however, is not very hopeful in this respect as far as the Dutch East Indies is concerned. "Pride and avarice", he says³⁾,

are the two most striking characteristics, although happily in recent times higher aspirations are appearing in a few Rulers. There is no denying that bribery, injustice and oppression are being fought by the administration, . . . against this remains the fact that the system of one-headed authority gives practically no influence to the people, and therefore injustice and bribery continue to be possible.

In other colonial territories the situation is no better. Panikkar reminds us of the seamy side of some Princes' lives, of the degraded luxury and the meaningless pomp of many Indian courts, which he calls the result of the lack of "direct responsibility in the Princes". In many states the most elementary rights are denied

¹⁾ K. M. Panikkar, *Relations of Indian States with the Government of India*, 1927, p. 125; Van Asbeck, *op. cit.* pp. 80, 86, and for states in French territories, pp. 87—110.

²⁾ J. Chailley, *Problems of British India*, 1910, p. 259.

³⁾ B. J. Haga, *Indonesische en Indische Democratie*, pp. 158 sqq.

to the subjects, whose political position is anomalous and "lacks the ordinary guarantees of a free man's life".

The conditions in Indonesian states in the Dutch East Indies are occasioning an increasing amount of interference on the part of the colonial authorities, although there is no intention of annexing them to the territories which their local officials directly administer. For it is probable that progress can be effected more quickly by other methods. In these states as elsewhere, education must be organised and encouraged. This can be done by systems imposed by the central government, in so far as treaty conditions allow this procedure, or through the personal influence of the officials who both in India and the Dutch East Indies maintain relations with the Eastern Rulers:

The states and their rulers have been custodians of our culture and artistic tradition in a degree that we cannot appreciate now. The very conservatism of the rulers has been of value in this connection. In the midst of a changing and disintegrating society, their states have in many cases preserved the solidarity of the social structure and kept intact the imperceptible bonds that unite classes and castes into one community. . . . Village life is vigorous, and there is almost undisturbed social harmony. This obviously is not due either to efficient administration — for in many states such a thing is unknown — or as a result of a purposive policy, for the rulers in many cases unfortunately have only their pleasures and their sport at heart. A more fundamental cause. . . . is found in the fact that society has continued practically undisturbed in these areas, while in British India new currents of life and new and changing political and social conditions have tended to disorganise and render ineffective the unseen forces behind the structure of the community. This is certainly not all to our advantage, for progress can come only through purposive evolution, and a static society must tend to weigh down both individuality and activity through the leaden weight of encrusted custom. But all the same, a conservative tradition has much in its favour, especially in the midst of a society which is changing fast through the contact of dissimilar cultures. Moreover, to a large extent the states have served the cause of India's civilisation by acting as a refuge of certain valuable forms of intellectual activity which, through one circumstance or another, could not find adequate support in British India (Panikkar, p. XXVII).

These passages touch upon a great problem that also exists in the Dutch East Indies, where the Rulers also perform a cultural function. What is needed is that they should be persuaded to

adopt an enlightened policy, by restoring to the villages and other local autonomies the powers of which despotism may have deprived them. At the same time ceaseless efforts must be made to encourage the idea of unity, by co-operation between the Eastern states as amongst themselves and between them and local or provincial autonomies which are already in existence or are being established, and furthermore with the central legislature at the top. The "Chamber of Princes", created in India in 1921, was a first step in this direction,¹⁾ which H.H. the Maharajah of Alwar welcomed in the following terms:

My goal is the "United States of India" where every province, every state working out its own destiny, in accordance with its own environment, its tradition, history and religion, will combine together for higher and imperial purposes, each subscribing its little quota of knowledge and experience in a labour of love freely given for a noble and higher cause.

In this development also a great variety is to be expected in accordance with the size and the degree of dependence of the territory upon its neighbours. In the Dutch East Indies the tendency has been to unite miniature states or to establish federative boards, in order to facilitate the care of interests which fall too much outside the narrow limits of the separate states. Various miniature states have already been given common treasuries, and the next step will be to facilitate their political growth which must result from these partial amalgamations.

In the formation of greater autonomous units such as provinces, the question always arises how the states which are situated inside them must be represented. For roads and economic life do not stop at political frontiers, and it is impossible to leave the enclosed states without relations with the autonomous territory that surrounds them. Local conditions will have to decide what procedure is to be adopted, and in the course of the adjustment questions relating to persons, such as exterritoriality, will have to be solved. In the Dutch East Indies the Indonesian

¹⁾ Cf. The British Crown and the Indian States, an Outline Sketch drawn up on behalf of the Standing Committee of the Chamber of Princes, by the Directorate of the Chamber's Special Organisation, 1929, and *Indian Round Table Conference*, 12th Nov. 1930—19th Jan. '31, presented by the Secretary of State for India to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

States are already by means of the electoral system connected with the central legislative assembly.

Central and popular authorities

In the previous section we have among other things dealt with local or provincial autonomy which came as it were from above. There are also the numerous forms of autonomy which have to be constructed from below. It is not necessary to accept the views of Professor Mukerjee which we gave above, because it is not possible to expect from ancient institutions and ancient loyalties more than they were intended to give, but one may well agree with his wish that all the forces which are real and living in the people should be entrusted with those functions which they are indeed able to perform. All these connections should be utilised by the authorities. They will have to be thoroughly studied; no uniformity of regulations or alien formalism must be imposed upon them. Only thus can they be perfectly welded into new autonomous and self-governing units, not only with regard to territory but also to function. They must be left their ancient functions such as jurisdiction in minor civil and criminal matters, under due supervision, whenever possible. We shall not enter into details about this aspect of colonial policy, to which we return in the next chapter and again, in so far as the Dutch East Indies are more particularly concerned, in the second part of this work.

But let it not be thought that the central authorities have merely to give their full support to the ancient village administrations in order to effect a complete and fruitful return of all their useful functions. On the one hand there is no need for any central authority to stand behind these territorial, functional and genealogical communities, as long as mutual dependence and the sense of cohesion which results from it are sufficiently alive. But it is equally certain that no central authority could keep together, by its incidental support, a community which is crumbling to pieces because of the growing sense of personal independence.

It is another thing, of course, to entrust small and definitely specified civil and penal matters to the councils of lower units, councils which breathe the spirit of customary law, even though they need not be wholly based upon it. Satisfactory results may be obtained in this way, and also by making use of them in such

a manner that a higher sanction is given to customs, institutions and obligations which are valued by the population. Nevertheless, contact between modern democratic decentralisation and the living popular connections is as yet not easy to establish, and it is for this reason that the authorities have usually sought salvation in maintaining an intensive contact between their European and Eastern officials and the population.

This method, however, has its drawbacks as well as its advantages. A small unit has limited means at its disposal, little experience and little talent. Many of the functions with which it is or should be entrusted are beyond the capacity of the village. They will, therefore, be badly performed, if at all, and the result of course must be that the administrative official will pour out instructions, and interfere increasingly. This will damage the prestige of the popular heads, who, for fear of perpetual reprimands, will begin to look exclusively to the power above, and become a mere mouthpiece of the administration. Placed between two fires, they will lose their valuable character derived from customary law, until the authorities have to draw the conclusion that customary law after all has not the administrative efficiency which they expected from it.

The creation of higher indigenous bodies such as village unions and federations of unions, will of course partly obviate this inconvenience, but only to become perceptible in a sharper form, when similar difficulties arise between these bodies and the officials above them. For the fact remains that a community based upon ancient custom may be totally unable to bear the burden of modern duties. It is not by accident that everyone from the highest Eastern potentate to the smallest village headman has noticed the growth of official interference, while at the same time the official busybody everywhere tries to act, as much as possible, through the intermediary of Eastern Rulers, of headmen and of indigenous administrative bodies. Both tendencies aim at effecting the osmose between the contiguous Eastern and Western spheres. The autonomous organs of popular life form one of the principal lines of contact along which the different tension of Eastern and Western society is being equalised. They will the better perform their task as the minds of the peoples broaden through this performance of their autonomous functions,

and as a result of welfare policy, education, and world traffic.

The creation of autonomous and self-governing bodies therefore is only one of the ways of achieving the aim, the others being education, welfare policy with the co-operative movement as its core, which are each to be considered as a lever, as a means and an aim at the same time, and which must be all put into action together. There can be no flourishing autonomous life before popular education, popular health and popular co-operative systems, popular energy and popular prosperity have defeated particularism and inertia and created the sense of citizenship in their place. The autonomous organs must be rejuvenated by absorbing the educated and progressive people in their administration. Thus will the road be cleared for the sense of unity.

This vast treble task is already being performed. Reconstruction is proceeding all over the colonial world. Thousands of hands are busy weaving together the many threads we have singly observed, and the need is for more and yet more hands. The most many-sided renovation there has ever been is visibly modifying a static society, and the result will be, not the destruction, but the fundamental enrichment of the East.

CHAPTER IX

THE DIRECTING LINES OF THE FUTURE

"Bhinneka tunggal ika"

Distinct they are undivided.

TANTULAR, old Javanese poem *Sutasoma* ¹⁾.

"They are distinct, yet they are one; how can one hasten to divide these two, even though distinguishable in a certain respect". Thus speaks the old fourteenth century Javanese wisdom, when considering the forms in which Divine Revelation wished to manifest its oneness. May this idea put a seal on all that has been said in this volume, because, going forth from the kinship of all human beings, and consciously proceeding towards the unity of synthesis, we have attempted to make this truth acceptable as the guiding principle of modern world policy and colonial statesmanship for all those who might still withhold their interest and their collaboration from a great and noble cause.

That is why, in the previous pages, it was not deemed enough to picture distant vistas of synthesis, as seen from the peaks whence the spirit of the West points to the field of action for our time, vistas which, in metaphysical contemplation, the soul of the East had indicated to its greatest representatives in the time of the Upanishad conceptions. It was necessary to foster the realisation that more is needed than an exalted vision, more than sympathy and goodwill; it was necessary to descend into society, into modest popular spheres, and to examine the field of action from nearby. It is easy to enter into ecstasies over world-brotherhood, but very difficult to persuade the motive force of Western national life and Eastern group-life to take the road which may lead them towards this goal. For the more modest aspects of synthesis are the most difficult to achieve.

¹⁾ Kern, *Verspreide Geschriften*, IV, p. 172.

First directing line: Widening out the social horizon

The period is drawing near when synthesis may slowly grow into a reality: hence the bitter fight of the forces of antithesis. Already, through the idea of synthesis, a wider horizon has been opened to many people, taking the place of a narrow vision extending only to the limits of a small group, and has made them reach beyond that self-contained life which is unaware of a larger unity. The sense of unity has caused isolated bodies to expand and to grow upwards. For synthesis does not start with world conferences or a League of Nations organisation, but it begins by breaking down the partitions that isolate all smaller and greater particularisms. No world synthesis, no true national life even, is conceivable before group morality and the group conception of truth have been dissolved in the abstract notions of human dignity, patriotism, civic spirit, and love of truth.

Colonial policy had to insert a wedge between the joints of the wall of particularism, and the best method of attack was to invite the defenders of this wall to look towards the distant horizon. For, once they have been enticed into looking at the distance, they themselves will feel oppressed within the wall. They start to diminish its height, and to make breaches in it in order to welcome world traffic. In fact, the habit of distant vision makes them look beyond the horizon, from village to district, from district to regency and to province and ever beyond. The widening of the sphere of life — this is the fighting method of synthesis, the first of its mighty directing lines for the future. Neither caste nor family nor village republic will be unnecessarily attacked with violence or decrees. The members themselves will be persuaded to demolish their walls in order that they may enjoy work upon a wider field.

It is not owing to intellectual or moral impotence, nor to economic incapacity or lack of military means that Eastern society is so fragile, but to the nature of its social structure. To effect a modification of this structure, it is necessary that all men and women in the colonial world should gain the power of self-conquest, to keep down their sense of distinction and their indifference towards fellow human beings outside their own immediate sphere. This is why we have paid so much attention to the social structure of In-

dia, where the caste system possesses an extreme form which enables us better to understand the similar tendencies throughout the East. In the Dutch East Indies there are analogous cases, such as that of the Minangkabau population, where exclusiveness concerning connubium is scarcely less compelling than caste rules in India.

We have seen what factors contributed to the making of the caste system, and we have found that moral ideas of a high order went towards its formation. Nevertheless, its constructive force is neutralised by the fact that it judges the spiritual and social value of human beings far too much according to accidental externals, rigid formalism, and, usually, very unspiritual criteria. This is why India's millions suffer exceptional pressure from the social structure, which, nevertheless, cannot be abolished by decree, because, for one thing, it is the outcome of moral forces. Moreover, in all other Eastern societies similar difficulties exist, even though they are not as acute as in India. Everywhere the sterile social indifference of the populations has to be transmuted into interest for outsiders, i.e., for the public weal, by the application of moral principles in the widest circle. This is all that is needed, for once the spirit changes, the structure of society will soon enough also change.

It will not do, therefore, merely to condemn populations still in the grip of small particularisms—the West, after all, has still to rid itself of its larger exclusivism. Similar conditions once existed all over the world. Nor can one start to weigh up against each other the shortcomings of the East and of the West. It will be wiser to reflect on the services East and West can render each other in the removal of all those smaller and larger obstacles which still obstruct spiritual and material progress. For it is a fact that, at least in some of its cultural areas, the East possesses precious capacities which will be of incalculable benefit to the whole world, once the East has freed itself from the bonds that stifle it.

The East has a message which will activate the best ideas of the West. But it cannot deliver this message until synthesis has won its first victories against particularism in the bosom of Eastern society. By assisting its Eastern brother-in-arms, the West will therefore liberate itself, as the East liberates itself by collaborating with its Western companion and is thereby given the op-

portunity of contributing to the perfecting of the world. It is in this sense that the words of Pearson, that "India's message to the world is one of unity, unity of man with God, unity of man with man", must be taken. Perhaps the necessity of struggling for an honourable place among the nations is the means "used by Providence for converting it and for making it put into practice all it has been for centuries recognising in theory" ¹⁾).

When the splendid collaboration of the future, which will obliterate all the antagonism that is at present implied in the terms East and West, has come to stay, all these guiding lines of policy will appear so simple, in retrospect, that men will wonder how they could ever have failed to see their importance. The warmth of life will permeate all these seemingly arid ideas; popular education will be seen as a widening of the spiritual, the intellectual, and especially the social horizon; the co-operative movement and autonomy will be found to be the breakers of walls and the knitters of ties by excellence. These ties will enable men to grasp the meaning of the greater society and of world-wide kinship. When these things have come to pass, the East will be ready to deliver its message.

Second directing line: The collaboration of the élite

If it is by breaking down the walls surrounding narrow communities that the great work of synthesis is to be performed, it stands to reason that the popular sphere is by preference the territory where the task of leadership has to be performed, and where the Eastern élite has to fulfil its duty. If it turns its back upon them, it destroys the plants of personality, self-exertion, and sense of unity which are beginning to shoot up in every direction.

In the previous chapters much has already been said about the fact that the horizon of the people has to be widened. We have seen how the best thinkers of East and West observed the problems that are arising and how their knowledge and experience fitted in with this principle. But the work can only be done if Eastern leadership gives its full and unstinting assistance to Western leadership. The doctrines of antithesis are being actively dis-

¹⁾ W. W. Pearson, *Le Rôle de l'Inde dans L'Ere Nouvelle*, in *L'Inde et son Ame*, p. 431.

seminated everywhere. With the help of particularism and inertia, they are fanning racial, religious, national, and economic antagonisms. All the difficulties which meet the work of leadership in Eastern states are present in the colonial world, and in addition to them there is this spirit of antithesis which hampers the work of the colonial authorities.

And yet their achievements in the right direction are not inconspicuous. Their religious tolerance, their policy of differentiation according to needs instead of racial discrimination, the way in which they have thrown open all offices to every educated person, the recognition of the right to work, and their welfare policy ought to satisfy all those whom the doctrine of hatred has not blinded. But there still remains national antagonism, which appeals especially to the Eastern élite and tends to turn it from the means by which national sentiments can be satisfied most speedily.

Synthesis, however, may also win this struggle, because there is really no durable conflict of interests, but only a blind urge of sentiment against reason. The tactics of the engagement are thereby indicated: a sentiment that can be easily understood must be respected and made to bear fruit. In the interests of the population itself, justice must sometimes, however reluctantly, be meted out to anti-national expressions of a misguided nationalism. A wise policy favouring a varied autonomous life will open to everyone the opportunity of collaborating in all the stages of the construction of the great organism. The proto-parliaments fulfil the function of directing nationalism towards synthesis, a roll of primary importance, although one teeming with contradictions and difficulties. We shall return to this matter at a later stage, but we may anticipate our eventual conclusion by stating at once that the creation of these bodies as a means of securing the collaboration of the élite and persuading its nationalism to exchange negative tendencies for true civic spirit is a necessity no which pleas for the restoration of ancient Eastern despotism can affect. Prof. Schrieke has pointed out how when riots take place or difficulties arise, the old panacea, the re-establishment of institutions based upon customary law, is of no avail. The same thing applies to the return to Eastern despotism. Wherever it still exists, it feels compelled to grant constitutional conditions, and

where it has ceased to exist, the return to the absolute character of the Ruler's power would only increase the difficulties. For the source of all unrest and of all disturbances of equilibrium does not reside in the change of the forms of government or administration but in the change of spirit which caused these modifications.

Democracy has had its day, some people will say, pointing to some European states where parliamentary government has given place to dictatorship by a party or person. Democracy would therefore seem to be a plant that does not flourish under all climes and is particularly unsuited to Eastern lands. The Oriental, so these critics say, is happiest when he can obey; leave him his autocratic chiefs, rulers, and governments. But these critics are only right in so far as they take the past for a starting point and indicate various relics still subsisting. If we look at the stage that is already ended and at the direction in which the movement goes, we shall see how weak all their arguments are.

Even the freest Western nations of to-day formerly showed the meekest submission to their feudal Rulers and their absolute kings, and that not so many centuries ago. It is a wonder how the one-time free Germanic populations could have had as descendants such servile souls, and how the latter in their turn could be the ancestors of freedom loving descendants. All this is due to the spirit of the times, a combination of economic and other influences which even to-day are changing the very foundations of Western society. And what is true of the West applies equally to the East. Japan, China, and India already give many hints of the truth that similar factors will have similar results in Eastern as in Western society.

It is untrue, also, that the Eastern temperament is naturally submissive. That it should appear to be so is the result of utter dependence upon the group, and of the social structure which results therefrom. Where the group cohesion has been prematurely shattered, unwillingness, a sterile sentiment of independence, selfishness, and rudeness occur. One may safely predict that the greatest difficulty of Eastern democracy will be, not Eastern obedience and submissiveness, but the lack of obedience and readiness for service in the Western sense of freely accepted limitations. This, the highest form of obedience, is the first demand of democracy. Wherever this sense of accepted limitations has been

absent in Europe, democracy has failed, because freedom immediately degenerated into anarchy, which resulted in tyranny and the loss of freedom.

The backward step taken in some Western states does not prove anything against the naturalness of a gradual democratic development in the East. It only proves that forcing the pace of democracy leads to anarchy, because true democracy is a result of a long process of self-renovation, not of political reforms. Let there be no false analogies or attempts to declare democracy unfit for Eastern consumption. Let us rather concentrate upon the method by which democracy can be made to apply in the East. Prof. Mukerjee and many others want a democracy upon an Eastern basis, but if we look closely, we shall find that in its upper structure this Eastern democracy resembles its Western sister as one drop of water resembles another, while in its lower structure it is overburdened with functions which in this simple form it could never perform, because these functions cannot co-exist with the preservation or restoration of village republics. If shocks are to be avoided, all useful attributes of the village republics will be treated with respect and, when possible, they will even be strengthened. But this does not alter the fact that the self-contained village republic is a hopeless basis, not only politically, but spiritually, morally, and economically.

What is needed to harmonise democracy with the mentality of the East and to make it agree, at least in its lower structures, with the existing order, is development of traditional institutions and of village economy. This leads us to the third directing line of the future, differentiation according to needs, but inside the frame of unity that is being perfected.

Third directing line: Differentiation according to needs inside the frame of unity

As the policy of differentiation according to needs progresses, the prospect must become more promising, for its possibilities are endless. Without giving up any of the lofty ideals of unity, collaboration, and democracy, it nevertheless works in each field according to its nature. It saves us from mass production, and assures us a rich future, where innumerable cultural germs can develop, fructify, and fertilise each other. This way has been fol-

lowed with growing determination for half a century. The devoted study of customary law, the warm sympathy felt in the West for Eastern art, literature, and wisdom were not merely the whim of fashion. And the study of synthesis as practised in the ancient world has given us the certitude that these prodromes of synthesis were bound to come, even if they had not already arrived. We can be sure that these signs are no accident. They are historical necessities, and they show us to be upon the threshold of a new era.

In the Dutch East Indies, colonial policy is certainly steaming full speed ahead in the direction of synthesis by applying the policy of differentiation in a matter of fact way. The grant of autonomy and self-government to small and large territories, democratic decentralisation, and administrative division based on old Indonesian units, juridical circles, and potential national connections all display the will to act in this spirit. Much is still wanting, but the understanding that has been acquired steadily gains ground. Once the great guiding lines have detached themselves from the chaos, all deviations will be put right. The main thing is that these lines are already fixed and that there is no lack of men working to make them into a reality.

The case of the Indonesian states and of the village units provides a good illustration of this policy. If a system of abstention were followed towards the autonomous states, there could be no question of an active policy of differentiation. If there were systematic annexation and strong centralisation, the idea of differentiation would be violated in the opposite direction. But the golden mean has been chosen, first owing to practical considerations, and now owing to ideal reasons of equality. In the Dutch East Indies the states cover more than half the surface of the country, and they show the capacity of Eastern institutions and law to develop along their own lines once they are carefully guided by wise leadership. Had they been left to their own fate, the virtues of this policy could never have shone forth. The conditions in these territories, which as yet from a modern angle of vision are none too happy, would have been less hopeful. As Professor Logemann says ¹⁾:

¹⁾ J. H. A. Logemann, *Over enkele Vraagstukken eener Indische Staatsrechtsbeoefening* 1927, p. 20.

To withhold the right support from Indonesian institutions throws upon them an unjust appearance of helplessness, which can easily strengthen the scornful opinion of those concerned who do not know where the shoe pinches. It may make them wish for soulless unification.

It is necessary therefore to induce all living customary law and all living forms of organisation to expand in a range of country which is strange to them, where new social, economic, and political relations, and above all, a new feeling of life and a widening social horizon can accrete to them. As Professor Logemann remarks, "The two questions which are most important are that of marking out the proper field of activity of these indigenous organisms, and that of fittingly ordering their authority". The better functioning of Indonesian states and village autonomies and the organisation of village-federations are an expression of differentiation according to needs inside the frame of unity. So is the building of Indonesian jurisdiction in the sphere of modern needs. Here again it is not unification of law and jurisdiction, or abstention, but development along their own lines that is needed. For, as Professor Ter Haar writes ¹⁾, the Dutch East Indian legislator is not placed between the Scylla of government jurisdiction and the Charybdis of Indonesian jurisdiction as it is working to-day. Between them there is a perfectly navigable fairway, the natural development of what is the people's own, along its own lines.

Professor Ter Haar gives a typical instance of the way in which this channel can be navigated. A jurist, a specialist in customary law, was entrusted by the government of the Dutch East Indies with the task of studying, as closely as possible, the methods and practice of Batak jurisdiction, and of issuing after a few years an extensive report on his experience, indicating the direction in which the judicature in Central Batakland should be developed in accordance with social needs. Such local studies, which will enable the central legislature to indicate some directing lines that will itself be supplemented by regional regulations, form the real method for the living formation of law, guarantee the maintenance of the law in a manner that will find response in the popular soul, and respect the frame of unity.

¹⁾ B. Ter Haar, *Een Keerpunt in de Adatrecht-politiek*, Kol. Studiën, June 1928, pp. 260 sqq.

Differentiation according to needs imposed a similar line of conduct in economic matters. A living and happy example of this policy is the effort to adapt the small rural banks to the peculiar features of corporative village life. They are a transition form of traditional co-operation (with a communal character) which fits in with the popular mind and prepares it for modern co-operation on the basis of selection. Private co-operative credit did not succeed, for reasons which have been given above. Notwithstanding the criticisms which have been made of this policy, it was an act of wisdom to fall back upon the old corporative village-unit. One can already see how the population likes its small village banks, and would no longer care to be without them, while at the same time its interest in several old institutions is waning. If the central authorities had not taken their duty so seriously, if they had looked on as outsiders at the decomposition of the old cohesion, without understanding that self-exertion cannot be waited for and must be stimulated by adapting special transition forms to its successive stages of growth, the resulting situation would have been pitiable.

The encouragement of a self-renovation of Eastern society and of its institutions is not enough. Here we come to the second aspect of the third guiding line. Differentiation must be according to needs, but inside the frame of unity. This qualification of a principle which is, nevertheless, absolute, scarcely requires any explanation, for after all that has been said about the need of a sense of unity, it is self-evident. All the influences which are rushing down upon these old spheres and institutions, and which cannot be averted by human power, come from a wide and dynamic sphere. That is why the popular soul can withstand the shock only by unfolding itself into stronger forms, able to weather the onslaught of the spirit of the times.

It is for this reason that self-renovation is needed, and that it must lead upwards, and towards a wider horizon and to the vistas that lie beyond, to a great unity. Thus the real differentiation according to needs which takes by the hand, as it were, those who require its assistance and addresses them all in their own language and in accordance with their own needs must by the same deed lift them up towards the consciousness of unity. For it is the unity of wider circles of interest, of universally valid truths, of

abstract morality, of world traffic, of science, and of large-scale collaboration as a result of mutual dependence in the widest sphere that will endow the spirit of the times with a trumpet call to humanity.

The comparison of society with a living organism like the human body has been somewhat overdone. The simile only applies to certain aspects of the social organism. But one of the characteristics common to both terms of the comparison is the inner necessity of harmony between the organs and their functions. There is a great mutual dependence between all the organs, which is recognised, confirmed, and glorified by the collective constructions of ligaments, blood vessels, nervous system, and muscles, all of which are carried by the mighty structure of the frame of unity, which is thereby invested with a flourishing organic life. Independent functioning of any of these organs harms the whole, and failure to function on the part of an organ causes a disturbance of the entire body. All this applies with equal strength to the organically united state that is being born. The more it absorbs independent and quasi-independent Eastern organisms, the more the initially unconscious endeavour to achieve a harmonious distribution of the public task and an internal ordination of central and local organs enters into the consciousness of policy. And, inversely, organisms which used to be independent now show themselves to be linked up by the ligaments of the greater society and are therefore felt as irregularly functioning organisms.

When, therefore, Professor Logemann points out that the question of apportioning their right task to Indonesian institutions, and of fittingly ordering their authority should precede the efforts to find a suitable position for them in the political structure, his basic idea should not be misunderstood. These institutions are intimately connected with a self-sufficient produce economy, with the early phases of the division of labour, and with the world of ideas of magical mysticism. This ideology is being slowly but radically altered by the influence of education, the press, traffic, trade, and the thousand whispers which penetrate from the outside world into the smallest community. Money circulation and rational production are one by one breaking all these non-communicating vessels and bringing into existence economic basins that have continually greater dimensions. Since the preservation

of public order by the authorities has brought about the atrophy of some formerly very essential organs of the smaller bodies one can no longer believe that there is a single popular institution or a single popular conception that can be preserved in the old form, precisely because these old institutions belong to the old environment which nowhere in the world remains what it has been and will deviate more and more in the future. And let it also be remembered that, as we saw in our fourth chapter, customary law was adapting itself to the changes of environment even before the first contacts between East and West.

It is self-evident, therefore, that the mere study of the old environment and its organisms and functions would lead us astray, if we did not at the same time carefully take into account the process of mutation which everywhere transforms separatisms into centres of power in the midst of the great dynamic sphere. We are confronted with a single process, in which the laws of organic unity will be felt less and less as a mere completion, and more and more as the directives of the work of apportioning the right functions to the organisms of Eastern life as parts of the whole. Only by respecting this organic unity can we create the right functions, the right organs, and the right ligaments. Or rather, we shall not create them, but encourage them to grow under good tutorship. Those who would try to preserve the old institutions without paying attention to the change of environment would indeed be placing life under a lid of lead.

Let us remind ourselves continually that Indonesian institutions and forms of thought are by no means exclusively Indonesian or Eastern, that no small part of them has existed at some time throughout the world in corresponding social conditions. Let us beware of wanting to chain the East to antiquated forms which can no longer serve as a dwelling for the new spirit. This would be doing an injustice to this spirit as definitely as if one imposed upon it Western forms in violation of its nature. The cause of synthesis is not helped by the worship of form. Nor can one calculate some nice formula, indicating precisely in how far the old forms can be retained and in how far they must go by the board. The method which is gaining increasing favour with colonial statesmanship is by far the best: there are no formulas, there is no worship of form. Life itself is made to pronounce, and therefore it can only

be through living contact with the human element that development along right lines can be guaranteed to the colonial world. Our ancestors made the right beginning when they allowed the autochthonous population to live under their own chiefs, though under Western supervision, while their institutions, customs and conceptions were respected. The right continuation of this policy was the education of princes, chiefs, and leaders, and of a corps of indigenous officials, to enable them to co-operate with Western officials. It is the men formed by this method that have insisted upon the need of local differentiation and have been representative of the policy of administrative decentralisation. It is principally they who, by daily contact with the formerly self-sufficient little units, have first felt the need for new ligaments and stronger forms of growth.

These men had a great advantage over the ordinary population. They knew what was happening, they knew that their task was the protection and the preparation of the population for self-exertion and self-defence. Without them abstention or uniformity would have become the watchword of colonial policy. They have worked for differentiation according to needs within the frame of unity, and they have kept active the contact of the authorities with the people. Without such contact, as long as the population was unable to express its needs, there would never have been such a differentiation. At the same time local vision would have been even less able to organise adhesion of all the crumbling old connections to the frame of unity. Modern political decentralisation also comes down from above and could not at present fulfil without guidance and supervision from the local administration even a percentage of the task which this administration has hitherto honourably fulfilled.

Modern political decentralisation is undoubtedly an accessory of differentiation according to needs, but this does not mean that downward democratic decentralisation is always the right way of respecting popular character, and preparing it for self-exertion. For the people are by no means everywhere favourably disposed towards such alien democratic forms, and would probably much prefer the system recommended by Visman, who favours a suppler and more appropriate decentralisation on a large scale which would transfer greater powers to the traditional Indonesian

chiefs¹⁾. Such a form of decentralisation, which would in our time easily lead to the growth of an administration with what has been called an "aristo-democratic" character, can often be much better conciliated with differentiation according to needs and with the influence of local knowledge and general unity embodied in Western administrative direction.

When such an organisation, consisting in the establishment of de-concentrated Indonesian units in territory under direct Dutch administration, corresponding in some respects with the self-governing states in territory under indirect administration, ensures to the population the development of its own institutions and to the central government a satisfactory measure of control and supervision, it deserves preference for that region above decentralisation boards, modern suffrage, and a method which leads to Western formalism. Intermediary forms may also be found suitable. The main aim must remain that a democratic popular authority shall be enabled to grow, along lines of its own without disturbance of balance, into a wider and higher sphere.

But however decentralisation may be organised for the sake of differentiation according to needs, the right task and the right ordination of Eastern institutions are but another aspect of the settlement of the relation of the whole towards its parts, because the question is not one of the mechanical correlation of independent parts, but of the organic differentiation and interdependence of members. If this intimate growth is not yet achieved, the process nevertheless is in full swing, and that is why the task of organising Indonesian institutions has become a dominant problem. It is to this natural development, guided by living contacts, that we owe "the recognition of the Indonesian institutions which have been preserved as the fully equivalent part of an adequately differentiated state-organisation", as Professor Logemann expresses it. It always remains the same question: how can Eastern talents and inclinations unfold themselves and live to the full inside the frame of unity?

In this sense, Professor Ter Haar, pointing to the efforts of the government to bring all relations and arrangements in the Dutch

¹⁾ F. H. Visman, *Herstel van Zelfbesturen*, Kol. Stud. Aug. 1928, p. 103—133. H. T. Damsté, *Balische Bestuursproblemen*, Ind. Genootschap, 28 May, 1923.

colonies as much as possible into accord with historic growth, declares that with the agreement on such a principle, the elements of a solution have not yet been found. He mentions the presence of new factors, such as the existence of an élite educated in the Western sense, modern administrative methods, modern traffic and education, and the presence of large cities, and concludes, "These contrasts, which permeate the Dutch East Indies, make necessary certain provisions. What these provisions are is a question which a plan for making the Western administration fit in as far as possible with historic growth does not even attempt to answer".

One has reason to fear that a one-sided conception might easily find in the guiding principle of adaptation to the products of historic growth a source for dangerous criticism. If the principle were too rigidly applied, it would strangle the small village banks, the village schools and various co-operative organs, and might do the same to a hundred new forms of life, which cannot be found in the collections of ancient customary law. Only when a sufficient broadness of judgement is attempted, taking into account the needs of the frame of unity, both in the present and in the future, will the advice to the authorities in favour of adaptation to the historic growth be justified. Otherwise it will only amount to the renunciation of life in favour of form and the sacrifice of the spirit to a rule, of the present to the past, and of the future to the present. Help that proceeded in this way would do more harm than good to the population.

All the more to be commended are those who see clearly and who, while prepared to fit in where possible with the past, are trying to assist in the search for all that is elevating within the frame of unity. All collaboration from *savants*, official and private advisers, and others, in the performance of this task is to be welcomed. The example of Japan shows that this method can nowhere be applied with more success than where the mystic reverence and pious loyalty of the Eastern soul have embraced Eastern institutions. The presence of some three hundred Indonesian states in the Dutch East Indies, a number which one would like to see even increased, is as good a point of connection for evolution as the reverence for the Emperor, and the group, village, and clan-connection in Japan. The preservation of government by popular

headmen, of Indonesian jurisdiction and of traditional indigenous officials in territory under direct administration also form an ideal contact between the old and the new. True democratic decentralisation would in many territories appear for the time being to consist mainly in the recognition of the old territorial units, and of the village federations that still subsist as legal communities with a high measure of autonomy and self-government, not in the establishment of decentralised regions with modern local boards, suffrage, and so on. The latter method seems to carry forward most rapidly the process favoured, and appears especially to give better chances to the more educated to work for the public good as members of the boards. But often a danger signal shows in this direction.

The modern élite must be persuaded that it has to contribute to the enrichment of autochthonous life, to acquire and to preserve contact with the popular soul and with the institutions which have been entrusted to it, instead of seeking its exclusive salvation in ultra-democratic institutions for which these few may be ready, whereas the many certainly are not. Moreover, the Indonesian states and the position of the corresponding units in the directly administered territories in certain circumstances offer a much richer and more active function for the élite than, in the first phase of evolution, do decentralisation boards, which generally are too far away from Eastern life and give therefore an immense stimulus to oratorical talent. Necessarily, the different territories make different claims. Nowhere can salvation be expected from Eastern institutions unless they can absorb the dynamic element and utilise it. Against this it can be asserted that modern decentralisation, which some people obstinately defend as the only means available and as an unassailable principle, would often enough do but scant justice to the old institutions, benefitting only a few individualistic persons who have had Western schooling.

Although Japan has kept the individualistic element at arm's length, gigantic progress has proved to be possible. The authority of the Emperor and the "House" are for Japan what the Indonesian states, the popular institutions, and the village autonomies, are in the Dutch East Indies. By being absorbed into the frame of unity, popular institutions are lifted up and can become effi-

cient, as they have done in Japan. Organic functions can be given a character of permanence, not by being frozen into rigidity, but by self-renovation under guidance and supervision.

In this connection Professor Ter Haar asks whether, from the point of view of the jurisdiction of villages and village-federations, the legislator

"will allow a wild growing plant to continue or whether he will decide the precise place to which it is entitled, not hesitating to give it expert guidance and even to prune it. . . . The great difficulty about village jurisdiction resides in this contradiction: on the one hand the heads of the small legal entities are the natural and indispensable preservers of customary law, they are the custodians of legal order inside the villages. . . . on the other hand the large power of jurisdiction held by these heads of small communities, whose view is often restricted to the village territory and whose education is often lower than that of many of the villagers, is liable to run counter to the up-springing consciousness of justice and to lead to tyranny."

This is a problem which also arises in Japan, on account of the preservation of the authority of the House; but Japan has been well served by this preservation, because every person can appeal to the central authorities and to the courts of justice. Here lies the cardinal point of contact between the old and the new, and this applies to the Dutch East Indies also. Professor Ter Haar does not believe that the authorities ought to leave village justice to its own devices, because by giving it legal recognition, customary law is lifted up from the twilight into the open day, but also because means must be found to prevent village justice from serving also as a means of administration. There are, however, still considerable difficulties that prevent the immediate codification of customary law. During the process of evolution Eastern society is well served with the flexibility of customary law, while moreover the government does not fully understand its contents, and would be liable to introduce misinterpretations into its codification. Therefore the author we are considering thinks that not much can be done beyond the provision of a good judicial organisation, good rules of procedure, and good judges. He only wants general rules to be laid down, so that variety can be introduced according to local needs and in agreement with customary law. Guarantees such as collaboration on the part of the population

when the rules are fixed, the appointment of an expert in customary law to assist Governors or Residents, and the publication in the appendix of the official gazette of the arrangements made would enable village justice to continue to satisfy most social needs.

Even if one does not agree in every detail with the views advanced by Professor Ter Haar, one can see at a glance that they are a serious effort to lift up Indonesian justice by contact with the frame of unity, while allowing it to develop along its own lines. For details we would refer the reader to the second chapter of our second volume, which deals more particularly with the administration of justice in the Dutch East Indies. But we must now pass to the application of the same guiding principle to future political construction in the Dutch East Indies. As Professor van Vollenhoven remarks ¹⁾: "Decentralisation and de-concentration for the East must — as is being recognised more and more — not consist in Western importations only, but also in adaptation to the conditions obtaining in Eastern communities". The interesting consideration given by this author can be summarised in a conclusion which he draws elsewhere ²⁾; he agrees that the gaps in our knowledge of Eastern constitutional law and the imperfect wording in which it is couched impose upon the higher and the lower legislator the duty not of leaving the living elements of Indonesian constitutional law in the background, or of derogating them to the second rank, but of fitting them into one harmonious organic whole with Western elements.

Whatever author one consults, if he is familiar with these problems, one will find that he always sees the necessity of widening the horizon and of raising the zenith, and for this reason none of these authors will fail to begin at the foundations; that is, an existing Eastern sub-structure. This it is which they contemplate with the greatest attention, to this they put their enterprising hand, not in order to preserve it in its entirety for the pleasure of tourists and antiquarians, but in order to strengthen existing elements as the basis of the building on which Western leadership will place the mighty dome of unity which is held in readiness.

¹⁾ Van Vollenhoven, *De Lagere Rechtsgemeenschappen Overzee*, Kol. Tijdschr., May 1928, pp. 258—259.

²⁾ Van Vollenhoven, *Herkomst en Kracht van het Overzeesche Staatsrecht*, Kol. Tijdschr., Jan. 1928, p. 5.

Fourth guiding line: Linking up nationalism with the work of construction

The fourth guiding line of the future, which links up with the foregoing, is the metamorphosis of the sterile and destructive nationalism of antithesis into a fruitful civic spirit and a constructive patriotism animated by the spirit of synthesis. It determines, as we have already noted, the direction of the second guiding line which consists in co-operation instead of antithesis on the part of the Eastern élite. We have seen how much more constructive work remains to be done at the foundations, and many people may have concluded anew that this work is the most important, and that the institution of proto-parliaments is premature, all the more as so many states in Europe and in the Near East have now established a semi-dictatorial régime. The lessons learned in China, Japan, and Siam point in the same direction. They are a warning against full-blown democracy, although they prove nothing against Bryce's greatest saying that "no government demands so much from the citizen as democracy, and none gives so much back".

In the colonial world the natural sequence has been inverted. It has been necessary to give almost everything, and only then has it been possible to make those demands which the democratic idea is entitled to impose on every nation. This is an unnatural situation, and one bound to have dire results. It has created an artificial democratic atmosphere, with the right of assembly, freedom of speech and of the press, which is entirely alien to the patriarchal sphere and the mystical cohesion with which all popular institutions are intimately connected. In Eastern states there has been much less liberality in bestowing these privileges of democracy: this was possible because the spirit of antithesis had no hold upon the people. In Japan it seems as though, after half a century, the Osaka press has emancipated itself. But with a little attention one can discover how it still considers as sacred a certain territory which is pre-eminently the playground of the press in the colonial world.

If the Dutch authorities are trying to protect popular institutions, the authority of Indonesian rulers, reverence, and piety, they must not try at the same time to call into being too suddenly an ultra-individualistic democracy in their own sphere. For it

is vain to expect that the popular mentality will escape from these dissolving influences. Since all traditional authority is nowadays intimately connected with the East Indian government, the destruction of the basis upon which the latter rests also drags down the former. When acid influences work upon it, traditional authority crumbles. If in Japan, Siam, or China complete licence had been allowed, the pillars of antiquity would have fallen to earth. Can one really believe that what could not be borne by the populations of so many European and South American states would be innocuous to the tender Indonesian soul after a matter of twenty years?

No form of government makes such exacting demands as democracy, and it can give an adequate return only in an environment where it is realised that true freedom consists in voluntary service and submission. Eastern states make their own decisions; in the archipelago where the population cannot yet decide, Dutch leadership must do so, and it can allow all democratic liberties, establish proto-parliaments, put local boards with elected members in the place of government by popular headmen, and introduce universal individualistic and direct suffrage and encourage Western party-politics as the *ne plus ultra* of the modern era. All this can be done, but it would not be wise statesmanship to decree immediate full-blown democracy, rather than the necessary careful preparation for its ultimate attainment. Where two villages can scarcely be persuaded to put their resources together, there can be no question yet of the broad civic sense which is at the basis of democracy. The conjunction of democracy and immature popular forces would only bring forth anarchic freedom.

All the trouble taken by practical workers and scholars to protect and study Indonesian institutions, with a view to utilising their real democratic functions, all the efforts of Dutch colonial policy would be in vain. It is obvious that the immediate and complete transfer of power to a democratically elected Parliament would amount to a dereliction of duty and responsibility toward the population. No, whatever the hasty reformers who identify the self-renovation of society with the establishment of parliamentary institutions may say, there must be an organic evolution. Reforms must follow in the tracks of the Japanese, whose reverence for their Emperor, whose "House" traditions and respect for

the village and the clan have enabled them to evolve successfully into a modern nation.

We may be sure, therefore, that there must have been very serious reasons for the establishment of semi-parliamentary institutions in the Eastern states and in the colonial world. That they have a many-sided utility cannot be denied. They open to Eastern personalities a chance to devote themselves, and to learn how to devote themselves to the public cause in the widest possible sphere, and they avoid the mistake made by Rome, which attempted decentralisation without a convergence that brought the parts back to unity. It ensures publicity for legislation and budgeting, affords a forum for all grievances, and a check upon the administration. But there are also many drawbacks. They are not in these organs, but outside them, and would not disappear with their suppression, which does not prevent the proto-parliaments from giving them a sanction they would otherwise lack. Preparations for the democratic form of government automatically create an entirely new atmosphere: the representative idea necessitates a one-sided and therefore highly unnatural effort to organise people, who passively allow themselves to be represented, into societies and into parties, which exercise an utterly un-Eastern influence. The distance between those who have even a modest education upon a modern basis and the bulk of the population is in the Indies usually so great, that no actual superiority, no true civic spirit, no social devotion is necessary, and therefore, without having struggled with the difficulties of life, people can acquire prestige and influence, a situation which weakens self-education and self-control to no small degree. Many of them in all sincerity go to the masses and impart to them their illusions; they speak at meetings and write in the newspapers about freedom, without mentioning the duties that must go with freedom. Life usually may soon obliterate the greater part of immature theories, but part of them continues to work, to the detriment of authority, of popular institutions, and the harmony of Indonesian society.

We may safely assert that the creation of proto-parliaments gives a stimulus to unhealthy and premature Westernisation, that it makes society top-heavy, and that its ill effects increase as the one-sided preoccupation with the top of the building becomes

more marked in other directions as well. Who continues to take an interest in the uninteresting village, which nevertheless houses from 80 to 90 per cent of a thousand million Eastern people? Who maintains his interest in the still less interesting agricultural worker, by whose spiritual and material progress nevertheless nations must stand or fall? The Eastern élite should not despise modest work in rural surroundings and should help in the fight against social evils and encourage its backward brethren to strive after self-renovation. For those who really wish to do useful work for the population can achieve great things in any village in the course of a lifetime.

Those who wish to alleviate the burden of taxation and to bring prosperity to the population can find ample occupation in writing constructive articles for the press, or in using their experience as teachers, or as officers of the sanitation and irrigation services, in the institutions for popular credit, in agricultural demonstration work by means of small model-farms, etc. Real civic sense can employ itself in the difficult task of furthering the co-operative movement, in doing propaganda for better methods of production, for government welfare work, as is being done by special societies in Japan. On the other hand it is very easy, by opposing sound evolutionary methods, to turn even welfare and hygiene work, the provision of model dwellings, into an active source of discontent. In the Dutch East Indies efforts on the part of the authorities to standardise weights met for this reason with distrust, although the existing chaos was most harmful to the population. Such an improvement cannot be imposed by decree; the élite ought to consider it their task to explain its utility to the population. This is what would happen in Japan. One cannot expect the officials to do everything. Even the popular health service and the co-operative movement still lack this indispensable support.

The young national élite of the Dutch East Indies is not the only one in whose ranks many are serving the wrong cause. The President of China and his helpers continually complain of the same difficulty. In Japan a serious purge has recently proved necessary, and all over the colonial world the same complaint can be heard. These difficulties are greatly increased by the influence of communist propaganda. Once one has observed the methods

of subversive propaganda, one understands how it can succeed even in Japan. It is rather a subject for wonder that the good has still so much strength that it can neutralise the poison to a large extent. But this propaganda deserves no mercy. For it is too much to expect that the population will learn wisdom by itself. In its former secluded condition it would have been capable of strong defensive action, but in the present stage of transition it is unable to cleanse its blood from this virus.

The doctrine of antithesis has in any case in the nationalistic sentiment if it is devoid of real civic spirit an auxiliary whose danger is due to the fact that it may seduce sincere minds mainly because outwardly it seems to be idealistic. Therefore its international ally, communistic propaganda, must be refused access to the colonial world: otherwise people's attention will be distracted more than ever from the only necessary things, and constructive deeds will be forced to give place still further to mechanical interpretations of the mysterious process of social growth. Of this the East has no need. What it needs is men who are prepared to devote their whole life to modest evolutionary activity, avoiding all worldly display, at one with their rural environment and animated by the great and sacred purpose of assuring spiritual, moral, and material progress to their small circle. But according to Mayhew (p. 213) this ideal, even in progressive India, is still far from realisation:

Meanwhile we find an acceptance of insincerity which, morally quite as much as intellectually, is disastrous. The most eloquent at social reform conferences have allowed their infant daughters to be married, refused marriage to child-widows, and voted against proposals for raising the age of consent. Those who have thundered against class and race distinctions have supported locally the exclusion of outcastes from village school and well. In all this there is no wilful hypocrisy. On the platform they enunciate in all sincerity sentiments that are a real part of their educational apparatus and professional life. But in their conduct they are obeying forces that lie outside their professional life and sway their whole personality.

This insincerity makes people take the side of inertia and particularism for the sake of vainglory, and imposes upon them an attitude of protest against all good reforms on the part of the authorities. Mayhew describes, for instance, how the Indian government was unable to follow the example given in the educa-

tional establishment of Hardwar and in Tagore's growing university of "Shantiniketan" at Bolpur, "because of the suspicion that has invariably been aroused, and will continue to be aroused, by any vigorous change of policy". A proposal to found a new university in healthy rural surroundings "was ascribed solely to a wish to segregate the student from the national or political life of Nagpur". Suggestions for the wider use of the vernacular in Indian schools were considered to be a threat to Indian unity, a regrettable misunderstanding in view of the complaint that is always heard about the favoured treatment of the English language. It is curious to note that in the Dutch East Indies education in Dutch has been treated by some critics as a manifestation of "monstrous imperialism". And meanwhile the fact remains that if such misunderstandings continue to be fostered Western leadership can no longer act according to its own lights and its objective judgement.

Rather than continue the enumeration of such errors, condemn them in a sterile fashion and utter cheap advice about self-control, let us try to see what is their cause. Mayhew attributes the contrast between words and deeds to the restricted development of the personality, for which Western education and the present social structure are responsible. According to him, the noisiest leaders lack moral courage and perseverance, and choose the easiest way to notoriety. This, however, is a phenomenon which is not absent in the West and which can therefore not be called exclusively Eastern. East or West, this attitude is remarkable for the same anxious care with which it avoids telling its audience anything that might displease it, and it would certainly never dream of inviting people to search their own hearts.

The disdain, not only for the right word, but for the necessary deed of devotion performed in obscurity away from the main road, the waste of energy by almost the whole press, by various societies and by the non-co-operative movement, all these evils, many people will say, would be just the same if there were no proto-parliaments. This is a profound mistake. The national antithesis would still exist in the colonial world, many people would still place notoriety above social self-sacrifice, but one thing would be absent, the atmosphere of unreality which the proto-parliament brings with it. It creates the illusion that the

goal has been reached. A semblance acquires shape without becoming real, and unsocial abstentionism finds a sanction in political activity. The parliamentary atmosphere may become a danger to the East, because there the only thing needed for the time being is work at the foundations.

Can one imagine a more beautiful task, one more useful, and one more eminently national than the study of customary law, of the essence and the function of popular institutions, especially with the help of the accumulated resources of modern economic, sociological, legal, and political science? Yet, in the Dutch East Indies, 99 per cent of this work is done by Dutch *savants*, officials, jurists, and missionaries¹⁾. The same applies to well-nigh all other kinds of intellectual and social work.

Mayhew, as we have already stated, explains this abstentionism and the frame of mind of the educated class by the failure of Western education in the East "to reach the individual personality and educate it, by the suggestion of other influences than those of tradition and surroundings". But this explanation, which makes it clear why so many intellectuals follow the line of least resistance and adopt popular and reactionary modes of self-expression, throws no light upon the mentality of those who explain to an audience their objections to social evils, but afterwards return home and support all these evils and practise them. No education could develop the heroic personality for which Mayhew calls, unless the environment co-operated in the educational task.

For the personality is not an individualistic atom. Situated in an Eastern environment with entirely different traditions, a personality of the kind which Mayhew visualises would lose literally all contact with it, and, owing to the larger horizon which it has acquired, would separate itself and degenerate into a social hermit, an amphibious being or an unsocial individual. Education must not aim at such giant strides; it should leave the individual in his surroundings, giving him so much insight and social sense that he can work as a leaven, and not as an iconoclast. The moral distance between a man and his circle should not be too considerable; he must feel at home with his environment, and, while seeing its shortcomings, gradually instil better ideas

¹⁾ Van Vollenhoven, *De Ontdekking van het Adatrecht*, 1928, p. 183.

rather than urge his views upon his relatives and friends. This is the most natural and the most fruitful attitude, but a strong personality would often be unable to exercise the requisite self-control.

Education, therefore, cannot be made responsible for the lack of personal courage. The explanation of all indifference, of the contrast between words and deeds and of the support given by a negative nationalism to the antithesis lies in the lack of insight as to the one thing needed. Orientals have thought that technique, science, and organisation, and especially guns, are the secret of the West. The spirit of the West was overlooked, and the inner force which is its real mystery. The reticence of Western manhood, which shrinks from self-revelation, is responsible for these misconceptions. It is time, therefore, that the West should bear witness to its more intimate motives. It has admitted the East to its tree of knowledge, let it now also reveal its tree of life. We have dealt with these precious possessions of the West in our third chapter, we have spoken of its civic spirit, its personality, its love of truth, its sense of freedom. We have mentioned the unselfish devotion of inventors and technicians, of tens of thousands of social workers in the midst of every Western nation. It is time that the veil should be rent and that the East should know the West as it really is.

It will never be possible to point out to the East the way for which it is groping, if is not made clear that the real and only difference is the wider social horizon of the West. We must proclaim that the real and only difference that matters is this wider horizon. We must proclaim that the real dynamic force from which science, technique, and organisation draw their elixir of life is the civic consciousness which animates this wide sphere of applied morality, and that therefore the parliamentary form of government is impossible where this strength is absent or weakened. We must proclaim that this sphere would never have been extended over the West to its full social extent without the influence of the second commandment of Christianity, and without a serious effort to rise to the highest spiritual zenith by striving to fulfil its first commandment. Spiritually, the East has aimed at a lofty zenith and a wide horizon, but it has failed to adhere to the right direction and in observing the second commandment it

has allowed the great unity of society to drop into fragments, into millions of groups, with the result that the elevating influence of the spiritual zenith was unable or scarcely able to reach the millions.

The exclusiveness of the group, the indifference of the members of each group towards all outsiders, this is the ground of the unpleasant phenomenon we have just described, and this also is what gives significance to popular education, information, the co-operative movement, and above all to the metamorphosis of the village republic into a village autonomy, part of a greater whole and no longer a separate and self-contained entity. The di-thyrambs of Western and Eastern thinkers in honour of "self-contained" villages are utterly ill-founded.

It is of course not surprising that in their ignorance of the real West some members of the Eastern élite should act as they do. If we try to place ourselves in their position, we shall realise that we should behave in the same way. They are in the position of the artist who has to exercise a trade or a profession for the sake of earning a living. He submits to all the rules of his profession, and may even be able to speak most convincingly about them. But no sooner has he finished the daily task than he escapes entirely from its discipline. Is this really a case of a double life, as Mayhew would have it? These purely external acts and words cannot be called a side of a man's life. In any case, such amphibianism as there is is not merely the result of "Western literature and thought which cannot reach the core of Indian life".

Education has a large share in determining the state of affairs, but it cannot be held responsible. The cause is the identification of the essence of the West with externals like machinery, the party-system, suffrage, parliament, the emancipation of classes and of woman. It is this complex that causes the Eastern élite to absorb in a mechanical way the mottoes and the knowledge of the West while their hearts remain absolutely cold. Their own feelings remain attached to tradition and custom, even if they are not compatible with human dignity, and at the same time their minds turn away from many traditional institutions which they recognise as utterly useless in the process of evolution.

When the intelligentsia has made these Western externals its own, it waits for the miracle and, when nothing happens, it be-

comes profoundly disappointed. The Westernised intellectual often does not expect salvation from his own "antiquated" and "narrow" institutions and would consider it beneath his dignity to study or to strengthen them. Yet, all the while, the Eastern feeling is unwillingly attracted towards these venerable relics of an honourable past. The thing that is loved is mocked. At the same time there is growing disbelief in the justification of Western leadership. The élite possesses more knowledge than 90 per cent of the Occidentals themselves, and does not see, therefore, why it should be guided by the West. They are better acquainted with the weaknesses of the West than with those of the East, for never before has a civilisation published its failures with the frankness of the West. All the while the real secret of the West remains completely hidden. No wonder then that these educated Orientals mock in their heart the West which their intellects want to imitate, and that they mock in their mind the Eastern institutions from which their hearts cannot be torn away. The worst fate that can befall a man, the disturbance of the harmony between head and heart, visits these people twice over.

It is therefore the greatest task of all the servants of synthesis in international as well as in colonial affairs to clear up this tragic misunderstanding. It must be made abundantly clear that the secret of the West resides in the same sphere that is so dear to the East. Both are akin in this respect, and their difference lies in the direction of their urge towards the eternal and in the width of their horizon. That is all, and it means that nothing is needed but the ascent and the widening out of the spirit as a sure means of progress. When this understanding is reached, a powerful current of healthy interests will be directed towards Eastern popular institutions, in which spirit and soul will at last detect a high moral significance and the germs of a magnificent national future. When this insight is reached, there will be an ardent endeavour to reach the innermost self of the spirit of the West, and to take from it the strength needed for the unfolding of Eastern capacities. Then will the era of synthesis have been truly reached. The better functioning of village autonomy will cause more joy than the establishment of a parliament, loyal agricultural co-operation will be seen as the breaking of a happy dawn, and thousands of educated people will listen to the call of their fellow countrymen

and devote themselves to fundamental work. For such workers the doctrines of antithesis will have no attraction.

Professor Hu Shih, the spiritual father of the Chinese Renaissance, realised most of this when he wrote ¹⁾:

The real problem, therefore, may be re-stated thus: How can we best assimilate modern civilisation in such a manner as to make it congenial and congruous and continuous with the civilisation of our own making. This larger problem presents itself in every phase of the great conflict between the old civilisation and the new. In art, in literature, in politics, and in social life in general, the underlying problem is fundamentally the same. The solution of this great problem, as far as I can see, will depend solely on the foresight and the sense of historical continuity of the intellectual leaders of New China, and on the tact and skill with which they can successfully connect the best in modern civilisation with the best in our own civilisation.

We might subscribe to every word used by a man who is perhaps the foremost personality of China's cultural life, were it not that by wanting to "connect" the best in the East and in the West he runs the risk of being interpreted as wanting a kind of Janus-policy, a social and political mosaic of Eastern and Western elements. Such advice always leads to a wrong application of sound principles, to a mechanical conception of cultural fecundation, with the result that Eastern and Western cultural elements are in turn submitted to destructive criticism. In the latter spirit the author, in 1928, ²⁾ was soon led to tender the following advice:

We must throw away our so-called classical heritage and advocate the establishment of a new civilisation. . . . We must know ourselves. What is needed is a deep conviction, which should amount almost to religious repentance, that we Chinese are backward in everything and that every other modern nation in the world is much better off than we are. We must confess that our political life is corrupt to the core and that most of our homes are nests of crime, of injustice, oppression, lynching and suicide. . . . We are only reaping the fruit of the sins of our fathers and of ourselves. . . . Let us no longer deceive ourselves with self-complacent talks about imperialistic powers hampering our national progress and prosperity, let us bury our conceit and self-deception once for all in shame and repentance.

¹⁾ Hu Shih, *The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China*, p. 6.

²⁾ Quoted in *Perniagaan*, Batavia, Nov. 20, 1928.

Although in this statement, as in those of others like Ghosh about the lack of harmony in the Indian joint-family, and of Mukerjee, Cheng Tcheng, etc., too little is made of the enormous difficulties which have to be overcome, or of the promising social reservoir of family, caste and popular institutions, the recognition that the one-sided pictures of Eastern village idylls and the habit of blaming the West for all the wrongs of the East lead nowhere point to the fact that we are nearing a decisive turning point in the relations of East and West. But the counsel to throw away the inheritance of the fathers is not that of the policy of synthesis. Too many proofs of self-sacrifice, of chastity, of feeling for the honour of the family exist in the history of the Chinese and Hindu family.

On the contrary, it is the duty of the whole East to enrich the inheritance of their fathers as their fathers enriched what was handed down to them. Thousands of Chinese voluntarily lay down their lives for their parents, for their family, a proof that the ancient inheritance has virtues upon which the society of the future can rest. All that is needed is to broaden out this spirit of sacrifice into the devotion of the citizen for the public cause and of the human being for the cause of mankind. And while this is being done, no mosaic of East and West is being created, but the sphere of the Eastern soul with its precious treasure of moral and spiritual capacities is widened and strengthened. This is the whole essence of the idea of synthesis, the reason of its dislike for idealistically inspired but indolent superficiality, and the source of its endeavour to conciliate the ideal with practice. No wonder that its intensity goes far beyond that of assimilation and association.

Once it is realised that this is the true and only solution, the means to bring it about are not difficult to find. We have reviewed them in detail in the previous chapter. First needed is a good central state organisation, supported by the steel structure of an administrative and judicial organisation which links up the central government with the people. In the second place there must be a good and untrammelled system of communication, including roads and railways, telegraph, telephone, wireless, post, in order to put an end to exclusivism and isolation. The third requisite is a popular education which, without neglecting the inheritance of the fathers, points out to the children a wider sphere of action than the family, the village, the caste, or the clan. In the fourth

place there must be an active co-operative movement, which, making use of the ancient custom of mutual assistance, also breaks away from exclusiveness and can assure material progress to immense masses of people. What is needed in the fifth place is the switching over of the village states and clan-republics to well functioning village, district, and provincial autonomies which are felt to be the living organs of a great whole. And all this can be assured if the élite puts its hands to the task and starts building up from the foundations.

Now that misunderstandings have been sufficiently set aside we may return to the earlier question, which has not yet been answered, of the place taken by the proto-parliaments in the general architectural scheme. We have seen that considerable disadvantages are connected with these institutions: the unhealthy parliamentary atmosphere which tends to make little of the foundations and the tendency to identify the West with its external characteristics. If these councils and assemblies could be dispensed with, if the consciousness of unity could still be embodied exclusively in the Western colonial authorities, there would be no need of them. The birth of nationalism confronts the policy of synthesis with the dilemma that, while the village even is unable to organise itself by its own strength, the organs of future political units must be established, although this increases to a considerable extent the risks of the identification of external political structures with the gigantic evolutionary task which has still to be fulfilled.

The Council of the People in the Dutch East Indies, the Philippine Assembly, the Indian Dyarchy, the advisory councils of Indo-China, have for direct object the allaying of the distrust felt by the intelligentsia, at the very time when indirectly they also foster this distrust. Let it be remembered that the real task, which is that of dynamising the forces at the bottom of Eastern society, makes a call to the self-exertion, the personality, and the sense of unity of the Eastern élite. Even the metamorphosis of ancient mutual assistance into a rational co-operative system pre-supposes the beginning of civic consciousness. A village autonomy cannot function according to present day requirements unless its leadership has been lifted up into the sphere of civic sense, and the higher autonomies will only work if their leadership sees them as

parts of an organic complex. Village councils, local boards and provincial assemblies will not function properly until the civic sense which must support them can also support the unity of the state.

For evolution follows a different road in the East from in the West. In the West it was in various countries possible to ascend, in successive and natural stages of growth, from the village to the town, from the town to the province or county, from these to federations, and from federations to unified states. In the East everything must take place at the same time, because every colonial territory is already surrounded by the atmosphere of the unified state, already possessed of a structural organisation that cannot recognise as its own any organ which does not function in harmony with the whole. Even the modern village autonomy presupposes a social and economic evolution and an organic unity, which can only be supported by the sense of unity of the population in large, even in very large territories.

It would be perfectly possible to imagine for the future the continuation of the mechanical structure of unity which is supported only by the authority of Western leadership. In such a case the leadership fulfils, by means of its administrative bodies and of its central and local branches of the special services, which are recruited either in the West or in the East, the functions which are needed for the colonial unified state. The government by popular chiefs functions in this organisation as a part of the mechanical super-structure, while in the organic and properly popular sphere it gyrates around thousands of independent miniature axles with which the unified state does not interfere. Such a relation is not unthinkable even for the future, and until recent times it was the only really existing condition. It resembles the static structure of the unified Eastern states of earlier days, in so far as it is considered from the point of view of the popular sphere, with this difference, that the labour of the colonial authorities is infinitely greater because there is no mystic link between them and the popular sphere.

The structure would therefore have to remain entirely mechanical in the future as well, but it would at any rate allow an intense downward activity which would be passively accepted and to which there would be a static reaction, e.g. by a strong increase

of population. Wise authorities would, in such circumstances, pour out their blessings over the population, and give them public order, security, communications, health, emigration, etc. But at a given moment this mechanical relationship would no longer satisfy: a certain phase in government care and in the influence of the outer world would be reached which would tax the authorities beyond their capacity. In the long run a mechanical structure becomes too costly and too dangerous. The growth of government care means the growth of the body of officials, and the people will look upon interference, such as in its own interest is needed for many schemes, as a climax to ancient despotism.

Self-exertion therefore is a release of the pressure of taxation and of psychological pressure, while it helps evolution. It is the pre-requisite of economic and scientific progress, it widens the sphere of activity in every direction and it cannot be tolerant of efforts to exclude the political field from this movement of expansion. It must, therefore, change the mechanical structure into that of an organic body of state, and in view of the fact that it pre-supposes a wider horizon, it implies from the very outset not only the broadening out from the village state into the village autonomy, but even the whole construction of the organic unified state. It is the mainspring of the democratic tendency which follows in the wake of economic progress and becomes perceptible in all states that are modernising themselves. This may sometimes lead to anarchical freedom and necessitate the falling back on a retrogressive form of party or dictatorial government, which, however, nowadays must retain many features of democracy, unless it is ready to kill liberty and initiative in all its forms, not only politically, but also in the field of religion, economy, and science. Actual tyranny nowadays implies a popular mentality which is willing to be satisfied with medieval conditions.

On the other hand, it is just as obvious that the acceptance by an autocratic government of the fundamental principle of democracy, which is the duty to increase the dignity of every human being, implies the encouragement of initiative in all its forms, active or latent, not only in the field of education, science, social and economic progress, but also in the sphere of politics. Our conclusion must be that any government, once it has started along the road of social and economic improvement, will have to face

sooner or later the necessity of creating democratic organs. And that such organs must come into being everyone will recognise. That the logical conclusion of these creations in sub-districts, districts or regencies, and provinces is the establishment of a proto-parliament in the sphere of central legislation is a fact which may receive less universal recognition, but which nevertheless cannot be rejected from historical, sociological, or organisatory considerations ¹⁾. It is a step by which the colonial authorities are showing that they have grasped the full significance of their evolutionary policy and are willing to accept loyally all the consequences.

Of course, by so doing, they place themselves in a position when every step must be taken with the greatest circumspection; at all times a more delicate balance has to be struck than had ever to be aimed at before in the history of statesmanship. One rash step and the gain would turn into loss for the great work of construction and for the development of popular institutions along their own lines. The colonial authorities must also exercise the greatest care not to be liable to criticism themselves. The population as a result of the continual whisperings of antithesis is very wary, wide awake to the slightest mistakes of Western authorities and has an incredible sharpness of perception. If it is to be guided towards the things that matter, the authorities must see that their own policy is all of a piece, honest and loyal, free from national, racial, religious and economic partiality, and ready to accept the political consequences of their evolutionary efforts without any mental reservation.

In this manner the racial, the religious, and also the economic antithesis can be disarmed. Will it be more difficult to cope with the force of antithesis when it permeates nationalism? Yes, in this field the difficulties are in the beginning well-nigh insurmountable, and must remain so as long as nationalism is merely or mainly the shibboleth of sterile and negative tendencies, devoid of civic spirit and true sense of unity; but here too the policy of synthesis may find a way. A great sacrifice is being made. It must, of course, be made without any mental reservation whatsoever. There must be no attempt to profess a high-sounding liberalism while taking care at the same time that the financial and commer-

¹⁾ See Kerala Putra, *The Working of Dyarchy in India 1919-1928*.

cial interests of the motherland shall take precedence over all others. What is necessary is a whole-hearted deed, which will carry conviction with good workers and honest Eastern nation-builders.

A gigantic sacrifice has been asked on the part of the colonial nations. The policy of synthesis demands that the whole patrimony should be put in the name of the ward and be transferred to him as soon as he has finished his "masterpiece", the work which admits the companion into the mastership. The establishment of a Council of the People in the Dutch East Indies, of dyarchy in India- and in the future responsible government in the provinces and even in the centre- is a public act performed before the eyes of the whole world. It is also an act that transcends in importance anything achieved by the policy of synthesis in the ancient world.

The British Empire is an illustration of the fact that the new development goes beyond anything that happened in the ancient world. The parts of the Empire are developing into equal partners with the mother country, and are becoming independent states under one vast dome of imperial unity which also covers the mother country. That such a development into a dynamic Empire should be allowed is a proof of the greatest confidence, for it is obvious that autonomy within the imperial connection and on such a basis allows the different portions of the Empire to develop such a complete organisation that each of them will eventually make the impression of an independent state which is a member of a confederation ¹⁾.

Such a form of autonomy in the long run cannot prevent a separate diplomatic representation, the gradual development of relations with other states, in a way for which the Empire might not even feel prepared to be responsible as a whole. The dynamic nature of the present-day Empire does not oppose such centrifugal tendencies; the parts of the Empire can freely go in the direction dictated by their economic interests, and situations are conceivable in which the economic or even the political interests of one

¹⁾ Prof. J. A. Eigeman, *Indië en het Koninkrijk*, 1928; A. B. Keith, *Responsible Government in the Dominions*; A. B. Keith, *Dominion Home Rule in Practice*, 1921; Sir Frederick Whyte, *India a Federation?* Leonard le Marchant Minty, *Constitutional Laws of the British Empire*, 1928, esp. pp. 95 sqq.

dominion are in conflict with those of other dominions and the mother country.

If such symptoms of possibilities are already to be perceived here and there in a case where mother country and dominions are united by strong blood-ties, it may be presumed that in the case of the eventual grant of dominion status to colonial territories, the absence or the smaller importance of blood-ties may bring about more speedily similar symptoms of divergence. Autonomy within the imperial connection may tend to lead to independence outside it, and the fact has frankly to be faced that, once this road has been chosen, the tie with the mother country can only be preserved through the consciousness of belonging to one greater unity, through loyalty and piety, whether or not strengthened by a community of interests.

This development will probably apply to the whole colonial world, and it is clear therefore that the establishment of organs which tend to create autonomous parts of the Empire represents an act of the highest confidence and of the greatest willingness to make sacrifices. Those who could bring themselves to do such a deed need not ask for confidence: they are entitled to demand it, and if the spirit of antithesis supported by the misinterpretation of true patriotism and true democracy, and by international propaganda places difficulties in the way of a better spirit, the authorities have to wait patiently, though without desisting from their efforts to establish this better understanding by trying to develop the promising germ of nationalism into civic spirit, a positive sense of unity, social feeling and readiness for service. For time is working with them. They must not help this bad sentiment by actions that might encourage the almost general disdain for the foundations of national progress. And in the long run their continual appeals to the common sense and to the feeling of decency of the East will triumph. The East is bound to see how much confidence is given, and how little returned. Reason and sentiment must admit that the invitation to taste the fruit of the tree of knowledge gives the lie to all the whisperings of the spirit of antithesis. Throughout the colonial world the Western authorities are the creators and supporters of unity, and the fact that, even before the village autonomies function properly, they show themselves prepared to accept the future organisation in ever widening

spheres within the frame of unity gives them the right to demand forthwith that self-exertion be developed in every direction inside the popular sphere.

Further reflections on the fourth guiding line: Public opinion

We must now give a few additional considerations before we can examine the fifth guiding line of colonial policy. We have already mentioned the fact that unreasoning sentiment will not always admit the right to confidence of the Western authorities. Let us realise the position in the East. As Kerala Putra remarks, "Indian political ideal and Indian political practice are largely the reflexion of what has grown up in England".¹⁾ He points out that British political tradition has become part of the heritage of India. For instance, there are complaints of deportation without preliminary judicial trial. But the idea that such a procedure is wrong is British, not Indian. Similarly the right of certification, by which the authorities refuse to accept the rejection of a measure by a proto-parliament, is much criticised, but the idea that the executive is bound by the decisions of the legislature is purely British. The whole East criticises the colonial authorities by Western as well as by Eastern standards.

It is for these reasons that the task of enlightening the public is so important, especially so long as the élite fulfils its task as intermediary between the authorities and the people so inefficiently. It is necessary that by spreading good reading, the real being of the West, not merely its externals, and the purposes of its leadership should be made known. Excellent work is done in this respect in the Dutch East Indies by the institution called *The Bureau of Popular Literature: Balai Poestaka*, which will be described in detail in our next volume. It would, of course, be an excellent thing if the press in the colonies co-operated with the work of enlightenment, but at present nothing of the kind happens. The problem of the Eastern press is a thorny one. To begin with, it cannot be said that the European press in the East always sets a good example. It sometimes influences the European community in a fatal direction, irritates reasonable Eastern feelings, and makes the position of the authorities very difficult. It might take

¹⁾ *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

to heart the words of Lord Morley, who once wrote: "India is a country where bad manners are a crime. . . ., things which journalists might say without let or hindrance in England must in India be treated and dealt with as crimes" ¹).

The situation could be greatly eased if an attempt were made to create a better understanding between the Western and the Eastern press, by striving for the creation of a common journalistic tradition, which would begin by forbidding everything that emphasises the opposition between different groups of the population. The colonial governments, unlike those of the Eastern states, rarely try to curb the liberty of the press, even if it tends to undermine confidence in the authorities. The Eastern press is a great power, either for good or for evil, and it has a great future before it, if it wishes to perform its task of enlightenment.

Nobody desires that the Eastern press should be asked to desist from constructive criticism. But what may be demanded is that the existing frame of unity, supported for the time being mainly by Western leadership, should be respected, because it is the only one that can be effective and strong, as long as the Eastern leaders do not themselves help in the construction of the foundations. In the Dutch East Indies tolerance of the authorities towards the press goes very far, although owing to the mentality of the people this freedom is not without its dangers. In the East, as a consequence of traditional social relations, there is no sharp distinction between criticism and hostility, between action against the policy of government and actual rebellion. An objective activity of any one party or group may easily degenerate into personal complications, with the incidental result that party politics in the Western sense are really an impossibility. This is a handicap from which even Japan still suffers. It proves that an over-hasty introduction of individualistic democracy in the East presents great dangers.

If one considers that strong criticism of the government or of its agents immediately amounts, in the eyes of the people, to a refusal of obedience, one will realise that Western criteria of tolerance cannot apply, without results that would not arise in the West. It is impossible not to bridle criticism which is fraught with such dangers. Once again we see the dilemma which confronts the authorities: for the sake of peace and order they must sometimes

¹) Curtis, *Dyarchy*, pp. XLIX, LIII.

interfere, and many enlightened people consider that there is not enough interference. Certainly, if they were still under their own Rulers, the critics would be treated with less forbearance.

Word for word, these considerations also apply to freedom of speech. If anarchic licence to undermine the prestige of the authorities during the first phases of the period of transition is allowed, the population will be led into the erroneous ways of negativism which holds its anti-Western agitation forth as nationalism, and all hope of the construction of the foundations may be abandoned. Criticism, however, which tries to improve the methods that are being applied, to find a better starting point for them or which wants to propose a more adequate aim must be welcome. The distinction between what is legitimate and what is not is easy to make: such criticism is legitimate as does not attack the existing frame of unity and does not interfere with the construction of the foundations. Ill-intentioned or short-sighted agitation is fatal at the earlier stages of transition. It is the sacred duty of leadership to oppose it, because it can so easily induce the population to commit excesses and to go astray altogether. As soon as they have come to realise the good effects of many measures taken by the authorities, the people will be less sensitive to revolutionary or reactionary instigation, but while their limited horizon prevents this understanding, they are little inclined to favour administrative intervention, although as a rule it furthers their own interests.

Such feelings nowadays find an echo in the opinion of the Western non-interventionists. The East also has its theoreticians who want a return to the purely Eastern past. The reactionary Samin movement in Java, for instance, which finds an ally in the revolutionary tendency of extremists, preaches a return to the good old days, and has been interpreted by Meyer Ranneft as a symptom of the wish of the population to be left alone. As though a complete restoration of the fullest measure of pre-Western life would please even the simplest peasant in India or the Dutch East Indies! One has to guard against the danger that hyper-modern extremists, who have quite different purposes in their minds, are given liberty to play to the tune of the people's dislike of progress. India has also known that nostalgia for the old freedom, which, says Kerala Putra (p. 113), until recently

meant the freedom to follow the customs of caste, religion and sect

...but that conception of freedom has entirely vanished. People now clamour for social reform, that is the interference of the state in the customs and institutions of the people. Their complaint is now that the British Government does not lend its support to the efforts that are being made to re-order society.

So there we have the very opposite of "Saminism", and in this direction people's minds are bound to move. Western leadership is therefore in the right when it does not allow agitators to interfere with the construction of the foundations. For the colonial world is no Robinson Crusoe's island, where one can comfortably allow one's plans to rest or to ripen at leisure. World influences interfere with the population far more than any colonial authority would allow itself to do, and the influence of the latter aims precisely at the defence of the population against these influences and at preparing it for its own defence.

The success of modern agitation among an ignorant, economically backward, and socially divided population is an unmistakable proof that government influence lags far behind the interference of world influences. The fact that India is turning away from "Saminism" and is loudly calling for social reforms and government interference may be a warning against a "Saministic" policy, and its elusive revolutionary ally which tries to manipulate public opinion, although it will be wise to proceed with care and to take no measures without at the same time persuading the beneficiaries of their utility.

Final reflections upon the fourth guiding line: The duration of Western leadership

A second series of considerations will be in its place before we leave the problem of lifting nationalism into the scheme of evolution. Some time ago the government made a declaration in which it was said that responsible government in the Dutch East Indies cannot be promised in advance because it must largely be the outcome of the people's self-exertion and belongs therefore to an unknown future. It would be premature to promise definite results, but all consequences of the process of social evolution would be loyally accepted. Responsible government at the centre did at any rate not yet enter into the sphere of practical politics and Dutch authority would remain indispensable for a long time. This decla-

ration had been called forth by the misinterpretation of recent political reforms as if they were the keystone of evolution, whereas in reality they are merely a structural preparation, and also by disruptive communistic propaganda, which has increased tenfold all the difficulties inherent in a period of transition ¹⁾. The impatience of the Indonesian leaders, their exclusive pre-occupation with the summit of the building, and their indifference to the work of basic construction, due to their lack of a sense of direction, have dictated this declaration by the Dutch authorities.

There is no need to discuss the question whether the authorities or the élite itself is responsible for this misinterpretation of the reforms. The over-estimate of themselves by Indonesian leaders is due to the fact that they under-estimate the nature and the extent of the process of evolution, and consequently under-estimate the necessity of Dutch leadership. It should not be thought that the Dutch authorities want to cry "halt!" to this movement merely because it is not in the interests of the existing frame of unity. What they aimed at primarily was to warn those who were moving still further away from the foundations of the task.

Nevertheless, the question may certainly be asked why and how long Dutch leadership will still be needed in the East Indies. The honest builders at the foundations of their nation, who have the right to ask the question, are also entitled to a precise and unambiguous reply, which is simply this: *Western leadership must remain until the foundations have been constructed. This implies that illiteracy must have disappeared as a result of a good general popular education, as it has disappeared in Japan, that the particularist village spheres must function as village autonomies, as conscious organs of the great whole, and that the popular credit-system and the co-operative movement must have freed the people of debt, and must, by the application of better methods of production, have called into existence a prosperous population and a strong middle-class.* The meaning of this reply and of the government declaration is therefore that the Dutch East Indies want thousands and thousands of hard workers, builders who are willing to lay foundations, and not politicians. Let it not be thought that these conditions

¹⁾ J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, *Le Communisme aux Indes Néerlandaises*, 1929, *passim*.

sin by any excess of moderation! To establish a central legislative assembly is child's play compared with the building up of the small live cells of the great organism. Let the élite prepare for the hardest task it has ever tackled. It will be the best proof they can give of true patriotism and the surest and quickest way to achieve that which politics can never give them.

The other colonial powers appear to hold similar views. Let us only give one instance, that of the Philippine Islands, which have progressed farther than any other territory and are particularly useful because they present the problems of the future better than do less politically developed countries. These islands had, before the American occupation, already experienced for several centuries the influence of Spanish rule and of catholic missions. The social structure had been entirely modified, women were highly respected, the tradition of the monogamous household was honoured everywhere except among the population in the interior. Economically, however, the population had made little progress. But the élite, as one can realise by recalling men like Rizal, Aguinaldo and others, had already a clear sense of unity before the end of last century. The population itself nevertheless remained unmoved in its deeper layers, except when it became temporarily agitated during exciting periods.

The American régime concentrated its attention mainly upon popular education, and endeavoured to create economic understanding through this medium, as well as an interest in better means of production and in the co-operative movement. It made it a point of honour to do good and quick work, and it appeared to aspire to giving the old colonial powers a lesson in "how to do it". It trained the population with all its energy and with great devotion in order to enable it to take over responsibility as soon as possible, and became impatient whenever it found that an American school-teacher or officer could not be replaced by a Philippino at the end of the indicated term. Every time a Philippino took over the work of an American he was welcomed as a proof of the success of American efficiency. Representative bodies were indicated from the beginning as an essential aim of development. The speediest possible independence of the Philippines was the great goal which American democracy kept always in view.

It will be seen, and President Wilson's declaration was emphat-

ic on the point, that the Americans would have preferred Philippine independence to-day rather than to-morrow. But what happened? Notwithstanding all the hustle, notwithstanding the desire to beat older competitors in the colonial race, independence has still not been granted. Not that the élite has requested the Americans to stay: one of them declared that he would prefer to go to hell with a government of his own than to heaven under the Americans. Yet there is no complaint of ill-treatment. On the contrary, their labour and good faith are not questioned at all. The only thing is that the élite ardently desires the independence of which it already enjoys all the essentials, albeit under American supervision. All they want is to be entirely masters in their own house.

But for the millions the question is not so simple. Political independence is not such an easy thing to bear, and without a strong sense of citizenship, a power of economic resistance, a broad middle class, and a general interest, independence would be baneful to the people, a danger to neighbouring states, and would therefore end by leading to foreign intervention and the complete loss of independence. America feels its responsibility and is aware of all the factors which exist, apart from the political sentiment for which the masses happen still to show very little enthusiasm. If independence were to be hell, it would be little consolation to tell the victims that the fire had been lit by their fellow-countrymen.

All the American government wants is to assure the freedom and the happiness of the many, instead of providing a small number with unchecked authority over a population which has still too little sense of collective action and too little public spirit. It is not implied that the Philippine élite would deliberately set out to treat their ten million fellow countrymen in a harsh or unjust way, but the history of mankind is there to prove that no government can stand the strain of uncontrolled power. Moreover, after a period of greater freedom, the Philippines, as a consequence of lack of balance in the social structure, necessarily developed a number of serious evils which had to be weeded out by the stronger hands of Governor-General Wood. America has no intention of allowing its work to be destroyed in a few years. Therefore it proclaimed its willingness to transfer its authority to a real democracy, not to a completely independent oligarchy.

We may refer to the views of Judge Fisher, a man of great personal experience ¹⁾; and in particular to the words of President Coolidge which he quotes. The President had vetoed a proposal of the Philippine Assembly to have a plebiscite in the Philippines on the subject of independence. This is how he justified his action:

The ability of a people to govern themselves is not easily attained. History is filled with failures of popular government. It cannot be learned from books; it is not a matter of eloquent phrases. Liberty, freedom, independence are not mere words, the repetition of which brings fulfilment. They demand long, arduous, self-sacrificing preparation. Education, knowledge, experience, sound public opinion, intelligent participation by the great body of the people — these things are essential. The degree in which they are possessed determines the capability of a people to govern themselves. In frankness and with the utmost friendliness, I must state my sincere conviction that the people of the Philippine Islands have not as yet attained the capability of full self-government. Demonstration of the ability to carry on successfully the large powers of government already possessed would be far more convincing than continued agitation for complete independence.

It will be seen that, fundamentally, the problem is the same throughout the colonial world, and that, as Lord Sinha's warning to India against "wasting time and energy in sentimental declarations" shows, it is understood in the same way everywhere.

These difficulties seem to be more generally realised nowadays, and many people are beginning to pour water into the wine of extremism and are coming forward with proposals of a seemingly more moderate nature. There are those who have invented the new battle-cry of "Eastern efficiency". "We know," they say in effect, "that the East is not at present able to develop the efficiency of the West. But you can safely entrust us with the fate of our fellow-countrymen, because all they want is a standard of Eastern efficiency that will amply satisfy them." The latter assertion may be true. But, as we have already pointed out in a previous chapter, there is only one kind of efficiency, the efficiency that works, that runs a railway system to time-table, justice according to fixed rules, and an administration according to plan. One hundred per cent efficiency or inefficiency, injustice, and dishonesty; there is no intermediary stage.

¹⁾ In the News Bulletin of the Institute of Pacific Relations for Sept. 1927.

The idea of others, that the Oriental is born to obedience, that he would willingly submit to an oligarchy of intellectuals, and that the effort to raise the whole population according to the standards of true democracy is doomed to fail, is belied by the aspirations of the Eastern élite. Are they, with their impatience of authority, not Orientals? Would the East submit to them indefinitely, if left to their rule? No, world communications, which have brought millions of citizens of other countries to the colonies or in continual contact with them, will daily increase this intimate connection. The millions of the East might perhaps for some time submit silently to an oligarchy with its unavoidable misrule: but these other people will not. They will not accept bad justice, lax administration, and growing insecurity. Exterritoriality, intervention, and the loss of national freedom would soon result if the advice of these moderates were accepted. Even if nothing worse happened than a withdrawal of world-credit, badly governed countries would be unable to provide for their own internal security and national defence.

Need we refer except in passing to the view expressed not only in the East, but also in the West, according to which the duration of Western leadership is exclusively a question of money — the West will maintain its position only so long as it can continue “to drain away treasure from the East”? This represents a vision of life that is really too elementary. Moreover, it entirely overlooks the fact that big enterprise is altogether indifferent as to the flag under which its energy and capital find employment. All it demands is good administration, fair legislation, honest justice, order and security. If an Eastern government were able to guarantee all these, it would find its strongest champions among the leaders of foreign enterprise. If the West wanted only financial profit, surely it would not encourage the spread of Western knowledge in the East, which increases Eastern capacity to compete in the world-markets.

The great task of Dutch colonial administration has not been undertaken merely to be dropped owing to a feeling of fatigue at the moment when its first phase is nearing accomplishment, or, worse still, because irresponsible catchwords have been bandied about. In the same way as the widening of the sphere of all Western activity developed a broad interest in public affairs, and con-

tributed to develop the democratic idea in each of its phases, an analogous growth in the East is having similar democratic effects. The Indonesian élite is itself a proof that this broadening out everywhere is followed by the democratic idea, and there is nothing remarkable in this, because expansion of the mind, personal initiative and activity on the part of the population are the essence of real democracy. Historically, sociologically, and philosophically these conceptions are different aspects of the same thing. Unless well-nigh all the moral, social, and economic development were to be undone, democratic growth cannot be arrested. We have to take our stand on the basis of democracy, but we have to guard against sham democracy. The great success of colonial organisation, which until very recently was purely mechanical in structure, is measured by the activity and interest it rouses in the population. However modest it may still be, it is nevertheless already demanding that preparations should be made for the change into a dynamic order, if progress is to be confirmed and activated by the forces which are ceasing to be earth-bound. Society wants all these forces, and the state, whose organisation sooner or later reflects existing social conditions, is in fact already taking a democratic direction owing to the mere fact of the development of these social and economic forces. If the organisation of the state refused to take this into account, it would soon be broken by revolutions or else arrest evolution and presently change it into a movement of regression.

This is why Dutch colonial policy had to remain deaf to the most eloquent pleas in favour of Indonesian absolutism or the oligarchy of the intelligentsia in the future. But this attitude imposed upon it a frank declaration of the conditions which will lead to responsible government. And such a declaration was necessary, not only for those members of the Indonesian élite who had not yet grasped the essence of evolution, but also for all those members of the leading Dutch nation who were equally blind to its significance and imagined that the continuation of colonial leadership is mere usurpation. To hold such views is to place oneself upon the level of comprehension which would maintain that political reforms are sufficient to create the consciousness of unity, to widen the social horizon, to strengthen the economic sense, and to change group-loyalty into civic spirit. Nationalist sentiments,

as long as they merely create a semblance of unity of a negative nature, must not be identified with civic spirit. If this mistake continues to hold the minds of so many men of the West and of the East, the task of leadership cannot be fulfilled and the present century will end in chaos. In developing civic spirit Western leadership is honestly trying to make itself superfluous, and true nationalism should consider it to be its sacred duty to devote all its powers to help the authorities in the fulfilment of this noble task. If Western leadership neglected this elementary duty, then there would be good reason to suspect an attempt to conduct a policy of usurpation. But who will assert, after all we have seen above, that colonial leadership is either neglecting its duty, or has already accomplished it and, having become superfluous, is merely trying to justify by false pretences its refusal to abdicate?

Fifth guiding line: The transformation of the mechanical structure into an organic dispensation

One last guiding line remains to be examined. In a way, it does not indicate a new direction, but only a method by which the other lines can be made to stand out more clearly. The first period of evolution, which joined the loose particles of Eastern society into a centralising, but still mechanical, unity, is drawing to a close. Like the Shogunate of Japan, it had to fulfil a great preparatory task. The second period, that in which the mechanical dispensation will become organic, is approaching. The separate entities are beginning to break through the walls that imprisoned them; they are developing a wider consciousness of unity, which is revealing itself as a living tissue that slowly covers all the separate parts. This tissue is still weak but it must be strengthened by popular education and all the means which we have more than once passed in review. How can the mechanical structure itself be, without shocks, displaced by an organic order? This is the question which remains to be answered.

An apparently simple way of proceeding is to demolish all the popular institutions of the static period, and all the super-structure of government of the mechanical period in order to give immediate and ample space to the organic bodies of the modern autonomies. To order a society in an organic way is, however, a long and deli-

cate process. Unless one wants the mass of cells that are still so loosely connected to adopt the shapelessness of invertebrates, the frame of unity must be preserved in all its joints. It will then, slowly and gradually, be absorbed by the organs.

This idea seems very simple, but when it comes to the application, all kinds of difficulties arise. Indeed, it would sometimes appear as though there were nothing in the world more complicated than colonial policy. One seems never to have reached the end of all the questions that can be asked, and it is not surprising that one meets uncertainty at every turn of the road. But there is no need to allow these doubts to acquire unnatural dimensions. They would stifle all useful activity. Let us beware of making individual complications bigger than nature, and losing our mental balance as a result. We must remain upon the trodden ground, and keep the future in sight, independent of transitory events and incidental risks, which will be dealt with without trouble when the moment to tackle them has arrived, provided the true relation between the past and the future with its guiding lines is not forgotten.

Provincial councils in some form or other have now been created in most colonial territories; in the Dutch East Indies but little time has passed since the establishment of Provincial and Regency Councils and Boards. If they were already functioning to perfection they would indeed be the eighth wonder of the world! Many people, looking only at the present deficiencies of these institutions, sigh for the good old days when customary law held full sway and when the person of the indigenous Regents still possessed a sacred and mystical character that was challenged by none. But at the same time they make comparisons with the West and its far more perfected organisation. Compared with the best aspects of these two different conditions, the period of transition naturally appears to have only drawbacks, and as a result one hears pleas for a complete return to the past or for hurried progress. There is, however, not the slightest reason for concern, if one remains fully aware that the present is only a moment in the process of evolution from the static period of the past through the mechanical period of to-day towards the organic and dynamic future.

Only a survey inspired by such reflections can give rest to the

mind, and will enable the onlooker to reduce to the right scale the manifestations of the present, while helping him to decide, by the criteria provided by the guiding lines of the future, which of them deserves encouragement and which must be repressed. The mind will thus be able to dominate events and to force them to fit into its plans. Naturally, one must not expect the process to be as easy as in the case of an individual who has been withdrawn at an early age from his environment, and who in the course of ten years can be made to travel the length of five centuries of evolution. In dealing with a society one finds the old with all its qualities and all its limitations. The good gardener will have to act quite differently from the educator of an uprooted individual in exceptional circumstances. The growth of the popular credit system in Java proves that much can be done by appropriate methods, but also that much still remains to be done before social and economic self-exertion may really be said to have been launched. Both in Java and in India, although there is still a need for much further advance, one may hope that devotion and tenacity may reduce a centuries-long process to a number of decades.

The same considerations apply to self-exertion in the autonomous organisations, which are really nothing but co-operative associations on a larger and many sided scale. If the process of the transformation into an organic system has once been seen in this light, the methods to be followed become perfectly clear. But nowhere can the great advance which has been made upon the slow march of time be considered to be definitely assured. If the towing lines broke, the whole mass would slide back. The organs which will enable it to maintain itself upon the level it has at present reached remain to be evolved. If the Dutch authorities were to cease their supervision of the popular credit system, little would be left of it in ten years' time.

The first thing needed for ensuring the continuance of the growth of self-exertion is therefore not a policy of abstention, but a contact, more intimate, though differently guided, between the central government organisation and the population with its natural chiefs. The latter especially have to be constantly used as antennae of the body politic, because in the period we are entering there must be a continual sensing of the situation, which is the only way by which it can be discovered when intervention and

assistance are needed. It is clear, therefore, that a complete separation between autonomous bodies and the administrative corps would have been very regrettable in the first phases of organic transformation, and would have led to a debacle, even if the guiding lines had been faithfully observed. The administrative corps must stand immediately next, above, and among these autonomies. Only in this way can the task of the administration be identified with the organic growth and finally become absorbed by it. For it is the task of the administrative corps eventually thus to be absorbed, after having imported all its devotion, experience, and energy into the rising autonomous life.

Some people would have liked to start with the abolition of the administrative corps as the first instead of the last step towards autonomy. They do not seem to know of any pace between running and standing still, and want an immediate "full-blown" democracy or nothing at all. Again this is the usual inversion of the true sequence, which we have already noticed among the critics of the latest government systems of Japan, Siam, and China. It is continually being overlooked that the governments in question are not less enthusiastic for an organic order throughout the length and breadth of the spheres of official authority in the country. It is precisely for this reason that they have created all these organs, not as a recognition that the people are already possessed of sufficient capacity to participate in the task of government, but rather to give them an opportunity to learn how they must perform their tasks.

If one considers affairs in this light, one will see that there is no need to make a continual contrast between the extent of the functions of the communes and provinces in Holland, for instance, and of those in the Dutch East Indies. If such comparisons are taken as a starting point, one might as well go one step further and demand that the responsibility for government be completely and immediately handed over to the representatives of the people of the Dutch East Indies, as it is in Holland. Personal suffrage will be the natural corollary. If one realises that the time for this has not come, one must consider whether the same considerations do not equally apply to the functions of the lower autonomous units.

This is indeed the case. Co-operative societies, village councils, regency boards, and the frame of unity all require, before they can

become dynamic, a width of horizon inspired by interest, civic sense, and a wish to co-operate for the common good. For this is the criterion by which can be judged the prosperity of autonomies of every degree, whether they concern only a village or the full extent of the colonial territory. Need it be pointed out that this element is still utterly lacking and that Indonesian society in the popular spheres is completely disunited? Communications, education, trade, and government may have drawn these isolated bodies together up to a point, but their inner character still resembles that of a mass of sand, in which each grain runs away as soon as the closed fingers cease to envelop it.

Let us never forget that we are in a period of transition, which makes it necessary for us to look at once both to the past and to the future. All those who take their measure only from the future and have only blame to bestow upon the small beginnings of autonomy would make us exhaust our strength. All those who continually stop and look back with longing to the good old days with their Rulers, their customary law, their self-contained villages, and their absolute rule are growing rigid, like the wife of Lot, because their souls are lingering in the past, whereas a higher ordination commands them to proceed forward with courage, even though with care.

The population itself is indifferent as to the source whence novelties flow. What it objects to is the novelties themselves. If one could reverse the parts, merely for a week, and entrust reputed agitators with the task of collecting taxes, looking after health, sanitation, security, peace and order, and of preaching improvement in the conditions of living, regular schooling, etc., while the officials were invited to criticise their activities, there would be a radical reversal of popular sympathies. The same applies to autonomous boards that wish to do constructive work. Higher boards, which are further away from the village circle and its mentality, do not yet inspire the people with much confidence. Many of their members have the town mentality and are entirely unknown to the people. If the central administration did not set the pace, they would probably wish to force it, and create still further resentment by their zeal for novelty, or they would, after the first bright flow of enthusiasm, let things take their course.

When the population has made further intellectual, social and

economic progress, has further detached itself from the particularist spheres, and has replaced its inertia by activity, its attention will inevitably be drawn by these more distant boards. There are so many symptoms that prove that the broadening process is in full swing that the authorities, wisely remembering the principle *gouverner c'est prévoir* have begun to establish these bodies in the same way as, at an earlier period, they created institutions for village credit as a preparation for the future. This proves that the councils are not premature and also that they do not lag behind popular consciousness. The fact that these two criticisms are simultaneously to be heard might well be the best proof that the authorities have chosen the golden mean.

It may be asked whether the Regency Councils and Boards in Java should not be given wider functions than those they at present fulfil. But the same danger of premature westernisation which we detected in the parliamentary atmosphere that surrounds the proto-parliaments also lurks here. Westernisation and individualism would soon be rife in these lower legal entities, and would be even more dangerous there, because they are nearer to the foundations so that the chance of misunderstandings among the army of active builders would be increased. Instead of finding a counterpoise in the foundation-workers against the threats of anarchic democracy which come from the parliamentary sphere, the organism would run the risk of being poisoned to the bottom.

We have seen how, in Japan, the establishment of two Chambers of Parliament for budgetting and legislative purposes has led astray a great many Japanese at home and foreigners abroad. Everything else was measured by the standard of parliamentary democracy, and was pronounced to be dwarfed and rudimentary. Thereupon the two houses of parliament were declared to be nothing but a democratic masquerade. If the dissatisfied element had been able to realise that the popular sphere can only be broadened by a very gradual process, in such a manner that the slightest symptoms of widening represent impressive achievements, while on the other hand the representative bodies contain no more than the promise of a democratic future, the double misunderstanding would not have arisen. It is a misunderstanding which is now repeating itself throughout the colonial world. If it is not cleared up in time, it will do the greatest harm and compromise the future



irretrievably. Everything is now being measured by the large scale standards of modern democracy. Exception is thereupon taken to all administrative authority, which is made responsible for everything that is not yet working properly from the democratic point of view. No rest is to be taken before the whole structure has been demolished, for it is there that the cause of all stagnation, friction, and difficulty is sought. And the result of this psychological trouble is a complete misunderstanding on the part of many people even in the West, who think that too few democratic forms have been granted. Let those who expect everything from the initiative of the population and of the councils, and consider in consequence that there is no need for administrative assistance, be reminded of the words of Howard, based upon experience gained among the people who for centuries were the teachers of a large part of the Far-East: "Nowhere have the people come forward, either directly or through their elected representatives on the Councils, with practical proposals for better roads, marketing facilities, education, etc." The policy of the government concerning the composition and the attributions of these councils must therefore be very guarded, and one may wonder whether these first lines of the design of the future have not been too thickly marked in the ink of Western democracy.

All the experience acquired in the Dutch East Indies proves that if the contact between the Dutch administration and the population is too speedily relaxed, the population, contrary to the opinion of many people, will certainly reap no benefit. Even from India voices can also be heard, coming from people whose patriotism is above suspicion, like Gupta and Kerala Putra, warning us that the European administrative body must not yet be dispensed with, although there is a strong current in this direction under the influence of Indianisation and enthusiastic autonomists. Gupta (p. 323) complains that "the recent policy of Government initiated since 1915, by which the District Officer has ceased to have any direct connection with the administration of the District Board, has very seriously affected his position". After he has explained more precisely the reasons for his criticism, he continues: "How normally to repair the impaired position of the District Officer is in my opinion one of the most serious administrative problems in Bengal".

The Western administrative busy-body has his virtues, after all, and they are only appreciated when they are partly or entirely missed. Gupta, however, does realise that in the future a time must come when patriarchal government will have ended: he fully accepts the guiding lines along which the authority of the people must be established, but he favours a slow advance in order to be sure that the final goal shall be reached, and that there shall be no drifting into "chaos and uncertainty".

I, of course, fully realise that the old system of paternal Government by the District Officer must gradually give place to a system which will give increasing scope to the people to look after their own affairs. . . . What I submit, however, is that whereas on the one hand it is very necessary even in the present transitional stage, which intervenes between the paternal and national form of Government, that full scope for local self-government must be afforded to the people and the chairman of the District board, and the other office bearers and members of the self-governing local bodies must feel that the responsibility for all schemes of local utility principally rests on them, yet on the other hand it is equally important that the position of the District Officer must be stabilised and sufficient powers must be left in his hands to enable him to co-ordinate the efforts of Local Bodies with the activities of the special departments of Government in charge of the "nation-building" departments in carrying through suitable schemes in his district. . . . It would be obviously unwise to alienate his sympathy with all progressive activities in his district by reducing him to a state of impotence in such matters.

Gupta realises that to move from paternalism to democracy is not such a simple thing:

As regards the system of district administration itself I am strongly opposed to too great a hurry in introducing any drastic changes into it. The people have long been used to the personal rule of the District Officer, and now that suitable avenues have been found by which the people who are interested in the welfare of their district will be able to take an honourable part in co-operating with the District Officer and the Government in advancing the best interests of the district, sufficient time must be allowed for the constitutional changes to achieve the objects for which they have been conceived before any fresh and drastic innovations are again made.

The author considers that the people themselves greatly value the advantage that the District Officer has no local and personal interests.

Kerala Putra, who favours a strong Indianisation of the administrative personnel and a much more far-reaching democratisation and extension of parliamentary responsibility, both in provincial and central government, nevertheless hastens to qualify his views as follows:

It would be a disaster of the first magnitude, if the Superior Services which have been built up through the efforts of over a century and on which depends the peaceful evolution of self-government, should be made a prey to shifting political considerations and communal and personal interests.... Only so much of the functions of the Civil Services, as is compatible with the authority of the Councils, should be thus curtailed. For the rest, the purely administrative authority of the Services should be maintained intact and without interference either from the Ministers or from the Council.

One of the reasons why he asks for caution in the process of Indianisation is that, owing to the sectionalism of religious groups, there is a danger that the ideal of an efficient public service may be subordinated to the work of balancing communal claims.

The mentality of the Indian Civil Servant and of the official in the Dutch East Indies is also a factor that must be taken into account. As Kerala Putra notes, the first result of the British-Indian reforms, which, it was feared, would almost completely subordinate the administrative officers to inexperienced boards, was a remarkable fall in the number of candidates for the I. C. S., and a large number of retirements. In the Dutch East Indies also, the officials are beginning to complain that as a result of the reforms they are being overwhelmed with office work and are losing contact with the population. Mr. H. D. van Werkum says ¹⁾ that

contact with the population diminishes as a result of the lack of personal duties and the consequent decrease of interest taken in his work by the official, while it becomes more and more difficult to exercise control. The training of European administrative officials is suffering. Formerly it was entrusted to experienced Civil Service Officers (Controllers), who were able, from their own experience, to point to the various difficulties inherent in the different duties, while at present officials cannot become acquainted with these difficulties owing to the transfer of all activities to Javanese officials, which means the loss of all possible control....

¹⁾ Koloniale Studiën, 1928, pp. 310—330.

It is not a mere desire for power that causes this dissatisfaction, this lack of enthusiasm. The men who go to the colonies in order to give up their best years to an arduous task are not self-seekers. But they want a man's full job, a real task, an active share in the process of evolution!

The period of transition is indeed wrought with immense difficulties. One hears in Java complaints of the dislocation of Dutch administration, or of Javanese administration, or of both. Others consider that the central government has still too much influence, and that the centre of gravity ought still further to be transferred to the modern Boards. If one adds to this that hundreds of very active Indonesian political leaders absolutely refuse to co-operate in any way and on any conditions, one can imagine what obstacles still bar the road to harmonious progress. These obstacles, nevertheless, can be overcome, if the guiding lines of the future are kept in mind, and if the leading colonising nations have the courage to slow down or hasten their pace according to the requirements of the situation.

Much will have been gained once it is realised that there is, in all these difficulties, no question of guilt, but that cosmic events are taking place, of which we must learn to understand the essence and the purpose; while it is the duty of everyone of us to assist to the best of our ability in their harmonious fulfilment. To this end it is necessary that we should look at both aspects of the period of transition, and remain aware of the needs of the present as well as of the direction in which future developments will carry us. Interesting illustrations of this principle occur in the recent Report for the West Coast of Sumatra and in the Bantam Report. The former notes the psychological pressure exercised by government measures, and pleads for a large amount of non-intervention in the reasonable sense of the word, pointing out, however, that there can be no return to the past and that "a passive attitude of the authorities towards the process of social growth would have evil results". The contemporary Bantam Report had to declare on the other hand that a very unruly population pays little heed to the administration, that there were virtually no lower popular chiefs, and that in consequence the elements of contact between the population and the administration had little influence. Political reforms had not improved conditions, which

in any case were far from ideal. A strong administrative organisation was therefore needed, to assure contact between the different organs of administration and the population. There can, however, says the Report, be no question of compulsion; the impulse seeking for adequate forms of self-expression must be respected and encouraged.

Both reports, it will be seen, give hints in opposite directions in accordance with local circumstances, but at the same time they agree in pointing to the other side of the problem. This must still be the procedure for many years to come. A general share in the determination of its conditions is demanded for the population; but unless the authorities continually influenced the population it would not even stir to achieve better conditions for itself. It has ample opportunity already to work independently for a good village organisation, better methods of production, education, health, popular credit, co-operation, etc., but without a continual stimulus from above it prefers its customary inertia, which would make it the slave of the new world relationships that are shaping.

It is obvious therefore that the Dutch administrative corps must continue a task which will of itself preserve an intimate contact with the population without any artificial endeavour to do so. The situation in India up to a few years ago was not materially different. Gupta, noting the distinction between contact in the raiyatwari areas, where the administration itself collects the revenue, and the permanently settled areas, where this is not the case, remarked (p. 231) that in Bengal, where the land revenue was collected from Zemindars or landlords,

there is no occasion for the maintenance of an elaborate revenue collecting agency to work under the Collector, and there is a consequent lack of opportunity for the Collector to come into the same close and intimate touch with the people as in raiyatwari areas.

An interesting confirmation of this view comes from Nigeria, where Temple says that indirect taxation ought never entirely to take the place of direct taxation, because only through the latter can the administrative, i. e., political officers, be brought into close touch with the population.

The administration of justice and the employment of forced labour constitute two other channels for such contact, but they are

subject to great limitations, they bring the European official into connection with affairs which do not enter greatly into the everyday life of the vast majority of the population ¹⁾).

It is indeed a fact that intimate contact between the Western administrative body and the population with its traditional chiefs or its modern boards is in the interest of the development of sound autonomous life and of responsibility, indispensable during the period of transition. Disregard of this truth, to be ascribed as a rule to the influence of generous feelings toward the encouragement of democratic modes of self-expression and self-exertion, will not in reality confer a boon. It would break up rashly the system of direct contact with its wonderful adaptation partly to the sphere of Eastern paternalism, partly to the policy of personal self-exertion, and this contact would soon have to be replaced in the interests of peace and order by police-control. The police-state is the necessary complement of premature democracy. It is obvious that the gradual replacement of the civil service officers by democratic organs reflects a very serious problem, though it is only a question of tactics, of method, not one which affects the guiding lines of strategy.

Wise tactics demand that, during the most difficult phases of the period of transition, which is so fraught with complications in any case, the principle of our fathers, which was to leave the population under its own heads and in the enjoyment of its own customs and institutions, should be preserved. There must be a continuation of the system of indirect administration which is gradually being adopted in many parts of the colonial world. The French likewise are applying this principle more and more in their Asiatic and African colonies, by trying to strengthen the village organism and by organising an indigenous administrative body which establishes contact between the village and the European administration. Other autochthonous institutions, however, are considered less useful by the French. The policy adopted in the Dutch East Indies, which is embodied in the development of Indonesian states, village federations, decentralisation of authority in favour of popular chiefs, adapts the old principle to modern needs. But wise tactics require not only that indigenous administrative capacity shall be allowed to unfold itself, it

¹⁾ C. L. Temple, *Native Races and their Rulers*, pp. 197 sqq.

also requires that the Dutch administrative corps shall be used in his process of unfolding. Administrative functions of Dutch and Javanese officials must be buoyed off. It is impossible to believe that the difficulties involved cannot be surmounted by experienced colonial workers who could draw up a scheme in a very short time, and, according to the progress made by the evolutionary process, small readjustments would have to be made. In this way the mechanical structure will resolve itself into an organic system of state. Those who have any understanding of the process will know that it must be a very slow one, and that the criticism both of those who want a quicker pace and of those who want no movement at all simply does not apply to it.

Those who dislike government interference might apply to the whole East the remark made many years ago by Chailley-Bert that Java is too much governed. But can it really be believed that enlightened and self-possessed people, from Nigeria to Formosa and from Java to Corea, are seized by an irrational desire to interfere the moment they are appointed to an administrative post? What is happening is that these men, seeing before them innumerable small and disconnected units, have felt the obvious need of introducing them into the larger framework into which they would fit. As soon as one undertakes to effect this, one enters the period of the broadening process, for useful co-operation is possible only when each small unit can observe the larger social horizon that surrounds it. At the same moment begins that period of continuous and inevitable administrative interference, with an undercurrent of excessive praise for the imaginary good old days which will come to the surface each time things do not proceed as might be wished owing either to excessive or to insufficient interference. But whatever organisation is given to these small units, pressure must continue to be exercised from outside, as long as the atmospheric tension of dynamic society has not equalised itself with the weak social and economic forces of the small popular spheres.

It is to be regretted that colonial literature and the writings of the modern Eastern élite still show so little comprehension of this necessity, although this, and this alone, is the problem the solution of which will solve all other problems. It might even be put in a broader form, because the administrative corps must not be

seen as the real dynamic factor, but merely as a lever adjusting its motion according to the needs resulting from the great spiritual happenings brought about by the meeting of East and West. Without an intense exercise of the functions of administration the old system would, in a score of years, be completely out of joint and would have given birth to no possibilities for the future.

In order to make the transition between old and new as gradual as possible, three things must be taken into account ¹⁾: the traditional form of society, the claims of modern administration, and the needs of the new generation. As regards the traditional form of society, it is clear that there is a gaping chasm between the conception of life of the traditional chiefs and the world of thought of modern administration. The organisation based upon customary law is the most stable element, but a return to the old, to resigned acceptance of what happens to exist and the uncomfortable feeling aroused by anything new, is impossible. Therefore as long as a hybrid system which tries to conciliate the two incompatibles remains in existence, the traditional relation of power within Eastern society will crumble without any hope of a better system to come.

Modern administration therefore must be intensive and all-pervading, at least in the first phase of the development of lower autonomous organs. And the third element, the small group of the educated élite, counts in the combination mainly because it can provide the missing link between the old and the new, between the claims of tradition and the needs of the future, between the administration and the population. It is owing to the confidence inspired by its capacities and sense of unity that the establishment of proto-parliaments and provincial boards took place. These institutions are at the same time the frame of the organic order which is being born and the indispensable stimulants which must help this organic growth. However, the élite does not and perhaps cannot always react to these intentions in the way that is needed. When one thinks of the incongruity of people who sometimes may be found to be living in regions which still adhere largely to the traditions of closed produce-economy but who themselves are so advanced that they regularly receive the New York

¹⁾ Prof. Dr. B. Schrieke, *Het Problem der Bestuursorganisatie ter Sumatra's West-kust*, Kol. Stud., Feb. 1927, pp. 57—106.

rubber quotations, one can understand that there are, in these old societies, gaps which may be fatal to a normal development. The success of destructive propaganda and of non-co-operation is the best proof that even in the midst of the Eastern élite itself there are still many who, far from being ultra-modern, lag behind in responding to the demands of actual and still more of future national interests. A great world event is taking place before their unseeing eyes. They must realise that gigantic labour is necessary for the social and economic broadening out of the popular sphere, which is the first necessity for achieving the political aims of which they dream.

Always, then, and whichever thread we pick up, we come back to the central need of an active and intensive administrative system working to make the old self-contained and the modern artificial autonomies fit into the frame of unity. It must nevertheless be realised that administrative decentralisation, albeit in a lesser measure, has the same salutary effect as political decentralisation: it is an excellent way of diminishing psychological pressure. This pressure is in no small measure due to the responsibility which the colonial administrations owe to the parliamentary governments in the mother country. From the Viceroy or Governor-General to the humblest indigenous official, all are compelled by the system to render account of every event, every situation, and every measure that is taken. And as parliaments usually go by Western standards, an excessive impetus is given to ideas for which often enough Eastern society is entirely unready. A European official can therefore not close his eyes to things which, in the interest of the old social order, had better be left unnoticed. But as Temple remarks (p. 53), "unless men are found with shoulders broad enough to carry such responsibilities, the British nation will inadvertently fail to discharge in a proper manner those duties towards other races which it has itself undertaken". Furthermore, a sense of "over-efficiency" is born of the fear of displeasing parliament or public opinion at home.

In the House of Commons in 1907 Lord Morley remarked that "our administration would be a great deal more popular if it was a trifle less efficient, a trifle more elastic generally. We ought not to put mechanical efficiency at the head of our ideas," and the Decentralisation Commission declare that the Indian Government

have paid too little regard to the importance of developing a strong sense of responsibility among their subordinate agents and of giving sufficient weight to local sentiments and traditions. In our opinion, the burden of work could be materially diminished if the Indian Government were to refrain from interfering in unnecessary detail with the action of the authorities subordinate to them.

As Kerala Putra very well puts it, the result of these tendencies is that "the man on the spot becomes little more than a clerk or an agent to the man at headquarters".

What the man on the spot wants most particularly is a sufficient appreciation of local sentiments and traditions. And he usually has it. A system which leaves sufficient freedom to the man on the spot can, even in the case of a completely administrative system of government, provide to a large extent advantages analogous to those of political decentralisation during the further stages of local autonomy. European officials have therefore tried to exercise this decentralising function as far as lay within their competence. Temple expresses their feelings when he says (p. 66)

I hold strongly that reference to Headquarters is useful only if it be strictly limited to those questions on which persons at Headquarters are in a position to arrive at valid decisions. On all other questions the decision, for better or worse, should be left to the Resident. In a vast number of matters, and important matters, the Resident only is in a position to give a right judgment. If he cannot do so and continually blunders then he must be replaced by another more qualified. Reference pro forma to Headquarters is in my humble opinion wholly mischievous in almost every case . . . Loss of time . . . is the least evil which may result. More important is the loss of prestige on the part of the Resident in the eyes of the Emir, and even more important still is the loss of prestige on the part of the Emir in the eyes of the people.

How can this evil be remedied? Certainly not by leaving the man on the spot entirely free. For however much one may regret his dependence upon the central authorities, his responsibility to higher authorities remains an essential element of the administration. Neither responsibility nor efficiency need be attacked. For better or worse, the local administrator has to be left much freedom. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, this will be of advantage to the method of differentiation according to needs; while the control which remains the right of the central administration can

soon enough detect the exception and replace him by someone more competent.

This consideration leads us to the keystone of the democratic, or rather of the aristo-democratic building. When put into practice, this principle which furthers the growing into one of autocratic and democratic organs does assure, and to an increasing extent, the possibility of differentiation according to needs. Popular chiefs, regents, governors may under the new democratic dispensation have to function also as servants of local or provincial councils and are thus enabled to take into consideration, more than used to be the case, the peculiarities and the wishes of the citizens. This political decentralisation is moreover not without a corresponding effect upon the practice of the administrative decentralisation which proceeds side by side with it. For, as it is intended to continue this process of transmutation from mechanical structure to organic order throughout the period of transition, in such a way that the latter will eventually altogether absorb the former, one sees, in regencies and provinces, the formation of administrative nuclei, which are given their own sphere of action and will eventually be incorporated as organs into the autonomous life. At the outset this is not yet the case, in principle at any rate. There are two separate beds: the streamlet of autonomy runs through the first; at its side is the wide canal of authority, which is still indispensable. But the time will come when the streamlet has grown into a mightier river that can absorb the waters of the canal. In principle the officials within the territory of autonomous provinces and regencies remain responsible to the central government as far as central subjects are concerned, whereas in their quality of local executive agents they are the servants of the people's representatives. It is clear that, in view of the growing political decentralisation, they will be more and more equipped with powerfully decentralised administrative means, in such a way that the central organ will be automatically unburdened of local government except general supervision and general leadership. In this way full right can be done to the frame of unity. Its line can be made to stand in ever clearer relief, without at any time becoming rigid through complete uniformity or in a centralisation which stifles popular energy: differentiation according to needs can go together with a gradual shifting of responsibility.

The relation between the mother country and the territories overseas can be looked upon in the same way. Here also there is a shifting process which follows a double bed, and an elastic method which aims at leaving as much as possible to the overseas population's initiative while on the part of the mother country a reasonable measure of responsibility, general guidance and supervision are preserved. Modifying circumstances must be continually taken into account, and both the extremes of rushing into the dominion status or beyond, and of stopping at government from a distance must be eschewed with equal care.

A final word must be said about another function of the European administrative corps which has to perform a higher task than that of merely providing the steel frame of unity. It must also be a social organ, and as such it must prepare the future in which it will itself be absorbed. For it is the heroic task of the administrative corps to make itself superfluous, as the Japanese House is doing when it transfers its energies to growing personalities. Let us recall the description given in the previous chapter of the promising Indian nucleus of village organisation and village co-operative societies, Union Boards and Union central co-operative bodies, Indian Circle Officers, higher autonomous units, European administrative body and central administrative branches. We mentioned the efforts of that true Indian patriot Gupta to concentrate all evolutionary forces into one serried invincible phalanx.

Although these ideas were being realised in India, Gupta was not satisfied, for he discovered that the prevalence of unreasonable ideas and a practice which did not do sufficient justice to this *modus vivendi* compelled the European administrative official to march alongside this development without being given an organic place inside it. Gupta has declared that the restoration of the strongly affected position of the European administration is "one of the most serious administrative problems in Bengal", and that, for the sake of a successful continuation of the organic growth, "one of the most urgent needs in Bengal at the present moment is the stabilising of the scheme of district administration". Kerala Putra, another Indian with very progressive views, considers that "the only foundation on which Indian self-government can be built" consists in "the unimpaired strength of the

administrative system". Did not the same Indian say "it would be a disaster of the first magnitude, if the Superior Services on which depends the peaceful evolution of self-government, should be made a prey to shifting political considerations and communal and personal interests", and did he not describe the administrative bodies as the "steel frame"?

As a result of the reforms, says Gupta, the district board has become the only organ in Bengal which is entrusted with the care of the material needs of the population of the district; so that in this respect the position of the European administrative official, upon whom alone the preservation of public order is incumbent, contrasts unfavourably with that of the chairman of the district board. He can do nothing to assist the population by deeds or by advice, "he cannot help the people in even such matters as the sinking of a well for the supply of drinking water or the construction of a village road or the establishment of a village dispensary", while the recent policy "of completely dissociating him from the administration of the district board has still further undermined his position". The author pleads for an entirely different *modus vivendi*: he wants to entrust the European administrative official with sufficient power of guidance in the evolutionary process to enable him to co-ordinate the work of the boards with the activities of the various branches of the government service, which must as it were converge upon him as upon the central point of local experience, devotion and personal influence with the population.

In this order of ideas we see the European administration as an organ which, apart from its administrative function, should also develop social functions aiming at popular development, a task in which, in good understanding and collaboration with the indigenous administration and autonomous bodies, it can continue to take an active and very useful share. In this system we see government assistance distributed to the population through two channels, which run together in the same good cause of popular progress. The administration, in this way, does not hamper the work of the autonomies; its collaboration provides the best means of guiding all endeavours towards a good purpose and of causing the administrative organism to become welded together with the autonomous life. The administration undergoes a social

metamorphosis in accordance with the modifying social and political conditions which enables it to adapt itself and to fit into the process of evolution.

No method is more suitable than this, if one wishes to achieve an intimate social contact between the European officials, their Eastern colleagues, and the population, otherwise than through the tax-collectors and the police officers. It is an ideal method for ensuring a harmonious character to the indispensable task of leadership and supervision. And it is certain that those who preserve contact in this way will know the needs and aspirations of the population, and that this knowledge means more in the interests of quiet and peaceful development than a strengthening of the army or of the police force. Wherever such contact exists between the population and the administrative officers who are the right hand of leadership, there will be no need to spend upon the apparatus of a police state moneys which are urgently needed for the fostering of an organic growth.

The autonomies will soon enough show their appreciation of this collaboration. Gupta pointed this out in another connection, when he spoke of the relations between Union Boards and Circle Officers. Of the British Resident and the District Board he also says, after having pointed to the excellent collaboration which has resulted from the establishment of special committees by the Board of Alipore, of which an administrative Director of Public Health was chairman and the Resident Vice-Chairman:

Other District Boards will also find, as the premier District Board of Alipore has already experienced, that the ultimate good of the people of the district whose representatives they are is not to be attained merely by too jealous a guardianship of their own powers and privileges, but by a wise and tolerant utilisation of the good offices of the District Officer and the special technical officers of government who are there to help them. Even under present conditions it is quite possible to make for harmonious co-operation between the District Board and the District Officer and his subordinates.

In the Dutch East Indies too symptoms of an increasing appreciation of administrative assistance on the part of the regency-organs are apparent. There is no doubt that to do everything possible during the coming years to make this collaboration organic and to give a social character to the European administration will

prove a policy of real statesmanship, of real democracy, and of real evolutionary endeavour.

Wherever this policy is applied, the autonomies will be inspired by wisdom and strength, self-exertion will be stimulated as never before, and will grow up with a backbone which will eventually be able to bear unaided the burden of responsibility. Friction will change into harmony and fruitful collaboration, contact will be assured in an abundance of the most effective social activity, and the pace of progress will be indicated right up to the end of the period of transition by the growing social, economic, political, and especially spiritual forces of Eastern society. Thus will the true spirit of synthesis be revealed, and the era will open when, as the old Javanese proverb puts it, the distinctions, visible to every eye, will have become indistinguishable and will function as the members of one body.

C o n c l u s i o n

A long way lies behind us. First it has led us to the lofty summits of the spirit of the West and of the soul of the East, where we were vouchsafed the first vista of synthesis, in order to gather courage for a descent into the plain itself, almost impenetrable on account of its thick and difficult undergrowth. The recollection of the view of the splendid horizon of the future and of the majestic zenith of synthesis gave us the strength to endure, and to go forward, that we might touch the wonderful reality, and know that it was not merely an illusion of the senses, a *fata morgana* which might disappear at any moment. And we can now rest assured that we are dealing with realities and with possibilities that can come true.

The way to make them come true must be clear to every reader, although in the course of our journey we have not touched on more than one out of every hundred subjects that arose. Details, indeed, do not matter. What is of import is the realisation that colonial policy is everywhere confronted with a cultural, i.e. a spiritual and moral problem, of which the real solution will bring about the synthesis of East and West and give to the East the opportunity to take a share in preaching the great gospel of unity.

These pages should be taken, not as the profession of faith of any particular political section, but as an appeal to the Eastern

élite in and outside the colonial world and to all the colonising nations, to all their men and women, their thinkers, their savants, their statesmen, to all the workers who try to make the Press into a servant of humanity, to all the leaders of business, to all, lowly or high, who are invited not to count the difficulties of the future, but to enrol under the banner of synthesis and to march against the forces of antithesis.

There is no place for uncertainty or hesitation. If the guiding lines of synthesis are observed, the Eastern élite will gradually become convinced that this is the only right way which will lead upward and forward. But how can these views, so full of promise for the future, be spread until they reach all those they may affect unless the colonial powers consent to exchange information and to establish closer contact between themselves? In scientific circles¹⁾ this contact has already been established, and in other directions too, under the auspices of the League of Nations. There have been exchanges of colonial experience, both verbally and in the form of documents, and the Mandate system itself is an active stimulus as well as a clear proof of the existing tendency.

The fact that more information about one another's difficulties, methods and results is being increasingly appreciated is established by recent colonial literature, journeys and visits of colonial officials and even of governors and royal personages. Under the auspices of the *Union Coloniale Française* meetings have taken place in Paris, in which colonial ministers of different nations have participated. Sir Hesketh Bell is inspired by the realisation of this necessity for international co-operation when he ends his excellent work on French and Dutch colonial systems with these words:

"The three great colonising nations of the world — the British, the French and the Dutch — now control the destinies of one third of the inhabitants of the earth. They have made themselves responsible for the intellectual, social and economic improvement of the population in the tropical regions of the globe, and the degree of success that will attend their efforts will depend on the soundness of the policy adopted. Injudicious measures, misguided efforts and lack of understanding — all due, in most cases, to inexperience — may entail great miseries and immense hardships on helpless peoples. It is therefore essential that every effort should

¹⁾ Institut Colonial International.

be made to avoid the purchase, several times over, of the same experience.

In no way can this better be done than by the cordial interchange of information between the administrative officers of the great nations concerned. Lessons learnt, experiences gained, and successes achieved in any direction, should be pooled for the mutual benefit of the leading Powers regardless of nationality, to play their proper part in the general uplift of mankind throughout the world."

We could not omit a reference to these signs of collaboration at the end of a work on a colonial policy based upon the principle of the synthesis of East and West. For in the minds of those who inspired the writing and the translation of this book, it is to be a contribution to the encouragement of international collaboration in the interests of the whole colonial world.



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